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Abstract 
This thesis examines French relations with Yugoslavia in the twentieth century and its 
response to the federal republic’s dissolution in the 1990s. In doing so it contributes to 
studies of post-Cold War international politics and international diplomacy during the 
Yugoslav Wars. It utilises a wide-range of source materials, including: archival documents, 
interviews, memoirs, newspaper articles and speeches.  
Many contemporary commentators on French policy towards Yugoslavia believed 
that the Mitterrand administration’s approach was anachronistic, based upon a fear of a 
resurgent and newly reunified Germany and an historical friendship with Serbia; this 
narrative has hitherto remained largely unchallenged. Whilst history did weigh heavily on 
Mitterrand’s perceptions of the conflicts in Yugoslavia, this thesis argues that France’s 
Yugoslav policy was more the logical outcome of longer-term trends in French and 
Mitterrandienne foreign policy. Furthermore, it reflected a determined effort by France to 
ensure that its long-established preferences for post-Cold War security were at the 
forefront of European and international politics; its strong position in all significant 
international multilateral institutions provided an important platform to do so. Therefore, it 
was imperative for France that Yugoslav dissolution, and recognition of its successor 
states, be firmly anchored within a strongly European and international framework. 
Moreover, it was absolutely essential that the Yugoslav crisis did not threaten the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991 nor the national referendum on its passing into law in September 
1992. Therefore, French diplomacy stressed the primacy of a unified common European 
approach to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Many of the methods employed in diplomacy 
towards, and peacekeeping within, Yugoslavia thus bore the hallmark of French initiative. 
In addressing these issues, this dissertation demonstrates that France played a far greater 
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Introduction 
The late historian Eric Hobsbawm opens his seminal work Age of Extremes by recounting 
the visit of the French President François Mitterrand to the besieged Bosnian capital of 
Sarajevo on 28 June 1992.1 The date of the President’s visit was highly significant: it 
marked the anniversary of the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand by the Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip close to Sarajevo’s infamous 
Latinska ćuprija (Latin bridge). The date also has a further connotation within the Balkan 
context, as it marks the celebration of Vidovdan: a Serbian national holiday that plays an 
important role in Serb ethnic and religious identity. The symbolism of Mitterrand’s visit, 
from a ‘Western’ perspective, was stark: Europe could not allow itself to end the century as 
it had begun it, at war. Hobsbawm contends that “hardly anyone caught the allusion except 
a few professional historians and very senior citizens” adding that “the historical memory 
is no longer alive.”2 Notwithstanding, the President’s personal undertaking certainly 
demonstrated a serious French commitment to resolving the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
 Mitterrand’s bold gesture is a near-perfect microcosm of France’s policy towards 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It demonstrated France’s ambition to take significant 
initiatives and provide leadership in an effort to reinforce humanitarian intervention whilst 
international mediators sought a negotiated political settlement. Furthermore, it 
demonstrated that, although France had significant aspirations on the international stage, it 
had reconciled itself to its medium-power status. 
 France, since the return of Charles de Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth 
Republic, had sought to bring about the end of the ‘Europe of Yalta’. Fate conspired so that 
the historically sensitive François Mitterrand – a man whose own biography reflects 
                                                     
1 Hobsbawm, Eric. Age of Extremes (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 2-3. 
2 Ibid., 3. 
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France’s conflicted history in the twentieth century – had near-total control in the realm of 
foreign policy. France had long sought a Europe from ‘the Atlantic to the Urals’ and, as the 
blocs disintegrated, the President feared that the ‘Europe of Yalta’ would be succeeded by 
the ‘Europe of Sarajevo’.3 As Yugoslavia dissolved, Mitterrand faced a seemingly 
impossible task: to create an independent and integrative Europe to manage and mediate 
the dissolution of a Federation that, for almost the entirety of the Cold War, had overcome 
the nationalism that he so greatly feared. An analysis of France’s policy towards the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia will provide an understanding of how it sought to manage these 
two difficult and seemingly contrasting goals. Moreover, it offers an interesting vantage 
point from which we can better understand France’s role in the international community’s 
involvement in Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the Socialist President’s vision for post-Cold 
War Europe.  
 
Historiography 
The international community’s involvement in the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 
resultant wars has inspired a broad literature and continues to provoke several heated 
debates.4 Temporally, works can be divided into three distinct groups: memoirists and 
contemporary commentators; a first wave of scholarly and popular works; and a newly 
emerging body of archival studies, which will proliferate over the next decade.  
The memoirists occupy an interesting position in the historiography of the 
Yugoslav dissolution as they simultaneously wrote the history of the conflict but were also 
actors in the international negotiations. Sensing that the Yugoslav conflicts required 
detailed explanation, and would later provoke detailed historical investigations, a plethora 
                                                     
3 Bozo, Frédéric. “The Failure of a Grand Design: Mitterrand’s European Confederation, 1989-1991”, 
Contemporary European History 17, no. 3 (August 2008), 412. 
4 The particularly heated and rather personal exchange between Marko Attila Hoare and David N. Gibbs is 
perhaps the most notable recent example. Hoare, Marko-Attila, “First Check Their Sources: On David N. 
Gibbs and ‘shoddy scholarship’”, Greater Surbiton. Accessed on 7 August 2015. https://goo.gl/Ed66bu.  
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of politicians, peacekeepers and negotiators produced autobiographical accounts of their 
roles in the conflict. Hubert Védrine’s Les Mondes de François Mitterrand provides a 
fascinating insight into Mitterrandienne policy towards the Western Balkan federation’s 
dissolution.5 Although Védrine has produced scholarly works, Les Mondes cannot be 
classed amongst them. Other political and military figures closely involved in France’s 
foreign policy towards Yugoslavia have also reflected on their roles in writing.6 The work 
of the two Agence France Presse (AFP) journalists Pierre Favier and Michel Martin-
Roland also falls within this memoir category.7 
 The first wave of academic works on the international community and the conflict 
appeared with the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995 or shortly thereafter. As such, 
many of them lacked historical distance and access to archival documents.8 With the 
opening of archives from the early 1990s, we will slowly begin to see more historical 
investigations of the international community’s policy towards the Yugoslav crises. 
Currently, the most notable example is Josip Glaurdić’s The Hour of Europe.9 It is hoped 
that this study will be situated firmly in this final temporal trend. It is a preliminary 
archival study, which can be built upon with the further declassification of documents.    
With some commendable exceptions, France’s contribution to the international 
community’s response is consistently overlooked. 10 Whilst other countries have provoked 
                                                     
5 Védrine, Hubert. Les Mondes de François Mitterrand: À l’Élysée, 1981-1995 (Paris: Fayard, 1996). 
6 Dumas, Roland. Le fil et la pelote: Mémoires (Paris: Plon, 1996); Balladur, Édouard. Deux ans à Matignon 
(Paris: Plon, 1995); Kouchner, Bernard. Ce que je crois (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1995); Morillon, Philippe. 
Croire et Oser (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1993).  
7 Favier, Pierre, and Michel Martin-Roland. La Décennie Mitterrand, vol. 4 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1999). 
8 Gow, James. Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War  (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997); Woodward, Susan. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the 
Cold War (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Almond, Mark. Europe’s Backyard War: The War 
in the Balkans (London: William Heinemann, 1994); Berg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shroup. The War in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).  
9 Glaurdić, Josip. The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2011). 
10 Most notably: Lucarelli, Sonia. Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: a political failure in search of a 
scholarly explanation (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000); Tardy, Thierry. La France et la gestion 
des conflits yougoslaves (1991-1995): enjeux et leçons d’une opération de maintien de la paix de l‘ONU 
(Brussels: Bruylant, 1999); Wood, Pia-Christina. “France and the Post Cold War Order: The case of 
Yugoslavia”, European Security 3, no. 1 (1994), 129-152. 
 4 
dedicated studies, 11 France has largely been relegated to fleeting mentions as a 
powerbroker in the international community,12 or the Yugoslav crisis has been one aspect 
of France’s post-Cold War foreign policy.13 Where France is acknowledged, a 
consideration of the existing historiography of France in the post-Cold War era is 
invariably omitted much to the detriment of the overall analysis. Nonetheless, there are 
some dedicated chapters in edited volumes, written as part of broader studies.14 Thus far, 
there has been no single study devoted to the French political response to the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. This preliminary study hopes to partially address this lacuna. Moreover no 
English language study has yet made use of French archives or the broad-range of primary 
French language material available. As such, those studies that do attempt to analyse 
French policy and its consequences almost unfailingly underplay France’s initiatives or 
present them as unpredictable.  
                                                     
11 For Britain see notably: Simms, Brendan. Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: 
Penguin, 2002). For the US see: Power, Samantha. “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of 
Genocide (London: Flamingo, 2002). For Germany see: Libal, Michael. Limits of Persuasion: Germany and 
the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992 (London: Praeger, 1997). For the Netherlands see: Both, Norbert. From 
Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2000). 
12For example see: Gow, James. “The Major Players: Paris, Bonn, London”, in Gow. Lack of Will, 156-183; 
Almond. Europe’s Backyard War; Woodward. Balkan Tragedy; Berg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shroup. The 
War in Bosnia-Hercegovina; Gibbs, David N. First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Destruction of Yugoslavia (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009). 
13 See, for example: Treacher, Adrian. “A case of reinvention: France and military intervention in 1990s”, 
International Peacekeeping 7, no. 2 (2000), 23-40; Dyson, Tom. “Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold 
War British, French and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive 
Autonomy”, Security Studies 17 (2008), 725-774. 
14 Dedicated chapters on the subject are scarce. See: Jones, Chris. “‘N’ajoutons pas la guerre à la guerre’: 
French Responses to Genocide in Bosnia”, in Genocide, Risk and Resilience: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 
eds. Bert Ingelaere et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 150-163; Canivez, Patrice. “France’s 
Yugoslav Policy Contribution to a Collective Failure”, in International Perspectives on the Balkans, ed. 
Jacques Rupnik (Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2003), 115-135. This chapter is, for the most 
part, an English-language translation that previously appeared in French: Canivez, Patrice. “François 
Mitterrand et la Guerre en ex-Yougoslavie”, in Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide, ed. Samy Cohen 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998); Laughland, John. “France: To Believe and to Dare”, in With 
No Peace to Keep, eds. Ben Cohen and George Stamkoski (London: Gainpress, 1995), 134-141; Lepick, 
Olivier. “French Perspectives”, in International perspectives on the Yugoslav conflict, eds. Alex Danchev and 
Thomas Halverson (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 76-86; Morjé Howard, Marc and Lise. “Raison d’état or 
Raison populaire? The Influence of Public Opinion on France’s Bosnia Policy”, in International Public 
Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis, eds. Richard Sobel et al. (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003), 107-134. 
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James Gow characterises the French response as “the most erratic approach to the 
problems of the Yugoslav war of dissolution, at least viewed superficially.”15 Gow is right 
to caveat his assertion as, through a detailed study of France’s policy, it becomes patently 
clear that Mitterrandienne policy towards Yugoslavia’s dissolution was coherent from the 
outset, originally aiming towards pan-European unity but having to settle for Western 
European unity. Indeed, my own interpretation of France’s contribution to the international 
efforts in Yugoslavia changed during the research process.  
On the issue of Croatian and Slovenian recognition, Glaurdić, reaffirming Gow’s 
interpretation, argues that France “viewed the possible dissolution of Yugoslavia’s center 
with disdain, perhaps because of their own ‘Bonapartist’ and state-centric prejudices and 
even more so because of how they saw the future of Europe.”16 Indeed, France’s response 
conformed to Mitterrand’s vision for Europe, which was a pan-European idea and not 
solely Western European; the dissolution of Yugoslavia into its six constituent republics 
was an affront to this aspiration. Mitterrand aspired to the Gaullist dictum of a ‘Europe 
from the Atlantic to the Urals’ and had “hoped to see emerge in the 1990s a European 
confederation in the true sense of the word, which will associate all states of our continent 
in a common and permanent organisation for exchanges, peace and security.”17 Although 
ill-defined, Mitterrand’s Confederation aimed towards pan-Europeanism, in pursuit of 
France’s long-term goal of an independent and European Europe. The evolution of events 
in the Western Balkans by the summer of 1991 meant that, as Frédéric Bozo notes, “the 
Europe of ‘Sarajevo’, which Mitterrand had feared might succeed that of ‘Yalta’, had, 
indeed, literally – and sadly – become a reality.”18 
                                                     
15 Gow. Lack of Will, 158. 
16 Glaurdić, Josip. The Hour of Europe, 179; Gow. Lack of Will, 159. 
17 Ministère des affaires étrangères [hereafter MAE], Allocution de Voeux de M. François Mitterrand, 
Président de la République, 31 December 1989. Accessed on 6 August 2015. 
http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.  
18 Bozo, Frédéric. “The Failure of a Grand Design”, 412. 
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Although France’s preference for mediating the Yugoslav crisis through 
international institutions has not gone unnoticed, it has been misinterpreted. 19 Glaurdić 
argues that France sought to use multilateralism to deter German enthusiasm for the 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.20 Similarly Gow argues that it was a tactic aimed at 
“ensuring that French status and influence was not diminished.”21 Rather, Mitterrand 
sought to emulate his approach to the reunification of Germany, which was carefully 
anchored within a “strong European and international framework.”22 Indeed, two of 
Mitterrand’s closest advisers reflected that the President’s handling of Germany was a 
great success.23 This was a Mitterrandienne vision for preventive diplomacy and conflict 
resolution, which, whilst well-suited to the integrational process of German reunification, 
was sadly not sufficiently developed for the fragmentary process of Yugoslav 
disintegration. However, only hindsight allows for this observation. As Sonia Lucarelli has 
demonstrated, ‘realist’ interests do not “justify the enthusiasm with which it [France] 
supported European involvement in the crisis.”24 It was the traditional French goal of 
providing European solutions to European problems, independent of the US, which 
provoked French activism. That the United Nations (UN) became the forum after European 
failure was also preferable to the French as they sought to minimise the influence of  the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and maintain Russian support. 
France has been characterised as ‘realist’ for its policy, during the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia.25 Moreover, Mitterrand has been characterised as pro-Serb26 owing to 
France’s historical alliance with Serbia and his propensity for “thinking of the future in 
                                                     
19 Gow. Lack of Will, 159;  
20 Glaurdić. Hour of Europe, 266. 
21 Gow. Lack of Will, 159. 
22 Bozo, Frédéric. Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification, trans. By Susan Emmanuel 
(Oxford: Berghahn, 2009), xxii.  
23 de Margerie, Caroline. Interview with Author. Conseil d’État, Paris, 16 September 2014; Védrine, Hubert. 
Interview with Author. Paris, 18 September 2014. 
24 Lucarelli. Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia, 173. 
25 Glaurdić. Hour of Europe, 308. 
26 Almond. Europe’s Backyard War, xii.  
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terms of the past.”27 For some, France therefore acted as a block on Croatian and Slovenian 
independence.28 Rather, Mitterrand was keenly aware that the international community had 
little desire to intervene militarily.29 He believed that the solution to the Yugoslav crises 
would be political, it was thus essential to maintain an open channel of communication 
with the authorities in Belgrade. In an increasingly morally Manichaean era, François 
Mitterrand was a man comfortably at home in the moral grey zone: a Pétainist then a 
résistant; a Catholic, then an agnostic; a conservative, then a socialist; Mitterrand saw 
beyond the morality of the Yugoslav crisis and sought a political solution.  
The international community, France included, had missed several preventive 
opportunities in the preceding decade.30 That the international community failed to help the 
Yugoslavs achieve a more sustainable balance of trade only hastened the revival of 
nationalism. Therefore the inconvenient truth was that there was no forthcoming solution 
to the Yugoslav crises that could satisfy the liberal moralism of the post-Cold War unipolar 
world. Thus, when internationally-brokered peace plans required international support, 
which other powers criticised for legitimising ethnic cleansing, France was ready. The 
French government were certainly not Serb apologists but they clearly took into account 
the limited means and opportunities of the international community at that point in history. 
As the British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, noted “Mitterrand enjoyed playing with 
historical analogies, but had no intention of turning them into policy.”31 
Indeed, what this study hopes to demonstrate is that France possessed a strong 
vision for a European and international solution to the crises in Yugoslavia, which 
                                                     
27 Védrine, Les Mondes de François Mitterrand: À l’Élysée, 1981-1995 (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 464. 
28 Ramet, Sabrina P., and Letty Coffin. “German Foreign Policy toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991-
1999”, Problems of Post-Communism 48, no. 1 (2001), 48-64. 
29 Howorth, Jolyon. “Humanitarian intervention and post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era: a 
provisional balance sheet”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 2 (2013), 296. 
30 Woodward, Susan L. “Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985-1991”, in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy 
in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 133-172. 
31 Hurd, Douglas. Memoirs (London: Little Brown, 2003), 448. 
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reflected long-term aspirations in French foreign policy, an inherent awareness of its 
limitations, and the idiosyncrasies of the powerbrokers in Paris. However, activism 
becomes extremely difficult in multilateral institutions where the modus operandi often 
descends into the politics of the lowest common denominator. For better or for worse, 
France played a far greater role in the international community’s response to the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia than has hitherto been acknowledged. 
  
Sources and Methodology 
This is primarily a political history of France’s policy towards the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. It is certainly not another history of the Socialist Federal Republic’s sad 
demise in the 1990s. Nor is it another account of the ‘international community’ struggling 
to resolve the Yugoslav crisis.32 Rather, it seeks to make extensive use of French-language 
sources to integrate France in to the existing historiography of the Yugoslav conflicts. 
Indeed, as we approach the 25th anniversary of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the time has come 
for a greater historicisation in scholarship on the international community and the 
Yugoslav conflicts.  
Many of the principle actors have now either passed on or retired from the political 
scene. As a principal protagonist in this story, François Mitterrand receives notable 
attention. His Presidency was mired in controversy, which led to many fierce polemics at 
the time particularly surrounding France’s Yugoslav policy. Therefore, public opinion 
inevitably played a role in influencing the shape of French foreign policy in the former 
Yugoslavia. Historical distance – nearly twenty years have passed since his death – allows 
for a somewhat more dispassionate view of the man and his foreign policy. Indeed, as 
                                                     
32 The term ‘international community’ is a nebulous term used herein as a phrase of convenience to describe 
the group of nations that concerned themselves with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, usually through 
multilateral institutions. 
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Mitterrand himself said, “a politician expresses himself first and foremost by his deeds.”33 
Therefore this research project will not dwell on the psychology of the political 
powerbrokers in Paris but will instead seek to analyse the discourse and practice of French 
diplomacy during the Yugoslav crises. 
 This analysis will be based on a broad-range of primary sources. Firstly, it seeks to 
make use of partially opened French archives. Until the period of cohabitation, François 
Mitterrand held a firm grasp over France’s foreign policy. He also remained actively 
engaged with the subject whilst he shared political power with Édouard Balladur and Alain 
Juppé. As such, the archives of the Presidency – deposited at the Archives Nationales in 
Pierrefitte-sur-Seine – were an important point of departure. However, the 1979 French 
law on archives established a thirty year rule on classification, or sixty years for matters 
deemed relevant to national security, but individual requests for derogation are allowed 
and are considered on case-by-case basis.34 The author submitted a request, with the 
assistance of l’Insitut François Mitterrand, which was partially granted. The information 
found therein is used carefully throughout this study but it is hoped that future requests will 
allow for an even greater access to the Mitterrand presidential archives. 
 The second set of archives consulted in France was those of the French Foreign 
Ministry deposited at the Archives Diplomatiques. Owing to limited time, resources and 
reclassification work at these Archives, it was regretfully not possible to submit a request 
for derogation for this research project. As this thesis remains a preliminary study, any 
further research for resultant publications would certainly seek to correct this post-haste. 
                                                     
33 Mitterrand, François, and Elie Wiesel. Memoir in Two Voices (New York: Arcade, 1996), preface. 
34 For an overview of the presidential archives of François Mitterrand, see: Bos, Agnes, and Damien Vaisse. 
“Les archives présidentielles de François Mitterrand”, Vingtième siècle 86 (February 2005), 71-79. 
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However, the declassified documentation on Yugoslavia maintained by the Quai d’Orsay 
has been used extensively in discerning longer term trends in Franco-Yugoslav relations.35 
 Further miscellaneous archives were consulted during the course of the research 
process. The author also consulted the archives of the Brook Lapping documentary series 
The Death of Yugoslavia deposited at the Liddel Hart Centre for Military Archives in 
London. It contains more than eighty transcripts of extensive interviews conducted with 
many of the primary protagonists for the documentary. Furthermore Lord David Owen has 
deposited his papers with the University of Liverpool Library, some of which have been 
made available in the Balkan Odyssey Digital Archive. These provide a useful insight into 
France’s generally supportive role in the peace process. Further document collections are 
employed throughout alongside relevant international law, UN resolutions and proceedings 
from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
 Owing to the regrettably incomplete nature of the archival source base, it was an 
even greater necessity to use further complimentary sources. Accordingly, the thesis makes 
use of the publicly available database of the Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs, 
which holds thousands of official declarations, press interviews and images.36 Furthermore 
debates from the French Assemblée Nationale are also referenced where relevant. Equally, 
French press archives were also consulted to ensure a full-coverage of France’s public-
facing initiatives. Furthermore, the author conducted a handful of interviews with some 
notable political figures. These include figures close to Mitterrand, as well members of the 
British and European diplomacies. Although the interviews conducted here were rewarding 
and enlightening, there is scope for further fruitful investigation in this area. These 
interviews are reinforced by a good number of useful memoirs, diaries and reflections 
                                                     
35 The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs is located at the Quai d’Orsay. Thus ‘The Quai’ or Quai d’Orsay’ 
are common metonyms for the Ministry. Similarly, the Premiership is often referred to as ‘The ‘Matignon’ 
and the Presidency as ‘The Élysée’. These terms are frequently employed throughout this study.  
36 Available online at: http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.  
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written by the protagonists of this interesting history. This extensive collection of primary 
documents is supported throughout by the use of relevant secondary literature. 
 Of course, the historian must be careful and diligent in the use of these sources. The 
acceleration of events in the 1990s created a massive proliferation of diplomatic 
statements, initiatives and press coverage. As such, this study takes a strong chronological 
approach, which seeks to carefully place French policies and initiatives within a broader 
international context and thus allows for an analysis of their influence and impact over the 
course of the international community’s efforts. Furthermore, this study provides an 
historical overview of Franco-Yugoslav relations in order to geopolitically situate the 
Balkan federation in France’s long-term European planning. Indeed, this study is 
emphatically a work of history and it hopes to demonstrate the saliency of historical 
methods in understanding France’s policies in the 1990s.  
 
Overview 
This study is divided into two strongly interrelated parts. Part One investigates France and 
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, whilst Part Two focusses upon France’s intervention in the 
Bosnian War. The first chapter provides a long-term overview of the relationship between 
France and Yugoslavia. This rapport was feted by both parties as an amitié traditionelle, 
akin to a ‘special relationship’, throughout the twentieth century. However closer scrutiny 
reveals that the two states share a far more complex history. In the interwar period, France 
enjoyed significant influence, prestige, and material holdings in the Serb-led Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, which originated from Francophone cultural influence in the Balkan region 
during the nineteenth century and more particularly the Franco-Serbian allegiance in 
World War I. Following the Second World War, the victorious Yugoslav Communists did 
not seek a complete rupture with the history of the amitié. Rather they used the historical 
relationship to lend legitimacy to the nascent regime but also as a contingency against 
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overpowering Soviet ambition. Fourth Republic France was also initially keen to maintain 
a presence in Yugoslavia, particularly following the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, but would 
have to compete with the US and the UK. However, due to its limited means in the Cold 
War, stretched even more thinly owing to colonial conflicts, France could not maintain the 
level of influence it had previously enjoyed in Yugoslavia. Thereafter, Franco-Yugoslav 
relations were often characterised by a rhetorical enthusiasm but undermined by a lack of 
means and more pertinent political priorities. This leitmotif of Franco-Yugoslav relations 
would continue into the 1990s.           
The relationship between France and Yugoslavia during François Mitterrand’s first 
presidential term is the subject of Chapter Two. The Mitterrand administration sought to 
rekindle a close relationship with Yugoslavia in the early 1980s as the ‘New Cold War’ 
commenced, hoping to acquire leftist political credibility. However, when Mitterrand’s 
socialist project failed, and the President made a volte face in 1983, enthusiasm for the 
relationship waned once more. With the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR, and his 
moves towards glasnost and perestroika, Yugoslavia lost its important symbolic role in 
Eastern Europe precisely at the time its communitarian fabric was being unpicked by the 
resurgence of nationalism.  
Chapter Three examines France’s response to Yugoslavia’s dissolution culminating 
in its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992. As the League of Communists 
of Yugoslavia (Savez komunista Jugoslavije, SKJ) began to crumble under the forces of 
nationalism and bankruptcy, prescient voices within the Mitterrand administration warned 
in 1988 that Slobodan Milošević posed a grave threat to the peace and unity of Yugoslavia. 
As the socio-political fabric of the socialist federal republic was being torn asunder by 
centrifugal nationalist forces, France began to, alongside its European partners, consider 
how best to mediate the future arrangements for the geographical entity of Yugoslavia. The 
move towards fragmentation in Eastern European sat entirely at odds with Mitterrand’s 
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plans for pan-Europeanism. Therefore, the French President actively pursued a European 
solution to a European problem. This had been the mantra of successive Fifth Republic 
French Presidents and tying German reunification into a European framework had proved 
successful only two years previously. However the Yugoslav crisis came too soon for the 
Europeans who wanted to demonstrate they could act in unison through the European 
Community (EC) and created the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia 
(ECCY). Resultantly, European unity of purpose came far too late to salvage Yugoslav 
cohesion. 
Chapter Four – the first in Part Two – provides a thorough examination of the 
formation of France’s early policy towards the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH). 
France’s formulation of its policy in BiH was based upon three pillars: international 
institutions, humanitarianism and political negotiations. Guided by François Mitterrand’s 
belief in firmly anchoring international crises in international institutions, France supported 
initial EC peace efforts, sought to send peacekeepers to BiH under the auspices of the 
Western European Union (WEU), and was the largest troop contributor to the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The second pillar was greatly moulded by the 
growing influence of the publicly popular Minister for Health and Humanitarian Action, 
Bernard Kouchner. France placed a great emphasis on securing the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and was the first to suggest an armed UN contingent to perform basic 
humanitarian functions in BiH. When diplomacy failed to achieve this end, François 
Mitterrand personally sought to go ‘beyond diplomacy’ by staging an extraordinary 
personal visit to the besieged Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. Indeed, with a referendum on 
the Maastricht Treaty due in France in September 1992, it was vital for the French 
President to demonstrate that Europe could resolve a crisis on its own continent. The 
London Conference at the end of August provided a clear demonstration that Europe could, 
when pressed, find a unity of purpose. 
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Following the London Conference, the European Community and the United 
Nations cooperated in the creation of an International Conference for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY). By early 1993 the two ICFY co-Presidents, Cyrus Vance and David 
Owen, had produced a peace plan for BiH: the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). France’s 
efforts in support of the VOPP form the focus of Chapter Five. Politically, France 
enthusiastically supported the VOPP and David Owen consistently sought French 
assistance. Indeed, François Mitterrand agreed to host talks with Serbian President 
Slobodan Milošević at the Élysée at the request of the ICFY co-Presidents. On the ground, 
French General Philippe Morillon sought to ensure that the Bosnian Serb forces could not 
render the VOPP map obsolete by near single-handedly attempting to save the Muslim 
enclave of Srebrenica. In doing so, the General drew the international media’s attention to 
the plight of Srebrenica and forced the international community into reluctant action. In 
spite of these significant efforts, the VOPP failed as it was bulldozed by the moralising 
Clinton regime who believed the Plan rewarded ethnic cleansing. Following a disastrous 
diplomatic initiative to secure European support for its ‘lift and strike’ policy, the White 
House made an about-face and sought to distance itself from the conflict. In doing so it 
bulldozed the VOPP and proposed the Joint Action Programme (JAP). The new French 
Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé, thought it necessary to improve Franco-American relations 
and signed Washington’s JAP. Now in its second period of cohabitation, France would 
begin to take a more pragmatic approach to the former Yugoslavia. 
The European Union Action Plan, or Kinkel-Juppé Plan, forms the focus of Chapter 
Six. Differences over the VOPP created a new rift between France and Germany. Alain 
Juppé and Klaus Kinkel sought to kill two birds with one stone by providing a Franco-
German lead in a renewed effort to resolve the Bosnian conflict. The plan provided the 
European Union (EU) with a renewed sense of unity and purpose. France and Germany 
divided their diplomatic efforts intelligently, with the French applying pressure to the 
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Serbs and the Germans negotiating with the Croats. It demonstrated that, with a strong 
Franco-German lead, Europe could pursue a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). However, the Bosnian Serb rejection of the plan revealed that a unified European 
policy was not sufficient to bring the war to a conclusion, although it marked a significant 
step. It revealed that, if the international community wanted to end the conflict, Russian 
and US pressure would have to be brought to bear. The Markale Marketplace Massacre 
and Bosnian Serb attacks on the ‘safe zone’ of Goražde provided sufficient impetus to 
bring the US and Russia into concert with Europe in the Contact Group. 
The final chapter analyses the role of France in the conclusion of the Bosnian war. 
The failure of the ‘Contact Group Plan’ led France to seriously reconsider its commitment 
to BiH. Moreover, the Clinton administration became increasingly keen to deploy NATO 
air power against the Bosnian Serbs. France remained sceptical of the efficacy of the 
NATO approach and, fearing for the safety of its ground troops, opposed a reconfiguration 
of the authorisation mechanism for the use of NATO force. As such, the Bosnian 
government became openly hostile towards Paris. Following a ceasefire brokered by 
former US President Jimmy Carter fighting recommenced in the spring of 1995 with a 
renewed intensity. Amidst this fighting, Jacques Chirac succeeded François Mitterrand in 
the Élysée. Following NATO airstrikes, Bosnian Serb forces took French peacekeepers 
hostage, much to the ire of the new President. More prepared to take unilateral action than 
his predecessor, Chirac, in concertation with Britain, created the Rapid Reaction Force 
(RRF) to protect UNPROFOR. Following the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, Chirac 
proposed recapturing the UN ‘safe zone’ with elements of the RRF. The international 
community instead fell behind the US policy of massive airstrikes, as the US took the lead 
in solving the crisis. Although the Dayton Peace Plan was signed at the Élysée Palace, 
France was virtually excluded from the three week long negotiations. In spite of significant 
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efforts to the contrary over the preceding four years, France’s role in the Western Balkans 
had been usurped by the US. 
By undertaking a detailed investigation of this heretofore neglected subject, it is 
hoped that this study can make a modest, but meaningful, contribution to the broader fields 
of French foreign policy in the post-Cold War era and the international response to the 















Chapter One – Une amitié traditionelle? Franco-Yugoslav Relations in the longue 
durée, 1918-1981. 
 
The Interwar Years 
In interwar France, intellectuals likened the Serbs to “younger brothers” who saw France 
as a reference point in their own historical progression towards Human Rights.1 
Furthermore, literate Serbs already had knowledge of the French cultural world as French 
was often their second language. This ‘amitié franco-serbe’ was crystallised during World 
War I as French and Serb soldiers fought alongside one another on the Salonika Front.  
In 1915, the French Minister for Public Education, Albert Sarraut, gave lectures 
and talks in public institutions to make Serbia better known to the French public and to 
inform them of “the long fight against its economic oppressors, the Austrians, and its 
military oppressors, the Turk…”.2 Furthermore, in primary schools children learnt how to 
write “Brave Serbs, France is with you! Vive la Serbie! Vive la France!”3 Equally, some 
4,000 Serbs were educated in French schools and universities during the war, many of 
whom would go on to be the intellectual, professional and administrative elite in their 
country of origin.4  
During the war, the creation of a state of south Slavs became the key element of 
Franco-Serb relations.5 France, buoyed by its renewed global prestige in the aftermath of 
World War I, provided invaluable support for the Serb monarchy becoming the hegemonic 
power in the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (KSCS).6 It therefore 
                                                     
1 Sretenović, Stanislav. “French cultural diplomacy in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians in 
the 1920s”, European Review of History: Revue européene d’histoire 16, no. 1 (2009), 35. 
2 Becker, Jean-Jacques. “L’ombre du nationalisme serbe”, Vingtième siècle 69, no. 1 (2001), 7. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Sretenović, Stanislav. “Le monument à la France à Belgrade: La mémoire de la Grande Guerre au 
service de l’action politique et diplomatique”, Vingtième siècle 115, no. 3 (2012), 33. 
5 Pavlović, Vojislav. “La France et le programme yougoslave du gouvernement serbe”, Balcanica 37 
(2007), 171. 
6 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 110. 
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sought to maintain its client relationship with the nascent Balkan power through 
investment and ‘soft power’. A strong Serb-led entity in Eastern Europe suited France’s 
geopolitical and strategic interests: it filled the void vacated by the defeated Austro-
Hungarian Empire and created a bloc that would prevent any eastward German expansion.7 
The Kingdom was a key strategic location for France as it lay at in an important 
geographical crossroads for providing military aid to France’s other East European allies; 
access to the port of Salonika and the railway at Vardar were considered essential.8  
Therefore the continuation of strong bilateral relations was important for France. Thus it 
strongly supported the new regime in its endeavours to create a unified state, which proved 
to be a mutually beneficial relationship: France continued to enjoy cultural influence in the 
area and a client in the Balkan region whilst the new regime benefited from the support of 
the continent’s most significant post-War power. 
However, French influence in the KSCS was not without its problems, particularly 
in the former Austro-Hungarian territories. Croatia proved to be particularly resistant to 
French cultural activity, rejecting the opening of a French consulate in Zagreb in May 
1920.9 Significantly, the French Ambassador to Belgrade blamed Germany and Hungary 
for propagating anti-French ideas.10 The notion of clientelism between former Austro-
Hungarian territories and Germany would prove a prominent trope during the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.11 
The amitié thus remained a strong feature of Franco-Yugoslav relations. The shared 
struggle of World War I was used in service of political and diplomatic aims. Indeed, in 
French political circles, the words ‘Yugoslavia’ and ‘Serbia were interchangeable: French 
                                                     
7 Grumel-Jacquignon, François. “La France et la Yougoslavie de 1920 à 1940”, Relations internationales 
103 (2000), 362. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Sretenović, Stanislav. “French cultural diplomacy in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians in 
the 1920s”, 41. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Chapter Three. 
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soldiers had fought with Serbs rather than Yugoslavs and French diplomats, based in 
Belgrade, habitually referred to the ‘Serbs’ rather than Serbs, Croats or Slovenes.12  
The relationship was memorialised and commemorated during the interwar period: 
in Yugoslavia Bastille Day was celebrated annually and became a means to commemorate 
the French lives lost in the Balkans; in France a commemoration to “the brotherhood in 
arms of the Franco-Serb armies on the field of battle in the Balkans” was held in Nantes on 
the 12th anniversary of the war’s start.13 Annual Commemorations on 11 November formed 
a central pillar of the memorialisation process. Symbolically, a declaration of Franco-
Yugoslav friendship was signed in Belgrade on 11 November 1927, being simultaneously 
ratified in Paris. The following year, on the tenth anniversary of the Rethondes armistice, 
Serbs expressed their gratitude to the poilus of the French Orient Army and the official 
delegation led by Marshall Franchet d’Espèrey, who had led the Salonika offensive. 
Following the establishment of the Royal dictatorship in January 1929, King Alexander I14 
established banovinas, regional administrative units, which were sought to imitate French 
administrative practices.15 Furthermore, a programme of renaming in Belgrade created 
streets named after Franchet d’Espèrey, Aristride Briand and Georges Cleamenceau.16 
Significantly, a monument was erected in honour of France in Belgrade’s 
Kalemegdan Park and unveiled on 11 November 1930. Designed by the renowned 
Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović, the statue became a lieu de mémoire that has embodied 
the vicissitudes of the amitié in the twentieth century. For example, when France took part 
in NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 the statue was covered in 
                                                     
12 Drapac, Vesna. “A King is killed in Marseille: France and Yugoslavia in 1934”, French History and 
Civilisation 1 (2005), 232. 
13 Drapac, Vesna. Constructing Yugoslavia: A Transnational History (Hampshire: MacMillan 2010), 
104.  
14 King Alexander, like his father Peter, had attended the highly-regarded military academy École 
spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr in Paris. He served as the Supreme Commander of the Serbian army 
during World War I and served alongside Marshall Franchet d’Espèrey on the Salonika Front. 
15 Sretenović, Stanislav. “French cultural diplomacy in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians in 
the 1920s”, 35. 
16 Ibid. 
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graffiti that read, “to the eternal glory of France, which no longer exists”.17 Moreover, in 
2008, when France granted international recognition to the contested region of Kosovo, the 
statue was once again the target of anti-French sentiment, this time reading: “To France, 
with whom we spilt our blood and whose name we have mentioned in our prayers, and that 
no longer exists”.18 
One further event significantly affected Franco-Yugoslav relations during this 
period: the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister 
Louis Barthou in Marseilles on 9 October 1934. Often relegated to an insignificant 
footnote in French history, the assassination had profound political implications for both 
France and Yugoslavia.19 In Yugoslavia, Alexander’s successor, Peter II, was too young to 
assume rule and therefore his uncle, Prince Paul, became Prince Regent of Yugoslavia. In 
France, Louis Barthou was replaced as Foreign Minister by Pierre Laval. Barthou had, with 
some success, been pursuing a policy of encirclement towards Hitler’s Germany. The 
French Foreign Minister had undertaken an active diplomacy aimed at reconciling 
difficulties in Yugoslav-Italian relations with a multilateral security pact in mind. King 
Alexander’s visit to France was intended to demonstrate the progress in these negotiations 
and to underscore the strength of Franco-Yugoslav relations. With Barthou’s death, the 
Germanophile Laval slowly abandoned the encirclement policy and took a more 
conciliatory position with the fascist regimes of Europe. Laval would later serve in 
Philippe Pétain’s collaborationist Vichy regime and was responsible for turning over 
possession of the Bor copper mines - one of France’s most valuable assets in the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia - to the Nazis.20 
 
                                                     
17 Mijatović, V. “Poruka prijateljima”. Accessed 12 November 2014. 
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/beograd.74.html:211126-Poruka-prijateljima.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Graves, Matthew. “Memory and Forgetting on the National Periphery: Marseilles and the Regicide of 
1934”, PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies 7, no. 1 (January 2010), 4. 
20 Warner, Geoffrey. Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1968), 246. 
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World War Two 
Yugoslavia shared the same fate as France during World War II: it was divided, partially 
occupied by Axis forces and a complex collection of insurgencies and resistance 
movements emerged against the occupiers. Yugoslavia’s regent, Prince Paul, joined 
Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941; a de facto surrender to the Nazis. Two 
days later, General Dušan Simović led a coup d’état that ended the regency and formed an 
all-party government. Prince Paul was succeeded by the heir to throne, Peter II. 
Resultantly, Italy and Germany attacked Yugoslavia and Serbia was declared a war zone. 
The Yugoslav government fled, eventually residing in London.  
Resistance movements emerged in opposition to the regency’s capitulation. One 
such group was led by Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović. A Francophile, Mihailović had 
attended the prestigious École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr in Paris, of which Charles de 
Gaulle was an alumni. Furthermore, Mihailović had participated in Marshall Franchet 
d'Espèrey’s famous Balkan Offensive of 1918, a central event in the forging of the amitié 
franco-serbe. During World War II, Mihailović led his small group of followers from 
Northern Bosnia, where he had been chief of staff of the Yugoslav Second Army, and set 
up base at Ravna Gora in North-West Serbia. There he gathered around him fellow Serbian 
officers and formed military detachments or ‘chetnik’ groups.21 These chetnik groups were 
seen as the spiritual descendants of the Serbian comitadjis of World War I; guerrilla groups 
that earned a special place in the narrative of the amitié as resistance fighters.22  
 Mihailović recognised that he needed support from abroad and, as a legitimist, the 
Yugoslav government. De Gaulle, as head of France Libre, supported the Yugoslav 
monarchy and the Simović government and when they arrived in London he “welcomed 
                                                     
21 Pavlowitch, Stevan K. Hitler’s New Disorder: the Second World War in Yugoslavia (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), 53-54. 
22 Drapac. Constructing Yugoslavia, 103. 
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[them] with sympathy… and expressed solidarity with the Yugoslav resistance.”23 The 
Comité National Français continued to liaise directly with the Yugoslav government. It 
took Mihailović and his small nucleus of officers several months to establish a network and 
a list of conscripts and reservists for use.  
 Meanwhile, competitor insurgencies were emerging throughout the territories of 
Yugoslavia, most notably the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), led by Josip Broz 
‘Tito’. With the collapse of the Molovtov-Ribbentrop Pact, the KPJ prepared to seize 
power over the territory of Yugoslavia in partnership with the USSR.24 The 
commencement of Nazi attacks on the Soviet Union in June 1941 led Tito to publish a call 
to arms, which was published on 12 July.25 The Communists formed small guerrilla groups 
that would be famously known as the “Partisans”.  
The two leaders and their respective followers vied with each other for control over 
territory in Yugoslavia, whilst resisting the occupiers and collaborators, and their 
respective popularity waxed and waned throughout the occupation. However it was 
Mihailović who was recognised by the Allied forces as the commander of the Yugoslav 
forces in the homeland, owing to his links with the government. Following heavy German 
reprisals in the late autumn of 1941 both movements regrouped and began to struggle 
against one another, as well as the other insurgency groups that were fighting territorial 
battles all over the former Kingdom.  
The relationship between France Libre and the Yugoslav government-in-exile 
remained strong and de Gaulle decorated Mihailović with the prestigious Croix de guerre 
in February 1943. Furthermore, a request was made to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs 
for a direct link with the chetnik leader the following month; it was rejected as it was 
                                                     
23 Marès, Antoine. “La France libre et l’Europe centrale et orientale (1940-1944)”, Revue des études 
slaves 54, no. 3 (1982), 310. 
24 Pavlaković, Vjeran. “Yugoslavia” in European Resistance in the Second World War, eds. Cooke, Philip 
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deemed to “be imprudent from the point of view of France’s relations with different 
fighting Yugoslav elements, the other Balkan countries and Russia.”26 Support switched 
from Mihailović and the Yugoslav Home Army to Tito and his partisans following the 
Tehran Conference in December 1943, which Charles de Gaulle was powerless to resist. 
Relations between Mihailović and the British quickly deteriorated, as the chetnik leader 
told them that “The French … had been our only allies; they had not measured their sweat 
against our blood.”27 Abandoned, Mihailović appealed directly to de Gaulle for help and 
support in regaining the confidence of the allies.28  
The French General, concerned by the collapse of Mihailović’s movement, 
enquired to Stalin on the chetnik leader’s whereabouts in December 1944. Stalin tried to 
convince de Gaulle that Mihailović had left Yugoslavia and was hiding in Cairo.29 But the 
French Foreign Ministry kept a detailed dossier on General Mihailović and were able to 
track his whereabouts to Eastern Bosnia in April 1945, where he had amassed 60,000 men 
to rally against Tito.30 He, in fact, struggled against the Communists until March 1946.  
His capture, the procedure of his subsequent hearing for treason, and his eventual 
execution, gave rise to great concern in France and the United States; the latter appealed to 
Belgrade to allow American soldiers to appear as witnesses in Mihailović’s trial.31 Many of 
these soldiers, as a US State Department press release stated, “were rescued and returned to 
allied lines through the undaunted efforts of General Mikhailovich’s [sic] forces…” and 
they possessed “first hand evidence which cannot but have a bearing upon the charges of 
enemy collaboration which the Yugoslav authorities have indicated they will bring against 
                                                     
26 Marès. “La France libre et l’Europe centrale et orientale”, 321. 
27 Pavlowitch. Hitler’s New Disorder, 222-223. 
28 Ibid., 227. 
29 Ibid., 237. 
30 Minstère des Affaires Étrangères [hereafter MAE], Direction d’Europe, Note A.S. Entretien avec 
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General Mikhailovich [sic].”32 There was even a “Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja 
Mihailovich [sic]” established that consisted of six Governors, six Senators and several 
prominent writers, intellectuals and journalists.33 
However France, in contrast to its position after World War I, was in a fragile 
position internationally in the aftermath of the Second World War. Faced with the reality 
that much of its traditional sphere of influence was now under the aegis of the Soviet 
Union, France had no choice but to accept the change of regime in Yugoslavia, and the 
execution of Draža Mihailović, especially if it wanted to protect its material possessions 
from Tito’s nationalisation programme.  
 
The Early Cold War 
With the liberation of France and Yugoslavia, their respective reconciliation and 
reconstruction projects began in earnest. France’s significant involvement in the Western 
Balkan state prior to the Second World War cast a long shadow over the two’s post-war 
relationship, particularly owing to France’s significant investment in the banking and 
mining sectors. With France requiring significant materials and capital to undertake its 
own post-war reconstruction projects, it was unprepared to cede the Bor copper mine to 
Yugoslavia’s nationalisation programme without significant compensation. Indeed, 
General de Gaulle, in his capacity as head of the French provisional government, delayed 
formal recognition of the new regime in Belgrade by a month to highlight his desire to see 
Yugoslavia uphold the international engagements of the ancien régime.34  
Equally, Tito was not prepared to abandon a potentially useful partner in France. 
He was sceptical about the reliability of support from the Soviet Union and remained 
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reluctant to reconcile Yugoslavia’s interests with overarching Soviet ones. Stalin 
reportedly scolded Tito for not having sufficiently sovietised: “No, your government is not 
Soviet–you have something in between De Gaulle’s France and the Soviet Union.”35 
Perhaps Stalin’s reprimand was more prescient than he realised as, much like the French 
General, Tito would seek to overcome emerging Cold War bipolarity. Even in 1946, the 
Yugoslav leader was unprepared to be restrained by the “imaginary line traced by Mr. 
Churchill.”36 To this end, Yugoslavia sought a pact with a country ‘from the other side’: 
France. Accordingly, in April 1946 a Franco-Yugoslav friendship society was created.  
Tito sought to use the amitié to lend legitimacy to his nascent regime but also 
required trade partners in the West, as the Soviet Union could not absorb all of 
Yugoslavia’s exports. As such, and to maintain a level of independence from the Soviet 
Union, Tito sought a trade agreement with France. Running until 1948, the agreement 
increased trade between the two countries year-on-year, accounting for over $10 million of 
trade by its end.37 However this relationship was not without its problems. The Yugoslavs 
announced summary nationalisation in December 1946.38 France accordingly pursued 
compensation claims, particularly for the Bor copper mine, with its valuation differing 
from the Yugoslav’s. However, France was cautious lest it come away with nothing.39  
Tito continued to demonstrate that he was unwilling to reconcile Yugoslavia’s 
interests with overarching Soviet ones or to be confined by the parameters of the Cold 
War. Disagreements over ‘adventurism’ in Greece and Albania, which Stalin thought 
would provoke the West further, led to fractious relations between the USSR and 
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Central Committee was unwilling to give Stalin the required 
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level of obedience in the Communist bloc. Therefore, on 28 June 1948, Yugoslavia was 
expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM) and faced a period of 
isolation.  
Neither did the early Cold War favour France’s perceived foreign policy interests. 
As Frédéric Bozo notes, “France’s position in the Cold War soon provoked a number of 
frustrations that the country’s painful decolonization process and chronic internal 
instability only aggravated”.40 France viewed the onset of the Cold War with caution as it 
provided it with two significant international challenges: maintaining its status as a great 
power, particularly in its traditional spheres of interest; and preventing the potential 
remilitarisation and re-emergence of Germany.41 The ostracisation of Yugoslavia from 
COMINFORM provided France with an opportunity to increase its influence in Eastern 
Europe once more. However, France could no longer rely solely on the legacy of World 
War I and the amitié and would face increasingly stiff competition from the US and the 
UK for influence in Yugoslavia. 
Although the US had significant concerns about the Tito regime, particularly 
regarding its treatment of domestic opponents and assistance to the Greek Communists, it 
sought to pounce on the opportunity that Tito’s enforced independence provided. Therefore 
the US provided Yugoslavia with aid and loans.42 From an ideological perspective, this 
Communist rupture also had an important political value: Tito’s break from the Eastern 
bloc undermined the theretofore unshakable unity of the international Communist 
movement. It appeared to the West that other East European states may follow 
Yugoslavia’s lead and break their ties with the Soviet Union. 
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France, sensing that the US was attempting to usurp its role in Eastern Europe, 
agreed to participate in the Tripartite Aid programme, alongside the US and the UK, to 
Yugoslavia from 1951-4. The Direction d’Europe noted that participating in the aid 
programme was important for two reasons: it demonstrated solidarity with Great Britain 
and the United States and provided the moral benefit and strengthening of relations 
between France and Yugoslavia.43 The Fourth Republic had not yet lost all hope of re-
establishing its influence in Eastern Europe. Therefore, it would allow Yugoslavia “to 
safeguard its independence and to resist the pressure of the countries of the Soviet bloc.”44 
These were rather lofty goals for French foreign policy, particularly as France struggled 
with its colonial territories. Indeed, France’s contribution to Tripartite Aid highlighted its 
essential problem in the Cold War: it sought to reconcile Great Power ambitions with 
medium-power means.45 
France’s contribution was consistently the smallest of the three contributors owing 
to its own economic problems and expenditure in the extremely expensive conflict in 
Indochina.46 Paris also considered its April 1951 settlement for outstanding compensation 
from the nationalisation programme – $10 million over a period of ten to twelve years – as 
extremely generous and “therefore constituted aid in its own right.”47 France’s National 
Assembly ended its participation in the programme in 1953 owing to its need to finance the 
Navarre Plan in Indochina; an expensive, and ultimately fruitless, endeavour. France’s 
paltry contribution led to a diminishment in its influence in Yugoslavia. Where once 
French had been learnt in schools, it was now supplanted by English. Furthermore, French 
imports and products were being replaced by US and British goods.  
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Decolonisation and Early Non-Alignment 
Having weathered the storm of 1948, and now supported by US aid, Tito was once again 
becoming more active in international politics. In doing so, he began to feel his way 
towards a coherent foreign policy, which would later find its expression in the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). Tito was passionately anti-colonial and accordingly made 
contact with the National Liberation Front of Algeria (Front de Libération Nationale, 
FLN) in Cairo in 1953.48 Algeria also presented Yugoslavia with an opportunity to assist a 
national liberation movement, which would bring with it prestige amongst similarly 
oppressed peoples. Strategically, Algeria would also be a useful ally to Yugoslavia, being, 
as it is, situated in close proximity and at a key location on the Mediterranean littoral.  
Thus, when the FLN uprising began on 1 November 1954, Belgrade tacitly 
supported the rebels and received several prominent members of the movement in 
Yugoslavia.49 Therefore, in January 1955 Yugoslavia supported a Saudi Arabian proposal 
to bring the Algerian problem before the UN Security Council (UNSC) and challenged the 
French accounts of events in the General Assembly.50 As Matthew Connelly has 
demonstrated, there was a strong foreign policy aspect to the FLN’s strategy, which was 
often conducted in the forum of the United Nations. 51 In this respect, Yugoslavia provided 
Algeria with ample support. In light of these diverging political lines, France reconsidered 
its relationship with Yugoslavia. 
Furthermore, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had entered a period of 
rapprochement, which allowed it to further delineate its position on the international stage. 
However, Tito also wanted to continue to derive the benefits of non-alignment, particularly 
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Western aid and loans, which he had enjoyed theretofore. He cautioned Moscow not to 
expect Yugoslavia to improve its relations with the Soviets at the expense of its ties to the 
West: “we have numerous trade and other agreements with them [Western nations]… we 
still receive aid from some Western countries like the United States, Great Britain, France, 
for instance, and so far these countries have not shown themselves to be our enemies; they 
have proved to be friends”.52 Indeed, the Yugoslavs had just negotiated a food and 
financial assistance package from the US, reached agreement with Italy on the subject of 
Trieste, and signed a defensive pact against the USSR with Turkey and Greece known as 
the Balkan Pact.53 
Owing to this stability, Tito became increasingly ambitious on the international 
stage. In Western Europe he continued to focus on cooperation with France as the two 
nations’ security needs converged. In early 1956 the French government was considering 
two significant proposals for investment in Yugoslavia: the construction of an assembly 
line to manufacture Mystère IV B2 fighter planes; and Franco-Yugoslav cooperation in 
copper mining in Majdanpek, the construction of a foundry and a sulphuric acid factory in 
Bor and a superphosphate factory in Prahovo. The Yugoslavs made concerted efforts to 
flatter the French government: Tito was set to visit Paris in May and Borba published 
articles that evoked the traditional amitié.54 Parallel to these inter-state relations the SKJ 
also sought a rapprochement with the French Communist Party (Parti communiste 
français, PCF) and by July 1956 the Yugoslavs were considering sending a mission to 
renew contacts between the two parties.55 
Although the French Ambassador in Belgrade welcomed the warm messages, and 
explained that there was no reason to doubt their sincerity, he cautioned the Quai against 
                                                     
52 Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, 64. 
53 Rajak, Svetozar. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, comradeship, 
confrontation, 1953–1957 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 106-7. 
54 Telegram from the French Embassy in Belgrade to MAE, 27 February 1956, AD, 209QO/181, 37-17-
2. 
55 Telegram from the French Embassy in Belgrade to MAE, 16 July 1956, AD, 209QO/181, 37-24-1. 
 31 
an over-enthusiastic reaction. He explained that, in spite of the ardour of Tito’s resistance 
to Soviet subjugation, Belgrade was always at risk of being subordinated to Moscow, 
particularly if Tito was no longer in power. Moreover, he stated that Franco-Yugoslav 
rapprochement would be “an unacceptable fool’s game” if it should provoke the slightest 
weakening between the Atlantic allies.56 Therefore, France was keen to support the 
Majdanpek copper mine venture but withdrew its support for the Mystère as it required US 
Congressional support.57 With France facing an increasingly expensive war in Algeria, it 
was itself increasingly concerned with Yugoslavia’s ability to service its debts and pay its 
outstanding nationalisation compensation to France. However, by seeking to extract raw 
materials from Yugoslavia, France failed to provide any meaningful contribution to 
recalibrating the Franco-Yugoslav balance of trade, which greatly favoured itself. France’s 
short-sightedness – although not the sole Western power to only assist Yugoslavia in the 
short-term – would severely hamper Yugoslavia’s ability to service its increasing debt in 
later years. 
Simultaneously, Yugoslavia embarked on its more ideologically-driven foreign 
policy aims and started to look to the Third World, which would bring it into direct 
competition with France. The Yugoslav leader invited the Prime Minister of India, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Egyptian President, Abdel Nasser, to the island of Brioni for a 
highly publicised meeting with an international agenda. Nasser was deeply impressed by 
Tito’s Yugoslavia and particularly its careful balancing of East-West relations.58 France 
worried that the link between Egypt and Yugoslavia would make a change in Yugoslav 
policy towards Algeria even more unlikely.59 The French Ministry of Defence regularly 
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drew comparisons between the Egyptian President and Hitler.60  The Brioni Declaration 
signed by the three leaders committed them to take concerted action on issues such as 
decolonisation with Algeria featuring prominently.61 It also marked tentative steps towards 
an active policy of non-alignment.  
Owing to his close relations with the Egyptian leader, Tito supported Nasser’s 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The French were most displeased and criticised 
Yugoslavia’s policy of ‘equidistance’ asking: “Does the People’s Republic feel no 
embarrassment aligning its diplomatic action with that of a feudal regime openly preaching 
holy war whose repercussions could be felt in Bosnia?”62 In spite of this accusation, 
Yugoslavia remained supportive of “a French presence in North Africa.”63 Indeed, the 
Yugoslavs even continued to believe in the necessity of close Franco-Yugoslav relations 
for the sake of Europe: 
 
You well know… that the Yugoslav government considers that it is only 
around France that a united Europe can be based. We cannot count either on 
Great Britain, whose interests are not strictly European, or the Germans, 
towards whom we remain suspicious. It is through a close and sincere 
collaboration between France, Yugoslavia, the Nordic countries and Benelux 
that could create a real European community.64 
 
However, Yugoslavia was once more becoming isolated. Communications broke 
down with Western Europe, and particularly France, as the US encouraged Tito to act as a 
mediator in the Suez Crisis.65  Moreover, Yugoslavia came into confrontation with the 
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USSR as, following Khrushchev’s hardening after the Hungarian uprising, Tito refused to 
sign the Declaration of 1957, which called for Communist ideological homogeneity 
centred on Moscow.66 Yugoslavia therefore turned towards the Third World, where 
France’s empire was crumbling. Yugoslavia’s search for allies would lead to a great 
divergence between itself and France.  
In one of the few pieces of work devoted to Franco-Yugoslav relations, Gilles 
Troude greatly overstates the significance of Islam in Tito’s support for the FLN. Labelling 
Yugoslavia as a “real Muslim power”, Troude adds that “the Marshall did not hesitate to 
give himself a pro-Arab image, by giving materials and arms to a insurrectional movement, 
at the risk of breaking relations with a traditionally amicable Western power who has 
greatly aided him militarily and financially after the split with Moscow in 1948.”67 Rather, 
what motivated Tito’s assistance to the FLN was a strong aversion to colonialism, which 
brought Yugoslavia into direct conflict with France as its colonial territories sought 
independence.  
Matthew Connelly observes that the Algerian War of Independence “was both a 
cause and consequence of that movement’s [NAM] emergence.”68 Indeed, its campaign 
was focussed on maintaining equidistance between East and West and, thus, courting 
neutralist nations was a promising strategy. Therefore, Ferhat Abbas, future president of 
the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement provisoire de la 
République algérienne, GPRA), visited Yugoslavia in July 1956 hoping to present a note 
to Tito, Nasser and Nehru. Le Monde noted that their sources indicated that it was very 
likely that Tito received Abbas during this time.69  
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Yugoslavia thus sent five freighters a week to Morocco to resupply the FLN 
training camps in Oujda, Morocco.70 This came to light following an incident in January 
1958 when the Yugoslav freight ship Slovenija was seized by the French Navy off the 
coast of Oran carrying 7,000 weapons.71 The Yugoslav government denied that the arms 
were destined for the FLN and protested furiously for the cargo to be released.72 
Nonetheless, Belgrade still attached importance to France at the centre of its idea of a 
unified Europe and sought to manage the l’affaire Slovenija in a “friendly way.”73 
However, it greatly soured Franco-Yugoslav relations, which would only be reinforced by 
the return of the anti-Communist extraordinaire to the forefront of French politics: General 
de Gaulle. 
 
Old Rivals: The General and the Marshal 
It was the violent process of decolonisation that brought Charles de Gaulle back to the 
forefront of French politics in 1958. As Frédéric Bozo notes: “If France’s posture in the 
Cold War were to be summarized in one word, ‘Gaullism’ should be considered an 
appropriate one.”74 Truly, the constitution and workings of the French Fifth Republic 
allowed one man to near single-handedly define its foreign policy: the President. This was 
no mere coincidence; de Gaulle believed that France had lost much of its prestige over the 
preceding fifty years and ensured that the constitution would provide him with the 
authority to restore its ‘grandeur’. The decline of French influence in Yugoslavia only 
served to demonstrate how far French grandeur had declined.  
History played a central role in de Gaulle’s personal philosophy; he professed not 
to believe in ideology, only history. Whilst Marx pronounced that the “history of all 
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hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”, de Gaulle believed that “the 
struggle of nations” was history’s primary engine.75 Logically, therefore, the Cold War was 
a transient phenomenon and a break from the historical norm. Accordingly he believed that 
the conflict between ideological blocs would desist and that Russia would return to its 
“national” character.76 Resultantly, the Eastern European ‘satellites’, including the 
Yugoslav republics, would regain their independence. 
However, Yugoslavia was supporting another state in search of its national 
independence: Algeria. As Robert Niebuhr has demonstrated the Yugoslav leaders used the 
Third World to bolster domestic political legitimacy through foreign policy successes.77 
Aiding aspiring liberation movements also provided the Yugoslav administration with 
significant moral victories. Tito thus welcomed Ferhat Abbas to Belgrade in June 1959, 
declaring in a joint communiqué that:  
 
Yugoslav representatives, faithful to the principles of the politics of the 
People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, according to which each nation has 
the right to decide its own fate, and in believing that general emancipation of 
the people of colonised and dependant countries constitutes an historical 
process, progressive and inevitable, have confirmed their point of view that 
they consider the fight for and aspirations to liberty and independence of the 
Algerian people to be legitimate and in full agreement with the United Nations 
Charter.78  
 
Accordingly, the Yugoslavs tried to encourage dialogue between the GPRA and 
France. However, Charles de Gaulle believed that Tito “felt obliged to howl with the 
wolves, with the FLN, and all the Afro-Asiatics, against France…”79 whilst his Foreign 
Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville exclaimed that it was “unacceptable: it’s as if 
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General de Gaulle had welcomed the exiled Croat leaders to France”.80 The French 
Ambassador in Belgrade warned that any recognition of the GPRA as the legitimate 
government of Algeria would be poorly received in Paris and would cause a rupture in 
Franco-Yugoslav diplomatic relations.81 In response to Tito welcoming Ferhat Abbas, 
Paris decided to temporarily recall its Ambassador from Belgrade.82 However, in spite of 
the strong French reaction, the Yugoslavs continued to hope that the two countries could 
collaborate on the international stage as the Yugoslav Ambassador relayed a message from 
Tito to de Gaulle: 
 
We believe that, despite different points of views on certain international 
questions, there is a vast domain in which collaboration could develop to the 
benefit of both countries, in general European collaboration and the 
consolidation of world peace.83 
 
Tito therefore stepped back from full recognition of the GPRA. Nonetheless, the Yugoslav 
leader still pursued connections with the FLN but refrained from diplomatic recognition.  
Over the next two years diplomatic relations continued to deteriorate with a series 
of provocative acts and gestures being taken on both sides, much to the other’s disdain. In 
July 1959 the French Navy inspected the Yugoslav cargo ship Makedonija and found that 
it contained 10,000 heavy machine guns and 200 mortars destined for the FLN.84 In France 
de Gaulle insisted on receiving the deposed monarchs of Yugoslavia in the Élysée to 
commemorate the 25th anniversary of the death of Alexander Karađorđević; he also 
decorated Maria with the Legion of Honour.85  
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The Yugoslavs were also making similarly provocative gestures. In March 1960 an 
office for the FLN was opened in Belgrade.86 Whilst in March 1961 a FLN football team 
travelled throughout Yugoslavia facing a host of city-select XI sides in Tuzla, Rijeka, 
Zagreb and Maribor, culminating in a game against the national team in Belgrade on 29th 
March 1961.87 The same year Yugoslavia, alongside several other nations, officially 
recognised the GPRA as the legitimate government of Algeria.88 It also hosted the 
Belgrade Conference, the official inauguration of the NAM, at which Algeria was 
represented.  
Nineteen Sixty-Two was a decisive year in France’s foreign policy. France signed 
the Évian Accords and granted Algeria its independence in March.  Freed of the Algerian 
War but bitterly disappointed by the failure of the Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle broke with les 
Anglo-Saxons and pursued the creation of a Europe founded on Franco-German 
cooperation. This brought a temporary upturn in Franco-Yugoslav relations as de Gaulle 
reflected that “now that the Algerian War is finished, we must turn the page.”89 Franco-
Yugoslav diplomatic relations were normalised once more in August 1962 but sorely 
missed the warmth of the traditional amitié between the two countries. This can largely be 
accounted for by de Gaulle’s resentment towards Yugoslavia, as a country that carried far 
greater diplomatic weight than its means merited, and his historical hostility towards Tito 
and his Yugoslav project.  
Tito’s treatment of Draža Mihailović cast a long shadow over relations between de 
Gaulle’s France and Tito’s Yugoslavia. The General reflected that:  
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The true national hero was Mihailović. He did not fight for an ideology, nor for 
the soviet system. He was not set into motion because a foreign country urged 
him to. He was simply a patriot. He had no other goal than to liberate his 
homeland. He knew that no nation can be overcome by violence.90 
 
De Gaulle’s close confidant, Alain Peyrefitte, reflected that for the General, 
Mihailović was “a brother in arms, a pure hero whose tragic fate moves him. Between the 
General and Tito, there will always be the blood of this Serbian de Gaulle.91” Nonetheless, 
de Gaulle begrudgingly respected Tito, saying that he was “not without merit. Yugoslavia 
is a state that is respected inside and out. Externally, he has been the only one, a long time 
before China, to say no to the Soviets. Internally, he has maintained tranquillity between 
the nationalities who all hate one another.”92 De Gaulle believed that, nonetheless, 
Yugoslavia would one day cease to exist. He predicted that, “On the day that he [Tito] 
goes, the Croats, the Serbs, the Bosnians will put their passion to fighting between 
themselves, as they used it to fight against the Germans. They are warrior peoples.”93 
Similarly, François Mitterrand would later echo the General’s sentiment, describing Tito as 
“the only unifier in a country torn by centrifugal forces.”94  
The failure of the Franco-German axis in Europe necessitated a redirection of 
foreign policy for the General. As such de Gaulle developed a ‘politique à l’Est’ and 
relaunched diplomatic relations with the USSR. As Bozo rightly notes, for the General, “If 
Europe was to be spared a ‘new Yalta,’ France had to take the lead in the quest for détente 
in Europe and, indeed, for a European détente.”95 The General would have found a willing 
partner in Yugoslavia, who also sought a European détente for Europe, but he remained 
reluctant to deal with Tito.   
                                                     
90 Peyrefitte. Alain, C’était de Gaulle, vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard 1998), 209-210. 
91 Ibid., 209 
92 Peyrefitte. C’etait de Gaulle, vol. 1, 295. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Védrine. Les mondes, 593. 
95 Bozo. “France, ‘Gaullism’ and the Cold War”, 168. 
 39 
Therefore having withdrawn France from NATO’s military command, the General 
pursued relations with the Soviet Union.96 By removing France from NATO, de Gaulle 
could negotiate with Moscow with clean hands: he could neither be manipulated by the 
Soviets into undermining NATO nor could he be seen as a Western puppet by them. As a 
result, his negotiating position was far stronger, which enabled the General to pursue the 
East-West détente that was the cornerstone of his foreign policy. Furthermore, France was 
able to pursue relations with Eastern bloc states more vociferously.  
The General made an historic trip to Moscow from 20 to 30 June 1966. Under no 
false illusions about what he might achieve, de Gaulle was nonetheless forthright in 
outlining his vision for European détente and he set about probing his Soviet counterparts 
on their long-term vision for Europe. Furthermore, he explained his idea of “détente, 
entente and cooperation” as a means to solving the problems of Europe with a European 
solution.97  
Resultantly, Franco-Yugoslav relations began to improve once more. Although the 
two countries’ interests aligned on certain international matters, and held annual Foreign 
Ministry Meetings as de Gaulle’s foreign policy became more subtle, France could never 
fully reconcile itself to close cooperation with Tito’s Yugoslavia under the General. 
Throughout de Gaulle’s presidential tenure, the enthusiasm for Franco-Yugoslav relations 
stemmed from the East European side. Tito even invited France to the Non-Aligned 
Conference in 1969 believing the convergence of views on several important international 
matters would make them important European partners in the movement and ending the 
Cold War.98 De Gaulle declined.99 Throughout the period, the relationship remained firmly 
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stacked in France’s favour. However the creation of a joint governmental committee for 
economic cooperation in January 1969 suggested that de Gaulle’s antipathy towards 
Yugoslavia was easing as he became less confrontational in his abortive second term. 
 
Pompidolienne Pragmatism  
In spite of de Gaulle’s impressive efforts on the global stage, his rule was undone by 
domestic problems and the General retired from frontline politics in spring 1969. He was 
succeeded by his former Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou. Over the preceding half-
decade, France had become increasingly isolated from its European partners and the new 
President sought to reinvigorate the ‘European project’. The election of Pompidou did not 
mark a complete rupture with Gaullist heritage, but he was a far more pragmatic leader 
and, in Franco-Yugoslav relations, did not share the same hostility towards Tito as his 
predecessor. Pompidou therefore sought to reinvigorate the amitié through practical 
measures; political cooperation would come through economic cooperation.  
 
 
Franco-Yugoslav Balance of Trade, 1965-1970.100 
 
Pompidou’s first priority was establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). 
However, its establishment had significant effects for economic relations between its 
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member states and European countries outside the Community. Franco-Yugoslav 
economic exchanges would thereafter be contingent upon European trade laws, much to 
Yugoslavia’s disadvantage. Yugoslavia soon sought to reconcile itself with the continent’s 
new economic order and hoped to use its relationship with France, its closest ally in the 
Six, to its benefit. 
Experiencing an economic malaise in the early 1970s, Yugoslavia agreed a three 
year non-preferential agreement with the EEC. Furthermore, it re-established diplomatic 
relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in January 1968 in part owing to 
Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik but also Yugoslavia’s need to reconfigure its balance of trade 
with Western Europe. The Quai was aware that Yugoslavia sought to improve its balance 
of trade with France, and Europe more widely, and suggested that, for better access to 
French markets, the Yugoslavs could better promote the French language.101 However, for 
France, the fundamental problem of the trade balance was still “the weak complementarity 
of the two economies.”102 Nonetheless, it offered significant support and therefore, the two 
countries signed a cooperation agreement to create an intergovernmental commission to 
improve commerical and technical exchanges in arms.103 Furthermore, Yugoslavia held its 
first trade exposition in Paris in 1969 that developed significant industrial relations 
between the two countries.104 The two nations also established a Franco-Yugoslav chamber 
of commerce in Paris in June 1970. The motor industry quickly became the most 
productive sector with Citroën and the Slovenian enterprise Tomos signing an agreement 
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for the manufacture of 2 and 3 CV in Yugoslavia. Renault signed a similar agreement with 
a firm in Ljubljana, which within a year had built 10,000 vehicles.105 
 Seeking to improve Yugoslavia’s position in Europe, Tito visited all six leaders of 
the EEC between October and December 1970. Pompidou welcomed his Yugoslav 
counterpart to Paris on 24 October 1970. The two Presidents shared similar views on the 
need for an independent Europe and its security and Tito praised de Gaulle’s European 
policy reflecting that, “Europe is made up of independent and autonomous nations and not 
blocs.”106 As such, the two men hoped that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) would not be dominated by the two superpowers or bloc discussions and 
would allow Europe to address its own issues. Both Presidents hoped to derive some 
benefit from the meeting. Pompidou sought to use the meeting to establish the NAM’s 
attitude towards France. Tito hoped to use this position to improve Yugoslavia’s balance of 
exchange with the EEC and its agricultural sector suffering owing to import rules 
established by the Common Agricultural Policy. The Marshall thus happily cooperated 
with the French President.107 However, Pompidou could not expand Franco-Yugoslav 
cooperation further at this point and pointed to the recent progress as cause for optimism. 
The Prime Minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas would, accompanied by the Foreign Minister 
Maurice Schumann, be making a trip to Belgrade the following Spring and Pompidou 
indicated that he would possibly follow in 1972 or 1973.108 
Under Pompidou, Franco-Yugoslav cooperation initially witnessed an upturn, as 
business, cultural and diplomatic exchanges increased. With the Yugoslavs facing financial 
difficulties in funding new projects, French businesses were encouraged to provide 
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investment.109 In April 1971 Chaban-Delmas and Schumann were warmly welcomed to 
Yugoslavia visiting Skopje, Zagreb, Ljubljana and Belgrade. Alongside a meeting with 
President Tito, they also held detailed discussions with the Yugoslavia Prime Minister 
Mitija Ribičič who gave a frank appraisal of the Yugoslav economic situation. Both sides 
agreed to develop, diversify and rebalance commercial exchanges between the two 
countries to benefit Yugoslavia.110  
In Slovenia they met a host of directors of Slovenian enterprises in Bled. The 
Slovenian delegation hoped for an improvement in Franco-Slovenian exchanges, which the 
French delegation was also keen to develop. Chaban-Delmas left the meeting seemingly 
determined to develop Franco-Yugoslav exchanges believing that it attained to the higher 
goal of ending the Cold War: 
 
If I have understood correctly, the development of exchanges between 
Yugoslavia, France and Slovenia are not only an interest in themselves, and 
that would justify all efforts, but a higher interest that is fundamental to the 
independence of our countries, our people and world peace… Having arrived 
in Belgrade a little ignorant, I will leave Yugoslavia with a determination to act 
in a way that will produce positive results.111 
 
 Indeed, the visit was a formative experience for Chaban-Delmas who also wrote an 
extremely sincere letter of thanks to Ribičič reaffirming that he was “henceforth assured 
that the longstanding friendship between our two countries will accentuate the 
strengthening of our political as much as our economic relationship.”112 In this vein, the 
two countries held regular meetings of the Franco-Yugoslav commission and several 
bilateral meetings over the following three years until Pompidou’s demise.  
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However, Franco-Yugoslav relations would once more fall victim to a readjustment 
in French political priorities and a divergence of views on political matters. The Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister who had engaged so eagerly with Yugoslavia in 1971 were 
replaced by Pierre Messmer and Michel Jobert respectively. Furthermore, following three 
years of active engagement with the construction and enlargement of the EEC, Pompidou 
eased his European enthusiasm owing to poor health and public ambivalence over a loss of 
sovereignty.113 Accordingly, improving relations with Yugoslavia was far less salient.  
Significantly, relations between the two states cooled over the issue of nuclear 
testing. In spite of French warnings about the effects it could have on bilateral relations, 
Yugoslavia supported a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the suspension of all 
nuclear and thermonuclear tests. As such, the Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, indefinitely 
delayed a visit to Belgrade, much to the Yugoslavs’ disappointment.114 When Pompidou’s 
presidential term ended following his death, Franco-Yugoslav relations had thus regained 
their cordial, rather than amiable, character.  
 
Giscard d’Estaing: ‘Change Without Risk’ 
The election of the centrist Valéry Giscard d’Estaing marked a move towards “change 
without risk” that would not threaten the legacy of peace, economic prosperity and political 
stability bequeathed by the Gaullist period.115 Giscard’s election campaign was one of 
personalisation, emphasising the charisma and charm of the young, moderate and 
responsible politician affectionately known as ‘VGE’. Elected during a period of 
international change – Ted Heath, Willy Brandt and Richard Nixon all left office in 1974 – 
Giscard adopted a cooperative and conciliatory foreign policy towards the West initially.116 
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However, as Giscard’s Presidency matured, he became a more confident and assertive 
international statesman who sought to promote European, and French, independence 
through Franco-German cooperation and ‘mondialisme’, marked by an increasing 
engagement with the North-South divide.117 Furthermore, Giscard also proposed a 
European-led disarmament conference, as he sought to protect the force de frappe at the 
second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALTII).118 Giscardienne France and 
late Titoist Yugoslavia therefore shared a great many interests and concerns. 
  
French commercial exchanges with Yugoslavia (in millions of Francs), 1965-1973.119 
 
As the former Finance Minister, Giscard was aware of the joint Franco-Yugoslav 
committee’s aims and work having been party to its conception.120 The President sought to 
renew Franco-Yugoslav relations following their cooling in 1973. Following an extensive 
visit to Yugoslavia, a delegation from the National Assembly produced a report on the 
work of the joint committee in November 1974. It noted that, thus far, the results of the 
joint venture had been far from satisfactory as there were only six joint enterprises and 12 
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joint contracts. Indeed, as the table above shows, the commercial balance continued to 
greatly favour France (see above). 
There were positive signs of improved cooperation and the French government 
vowed to encourage French businesses to establish links with Yugoslav enterprises. 
However, several businesses remained concerned about the stability of Yugoslavia given 
the Croatian Spring, which was put down by the Yugoslav authorities in 1971, and the 
promulgation of the country’s new verbose and elaborate Constitution in February 1974. 
The sheer complexity of the Yugoslav system of samoupravljanje (workers’ self-
management or autogestion) made cooperation difficult and the French suggested that the 
Yugoslav state produce a brochure for French businesses to navigate the system!121  
The first visit of a member of the Giscard administration came in May 1975, when 
the Foreign Minister, Jean Sauvagnargues, travelled to Yugoslavia. Discussions between 
Sauvagnargues and his Yugoslav counterpart, Miloš Minić, took place “in a climate of 
confidence and the warm friendship that traditionally characterises Franco-Yugoslav 
relations.”122 Politically, both ministers agreed that the two countries were mostly in 
alignment on international issues. The problem in the bilateral relationship was still its 
economic foundation. Sauvagnargues proposed increasing industrial cooperation 
particularly in the Third World but underlined that, owing to France’s own economic 
situation, it would have to judge each proposition on a case-by-case basis.123 Minić was 
pleased with the Minister’s suggestions and understood, although with some 
disappointment, that France would have to be selective in its investments. Minić also 
thanked his opposite number for France’s cooperation in managing Yugoslav émigrés in 
France who were engaging in terrorist activity.124 
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The following year the amitié reached its Cold War zenith as ‘VGE’ became the 
first French President to visit Yugoslavia, some twenty years after Tito’s visit to France in 
1956. Giscard made the visit to reassure those in Yugoslavia that France, in its moves 
towards East-West détente, was not neglecting its traditional friend and to demonstrate the 
progress in relations between the two countries.125 The two leaders spoke largely about the 
international situation reaffirming their desire to see the end of bloc politics and an 
improvement in the material condition of the developing world.126 The following year, the 
ailing Tito reciprocated Giscard’s gesture by making a largely inconsequential visit to 
Paris.  
Bilateral relations between the two states began to falter towards the end of Giscard 
Presidency, as the Yugoslavs demonstrated some evident frustrations with the EEC and 
France. With their economy beginning to show severe strain, the Yugoslavs were 
increasingly concerned that they were being cut adrift of the EEC and warned France that 
they would be forced to become increasingly dependent on the USSR. 127 They looked to 
France to assist in a favourable renegotiation of Yugoslavia’s agreement with the EEC. 
The Yugoslavs threatened that, if its position in regard to the EEC failed to improve, it 
would have to reconsider its relations with France.128 The Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Olivier Stirn, believed that it was evident that France’s interests would be best 
served if Yugoslavia remained firmly anchored in the West rather than moving towards the 
East.129 However, the French government was limited in the ways that it could feasibly 
support Yugoslavia. 
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One way the French sought to support the Yugoslav regime was through its 
assistance in preventing ‘anti-Yugoslav’ activities. Towards the end of the 1970s the 
Yugoslavs had become increasingly concerned about the activities of political émigrés 
emanating from France. With the death of Tito in May 1980 this worry only increased. 
Thus, it became an increasingly significant topic of conversation in bilateral meetings and 
the Yugoslavs linked to it détente in Europe.130 
There was a notable spate of French nationals being expelled from Yugoslavia at 
the end of the Giscard presidency. In particular, the case of L’Express journalist, Émile 
Guikovaty – who was known to the Yugoslav authorities for his close relations with the 
chetnik Branko Lazić – was expelled from Yugoslavia on 11 February 1981. Guikovaty 
had previously produced a revisionist biography of Tito in 1979 that displayed strong 
sympathies towards Serbia.131 Ante Marković, the spokesman for the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry and future Prime Minister, declared that the expulsion of Guikovaty had been 
taken “owing to malicious writings and deceit towards Yugoslavia and because of his 
hostile behaviour towards Yugoslavia.”132 Privately, the French authorities protested 
vigorously and the French Ambassador to Belgrade, Yvez Pagniez, warned that these 
expulsions could have serious consequences for Franco-Yugoslav relations.133 Publicly, 
during a visit to Yugoslavia in his role as President of the National Assembly, Chaban-
Delmas was keen to express that the expulsion would not threaten relations between the 
two countries. 134 However, Franco-Yugoslav relations were once more characterised by a 
courteous, rather than close, cooperation.  
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Chapter Two – Franco-Yugoslav Relations in Mitterrand’s premier septennat, 
May 1981-May 1988. 
 
Tito’s Orphan 
In the spring of 1981 the campaigns for the forthcoming presidential elections were 
well underway in France. Simultaneously, Yugoslavia faced its first post-Tito crisis. 
Student unrest over material conditions in the Kosovan capital of Priština led to 
disturbances on 11 and 26 March 1981, and culminated in riots on 1 and 2 April. The 
federal government declared a state of emergency and sent a strong military presence to 
the region. As the dust settled, official figures reported that there had been eleven 
deaths, two hundred injuries and large numbers of arrests.1 The real figure remains 
unknown although one local, and over-exaggerated, estimate suggested that there were 
as many as 1,000 deaths.2 
The Quai took great interest in the events in the autonomous province owing to 
a small French presence there.3 The head of the French Consulate in Yugoslavia 
attempted to reach Priština on 3 April but was turned away at a police border, which 
had been instructed to restrict access to foreigners. Entry was only permitted with 
express authorisation from the federal government. The French petitioned the Yugoslav 
authorities to grant the Consulate access to the autonomous province; it was eventually 
granted on 13 April.4 
It became quite clear to the French diplomacy that access to foreigners had been 
restricted not for reasons of security but rather to control the flow of information from 
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the region.5 In France, the Minister-counselor to the Yugoslav Ambassador visited 
Benoît d’Aboville, from the Quai’s strategic directorate, to obtain information on the 
recent meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Rome. The Yugoslavs were 
particularly interested in the Council’s discussions of “ethnic problems in the Balkans”, 
which the Secretary General Joseph Luns had raised. D’Aboville confirmed that the 
internal matters of Yugoslavia had not been discussed during the NAC meeting.6 The 
Yugoslavs sought to use their relationship with France to glean information on the 
international response to events in Kosovo.  
The Yugoslavs attributed the majority of blame for the riots to Albania, whom 
they accused of deliberately interfering in their internal affairs and for inciting Albanian 
nationalism. However, despite reports within the Serbian media that the protestors 
chanted for “Unification with Albania!”, the demonstrators had little interest in the 
Hoxha regime.7 Accusations flew between the two Balkan Communist states, which led 
to a heated exchange through their respective national press and culminated in the 
termination of cultural cooperation.8  The bombing of the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana 
in late May only amplified the tensions. The Albanians accused the Yugoslavs of 
planting the bombs themselves and acting in concert with the Soviets as part of a 
“Russo-Greater Serbia conspiracy.”9 For France, the crisis had reinvigorated the 
question of stability in the Balkan region. 
Although some restrictions were slowly lifted, tensions remained high as the 
post-mortem began in earnest. The Yugoslav Ambassador in Belgium, Esad Čerić, 
sought out his French counterpart to discuss the demonstrations and stated that, 
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although complaints about material conditions in Kosovo were often justified, the 
political character that the demonstrations had taken on were the result of external 
action.10 Indeed, Čerić ventured as far as to suggest, “with a certain prudence of 
language”, that its origins could have been Soviet.11 The Yugoslavs offered a further 
theory that, following the visit of the US Secretary of State to Madrid and resultant 
rumours that Spain may join NATO, the USSR was hoping to put pressure on Albania 
to reintegrate into the Warsaw Pact. In exchange, the Soviets would endorse the 
creation of a Greater Albania that included Kosovo. Furthermore, the theory continued, 
the recent deterioration in Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations regarding Macedonia may have 
resulted from Soviet pressure as part of its “grand plan” for Yugoslavia and Albania.12 
The Yugoslav political leadership was feeling increasingly insecure and becoming 
increasingly paranoid. Its collective response was authoritarianism and autarchy. 
As Yugoslavia was in the midst of its first crisis since the death of the 
talismanic Tito, France’s first socialist president of the Fifth Republic entered the 
Elysée. His election was welcomed with trepidation in the West but with high 
expectation in Yugoslavia.13 A note written by the Air Vice Marshall destined for the 
new President reached Paris on 21 May.14 A highly insightful account of Yugoslavia’s 
condition, it underlined the systemic problems that “Tito’s orphan” faced and the 
crossroads at which the country found itself. It noted the strength of the JNA and the 
continued success of Non-Alignment but highlighted the fragility of state politico-
economic institutions. The report also astutely recognised that the poor socioeconomic 
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conditions in Kosovo had given rise to social unrest in the autonomous province, which 
had contributed to a renewal of Albanian nationalism. However, it concluded that 
“nothing indicates that Yugoslavia is threatened by a chain reaction of nationalist 
explosions, far less the collapse of the federation.”15 It added, “The riots in Kosovo 
more likely represent a warning sign of a contagious movement. Nonetheless, it 
constitutes a narrow escape and the first difficult test for Tito’s successors.”16 
Significantly, the incident had renewed tensions between Serbs and Albanians. 17 The 
Serbian Communist Party called for political reform believing that its southern 
autonomous province was “taking away Serbia’s character as a national state” thus 
“causing the disintegration of both Serbia and Yugoslavia.”18 Yugoslavia required 
economic and political support in the face of increasing destabilisation.   
 
Towards a European Socialism? 
Although the Yugoslav experiment was severely stuttering in the early 1980s, the Parti 
Socialiste (PS) had long held the Yugoslav path to socialism in high regard. In the 1970s, 
the Yugoslav model of samoupravljanje (workers’ self-management or autogestion) 
featured prominently in the PS’s discussions on its own path towards socialism. Indeed, it 
had become a prominent feature of its post-1968 programme as the PS welcomed the 
deuxième gauche into its ranks.19  Michel Rocard, part of this ‘new’ left and future 
Socialist Prime Minister, acknowledged the lineage between the PS’s conception of 
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autogestion and Yugoslav samoupravljanje and thought it necessary to build “a profound 
and strong alliance with a Communist party.”20  
Mitterrand and the PS had campaigned on a left-wing platform in the 1981 
elections and owed the electorate a programme that reflected its promises. As Mitterrand’s 
Finance Minister, and future President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors 
reflected: “The Left would not have been credible if it had not taken the measures due to 
its electorate. The sin of treason is more mortal than that of error.”21 A socialist 
reconfiguration of the amitié offered the Mitterrand administration leftist political 
credibility and created an opening to the East. Therefore, the first government under 
Mitterrand enthusiastically engaged with Yugoslavia. 
Mitterrand’s Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson was the first cabinet member to 
visit Yugoslavia. He met with several Yugoslav ministers during his two day visit on 20 
and 21 November. During a brief conversation with Aleksandar Grličkov, a member of the 
Presidium of the Central Committee of the SKJ, the Yugoslav relayed to Cheysson the 
need for greater cooperation between the PS and the SKJ. Moreover, he highlighted that, 
by opting for autogestion, the PS “have rendered us a great service.”22 Indeed, exporting 
Yugoslav self-management had become an internally legitimising agent for the Yugoslav 
state and a useful domestic political tool.23 Cheysson also believed that developing 
relations with Yugoslavia “will be very enriching in light of your experience as a socialist 
state, independent, close to the Third World and a neighbour to the Soviet bloc.”24 
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Moreover, Yugoslavia’s position within, and at the head of, the NAM provided France 
with a useful ally through whom it could gain valuable insights into Third World relations; 
the Third World formed an important part of Mitterrand’s foreign policy. France’s position 
within the Western bloc, but aloof of NATO’s integrated military command, could offer 
Yugoslavia a useful insight into Western strategy and politics. The parallels between the 
two states, and the potential benefits of an improved relationship, were not lost on either 
side. 
Cheysson’s most substantial meeting was with his opposite number, Josip Vrhovec, 
with whom he had a clear and amiable discussion on matters of convergence and 
disagreement. Earlier in the year Vrhovec had met Cheysson during a visit to Paris where 
the Yugoslav Foreign Minister expressed his happiness that the PS had been elected and 
the two men established a warm relationship.25 As French attitudes towards the USSR had 
hardened with Mitterrand’s arrival in the Élysée, the issues of the “New Cold War” 
dominated discussion between the two Foreign Ministers. Given the context, East-West 
issues featured heavily in the discussions. Cheysson highlighted that the new government 
wanted to develop close relations with Eastern Europe and enquired about the socialist 
bloc’s response to the unfolding crisis in Poland. Vrhovec, perhaps subtly referencing 
European interference in Yugoslav internal affairs, highlighted that, “The best service we 
can offer the Poles is to leave them to resolve their own problems. Any interference could 
only worsen the situation. Economic aid, this is a good thing.”26 
Poland’s economic situation paralleled that of Yugoslavia in the early 1980s, hence 
Vrhovec’s thinly-veiled recommendations. Therefore, in a separate meeting, the Yugoslav 
Prime Minister Veselin Đurarnović raised the issue of economic aid with Cheysson. Since 
the 1973 Oil Crisis the Yugoslav economy had been faced with increasing inflation and a 
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massive balance-of-payments deficit. Đurarnović had previously forewarned of serious 
impending economic problems.27 By 1980 Yugoslavia was suffering a major external debt 
crisis and had reached a deficit of $420 million to France, whilst three quarters of 
Yugoslavia’s deficit was towards the EEC.28  
One issue that remained highly contentious between Yugoslavia and the EEC was 
the observation of the 1980 Cooperation Agreement. When the EEC and Yugoslavia 
concluded the agreement key Yugoslav agricultural products, in particular veal, were to be 
protected, whilst the EC was granted the Most Favoured Nation clause. Đurarnović 
complained that Yugoslav beef exports had suffered as a result of the agreement and that 
the EC was not observing the spirt of the agreement. However Cheysson highlighted that 
the Yugoslav deficit vis-à-vis the EEC was nearly $3 billion and that sales of veal barely 
passed $80 million.29 The French Foreign Minister suggested that Yugoslavia could engage 
with the external market in more novel and enterprising ways than it was at the time, 
highlighting that the EEC imported nearly $2 billion of maize annually from the US and 
that Yugoslav tourism and industrial products were poorly advertised and unknown in 
Europe. Đurarnović admitted that the time for change had come before Western Europe 
closed off its markets to Yugoslav exports.30 Truly,Yugoslavia stood at a crossroads in the 
early 1980s. 
Following the success of Cheysson’s visit, Michel Jobert, now the French Minister 
for External Trade, led an industrial mission to Yugoslavia that sought to redress the trade 
balance between France and Yugoslavia and to develop Yugoslav exports to France. Of 
course, it was Jobert, in his capacity as Pompidou’s Foreign Minister, who had cancelled a 
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visit to Yugoslavia in 1974.31 This visit, however, was far more successful. Accordingly it 
was announced that the state-owned Électricité de France would begin to source certain 
materials from Yugoslavia.32 Further cooperation was envisaged in the energy industry as 
the cost of importing energy had greatly impacted the Yugoslav economy and, in this 
respect, greater energy self-sufficiency would bring down high import costs and help to 
redress the balance-of-trade. Yugoslavia possessed an abundance of lignite and therefore 
envisaged a programme to construct thermal power plants that would produce an extra 
1000 megawatts in the following ten years. The French company Alsthom-Atlantique was 
interested in the project and was negotiating partnerships with the Croatian enterprise Rade 
Končar to construct alternators and with the Serbian enterprise Minel to construct furnaces. 
33  There was also a Yugoslav nuclear power programme under consideration that would, 
by the year 2000, provide at least 2500 megawatts. The Franco-American nuclear company 
Framatome was going to provide expertise whilst Alsthom-Atlantique would provide 
conventional equipment.34  
Previously, the Middle East had been highlighted as a potential area for Franco-
Yugoslav industrial cooperation during the presidency of Giscard d’Estaing.35 In a bid for a 
contract on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Croatia, the Directorate for Eastern 
Europe advised that if Framatome cooperated with Yugoslav enterprises, particularly 
Yougoatomenergo in its construction projects in Iraq, then it would improve the bid’s 
chances.36 Thus the deteriorating situation in the Middle East in the early 1980s was an 
area wherein the two states’ interests often converged. 
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Therefore, during a UN meeting on disarmament in New York in June 1982, the 
Foreign Ministers met to discuss largely the subject of the Iraq-Iran war. Cheysson sought 
to use his amiable relationship with Mojsov to discuss the recent NAM conference in 
Havana and the Movement’s views on, and approaches towards, the conflict.37 Lazar 
Mojsov revealed that French views largely corresponded with the participants’ and that he 
had tried to convince the Iranians and Iraqis to soften their positions, lest the conflict lead 
to a “chain reaction in the Gulf and provoke an intervention by the two Super Powers.”38 
French and Yugoslav attitudes also converged over the ongoing disputes between 
Chad and Libya. France, who had intervened on the side of Chad, was pleased to hear that 
the Yugoslavs had been encouraging Tripoli to “adopt authentically non-aligned 
positions.”39 Both Ministers were also keen to underline the importance of the 
Organisation for African Unity, whilst Cheysson highlighted France’s support of the 
Organisation due to France’s preference for “regional structures that allow, without 
external intervention, the finding of solutions in different localities and regional security 
arrangements.”40 France’s preference for regional solutions became highly pronounced 
during the early phase of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.  
 
Political Émigrés: A Thorn in the Side of Franco-Yugoslav Relations 
In spite of early causes for optimism for Franco-Yugoslav relations in the Mitterrand and 
post-Tito era, the issue of Yugoslav political émigrés remained problematic. Following the 
aforementioned case of Émile Guikovaty, a further French journalist was expelled from 
Yugoslavia in November 1981. Kosta Christitch, the Head of Foreign Politics for Le Point, 
was visiting Yugoslavia to report on the visit of Claude Cheysson. However, on the night 
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of 21 November he was called in his hotel and in the morning was put aboard the next 
flight for Paris.41  
In France, the Quai conveyed its disappointment over ‘l’affaire Christitch’ to the 
Yugoslav Ambassador. The Yugoslavs responded that Christitch, who had previously been 
prohibited from entering Yugoslavia, had been expelled because “of contact he had made 
with characters from the opposition.”42 A spokesman for the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry 
declared that Christitch “had abused Yugoslav hospitality and by starting to meet with 
elements of the opposition, it demonstrates that his intentions in coming to Yugoslavia 
were outside of the visit of Cheysson.”43 
Following the death of Tito and the riots in Kosovo the previous year, the Yugoslav 
authorities were particularly sensitive to political dissidents. They were concerned that the 
Yugoslav émigré community in France was trying to destabilise the regime from abroad. A 
group of political émigrés in Paris planned a demonstration outside the Yugoslav embassy 
in Paris on 13 June 1981. The Yugoslavs requested that the demonstration be banned and 
that a greater security detachment be assigned to the Yugoslav Ambassador in the 
following days. The request was meant to be passed to the Cabinet for consideration. It 
was denied, although increased security was provided. The Yugoslav representative could 
not comprehend why France would authorise such a demonstration of “terrorists from 
abroad who openly call for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.”44 However, the 
demonstration was allowed to proceed and around 200 people – comprised mainly of 
Kosovo Albanian and Croatian émigrés – gathered in Place Victor Hugo draped in the 
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Albanian Flag and the flag of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska, NDH).45 
  The Yugoslav émigré population in France caused great concern for Belgrade, 
especially given the federal republic’s sensitivity to terrorism against Yugoslav 
representatives abroad. There were about 15,000 Yugoslav political émigrés in early 1980s 
France. The most notable diaspora in this respect were Ustaše – members of the Croatian 
fascist movement in power during World War II – of which thousands were dispersed 
around the world notably in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the US and 
Australia; it was estimated there were around fifty in France.46  
Given the number of opposition groups that were proliferating abroad, the 
Yugoslav authorities had begun attempting to oversee all economic emigration to prevent 
further opposition being mounted abroad. They were also trying to ‘survey’, which the 
Quai noted was double entendre for ‘eliminate’, leaders of the opposition.47 Several émigré 
Croatian separatist groups had emerged over the preceding two decades and were among 
the world’s most prolific terrorists.48 Indeed, they carried out two prominent attacks in the 
previous year: in July the Yugoslav Ambassador in Brussels had been attacked and a 
member of his family had been murdered in August; and there had been bombs set off in 
Munich and Frankfurt.  The French noted that, in this respect, the Yugoslav authorities 
were not averse to using extreme methods: namely abduction or assassination.49 
Throughout the preceding two decades the Yugoslav secret police had carried out a 
number of kidnappings or executions across Europe.50 This is what the French authorities 
                                                     
45 TD BELGRADE 221, 15 June 1981, AD, 1930INVA/5715, YOU-13-3. 
46 MRE, Sous-Direction d’Europe Orientale, Note A/S: Activités de l’émigration politique en France., 18 
November 1981, AD, 1930INVA/5715, YOU-13-3. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Tokić, Mate Nikola. “The End of ‘Historical-Ideological Bedazzlement’: Cold War Politics and Émigré 
Croatian Separatist Violence, 1950-1980”, Social Science History 36, no. 3 (Fall, 2012), 422. 
49 MRE, Sous-Direction d’Europe Orientale, Note A/S: Activités de l’émigration politique en France., 18 
November 1981, AD, 1930INVA/5715, YOU-13-3. 
50 Shain, Yossi. “The War of Governments against their Opposition in Exile”, Government and Opposition 
24, no. 3 (July 1989), 354. 
 60 
presumed happened in the case of Mate Kolić, who was killed on 19 October 1981 in 
Cachan in Paris’ southern suburbs.51 The Quai concluded that vigilance for these potential 
acts needed to be maintained and that, although the Yugoslavs could exaggerate the threat 
of their political opponents, the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia justified the 
French authorities’ particular attentions in this area.52 
The French authorities were particularly vigilant with regards to a certain Mirko 
Vidović. A Croat raised in the small village of Bila in present-day BiH, he had become a 
French national in 1971. He returned to Yugoslavia in 1972 where he was condemned to 
six years in prison for anti-regime activities: “propaganda hostile and offensive to 
Yugoslavia and its President”; and “enemy activities in liaison with terrorist émigré 
organisations.”53 However he was released, following “difficult negotiations” between the 
French Foreign Ministry and the Yugoslav authorities, on the eve of the visit of Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing in December 1976.54 Upon his release, Belgrade was given strong 
assurances by France that Vidović would cease his anti-Yugoslav activities. Nonetheless, 
he published an article describing his experiences in a Yugoslav jail in 1977 and in 1980 he 
was elected the President of the Croatian National Council (Hrvatsko narodno vijeće, 
HNV) - the main opposition-in-exile to the Yugoslav regime.55 The Yugoslav authorities 
consistently lobbied the French to keep watch over Vidović’s activities.  
The Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris highlighted that it appeared entirely contrary to 
the spirit of Franco-Yugoslav relations that a French citizen should be at the head of an 
organisation that openly calls for the destruction of Yugoslavia.56 Moreover, Vidović was 
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making public demonstrations against the Yugoslav regime: he participated in a 
demonstration outside the Yugoslav embassy on 13 June 1981 and delivered a speech to 
the assembled crowd.57 The Quai made a request to the Ministry of the Interior to approach 
Vidović to ask him to behave like a French citizen, “loyal to his host country”.58 This issue 
needed to be treated delicately however, as no acts of terrorist violence, to the knowledge 
of the French, could be attributed to Vidović.59 Although, owing to the Yugoslav 
authorities’ extreme sensitivity on the matter, it was in France’s best interest to avoid, as 
far as possible, any activity that may embarrass the Yugoslav authorities and threaten 
Franco-Yugoslav relations. 
A problem thus emerged for the French authorities when Vidović wrote to the Paris 
Police Prefect requesting that the HNV be allowed to hold a meeting in a Parisian Hotel in 
December 1981. On 20 November 1981, the Minister for the Interior, Gaston Defferre, 
wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to ask for his opinion on authorising such a 
meeting, noting that the meeting posed no danger to public security. However, the Quai 
was concerned that it would have ramifications for Franco-Yugoslav relations. A reply 
followed on 24 November highlighting that, even if some of the HNV’s members seemed 
moderate, they nonetheless possessed a doctrine that called for the dismemberment of 
Yugoslavia and the creation of a free Croatian, non-socialist, state.60 The effects of such a 
meeting taking place in France would have dire consequences for Franco-Yugoslav 
relations since the Yugoslav authorities would take the granting of any such meeting that 
would destabilise the internal balance of Yugoslavia as a “real and grave provocation.”61  
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An attack against a group of Yugoslav workers in Brussels, which left two dead 
and three injured, highlighted how seriously the Yugoslav authorities took the matter. They 
heavily criticised the Belgian authorities’ attitudes towards the crimes that had been 
perpetrated against Yugoslavs on Belgian soil. Belgrade criticised the Belgian government 
and declared that this attack “seriously compromised relations between Belgium and 
Yugoslavia.” Furthermore, they were even more surprised that “contrary to what one may 
think, no serious measure had been taken on behalf of the Belgians.”62 The attacks against 
Yugoslavs in Belgium over the preceding year had led to a cooling in relations between the 
two countries and the Yugoslavs were taken aback by the Belgian authorities’ lax attitude 
towards anti-Yugoslav activities on their soil.63 
Accordingly, the Quai was against authorising such a meeting in France.64 
However, it appeared that the message did not reach Vidović who appeared on Swiss 
television claiming that he had been granted the authorisation to hold a meeting of the 
HNV in France.65 Perturbed by this turn of events, the Yugoslavs insisted to the Quai that 
the HNV was a fascist organisation and included 13 war criminals amongst its ranks.66 It 
appears that until 30th December 1981, the meeting was scheduled to take place in Paris.  
The Yugoslavs sent an aide-mémoire regarding the activities of the HNV and its 
constituent groups to the Quai.67 It highlighted several incidents of terrorism that had been 
attributed to the group in the preceding five years including the attempted assassination of 
a Yugoslav vice-consul in Lyon in 1975.68 Indeed, experience had taught the Yugoslavs 
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that, following such meetings, there was an increase in terrorist and subversive activities 
against the Yugoslav regime. Therefore they called on the French authorities to prevent the 
HNV meeting and to stop Vidović from undertaking any further anti-Yugoslav activity in 
France.69 Shortly thereafter, Vidović decided to move the meeting, scheduled to take place 
at the Hotel Arcade in the 15ème arrondisement, to New York.70 Although Vidović cited 
economic reasons for the decision - much of the Croatian émigré community lived in the 
US, Canada, Australia and Argentina - it was evident that the pressure from the French 
authorities had forced Vidović to relocate the meeting.71 
The Yugoslavs continued to pressure France to maintain surveillance over its 
political émigrés. Therefore, in an effort to better coordinate their security efforts, the 
Minister of the Interior, Gaston Defferre, visited Yugoslavia and held conversations with 
his counterpart, Stane Dolanc, and the Prime Minister, Milka Planinc. Dolanc appealed for 
French vigilance of Yugoslav political émigrés.72 Indeed, further anti-Yugoslav activities 
appeared to be emanating from France: Mirko Vidović once more envisaged holding a 
press conference in Paris on 19 March, which had originally been planned for Brussels; 
and the Albanian émigré community had produced a Memorandum that it had delivered to 
the European Parliamentary Assembly with the support of French Deputy Gérard Israél, 
who had supported other anti-Yugoslav actions.73 Furthermore, the Croatian émigré 
community envisaged celebrating the 41st anniversary of the creation of the NDH on 10 
April 1982.74 The Yugoslavs expressed their concern, particularly regarding the Croatian 
communities and potential attacks in France, and hoped that the French authorities would 
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do their utmost to prevent them. Dolanc also added that there could be no doubt that if the 
perpetrators of the Brussels attack were traced to France they would pursued br with all the 
vigour that was allowed.75 
Two further leaders of the HNV were believed to be traveling to Paris to talk with 
Vidović: Mate Meštrović – son of the famous sculptor and designer of the Monument à la 
reconnaissance de France in Belgrade’s Kalemegdan Park – and Ivan Jelić. A press 
conference would then be held at the Hotel Niko on 19 March with an estimated 60 
journalists in attendance. Furthermore, the HNV had recently declared that it intended to 
establish a permanent office in France and they would seek an audience with the Quai’s 
representatives.76 The Yugoslavs warned the Quai that, if the HNV were allowed to 
establish an office and hold a press conference, then it would have “negative 
consequences” and “be a source of difficulties and problems” between the two countries.77 
Yves Pagniez assured the Yugoslav authorities that the seriousness of this request would 
be transmitted to the relevant French authorities but also highlighted that, although France 
was absolutely committed to preventing terrorism, one of its guiding principles was the 
freedom of speech. The Yugoslavs were disappointed and thought the propaganda 
activities of the HNV were the first step towards violence.78  
France held to its principles and allowed the press conference to take place. The 
Yugoslav authorities stated that this affair could have very serious consequences for 
Franco-Yugoslav relations and that its population and politicians found it difficult to 
understand that a French socialist government would take this attitude, which could weigh 
heavily on the two countries relations. Indeed the Yugoslavs even went so far as to 
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describe it as “a serious political provocation.”79 They warned their French counterparts 
that, “in France, especially on the Left, as so often in the West, there exists a naive 
romanticism in the name of human rights that allows the Vidovićs, Jelićs or Meštrovićs 
who want a return to the past that our countries fought against.”80 
A further anti-Yugoslav demonstration took place in Paris on 3 April 1982. The 
Paris Prefect had authorised the demonstration without informing either the Ministry of the 
Interior or the Quai. Approximately 100 Albanian demonstrators met at Place Victor Hugo 
before setting off towards the Yugoslav embassy, at 54 Rue de la Faisanderie, whilst 
carrying anti-Yugoslav banners. En route they stopped for speeches on the Rue de 
Longchamp where they were joined by Croatian émigrés, some of whom had travelled 
from Belgium. The demonstration was daubed with more than twenty Albanian flags and 
six Croatian ones. Moreover, they also destroyed and trampled on Yugoslav flags whilst 
shouting “murderers”, “Liberate Kosovo!” and “Yugoslavs = Gestapo!”81 
Following these various incidents, Harris Puisais, an official representative of the 
Quai, met with Ambassador Popovski on 13 April 1982 to discuss the state of Franco-
Yugoslav relations. Popovski was concerned that France had allowed both the HNV press 
conference and the demonstration to take place. Popovski recalled a document from 1972 
that declared that “groups that advocate the violent overthrow of the Yugoslav 
government… will be systematically refused the right to set up subsidiaries in France, 
where they have none in existence or no legal structures.”82 The Foreign Ministry 
responded that at its core this agreement had not changed but the recent meetings had not 
threatened public safety in France. 
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The Yugoslav press were clearly irritated that Albanian and Croatian émigrés were 
allowed to hold a demonstration in front of the Yugoslav embassy in Paris and openly 
questioned the French authorities’ decision to allow such a demonstration to take place. 
The Yugoslavs complained that France had not understood the true motives of the 
demonstrators “to protest against the constitutional order of an ally.”83 The separatist 
movements had been effective and had achieved a certain level of divergence between the 
two countries. 
 
From U-Turn to Downturn 
1983 was a watershed year for the Mitterrand experiment and, by extension, Franco-
Yugoslav relations. Mitterrand made a famous intervention in the FRG Bundestag on 20 
January 1983 in support of the deployment of NATO missiles. In doing so, Mitterrand 
implicitly supported the under-pressure Chancellor Kohl and disavowed the German 
Socialists.84 Although Mitterrand had attempted to define a nuanced stance in his support 
of ‘Euromissiles’, its subtlety was lost on many and he was wrongly labelled as an 
“Atlantacist”.85 Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs, not wanting to repeat the rupture of 1974, 
remained quiet on the issue but its preference for disarmament was abundantly clear.86 
Mitterrand’s move away from a European socialist path was completed in the 
spring of 1983. Following a vast nationalisation programme based upon traditional 
Keynesian economics in 1981, it soon became evident that Mitterrand’s expansive 
economic policy was incompatible with the ongoing global recession and cohesion to the 
European Monetary System (EMS). After painful deliberations and three devaluations of 
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the franc apropos the German mark, the Socialists decided to stay with the EMS in March 
1983 and instead embarked upon a course of rigeur (austerity). It was a truly spectacular 
U-turn that marked the abandonment of the 1981 economic programme. France was 
therefore set on a course towards participation in a Single Market, rather than a Common 
Market, and the Socialists wholeheartedly embraced the European project.87 Yugoslavia, 
with its continuing problems vis-à-vis the EEC, consequently became a diminishing 
interest for Mitterrand’s France. Similarly Yugoslavia embarked on a course of prescribed 
austerity as it sought to implement reforms required by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). These two factors would necessarily affect Franco-Yugoslav economic relations. 
Therefore, Mitterrand’s visit to Belgrade in 1983 was not as significant as the 
Yugoslavs had originally hoped. The President’s visit allowed the two countries to clarify 
points of convergence and divergence. However, it resulted in few concrete measures and 
Mitterrand’s priority was an improvement of France’s cultural presence in Yugoslavia. 
Even this was proving difficult given the budgetary restrictions that both states were 
facing, as evidenced by the closure of a French cultural centre in Split and a reduction in 
the number of education grants offered to Yugoslavs.88 Furthermore, a formal Franco-
Yugoslav cultural group that had been discussed had not met in the intervening months and 
only informal contacts had been made.89 
One area that remained fruitful was military cooperation. From 10 to 12 October 
1984, Charles Hernu, French Defence Minister, visited Yugoslavia to meet his opposite 
number, Admiral Branko Mamula, with whom he enjoyed a warm relationship.90 A joint 
Franco-Yugoslav venture to construct a fighter jet was discussed between Hernu and 
Mamula in October 1984, which would be produced by 1995. The French company 
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Dassault would work in partnership with the Yugoslavs who wanted to produce the fighter 
on their own soil.91 For Mamula the modernisation of the Yugoslav army was essential and 
accordingly he discussed several measures with Hernu.92 Mamula also expressed a desire 
that Yugoslavia should become an arms exporter and sought France’s help in this respect 
as Franco-Yugoslav cooperation already existed in arms manufacturing. Nonetheless, the 
relationship between France and Yugoslavia was weakening. Furthermore, Mitterrand’s 
foreign policy had begun to take shape in 1984 as he renewed the Franco-Soviet 
relationship and strong support for the European project. Yugoslavia was being left behind 
in France’s vision for Europe.  
The French authorities were beginning to privilege domestic business over its 
Yugoslav partners. The Société Européen de credit foncier et de banque, sought to claim 
reparation for goods lost after World War II totalling 145,261,307 Francs.93 The Legal 
Adviser to the Yugoslav Ambassador stated that the 1950 Franco-Yugoslav Accord 
definitively acquitted Yugoslavia and therefore demanded that the French authorities put 
an end to the procedure. 94 The case had the potential to greatly upset relations. Although a 
judge eventually resolved the matter in favour of the Yugoslav state, the ‘pro-business’ 
stance taken by the ostensibly ‘socialist’ French government soured relations between 
France and Yugoslavia. 
Notwithstanding the cooling in the Franco-Yugoslav relationship, the Yugoslavs 
continued to look to France as their connection with the EEC. The Yugoslav Ambassador 
to France, Boris Snuderl, sought out the Director of Europe at the Quai d’Orsay to discuss 
the re-examination of the agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia.95 Snuderl hoped 
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that France might use its influence to help ensure better access to the Common Market for 
Yugoslav agricultural and industrial products. The Director for Europe recalled that, as had 
been mentioned in a previous meeting, the decision did not rest with France but with the 
community itself.96 Snuderl warned that commercial exchanges with the EEC had 
produced a $500 million deficit for the first six months of the year. Therefore, 
Yugoslavia’s exchanges with EEC would diminish in favour of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON).97  
A French abstention in a vote on Yugoslavia’s request to join the Resettlement 
Fund of the Council of Europe as an associated member added to the Yugoslavs’ rancour. 
The decision of the French greatly irked the Yugoslavs, as it prevented them from 
participating in discussions on the distribution of the Fund.98 France noted that relations 
between Yugoslavia and the EEC had been damaged when a European Investment Bank 
loan for 380 million European Currency Units (ECU) to Yugoslavia was turned down 
following German, British and Dutch opposition, and an outright refusal from Denmark.99 
Although France had been open to the loan it had to accept the commission’s proposal of 
ECU5 million to be given to Yugoslavia for cooperation.100 However, this was the extent 
of France’s support for Yugoslavia, as French diplomatic energy in the East was being 
diverted towards the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev and Mitterrand became a strong 
proponent of a renewed East-West détente.101 
The change in political course by the Mitterrand administration and Yugoslavia’s 
increasing international isolation had a significant impact on the relationship. Furthermore, 
the change of Foreign Ministers, firstly in Yugoslavia and then France, altered the dynamic 
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of the relationship. Claude Cheysson and Lazar Mojsov had enjoyed an amiable 
relationship. The Quai had described Mojsov as a “brilliant and eminent man, with whom 
the contacts of M. Cheysson were frequent and fruitful.”102 His successor, Raif Dizdarević, 
was considered “an apparatchik without stature and a rigid dogmatic, of the most orthodox 
type.”103  
The Quai noted in 1985 that Franco-Yugoslav relations had lost some of their 
substance. Contact between ministers had plateaued owing to the internal problems that 
Yugoslavia faced and its need to maintain a low profile on the international stage. 
Commercial exchanges were also suffering, which affected bilateral relations. Yugoslavia 
was unable to fulfil its financial obligations towards France. An agreement to construct 5 
Airbus 320 had also fallen by the wayside owing to the level of compensation demanded 
by the Yugoslavs and the refusal of France’s other partners in the Airbus consortium to 
consent to the credits for the project.104 Similarly the previously successful Renault-IMV 
venture had encountered problems owing to the Slovenian enterprise’s poor economic 
situation. Dizdarević bemoaned the IMF’s attitude towards rescheduling Yugoslavia’s 
debts and that he was no longer satisfied with the discussions in Brussels regarding the 
agreement between Yugoslavia and the EEC.105 
In this respect, the Yugoslavs continued to look to France for support in its efforts 
to rebalance its economy and improve its relations with the EEC. On 4 July 1985, during a 
visit to Belgrade as co-President of the Committee for Franco-Yugoslav economic 
cooperation, the Director for Europe at the Quai met with a representative of the Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry. The Yugoslavs were disappointed that the volume of commercial 
exchanges between the two countries did not fulfil its potential, which they blamed on 
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“certain specific restrictions” limiting the access of Yugoslav goods to France and, more 
widely, Europe.106 Indeed, the IMF had necessitated that Yugoslavia open its markets to 
foreign investment and, having done so, it was now faced with the protectionism of the 
EEC. In this context, France had been supportive of Yugoslavia and supported the renewal 
of the financial protocol between Yugoslavia and the EEC, as it had done with the question 
of rescheduling Yugoslavia’s debt.107 However, the IMF measures produced few positive 
effects as inflation and unemployment continued to grow in Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia thus began to show serious signs of economic and political strain. The 
Serbian Communist Party had failed to make a convincing case for recentralisation to its 
partners in the SKJ. Thus, the Serbian intellectual elite seized on the issue of Kosovo in 
1985 and harnessed it as a political tool to revive nationalist politics.108 Defending the 
Kosovo Serbs became a cause célèbre of the Serbian intelligentsia, championed in 
particular by Dobrica Ćosić, culminating with the infamous leak in September 1986 of the 
‘Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts’. The Memorandum, which 
highlighted Serbia’s perceived victimisation throughout Yugoslavia’s history, provided 
Serbian nationalism with “its ideological and popular foundations.”109 Shortly thereafter, 
Slovenian intellectuals published a nationalist programme of their own in Nova revija 
entitled ‘Contributions to a Slovenian National Programme’. The two documents shared 
many similarities and provided significant momentum to the centrifugal forces that sought 
to dissolve Yugoslavia. However, Slovenia was largely ethnically homogenous and 
Yugoslavia’s Slovenes were concentrated in their titular republic. The ‘victimised’ Serbs, 
on the other hand, were scattered throughout the Socialist Federal Republic, which would 
have dramatic consequences as nationalism became the driving force in Yugoslav politics. 
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As Yugoslavia faced political crisis, France was experiencing a political novelty: 
cohabitation. The legislative elections of March 1986 had brought Jacques Chirac and the 
Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) to power. This would remain the case until May 
1988. This unprecedented situation created a bitter power struggle between Mitterrand and 
Chirac for the control of France’s foreign policy.110  Much of the initial momentum for 
links between Yugoslavia and France had been driven by the Parti Socialiste, rather than 
by the President himself. Accordingly, without a Socialist in the Quai, the Franco-
Yugoslav relationship plateaued as Yugoslavia turned inwards. 
As Mitterrand’s first presidential term came to an end, and he prepared for an 
electoral campaign against Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, the President’s diplomatic 
advisers warned that the growth of nationalisms in Yugoslavia was “very 
preoccupying”.111 Furthermore, it had significant consequences for the economy too as 
Croatia and Slovenia complained that they contributed too much towards the development 
of other republics and provinces. With inflation above 170% and external debt surpassing 
$20 billion, the Socialist Federal Republic was in a dire situation.112  
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Chapter Three – France and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, May 1988-January 
1992. 
 
“Two Contradictory Emergencies” 
On 15 May 1989 Yugoslavia ushered in its latest, and final, collective Presidency with the 
Slovene, Janez Drnovšek, as its President and the Serb, and close Milošević ally, Borisav 
Jović as his Deputy. It marked the end of the “generation of partisans” who had ruled 
theretofore.1 Without this shared experience and common cause, the political landscape in 
Yugoslavia became even more fractious.  
In Slovenia, the population became increasingly set against the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija, JNA) following the arrest and imprisonment of four 
young journalists; the so-called ‘Slovenian Spring’.2 Immediately, the Serbian President 
Slobodan Milošević condemned the “antidemocratic” tendencies in Slovenia.3 Accordingly 
the Conference of the SKJ at the end of May set the Serbs against the other republics; this 
attracted the Elysée’s attention. The diplomatic unit (cellule diplomatique) thought that the 
SKJ had been in decline since Tito’s death and was being progressively discredited by its 
inability to manage the economic and constitutional crisis.4 The Elysée’s analysis added 
that the SKJ was also increasingly the victim of “strong nationalist agitation, mainly at the 
instigation of the Serbs, and the leader of the League of Serbia, Mr. Milošević, whose 
nationalist and demagogic ideas are not without echoes.”5 
Over the summer of 1988, the worsening economic situation provided a fertile 
breeding ground for Milošević’s nationalist ideas, which became far bolder as he sought to 
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oust political opponents in Serbia’s autonomous provinces and Montenegro through so-
called ‘Rallies of Truth’. However, in France, the nature of Milošević’s ambitions and 
politics were hard to discern and Le Monde reflected that he was a “Serb by nationality, he 
is at the same profoundly Yugoslav.”6 This seemingly Balkan reformist had even been one 
of the founders of the Banque Franco-yougoslav in Paris.7 Therefore, the Yugoslav 
Ambassador in Paris, Božidar Gagro, sought to reassure the French that the situation in 
Yugoslavia was not as grave as the ‘Rallies’ suggested.8  
Following demonstrations orchestrated by Milošević’s supporters in the 
Montenegrin capital of Titograd at the beginning of October, the East-European 
department in the Quai became increasingly concerned by events in Yugoslavia. Jacques 
Faure, a diplomatic adviser, wrote an extremely prescient report on Yugoslavia’s 
trajectory: “National antagonisms constitute an ancient evil in Yugoslavia. However their 
expression until now has remained within reasonable limits. Owing to the social and 
economic crisis, they are resurfacing in an irrational and worrying way.”9 Faure warned 
that, “Milošević, by stoking the traditional nationalism of the Serbs, has thrown himself 
into verbal escalation on the theme of the situation in Kosovo” and rightly believed that 
Milošević could seek to revoke the powers of Vojvodina and Kosovo.10 Furthermore, he 
thought Milošević’s attacks against federal institutions revealed his ambitions at a federal 
level. Although the opposition to Milošević was slowly organising itself, the outbreak of 
greater-Serb nationalism worried the other republics and could, in case of trouble, bring 
into question the cohesion of the entire federation.11 Faure thus thought that the other 
republics would cede Kosovo to Milošević in the hope they could contain his ambitions to 
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There were further voices in France calling for vigilance of the Yugoslav situation. 
In the National Assembly, Deputy Charles Ehrmann, who had made two trade visits to 
Yugoslavia in the last decade, highlighted the plight of the Balkan federation. Ehrmann 
rightly indicated that Yugoslavia was experiencing more than just an economic crisis: 
“This crisis is also moral, with numerous financial scandals [most notably the Agrokomerc 
scandal]. It is taking an ethnic hue, pitting Serbia, the most populated republic, against 
other republics.”13 He wondered: “All these violent internal movements do they not 
jeopardise stability in the Balkans, and maybe peace in Europe? Need I remind you that in 
1914 it was in Sarajevo that the war began”.14 Ehrmann appealed to the Foreign Minister, 
Roland Dumas, to do more to support Yugoslavia. In response, Dumas revealed the line 
that the French government would pursue until the summer of 1991: “France intends to act 
to help Yugoslavia in this difficult period, without wanting to intervene in its internal 
affairs.”15 Milošević had suffered a minor setback at the Seventeenth Session of the Central 
Committee of the SKJ on 17 and 18 October, as one of his allies was given a vote of no 
confidence.16 Dumas thus thought that the Central Committee had “rejuvenated itself” and 
could restore order to the country.17 The Foreign Minister argued that France could do no 
more for Yugoslavia than it was presently and would continue to maintain trade and 
political dialogue. He reassured the Assembly that “this country, close to us in history and 
in what it represents, is at the heart of our concerns.”18 
However, the information that Roland Dumas received from the French foreign 
ministry policy planning staff (Centre d’analyse et de prévision, CAP), and that continued 
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to inform his analysis, was faulty.  Following its mission to Yugoslavia in November 1982, 
the CAP reflected that the “fundamental problems of Yugoslav society are the same as 
those of the Sovietised eastern countries.”19 Yugoslavia was not encouraged by the 
hypothetical extension of the EEC adding that it “seems to feel at home in isolation.”20 The 
CAP mission did not truly reflect the state of things in Yugoslavia and it appears that the 
Yugoslavs sought to deflect unwanted attention towards the need for Western Europe to 
“help Gorbachev”.21 Unlike Faure, CAP did not see cause for concern in Milošević’s rapid 
ascent. Milošević, they suggested, had near unanimity on the Kosovo question but his 
authoritarian and centralising tendencies were criticised or ignored.22 However, the report 
lamented that, “Whilst all recognise the weakness of federal power, nobody is committed 
to demanding political reform based on strengthening central power, whether or not Serb. 
This political deadlock is no explanation whatsoever of the current nationalist ferment.”23 
In spite of this evident crisis, CAP believed: “Paradoxically, the prevailing impression is of 
relatively large internal political stability. Neither of the two pillars of Yugoslavia 
[Communism and Federalism] are being called into question.”24 
However, those close to the President offered a slightly less optimistic view 
regarding the Federal Republic’s prospects. Jean Musitelli, then a diplomatic adviser in the 
Elysée, rightly warned that: 
 
The factors of the crisis have amplified. Eight years after his death, Yugoslavia 
is still Tito’s orphan. The dilution of central authority, the resurgence of 
national antagonisms, the arrival on the scene of a Serb leader with a populist 
and authoritarian tone (M. Milošević), the continuing economic stagnation 
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(inflation at 200%, worrying debt of $20 billion), all provide a worrying 
backdrop.25 
 
However, CAP’s view, certainly more than Musitelli’s or Faure’s, seemed to be in 
keeping with the international community’s analysis of events in Yugoslavia. Given the 
reformist aspirations of Mikhail Gorbachev – whom the West, and France, were 
enthusiastically courting – it was tempting to see Milošević in the same mould.26  
By the summer of 1989, the Serbian President had replaced the Communist 
leaderships in both autonomous provinces and Montenegro. His programme faced the 
greatest resistance in Kosovo, where riots once more erupted. Following the imposition of 
martial law in the southern autnomous province, Milošević installed a puppet and forced 
through constitutional change that revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina under the 1974 constitution. Of the eight votes in the Federal Presidency, the 
Serbian President could now confidently control four. Milošević’s ‘coronation’ came on 
the six hundredth anniversary of Serbia’s defeat to the Ottomans on 28 June 1989 at 
Kosovo Polje in front of over a million Serbs. Le Monde compared the event to a mix 
between “the ‘Fête de l’Huma’ [Fête de l’Humanité, the annual festival of the French 
Communist Party] to the power of 10 and a papal homily in a mystical land.”27 In this 
curious atmosphere, Yugoslavia’s highest political echelons watched on as the Serbian 
President addressed the assembled crowd: 
 
Serbs in their history have never conquered or exploited others. Through two 
world wars, they liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped 
others to liberate themselves. The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget 
that at one time we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into 
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battle undefeated. Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They 
are not armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet.28 
 
 Serb authorities pressured the Croatian authorities to authorise an imitation event in 
the town of Knin in the Krajina region. Although the Croatian authorities, hitherto notable 
by their silence, hoped to defuse the tension by acquiescing, the overt nationalism of the 
Serbs provoked strong public reaction in Croatia.29 Further Serb demonstrations erupted 
throughout Croatia in the summer of 1989, stoking a dormant, yet potentially virulent, 
Croatian nationalism.  
Within less than a fortnight of the Serbian President’s battle cry at Kosovo Polje, he 
gave an interview in Le Monde advocating market economics as the panacea for 
Yugoslavia’s ills. With the Federal President due to visit Paris as part of the bicentennial 
celebrations of the French Revolution, the Serbian President did not want to be usurped on 
the international stage by the Slovene Janez Drnovšek. To a Western liberal and capitalist 
audience, the Serbian President’s westernising rhetoric was evidence that Yugoslavia was 
experiencing the same phenomenon as the rest of Eastern Europe. 
 
We need fundamental reform and there can be no economic reform without 
political reform. We support the rehabilitation of the market because the 
market is the only democratic mechanism that can evaluate work. If there is no 
market, the bureaucracy will remain the arbiter, who fixes prices, decides your 
value, and that of others and your business, which has led us to an impasse. 
The Yugoslav system, which created the crisis, also encouraged separatism. 
Not just in the republics but also in enterprises, in the famous ‘worker-based 
organisations’, amongst communities, regions. This separatism is especially 
harmful in the relations between republics, which are practically states, and 
have widely different national structures. This separatism has contaminated the 
whole of our society.30 
 
 By blaming Yugoslavia’s problems on its economic model, Milošević was able to 
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cast himself in the role of a Balkan reformist, a wise move given the political popularity of 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Only a recentralisation of state power, he argued, could curb separatist 
enthusiasm in Yugoslavia’s republics and repair the federation’s broken economy. 
Slovenia, the most economically advanced Yugoslav republic, resisted this centralisation 
drive and proposed constitutional amendments that would provide it with the right to 
secede and an insurance policy against Serb hegemony.31 
 As history ‘accelerated’ in the second half of 1989 – Gorbachev announced the end 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Berlin Wall fell – Serbia and Slovenia openly clashed 
over the future direction of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav President, Janez Drnovšek, was 
invited to the bicentennial celebrations of the French Revolution, which Borisav Jović, 
Milošević’s man in the Federal Presidency, tried to prevent.32 Drnovšek reflected that: 
“Clearly the Serbs were interested in preventing me from having contact with Europe and 
the West.”33 Indeed, the Yugoslav President used the opportunity to make contacts 
amongst the multitude of heads of state and government present in Paris, including 
François Mitterrand. Slovenia reformed its republican constitution, which led to fierce Serb 
protestations. Drnovšek also spoke with Mitterrand’s former Finance Minister, and 
President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors with whom he discussed future 
integration into the European Community.34 In a press conference before he left Paris, 
Drnovšek emphasised his European orientation and preference for competition in markets 
and politics.35 
There was one final glimmer of hope for a unified Yugoslavia: the economic 
reforms of the Prime Minister Ante Marković. Marković, a Bosnian Croat, had been the 
CEO of ‘Rade Končar’, one of the firms that had benefitted from Franco-Yugoslav 
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economic cooperation in the preceding decade. He ascended to the Premiership in March 
1989 from a list of six candidates including Milošević and Kučan.36 Throughout 1989, 
Marković undertook delicate austerity measures seeking to halt Yugoslavia’s rising 
inflation. The measures, whilst effective in certain areas, failed to halt the climbing 
inflation and Yugoslavia was gripped by hyperinflation in September 1989. Marković 
sought to embark on a more radical course of ‘shock therapy’ shaped by the ideas of the 
US economist Jeffrey Sachs who had worked with the Solidarność government in 
Poland.37 
Amidst this rampant hyperinflation and socioeconomic crisis, the French Prime 
Minister, Michel Rocard, visited Yugoslavia. Ahead of his visit he boldly declared that 
“there is a pump to be primed and a political signal to be given.”38 Rocard, who had made 
several previous visits to Yugoslavia, reflected that:  
 
It is important for us to show the Yugoslavs, on one hand, and French public 
opinion, on the other, that we are not abandoning Yugoslavia. Under the 
impression that the events in Poland and Hungary are accelerating, it could 
seem that we have neglected you. This is not the truth.39  
 
The Matignon believed that for the Yugoslavs to rebalance their economy, the 
Yugoslavs “must accept a level of ‘recentralisation’ of the economy so that the central 
power can intervene with greater efficacy.”40 Le Monde accurately reflected the French 
position on the conditions France would attach to any aid: “For help in the same way as 
Hungary and Poland, you will have to, in turn, make new steps towards democracy by 
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considering free elections for example.”41 
During a one day visit, Rocard’s most substantial meeting was with his Yugoslav 
counterpart, Ante Marković. The visit was a particular coup for the Federal power, and 
particularly Marković and Drnovšek, as the French Prime Minister’s scheduled meeting 
with Milošević was cancelled. Rocard revealed that he and Marković shared a 
“surprisingly similar analysis” of the crisis of communism in Eastern Europe.42 He 
suggested that Yugoslavia continue to move towards “political liberalism” but also a 
“certain intensification of powers of the executive”, particularly in economic matters.43 In 
this respect, Rocard reflected, Yugoslavia faced “two contradictory emergencies”.44  
France had suspended all ‘supplementary’ aid to East European countries until they 
made further steps towards democracy; Yugoslavia was included in this category. The 
Yugoslavs hoped that France, and the other countries of the EEC, would be able to offer 
“more concrete support” and reinforce exchanges and investments in Yugoslavia. 
However, France’s support had clear and well-defined limits. Rocard offered France’s 
backing in Yugoslavia’s negotiations with the IMF and declared that France was prepared 
to “intensify not only exchanges but also cooperation.”45 However, this would not come at 
the expense of France’s developmental aid to the ‘South’, particularly as Yugoslavia 
required “intelligent cooperation” rather than subsidies.46 
Shortly after his meeting with Rocard, Marković announced a “draconian austerity 
plan” during a special session of the Yugoslav Assembly on 18 December 1989. Seven 
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new dinars – 1:10,000 against the old currency – were fixed against one deutschemark.47 
Furthermore, prices and imports would be liberalised although the price of vital services 
would remain centrally administered. The reforms would also create greater accountability 
at a regional level to uncover corruption. This ‘shock therapy’, which would increase 
unemployment, was intended to bring inflation back down to 13%.  In spite of the harsh 
propositions, it appears that the civilian population was broadly supportive of Marković’s 
reform package.48 However, it faced tremendous resistance in two areas: firstly, from the 
entrenched conservative political elites, particularly in Belgrade, who held key decision-
making positions in the distribution of federal funds, which maintained their power base; 
and the decentralising powers in Slovenia and, increasingly, Croatia were resistant to any 
drives for centralisation. 
 With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid acceleration of events at the end of 
1989, François Mitterrand was greatly concerned that the ‘Europe of Yalta’ would be 
replaced by the ‘Europe of Sarajevo’.49 Therefore, rather unexpectedly and unbeknownst to 
his collaborators, Mitterrand proposed a new institutional framework for Europe during his 
New Year’s speech, proposing a ‘European Confederation’.50 Roland Dumas reflected: 
 
It must be said that, at that date, François Mitterrand had only one fear: that 
Europe would return to the heartbreak of 1919, with a multitude of microstates, 
in poorly drawn borders, unable to curb explosions of national violence that he 
dreaded above all. This is what he saw was fatally on the horizon of the 
Yugoslav drama. With a Confederation, in a political and legal framework, 
flexible and light-touch, he thought that European countries – all European 
countries and not only those of Central and Eastern Europe – could help to 
maintain the delicate balance of peace.51 
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François Mitterrand seemed amply aware of the impending crisis in Yugoslavia and 
hoped that, by tying it into a multilateral framework and creating a pan-European 
institution, he could dissipate the threat of resurgent nationalism. As Frédéric Bozo notes, 
France faced a conundrum: how could European construction be opened to the East 
without diluting the process?52 A two-tier system that would allow a period of transition 
towards greater integration was Mitterrand’s vision. Evidently, the proliferation of smaller 
states would prohibit this evolution and, would in fact, reinforce Mitterrand’s analysis that 
Europe was in fact heading back to 1919. Although Mitterrand’s Confederation proposal 
ultimately failed in the face of resistance from East European countries who pursued an 
alternative ‘third way’, it was present in French foreign policy planning for Eastern Europe 
until summer 1991.53 
The Fourteenth Congress of the SKJ in January 1990 would have done little to 
assuage Mitterrand’s fears. As the Slovenes and Croats pushed for constitutional reform 
towards greater decentralisation – with multiparty elections in the two republics slated for 
the spring of 1990 – they were consistently thwarted by the Milošević bloc. The writing 
was on the wall for the Slovenes who walked out of the Congress en masse, followed in 
short order by the Croatian contingent. The SKJ had lost its political monopoly in 
Yugoslavia and both Slovenia and Croatia would now look to reconfigure their relationship 
with the federal structure.    
France was concerned about the implications of the latest developments in 
Yugoslavia, both economically and politically, but it continued to offer practical support. 
During an inter-ministerial meeting on 26 January 1990, the French Finance Minister 
revealed that he intended to approach the Yugoslav authorities for negotiations in light of 
Yugoslavia’s latest political and economic developments. France also envisaged offering 
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financial support to Yugoslavia. The USSR owed Yugoslavia some $2 billion, which the 
French proposed to loan to Yugoslavia so that they could import goods from the USSR and 
could therefore recuperate a part of the $2 billion.54  
The Federal authorities were actively reaching out to Europe in the hope that it 
could help with Marković’s reform package. Indeed, the “Yugoslavs vigorously put 
forward the view that the Community was paying insufficient attention to Yugoslavia 
compared to other East European countries.”55 In fact, “They considered that Yugoslavia 
should receive priority as the beginner of reforms and a country outside a bloc.” 56 
However the final quarter of 1989 through 1990 was marked by a proliferation of historical 
events: the unification of Germany; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent US-
led response; and the rapid retraction of the Soviet Union. With the Elysée firmly in charge 
of foreign policy, and suffering from personnel deficiencies, its resources were stretched 
thin.57 Indeed, France was not alone in this respect, with advisers and leaders throughout 
Europe struggling to keep pace with the speed of events. 
The reunification of Germany, rather than the potential dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
was the major European preoccupation in 1990 and it consumed a great deal of French 
diplomatic energy. Although France was initially surprised by the pace of events leading 
towards German reunification, its President did not attempt to hinder or impede the course 
of events.58 He sought to carefully manage the course of events and tie German unification 
into a European framework. Tried and tested successfully with Germany, this became the 
Mitterrandienne modus operandi for managing the dissolution of Yugoslavia. That the US 
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abdicated any responsibility in relation to Yugoslavia cleared the way for a European 
solution.59 
 
‘We would like Yugoslavia to remain Yugoslavia’ 
France welcomed Yugoslavia’s move towards democracy. Although it remained 
preoccupied by humanitarian issues in Kosovo, it hoped the evolution towards democracy 
would help defuse the problem.60 The elections in Slovenia on 25 April returned a majority 
for the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratična opozicija Slovenije, Demos) 
coalition with Milan Kučan elected as President. The elections took place in generally 
good spirit as the Slovenian Communist Party lost its grasp on power in Yugoslavia’s 
westernmost republic. Slovenia now proposed a confederate form for Yugoslavia, which 
the election victors in Croatia also supported. The Croatian elections, however, were a far 
more tense business.  
The Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) won the 
elections there on a platform of resurgent Croatian nationalism. Its leader, and newly 
elected President, Franjo Tuđman was a historian by training and a fierce nationalist in his 
politics. He was a Croatian reflection of the politics that Milošević and Ćosić had 
reinvigorated in Serbia. Croatian Serb communities were alarmed by the HDZ victory and 
greatly concerned that they would become stranded in an independent Croatia; its direct 
historical precursor had been deadly for vast numbers of Serbs. The Federal Government 
therefore sought to disarm the north-western republics. Since 1968, Territorial Forces 
(Teritorijalna Obrana, TO) were established in each republic in case of Soviet invasion. 
The federal government ordered the JNA to remove the arms from republics. 
Consequently, both the Croats and Slovenians began to arm clandestinely. 
                                                     
59 Glaurdić. Hour of Europe, 81. 
60 MAE, Situation en Yougoslavie, 20 April 1990. Accessed on 24 August 2015. 
http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.  
 86 
The Croatian Serbs coalesced around an ethnically based political party created in 
Knin: the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS). By the end of July, 
under the impulsion of Milan Babić, a dentist from Knin, the Croatian Serbs had created a 
Serb assembly in Croatia and announced that it would hold a referendum on Serb 
sovereignty in August. Ahead of the referendum, the JNA started transferring arms from 
the republican TOs to SDS supporters in the Krajina region. The Tuđman government 
declared the referendum illegal and attempted to seize control of local police stations on 17 
August. This was the first armed confrontation between the Croatian government and the 
Krajina Serbs.61 As the JNA intervened Tuđman backed down and withdrew. The Krajina 
Serbs established roadblocks and sealed the Krajina. The referendum proceeded and led to 
a near unanimous vote of autonomy for the Croatian Serbs.62 These events were, however, 
superseded in international attention by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and their significance 
was underestimated by the international community. 
Borisav Jović, a close associate of Milošević, succeeded Drnovšek as the Yugoslav 
President. Both he and Milošević began to consider altering borders with the support of the 
JNA to incorporate those territories in Croatia that were populated by ethnic Serbs.63 
Amidst this escalation, Jović travelled to Paris in November 1990. There he held a meeting 
with François Mitterrand. The French President expressed his concern to Jović that 
Yugoslavia would dissolve and feared that it was “a great danger to see a series of 
nationalities explode. In place of 32 or 33 states, we would have double!64”. Although this 
preference stemmed from Mitterrand’s vision for Europe, it was a clear indication to the 
Yugoslav President that France was against the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Mitterrand then 
inadvertently indicated that France, and Europe, would not intervene in Yugoslavia’s 
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affairs giving carte blanche to Jović and Milošević. The President told his Yugoslav 
counterpart that: “Only you can find a solution balancing the attachment to the Federal 
State and the respect for nationalities. These are extremely difficult problems. We have 
followed what has happened in Slovenia, in Kosovo.”65 However, the solution that Jović 
and Milošević had was a Yugoslavia under Serb hegemony, which was entirely 
incompatible with minority rights. Mitterrand remained concerned by the situation in 
Kosovo but reflected that: “It’s an internal problem, we will not intervene. It is not 
desirable that existing countries burst into several pieces. These problems must be 
exacerbated by economic problems?”66  
Whilst there was undoubtedly an economic crisis in Yugoslavia, it was a distant 
second to the threat posed by the ethno-political storm that was brewing between Croatia 
and Serbia. Mitterrand had indicated that he was prepared to allow the Yugoslav Federal 
authorities – whose actions in Kosovo he had already condemned – to find a solution 
internally. The events of 1990 had distracted France from the crisis in Yugoslavia and the 
significance of this tacit statement was missed. The election of Slobodan Milošević in 
December 1990 in Serbia’s elections only strengthened his power, and resolve, to create a 
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. In response the Croatian Sabor promulgated a new 
constitution providing for the right to secession and Slovenia held a successful referendum 
on its own eventual independence at the end of June 1991. The two north-western 
republics therefore preferred a move to a confederal arrangement for Yugoslavia, whilst 
Serbia remained the bastion of unified centralism. 
The prospects for 1991 were, therefore, grim. The situation was exacerbated by a 
financial scandal wherein the Serb government had taken $2 billion from federal funds, 
scuppering the federal government’s budget.67 With Marković’s economic reforms 
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spluttering, and the north-western republics withholding a large amount of the federal 
contributions, the financial scandal further highlighted the need for independence to the 
domestic populations of Slovenia and Croatia. However, with France participating in 
Operation Desert Storm and Yugoslavia holding the Presidency of the NAM in early 1991, 
France remained in close contact with the Yugoslav authorities and was therefore reluctant 
to involve itself in its internal affairs.68 
Simultaneously, the crisis was mounting in Croatia as the Federal Government 
demanded the Croatian police force disarm and relinquish its weapons within ten days. 
Following crisis talks in Belgrade, armed conflict was averted as the Federal Presidency 
voted against a proposal by the JNA to use military force in Croatia. Tuđman publicly 
announced that “we were on the brink of civil war, the Yugoslav army had been mobilised 
in Croatia, put on a war footing, our militia too.”69 Milošević realised that Yugoslavia 
could not be salvaged but he would ensure that the Serb territories in Croatia would remain 
within his reconfigured Federal Republic.70 The Serb President revealed to Western 
Ambassadors in Belgrade that he was prepared to relinquish Slovenia and, possibly, 
Macedonia, but he would be prepared to use force to maintain control of territory where 
Serbs lived.71 
The EC continued to support Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity as those who warned 
against Yugoslavia’s potential violent demise were believed to be too alarmist.72 The US 
was becoming increasingly concerned about the situation in Yugoslavia and encouraged 
the Europeans to be more pro-active in attempting to regulate the crisis. The EC’s attention 
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had been drawn to the crisis unfolding in Yugoslavia and it agreed to send a ‘Troïka’ to 
Belgrade.73  
  Aware that the situation was escalating, Tuđman wrote to Mitterrand in an appeal 
to turn France’s “attention to the situation in Croatia and in Yugoslavia, to support a 
peaceful and equitable dialogue between the Yugoslav republics to encourage the creation 
of a democratic union.”74 Similarly the Slovenes had been speaking to Dutch officials and 
had made it abundantly clear that they would become independent and called for the 
conflict to “internationalised”.75 At the end of February, BiH proposed creating an 
“asymmetrical republic” that would allow Slovenia and Croatia to increase their autonomy 
whilst those republics that wished to remain in a more centralised federation could do so.76 
However, Mitterrand instructed his government officials and Ambassadors to refrain from 
communicating with the republican leaders in an effort to dissuade disassociation.77 
Any inventive or dynamic solution to the Yugoslav crisis was soon bulldozed by 
the events of early March. Clashes between the Croatian police and Serb reservists in the 
town of Pakrac in eastern Croatia, led to accusations in Belgrade of the “Massacre of 
unarmed people” by a “fascist terror”, whilst Zagreb called the Serbs “bandits” and their 
leaders “bolsheviks and manipulators.”78 Tuđman accused Serbia of attempting to 
destabilise Croatia and warned that “Communist forces aspire to provoke incidents that 
would prevent the normal rotation of the presidency and therefore the appointment of the 
Croatian Stipe Mesić to the head of state on the 15 May… This is why there will be many 
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more troubles between now and 15 May.”79 However, the next major troubles erupted not 
in Croatia, but in Belgrade. 
Over the first quarter of 1991, opposition to Milošević had been growing amongst 
the liberal population of Belgrade. Led by Vuk Drašković, and his Serbian Renewal 
Movement, a demonstration on 9 March 1991 – attended by tens of thousands in the 
capital’s central square Trg Republike – called for press freedom, liberalisation and 
democratisation.80 Milošević and Jović ordered, with the acquiescence of the Federal 
Presidency, the deployment of JNA forces in the Serbian capital and the arrest of 
Drašković. However, rather than quelling the demonstrations, it led to an escalation.  
Milošević’s rule was, for the first time, significantly threatened. He called on 
Borisav Jović – as Federal President and Commander-in-Chief – to call a ‘state of 
emergency’ through Yugoslavia; this would enable him to pressure the Slovenes and 
Croats with the federal army. The JNA General Veljko Kadijević, the Minister for 
Defence, urged the Presidency to agree. The General knew that neither East nor West 
would be prepared to intervene in the event of a military takeover. In discussions with JNA 
General Blagoje Adžić, France had made it clear that it would not be opposed to such a 
move.81 The JNA was, however, unprepared to act unconstitutionally and would not launch 
a coup without the required authorisation. Milošević and Jović realised that they would not 
be able to achieve their ethno-territorial aim of uniting all Serbs in a Serb-led Yugoslavia. 
The Serbian President declared that the “The Republic of Serbia will no longer recognize a 
single decision reached by the Presidency under existing circumstances because it would 
be illegal.”82  
The March events revealed that Milošević’s popularity had rapidly declined but, 
more pertinently, that he was prepared to use force to maintain Serb unity, even against 
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domestic opponents. In attempting to declare a ‘state of emergency’, the Serbian President 
had also demonstrated his desire to use the JNA to secure his military aims in Slovenia and 
Croatia. His opponents in Slovenia and Croatia became increasingly vigilant and made 
defensive preparations. 
 In France, the seriousness of events had not passed unnoticed. The Minister for 
European Affairs, Elisabeth Guigou, revealed the government’s response to the events in 
Yugoslavia in an interview for RMC-L’Express. The Minister was asked “if the army 
intervenes to restore order, can we allow events to unwind without reacting?” Guigou’s 
answer was indicative of France’s reading of Yugoslavia’s predicament: 
 
We hope we will not get there, obviously! Firstly, we have called for this 
internal crisis to be regulated through dialogue and consultation. Basically, 
today in Yugoslavia we have the explosion of a situation that is well-known: 
it’s a country composed of six republics, two autonomous regions, three 
religions. So it is a country that has always lived in a form of fragmentation. It 
is a country where Communism tried to, precisely, tack on an artificial unity. 
So it is this artificial unity we see exploding today.83 
 
 The problems in Yugoslavia in fact reinforced the Mitterrandienne interpretation of 
the evolution of Eastern Europe. The rhetorical device that Yugoslavia was an experiment 
bound for inevitable failure would be frequently deployed over the course of the Yugoslav 
conflict. Dejan Jović has described this as the “Ancient Ethnic Hatred” argument and is 
quite right to note that it “ought to be rejected in any form.”84 Unfortunately, this was the 
interpretive prism through which Mitterrand understood the crisis in the Balkans. To an 
extent, the media also reproduced this discourse, as Le Monde described Yugoslavia as a 
“70 year stillbirth”.85   
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Rather, it was economic and political disenchantment with the Yugoslav state that 
led to political protests in the 1980s through to the early 1990s. The Serbian and Slovenian, 
and later Croat, elites harnessed these demonstrations against their republican rivals, 
constructing their respective populations as ‘others’.86 It was an extremely cynical but 
effective tactic which eventually ethnicised political debate. However the idea that 
populations in the Balkans are inherently destined to conflict with one another is 
intellectually lazy, and a highly questionable foundation for political policy.   
Despite this point of departure, France sought to dilute the problems in Yugoslavia 
by incorporating its minority problems into a multilateral framework. Elisabeth Guigou 
revealed that: “I think that what we are seeing in Yugoslavia is a concentration of all the 
difficulties we see in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe… it shows us how urgent 
it is to create a multilateral framework where all these Central and Eastern European 
countries, who are ultimately confronted with the same problems can meet and try and 
move past and overcome minority problems”.87 This multilateral framework was 
Mitterrand’s idea of a European Confederation. Although Guigou suggested a means to 
manage the crisis, it was still predicated on the idea that Yugoslavia would remain unified. 
However, Milan Kučan wrote to Mitterrand declaring the Slovenes’ intention to 
leave the Yugoslav federation. Kučan informed Mitterrand that “Yugoslavia as it is 
recognised and experienced today has no future.88” Kučan hoped “to achieve an agreed 
dissolution of the old state and to find a path of common interests and possibilities to a new 
relationship in a community of sovereign states, appropriate to the new realities, and 
especially a coexistence based on economic rather than ideological grounds.”89 The 
Slovenes’ preference for independence was clear.  Nonetheless, an EC declaration at the 
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end of March maintained its preference for a unified Yugoslavia and declared that “a 
unified and democratic Yugoslavia has the best chance of integrating into the new 
Europe.”90  
At the end of March, Milošević and Tuđman held two private meetings, whilst the 
six presidents of the Republics held the first of a series of negotiations on the country’s 
future. Whilst the republican-level discussions produced little, the results of the meeting 
between the Croatian and Serbian Presidents were far more significant. Tuđman thought he 
had secured a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with Milošević and that Croatia “was going to be 
bigger than ever”.91 This expansion would, of course, come at the expense of BiH, which 
sits precariously between Serbia and Croatia.92  
Amidst these events Mitterrand met the enfeebled Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante 
Marković, whose star had somewhat fallen as he had been systematically sidelined by 
Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia over the preceding six months. The discussions between the 
two men in London on 15 April, were focussed on Yugoslavia’s economic problems.93 
Although Marković’s economic reforms had made notable progress, the refusal of the 
republics to contribute to the federal fund had undermined the Prime Minister’s efforts. 
Events had quickly overtaken the Prime Minister over the course of the spring of 1991 and 
his influence over Yugoslavia’s future had become negligible. 
In spite of the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, tensions continued to heighten in Croatia 
as the Krajina Serbs clashed with the Croatian police force in Plitvice National Park. In 
response, the Krajina Serbs and the newly formed Serb Autonomous Oblast of Slavonia 
declared their secession from Croatia claiming to be an integral part of Serbia. The JNA 
positioned itself as an interposition force, but it was evidently a foil for the Krajina Serb 
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police chief Milan Martić and the Krajina Serbs to prepare for war. The Krajina Serbs 
ramped up their defences, which resulted in a violent clash between Serb irregulars and 
Croat police forces in the town of Borovo Selo on 2 May; twelve Croats were killed and 
over twenty wounded. It became quickly apparent that the worthiness of the ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’ between Milošević and Tuđman was commensurate to their own levels of 
‘gentlemanliness’: non-existent. The Croats and Serbs started to clash openly after the 
events of Borovo Selo and Milošević’s supporters blocked the ascension of the Croat 
Borisav Jović to the Yugoslav Presidency on 15 May. Four days later, Croatia voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of independence in a referendum. The significance of which was 
entirely obvious: Yugoslavia had de facto ceased to exist. 94 
The Quai started to consider the possible outcomes of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. Jacques Faure, believed that: “1. the maintenance of the federal state appeared 
doubtful 2. the collapse of the country - with violent jolts - could surface at any moment… 
but is not inevitable; 3. A confederation is not impossible.”95 However during the visit of 
Ante Marković on 23 and 24 May, France’s foreign policy players publicly behaved as 
though Yugoslavia was not experiencing an existential crisis. Guigou told Marković that: 
 
France understands and encourages your efforts. They constitute probably a 
reasonable basis of an agreement between the peoples of Yugoslavia. France is 
convinced, this you know, that it is up to the Yugoslavs and them alone, 
through political dialogue, to stay away from internal and external interference 
and determine the future shape of their state. This richly diverse unified state is 
the partner that Europe expects. It is also indispensable to a balanced 
development in the Balkans and the continuation of inter-Balkan cooperation.96 
 
 Marković still clung to the feint hope that Yugoslavia could be salvaged but it 
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would require far greater assistance from the international community than it had seen 
theretofore. As Pierre Morel noted, France “had spared no political gestures of support to 
Yugoslavia.” 97 Indeed, France’s support was for a unified Yugoslavia, which could then 
be better incorporated into Europe. The Prime Minister Edith Cresson asserted that 
“Yugoslavia cannot be part of Europe unless she remains united.”98 However, Marković 
had hoped for more concrete support from France and made an impassioned plea for 
greater assistance: 
  
The factors of disintegration are at work in Yugoslavia, factors which are 
mostly a cause of the external economic sphere but that have direct and 
powerful repercussions. We understand the reasons for the international 
community’s concern. Equally, we understand that a greater integration of 
Yugoslavia in the European Community, which we seek, is dependent on a 
number of conditions. However, this should not bring into question at this 
moment the understanding, solidarity and material aid of the international 
community and France towards us. Moreover, it seems to us that the principle 




Marković hoped to negotiate an aid package for Yugoslavia  and thought it would 
be a clear political message to reinforce the authority of the central government vis-à-vis 
the republics. France, it was noted, had supported without reservation the principle position 
that had been stopped by the European Council in Dublin, which recognised the calling of 
all Central European countries (except Albania) to benefit from an association 
agreement.100 France had also demanded that the commission begin formal negotiations no 
later than the beginning of the next year. 101 Although France was extending support to 
Yugoslavia, it had certainly not singled it out as a special case and it would be treated as 
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part of the evolution in Eastern Europe. Mitterrand’s approach was to create a framework 
for the evolution of Eastern Europe, and this equally applied to Yugoslavia. 
At the end of May, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, 
alongside the President of the European Council, Jacques Santer, undertook a mission to 
Belgrade. They offered the Federal Government economic assistance if Yugoslavia could 
satisfy four criteria: (1) a single market, currency and central bank; (2) a single army; (3) a 
common foreign policy; and (4) shared human and minority rights system.102 However, 
Yugoslavia had already passed the point of no return on many of these points and the 
proposal was dismissed.103 
Although France, and other Western European countries, continued to express their 
preference for a unified Yugoslavia, the newly reunified Germany was becoming 
increasingly concerned by the evolution of events. Mitterrand and German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl sent a joint message to the Yugoslavs calling on them to accept the 
Europeans’ conditions and to relaunch political dialogue.104 The French alterations to the 
declaration were few, but demonstrated French priorities. France wanted to ensure that the 
issue of minority rights was included in the speech, which had been excluded: the German 
draft read, “the strict respect of Human rights for all citizens”, whilst the French read “the 
strict respect for Human rights and guarantees for the minorities”.105 France’s alterations 
demonstrated one of its major preoccupations: minority rights. Indeed, Mitterrand had long 
pondered whether, in fact, a unified Yugoslavia was compatible with “the respect for 
minorities”, having previously told Borisav Jović that, “that’s the whole problem.”106 
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Slovenia’s secession from Yugoslavia therefore presented a lesser problem than 
Croatia’s. A mostly ethnically homogenous republic, the Yugoslav authorities revealed that 
they had conceived a strategy to allow for the eventual exit of Slovenia from the federation 
on 26 June 1992. The JNA would be used to reinforce the external borders of Yugoslavia, 
but also to reinforce the power of the federation to the remaining republics. As such it 
would send a clear message to Croatia and BiH. Nonetheless, Ante Marković continued to 
hope that the European Community would dissuade all the republics from the temptation 
of separatism.107 
The international community was still not prepared to relinquish the idea of a 
unified Yugoslavia, which was reaffirmed one week before Slovenia’s declaration of 
independence. The CSCE Council declared that it was committed to democracy, unity and 
territorial integrity in Yugoslavia.108 Germany, however, was beginning to argue for the 
recognition of Slovenia and in a meeting of the EC’s twelve Foreign Ministers on 23 June, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher appealed for the immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia; 
he stood alone.109 The EC would not extend international recognition to Slovenia and 
Croatia and neither would the US who, like France, thought that recognition “would 
constitute a grave danger for Europe.”110 Roland Dumas gave a clear indication of France’s 
response:  
 
This is a region that throughout its history has been a powder keg, the Balkans. 
It is here where World War I originated. We believe that any dismemberment 
of the Yugoslav state risks leading to a period of instability, conflicts, that 
could lead to the resurgence of old quarrels, local internecine strife, and for 
now, throughout the West and everywhere in the world, the views that are 
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expressed are in favour of maintaining the federal state… Slovenia and Croatia 
are saying that they want to try and find a new institutional arrangement.111 
 
 The US Secretary of State James Baker publicly declared that the US would not 
recognise Slovenia and was “ready to help Yugoslavia on the condition that its internal 
situation normalises.”112 Similarly, Jacques Attali, a former adviser to Mitterrand and the 
President of the European Bank for Development and Reconstruction, told Belgrade that 
he was favourable to the maintenance of a unified Yugoslavia. He believed that “divisions 
and scissions are synonyms of under-development” adding that “If Yugoslavia wants to 
cooperate with us, we will help.”113 
On 25 June 1991 both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence and 
sovereignty. The following day Milan Kučan wrote to Mitterrand to announce the adoption 
of the “Constitutional Charter on the Independence and Sovereignty of Slovenia”. In his 
letter he stated that “The Republic of Slovenia wishes to develop and promote profitable 
relations with your country, founded on respect and mutual interests.” He continued: “the 
Republic of Slovenia wishes to establish diplomatic relations with your country as soon as 
possible.”114 However, Slovenia, and Croatia, would wait over six months before France, 
and the EC, would grant de jure international recognition. 
 
‘The Phony War’ 
True to France’s diplomatic dispatch at the beginning of June, the JNA moved to secure 
Yugoslavia’s borders under the authorisation of Marković; without a President or supreme 
commander of the JNA, the decision fell to the Prime Minister: Ante Marković. The 
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Slovenian President, Milan Kučan ordered the Slovenian territorial forces to surround the 
JNA and cut off supplies to their barracks. On the afternoon of 27 June, the Slovene forces 
shot down a helicopter over Ljubljana whilst it was en route to resupply a nearby barracks. 
Slovenia had declared war on the JNA.115 
The US abdicated all responsibility as the US Secretary of State James Baker felt 
the Europeans should take charge arguing that, “they will screw it up and this will teach 
them a lesson and teach them to burden share.”116 Europe was overly confident in its 
ability to solve the crisis in Yugoslavia. Fortuitously, the EC Council had scheduled a 
meeting for 28 June and there decided to dispatch a ‘Troïka’ of EC Foreign Ministers to 
Yugoslavia: Jacques Poos, Gianni de Michelis and Hans van den Broek. At the European 
Council meeting Mitterrand told the trio of Foreign Ministers that they “must remind the 
authorities in Belgrade that we are in favour of the unity of Yugoslavia and that if the 
violence continues, community aid will be suspended.”117 The Luxembourg Foreign 
Minister Jacques Poos optimistically declared “This is the hour of Europe, not the 
Americans!”118 
During the course of the European Council meeting, the Troïka flew to Belgrade 
and then Zagreb to hold emergency meetings. The trio demanded: (1) a resolution of the 
presidential crisis; (2) the suspension of the declarations of independence for a period of 
three months; and (3) the army’s return to its barracks.119 The Troïka returned victoriously 
to the EC Council meeting, boasting of their success. Mitterrand was not as triumphalist 
and recalled that the EC was monitoring the situation and its economic aid was dependant 
upon this monitoring.120 The President told the Council that “Only force or law can prevent 
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certain federal republics from moving towards autonomy. It needs to be the law.”121 
Mitterrand’s caution was well-placed: almost immediately the ceasefire failed.  
On 30 June Milan Kučan sent a telegram to Mitterrand to announce that the JNA 
had violated the EC Troïka brokered ceasefire. He appealed to the French President: “In 
order to avoid furtherbloodshed [sic] and the brutaldestabilization [sic] of central Europe, it 
is most important for the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia to begiven [sic] 
international politivcal [sic] support, and in this connection, the earliest international 
recognition of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia is of crucial 
importance.”122 Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would transform the JNA into an 
invasion force under international law and the Iraq example, just one year previously, had 
demonstrated the international community’s response to invasion. The scrambled nature of 
the telegram only reinforced the seriousness of the situation in Slovenia. 
The Troïka flew back to Belgrade on 30 June chastened by their previous 
experience. The EC also employed an arms embargo against the whole of Yugoslavia in an 
attempt to demonstrate a unity of purpose behind the Troïka. In Belgrade, the three Foreign 
Ministers pressured the Federal Presidency to elect Stipe Mesić as its President, having 
blocked it since 15 May. Milošević, who needed to bring the army back under civilian 
control, tactfully made it seem as though this would be a major concession on his behalf. 
Therefore, Hans van den Broek declared that he would make a public statement on behalf 
of the EC in support of Yugoslavia’s unity; Europe would be supporting Milošević’s 
nationalist programme! With Mesić installed as President, the Troïka once more left 
Yugoslavia. Again the ceasefire failed to hold and the fiercest fighting theretofore erupted 
between the JNA and Slovenia’s TO.123  
Amidst this renewed fighting, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign 
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Minister, called on the CSCE to establish an observation mission to ensure that the 
ceasefire agreed on 1 July was respected. Genscher had just returned from a CSCE mission 
to Yugoslavia, as Germany held the chairmanship of the organisation. An action under its 
auspices suited Germany who would be better equipped to influence policy there rather 
than under the Dutch Presidency in the EC. However, as Yugoslavia itself was a member 
of the organisation decisions could not be made against its wishes.124 The CSCE was 
essentially a dead-end forum for dealing with the Yugoslav crisis at this point. 
Roland Dumas called on the Yugoslavs to respect the principles of the CSCE and 
the Paris Charter, amidst “the current tragedy that could wake old divisions and conflicts 
from the past.”125 The Foreign Minister also recalled that “France recognises two essential 
principles that are maintaining the integrity of states and self-determination of peoples.”126 
These two issues would be highly problematic in solving the Yugoslav crisis, particularly 
with regard to Croatia and BiH. 
Pierre Morel, diplomatic adviser to Mitterrand at the Elysée, was talking 
extensively with France’s partners about the Community’s next move. Genscher, who had 
been in Yugoslavia, relayed a message from Stipe Mesić that there had been a military 
coup d’état in Belgrade and argued that the EC should offer immediate recognition to 
Slovenia and Croatia. Indeed, the French Defence Minister noted that all the major 
command posts in the JNA had been given over to Serbs in the preceding days.127 In the 
face of this Serb attempt to hegemonise Yuoglsavia’s federal apparatus, the French 
Ambassador in Germany, Serge Boidevaix, reflected that Bonn was increasingly under 
pressure from public opinion to recognise the two republics. Genscher was in regular 
telephone contact with the two republics and sought to ensure they would cooperate with 
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the EC.128 Morel advised Boidevaix to underline the fact that “bringing the unity of action 
of the Twelve into question will have grave consequences.”129 As such Genscher kept his 
CSCE partners abreast of what was occurring in the EC negotiations, not wanting the EC 
to become the main forum for international mediation of the crisis. 
Significantly the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek – with whom 
Genscher had disagreed profoundly over German unification – was opposed to the 
recognition of both republics. The Netherlands held the Presidency of the EC for the 
second six months of 1991 and it would therefore play a significant role in the 
Community’s policy. This was a recurring feature throughout the crisis: the Community 
(or later Union) member that held the Presidency held significant sway over the direction 
of policy.130 Similarly, the US shared the Dutch preference for a unified Yugoslavia as 
Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates told Morel that “the US continues to desire 
a unified Yugoslavia”.131 Its recent change in tone, which had grown firmer, regarding the 
Federal Authorities was only intended to demonstrate to Belgrade that you could not 
command unity through the force of arms.132 
In light of the above, and given France’s own priorities, Roland Dumas advised that 
France should argue for prioritising a ceasefire, call for the withdrawal of forces and a 
moratorium on independence to restore political dialogue. In the meantime, the EC should 
not alter its position and reaffirm the Troïka’s mandate.133 Moreover, Dumas envisaged 
sending observers under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU), which 
would require authorisation from the CSCE in its forthcoming meeting. The French 
Foreign Minister envisaged two possible configurations for this observation initiative: a 
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lightly equipped team or an intervention force with armoured vehicles that could be in situ 
within eight days.134 
 At the meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers on 5 July, the Community demanded 
an immediate ceasefire threatening the immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia if 
the Belgrade authorities failed to comply. To demonstrate their determination, the 
Community placed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and froze economic aid to the country. 
France immediately undertook the necessary steps to implement this decision.135 During 
the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Dumas, and British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, 
sought to contain Genscher and secure a three month moratorium on independence. 
Notwithstanding, they also made important concessions towards the German position: 
primarily the threat of recognition, the right to self-determination, and acknowledgment 
that a “new situation” had arisen.136 The Troïka was once more dispatched to Yugoslavia 
and concluded an agreement with the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the island of Brioni. 
The EC would send a Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to Yugoslavia whilst negotiations on 
the future of Yugoslavia would take place over the following three months.  
As Hans van den Broek secured the Brioni agreement, Tuđman warned: 
“congratulations, but beware: this was Slovenia, but the next one is Croatia.”137 Indeed, 
what the Europeans failed to realise was that the Slovenian conflict represented the last 
violent jolts of an army still attached to a federal and unified Yugoslavia. Chastened and 
embarrassed by its experiences in Slovenia, it would thenceforth be far more pliable with 
regards to Milošević’s goal to create a Greater Serbia in coordination with the Krajina 
Serbs. 
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‘The Yugoslav Crisis could break the European Community’ 
With the conclusion of hostilities in Slovenia, Jacques Blot, the Director for Europe at the 
Quai d’Orsay, undertook a visit to Yugoslavia. During his conversations there, all his 
interlocutors expressed the opinion that there was no longer the basis for a federal 
Yugoslavia.138 Indeed, the Foreign Minister, Budomir Lončar, thought that the best that 
could be hoped for was a union of sovereign states, although he added there was no longer 
a basis for dialogue. Therefore, Blot thought it likely that Milošević and Tuđman were 
secretly studying a readjustment of boundaries.139  
Nonetheless, the priority was still preventing a resurgence of war in Slovenia and 
Blot thought that France could “make discrete contacts with the federal army wherein there 
are officers who were trained in France.”140 On military matters, Blot also revealed that 
Jacques Delors had spoken with the NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner who said 
that NATO was “neither ready nor prepared to act.”141 This was still clearly a European 
problem. 
France was certainly concerned about the implications of the Yugoslav crisis for 
Europe. Accordingly the head of the CAP, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, reported on the 
consequences of the crisis in Yugoslavia for the construction of Europe warning that it 
could lead to the “lebanonisation” of Europe.142 With this suspicion in mind, and aware 
that the Krajina Serbs would not live in an independent Croatia with only a minority statute 
for protection, the Dutch Foreign Ministry suggested that the EC should consider border 
changes. The suggestion was dismissed entirely out of hand by the Community.143  
Therefore, Guéhenno suggested a European effort to replace the federal state as 
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arbiter and guarantor, arguing that “a new European authority that would take up these two 
responsibilities is, without doubt, the most audacious option, but perhaps the least 
disagreeable.”144 Guéhenno suggested that the Community could play a similar role to that 
of an administrator of an insolvent company. If a purely Yugoslav solution failed then “this 
may be the role that the Community will have to take the risk of assuming”, only on the 
conditions that it is explicitly requested by all Yugoslav parties and approved by the 
CSCE.145 Such a solution would require a greater European involvement and would 
involve either the recreation of a federal Yugoslav authority or integration into a 
confederation under the aegis of the Community. Throughout the interim period, 
Guéhenno noted that an ad hoc European body would have to be created to arbitrate 
disputes between the republics and guarantee the individual rights of the minorities that felt 
threatened. The Community would therefore need to reinforce their dialogue with an 
increased military presence on the ground, the responsibility for which would fall to the 
WEU.146  
Guéhenno believed that such a solution would speed up the devolution process at 
the heart of the European Community and reconcile the two conflicting tendencies that 
trouble Europe, “a more and more pressing claim to identity… and moving beyond nation 
states”.147  He concluded:  
 
The Yugoslav crisis can break the European Community. It can also help it 
take a decisive step, if the Germans and French come together to build on this 
important subject, a common position, that would neither be rushing ahead in 
the recognition of minorities or the preservation of the status quo, but a 
revolutionary acceleration of the process of the devolution of powers by which 
we go beyond the logic of nationalities: we will only stabilise the borders by 
accepting a new distribution of powers.148 
                                                     








This report seemingly reaffirmed the President’s thinking or shaped policy as many 
of its suggested measures became policy. Therefore, following Guéhenno’s suggestions 
and with Croatian Serb forces expanding the territory of the Krajina throughout the 
summer of 1991, François Mitterrand proposed the creation of a WEU ‘interposition force’ 
on 25 July. 
Following the conclusion of hostilities in Slovenia, the JNA  had retreated into 
Serb-held territories in Croatia. Following an escalation of attacks targeted against 
ethnically heterogeneous areas in the second half of July, the French President kept 
warning the Serbs that “you cannot make a federation through force.”149 Therefore, France 
envisaged a European interposition force being deployed to Croatia, still in the vain hope 
of salvaging the Federation.150 Mitterrand envisaged the WEU becoming “the full-blown 
defence arm of the EC” but his proposal was rejected by the British and the Dutch who 
feared the effect it could have on NATO.151 Nonetheless, General Philippe Morillon was 
tasked with studying such a force’s implementation.152 Indeed, diminishing NATO 
influence was an important aim of an initiative intended to find a European solution to a 
European problem. This was an integral part of Mitterrand’s post-Cold War vision for an 
independent Europe.  
A solution was becoming an increasingly pressing matter as fighting continued to 
escalate at the end of July. At an EC meeting on 29 July, Dumas and Genscher convinced 
their counterparts to quadruple the ECMM and extend it to Croatia, although it required 
Belgrade’s authorisation.153 Therefore, on 2 August, the EC once more dispatched the 
Troïka to Belgrade. It was entirely futile as the trio proposed a similar ceasefire to the one 
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employed in Slovenia, which Milošević rejected out of hand. Although the federal 
authorities and the Croats accepted the proposal, the Serbian President reportedly told the 
three Foreign Ministers that “diplomats, businessmen and foreign tourists are always 
welcome in our country, soldiers, on the other hand, are asked to stay at home.”154 Without 
ECMM observation, international support, or support from Slovenia or BiH, Tuđman’s 
Croatia had been isolated and was set against Serbia and the JNA. 
Fighting in early August, particularly in the region of Western Slavonia, was 
punctuated by sporadic ceasefires, each new pause offering the Europeans hope that they 
could solve the conflict. France sought to regulate the conflict through two bodies, the 
WEU and the UNSC, and continued to encourage dialogue between the conflicting 
sides.155 Indeed, France proposed a move towards the UNSC, but the US blocked it.156 
France therefore proposed “rapid consultations of the populations… under strict 
international control.”157 Thus Roland Dumas wrote to Hans van den Broek on 10 August 
calling for the establishment of a peace conference. However, the situation was evolving 
far more rapidly on the ground than would allow for such an initiative. On 12 August, a 
new Serb Autonomous Oblast was proclaimed in Western Slavonia and a week later the 
JNA commenced operations against the eastern towns of Vukovar and Osijek. This 
offensive created a wave of refugees fleeing the conflict and by the end of August only 
15,000 of Vukovar’s 50,000 population remained in the town.158  
The failure of the August Coup in the USSR afforded the West a greater freedom of 
manoeuvre in Yugoslavia. The Europeans had been cautious vis-à-vis Yugoslavia because 
they were reluctant to destabilise Gorbachev’s position in the USSR. But the failure of the 
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Coup removed the same conservatives in Moscow who had been supporting Belgrade.159 
The EC planned to release a statement regarding the Yugoslav crisis at its forthcoming 
General Affairs Council (GAC) meeting on 28 August.  
Ahead of the meeting, the Dutch drafted a statement strongly condemning the 
Serbian republic and the JNA, and proposed a settlement which would exclude Serbia and 
Montenegro from the negotiations.160 The meeting itself was fractious and highlighted 
quite how far the EC would have to go to construct its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). Roland Dumas criticised the Dutch draft and considered it far too “anti-
Serbian”; he was supported by Britain and Greece. Spain, Luxembourg and Ireland all 
agreed with the Dutch analysis but suggested the tone of the statement should be modified. 
Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and the Commission all supported the Dutch draft.161 
This placed a great pressure on the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
whose own views aligned largely with the Dutch statement. However, ahead of the GAC, 
Dumas and Genscher had coordinated their positions, hoping to present a strong Franco-
German front. Mitterrand and Kohl had long been working towards a unified Europe. 
Therefore Genscher could not sacrifice the work towards a CFSP for his personal 
feelings.162 Genscher proposed the creation of an EC-brokered peace conference and 
Dumas suggested the creation of an arbitration commission.163 The Arbitration 
Commission would be led by François Mitterrand’s former Justice Minister and President 
of the Constitutional Council of France, Robert Badinter. The lawyer had written to 
Mitterrand two days previously to suggest such an initiative.164 By the end of the GAC, the 
ministers had reached a compromise that incorporated a mollified version of the Dutch 
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statement and created an EC Peace Conference and arbitration commission.165 However, it 
did single out the Serbs for criticism and condemned their attempts to present a fait 
accompli. The Yugoslavs would need to agree to, and observe, a ceasefire before the 
Conference would start its work. The EC would send a special representative – the former 
Dutch Ambassador to Paris, Henry Wyndaendts – and Hans van den Broek to Belgrade to 
negotiate the terms of the international mediation. In support of the EC’s initiative, 
President Mitterrand would hold talks with Tuđman and Milošević in the course of the two 
following days. 
In his meeting with Tuđman, Mitterrand was on sharp form. When Tuđman 
accused the Serbs of attempting to re-establish Communism in Yugoslavia, Mitterrand 
responded, “I didn’t know that the Serbs were such dreamers!”166 The President would not 
be duped by the rhetoric of either of his interlocutors over the course of their meetings. 
However, in a more serious refrain, Mitterrand told his Croatian counterpart that Europe 
was not fundamentally against Croatian independence, but “there must be a treaty, an 
agreement on borders and arbitration could help you.”167 The problem, of course, was that 
the Serbs of Croatia did not want to live in an independent Croatia and Mitterrand 
therefore sought guarantees for the twelve & of Serbs in Tuđman’s republic.168 However, 
Tuđman wished to maintain Croatia’s republican borders, which Mitterrand conceded was 
“perfectly legitimate.”169 
In his meeting with Milošević, the French President was treated to a similar diatribe 
but, this time, on resurgent Croatian fascism. Mitterrand had a clear warning for Milošević: 
 
To settle the problem between you and Croatia through force, I fear it will not 
stop there. We must have a legal international settlement. In 1991, the 
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European states are not ready to fight the war of 1914 again. You cannot restart 
it. If you are the strongest, you might impose your will at first, but then you 
will be isolated. We must resort to a court of international arbitration [emphasis 
added].170 
 
In Yugoslavia, Wynaendts had begun his efforts to secure agreements from Zagreb 
and Belgrade to the EC’s peace plans. The Dutch Ambassador quickly secured an 
agreement in Zagreb but talks were difficult in Belgrade. The main sticking point was the 
deployment of EC monitors; Belgrade saw them as an infringement upon Yugoslav 
sovereignty and would not welcome German or Italians in such a capacity owing to the 
historical connotations. Once Wynaendts had assured his interlocutors that they would be 
deployed in a purely civilian role the Serbian bloc in the Federal Presidency acquiesced.171 
Seemingly Mitterrand’s intervention helped to motivate Milošević who convinced Jović to 
sign by telling him “ne izolovati” (no isolation).172 The ECCY would start on 7 September.   
However, despite having secured an agreement for the two parties to begin 
internationally brokered negotiations, France remained wary of its European partners.  The 
same day that the EC released its statement condemning the Serb attempts to produce a fait 
accompli, the French Ambassador, Michel Chatelais, in Belgrade wrote to Dumas.  The 
purpose of the note was to inform the Foreign Minister of the relationship between the 
FRG and Croatia. Chatelais believed that the FRG’s policy vis-à-vis Croatia had 
encouraged Tuđman to harden his position, which, the federal authorities had argued, 
prevented them from softening theirs.173 If the ECCY were to succeed it would thus have 
to play a careful balancing act between Croatian and Slovenian aspiration and Serbian 
inflexibility with regards to Bosnian and Croat Serb minorities. This Serb obstinacy would 
prove insurmountable. 
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Ahead of the proposed start of the ECCY, the Serbs supported by the JNA 
continued to take control of territory in Croatia in an attempt to strengthen Milošević’s 
hand. The two forces established an extremely effective military strategy: the JNA would 
utilise heavy weaponry in support of conscripts and local Serb irregulars.174 Shortly 
thereafter, Tuđman mobilised Croatia’s nascent forces to blockade JNA barracks and 
requisition arms.  
International condemnation of the Serbs understandably grew and the inauguration 
of the ECCY came under threat.175 In Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher was facing 
evermore increasing pressure to recognise Croatia and Slovenia and indeed threatened 
recognition if Belgrade did not negotiate in good faith.176 Similarly, the French government 
was coming under increasing domestic pressure to condemn the Serbs. Although 
Mitterrand was hurt by the accusations that he was “proserbe”, he stuck steadfastly to his 
‘even-handed’ approach.177 
In a Cabinet meeting on 4 September 1991, Mitterrand reflected that the aim of his 
meetings with Milošević and Tuđman was “to see – through mediation, dialogue and 
arbitration – everything we could still get out of Yugoslavia. That’s the problem, rather 
than knowing who is the good and who is the bad.”178 The President rejected the criticisms 
of “half of France [who], for domestic political reasons, support the policy of foreign 
countries and finds German political influence excellent and values French friendships and 
influence in this region for nothing.”179 The debate around Yugoslavia was becoming 
increasingly moralised, which overlooked the complexity of the situation. Mitterrand 
sought to go beyond the moralism of the crisis and establish a European modus operandi to 
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European crises that had the potential to proliferate in the east of the continent. 
 Ahead of the opening session of the ECCY – which would be chaired by the 
former British Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington – France produced a draft 
memorandum of its Yugoslav policy. It consisted of seven points that were a perfect 
encapsulation of Mitterrand’s ‘even-handed’ approach based upon dialogue, international 
law and mediation. Its first point noted that the federation could only exist through 
agreement and could not be brought about by force. Secondly, France promoted all 
possibilities of a negotiated settlement that respected the desires of the population so that 
they can preserve a link between the republics. Its third point recalled the need for a 
peaceful dialogue based on democracy, law, respect for human rights and guarantees for 
minorities. It also called for the right to self-determination but, at the same time, added that 
Yugoslavia should be able to continue to exist for those who wished to remain associated. 
In the case of a republic disassociating itself from the Federation, it would have to take into 
account: (1) the interests of the other republics; (2) domestic law for specific provisions on 
borders and minorities; and (3) defining terms for international recognition. Finally, France 
would continue to privilege action through the EC before other bodies.180 It was a fair and 
sensible policy that would, had there been the political wills between the parties to settle, 
have presented a peaceful solution. Crucially though, there was  no desire in Belgrade to 
resolve the conflict in this way. Roland Dumas announced France’s Yugoslavia policy at a 
press conference ahead of the opening session of the ECCY.181 
France’s proposals would soon be put to the test following an acrimonious opening 
session of the ECCY. Carrington quickly realised that reconstructing Yugoslavia would be 
a fool’s errand and he began constructing a plan that would be based around the republic’s 
six constituent units. The republics would be granted as much sovereignty as they desired 
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and could choose which inter-republican institutions they wished to participate in. It would 
be a Yugoslavia à la carte.182 However, it sugested that the republican borders would take 
on an international character. Minorities would then be left in a state with no federal 
guarantor of their rights. This was France’s primary concern. 
On 11 September, Mitterrand hosted the British Prime Minister, John Major, at the 
Élysée where the two discussed Yugoslavia. They were both concerned that, in the face of 
continually growing public pressure, Germany would move towards recognition sooner 
than their European partners. The two leaders discussed the need to curb German 
enthusiasm for recognition and they shared their worries over the danger that Yugoslavia 
posed for European unity. Mitterrand told Major that, “I rely a great deal on your country. 
We are bound to the Germans, but on this issue we have a problem.”183 Major thought that, 
“It’s like a house of cards, if Germany gets involved it will touch everyone. Use your 
influence over the Germans. We will do so too.”184 The President joked that, if the ECCY 
failed, “the Germans will send their army to Croatia and the English and us [France] will 
send ours to Serbia.”185 Seemingly, the President’s humour was lost on the extremely 
serious John Major who rejected the notion of sending troops to Yugoslavia.186  
That same day Mitterrand held a press conference at the Élysée on matters of 
foreign policy; Yugoslavia featured prominently. Mitterrand bemoaned the demise of the 
Balkan state. Although he thought Slovenia and Croatia would achieve independence, he, 
somewhat provocatively suggested that Croatia was seeking to do it through force of arms. 
The President pondered: “How can we, European countries, who have strong links with the 
people of this region and who were at the origin of the creation of Yugoslavia after World 
War I, how could we be indifferent to the fate of this country, which, in its way, which is 
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not necessarily ours, has maintained a certain common reality and political reality in this 
part of Europe?”187 He recalled a quote from Otto von Bismarck following the Prussian 
defeat of Austria at Sadowa to explain the difficulties experienced by Western Europeans 
in the Balkans: “They [the Austro-Hungarians] know what to with the South Slavs. Not 
us.”188 Mitterrand concluded by warning that Europe must not allow a “kind of permanent 
guerrilla war between countries who have been at the origin of many great wars that we’ve 
been involved in.”189  
The following day Tuđman wrote to Mitterrand regarding the President’s press 
conference. After the EC’s declaration on 28 August, Croatia had felt encouraged to 
escalate their military efforts in the hope that European intervention would be 
forthcoming.190 The Croat President pleaded with his French counterpart to use “all [his] 
authority so Croatia receives aid and so we quickly find a solution within the European 
Union or the United Nations.” 191 The Croatian President continued, “the human losses and 
destruction in Croatia have reached a new level, that only the international recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia together with an energetic action by the international forces of peace 
can stop the aggressors before it’s too late.”192 Indeed, following the Croat move to block 
the barricades, fighting erupted in a crescent shape running from Gospić in the south, north 
to Karlovac then eastward to Vukovar.193 The JNA cooperated with Serb volunteers in the 
heavy bombardment of Vukovar that killed some eighty people, whilst Croats retaliated by 
systematically killing Serb community leaders in Gospić.194 Amidst this escalation, and its 
dire consequences for the civilian population, the Dutch Presidency cautioned Croatia 
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against military escalation stating that it would not lead to European intervention.195  
The German diplomacy was greatly irritated by the Dutch criticism of Croatia and 
thus Genscher and his Italian counterpart, Gianni de Michelis, held a bilateral meeting in 
Venice. Afterwards they announced that, if peace negotiations in The Hague failed, then 
they would recognise Slovenia and Croatia regardless of other EC members’ decisions. A 
particularly testy exchange of accusations between Germany and the Netherlands followed, 
culminating in the Dutch Presidency attempting to call Germany’s bluff by rehabilitating 
the French proposal for a WEU peacekeeping force. As Norbert Both astutely notes, the 
Dutch rightly assessed that Germany would be morally obliged to support the proposal but 
would be prohibited from contributing for constitutional reasons.196  Its influnce over the 
EC’s policy direction in Yugoslavia would therefore diminish without a troop contribution. 
The Dutch made public their proposal on 17 September as Lord Carrington secured 
a ceasefire between the parties. France was greatly enthused by the suggestion as it 
provided an opportunity to build the WEU in to the defence arm of the EC. Hubert Védrine 
outlined the potential shape of a WEU intervention force in a note for the President, 
envisaging an interposition force, mandated by the UNSC, implemented through the WEU, 
which would allow members of the EC to contribute. In this way, the diplomatic adviser 
highlighted, it was important to bear the forthcoming Maastricht Treaty in mind.197 Such a 
measure could increase European unity. 
With Germany becoming increasingly vocal in the direction of recognition and the 
final preparations for the Maastricht Summit in December in full swing, Mitterrand and 
Kohl met the following day. The two heads of state held a frank and open discussion on the 
Yugoslav crisis. The discourse that was growing in the French and German press was one 
that suggested that France supported Serbia and Germany supported Croatia, which greatly 
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concerned Mitterrand. The French President warned Kohl: “If we continue like that, we 
could break the Community. We must not allow too many differences of opinion among its 
members. I am ready to compromise with you, but we must talk.”198 Kohl reassured 
Mitterrand that Maastricht was his priority and that Germany would not act alone.199 The 
two men thus reached a compromise: Mitterrand suggested that they approach the UN to 
obtain a peaceful revision of borders between Croatia and Serbia and, in turn, owing to 
Germany’s inability to contribute to an interposition force, France would renounce its 
initiative. The priority, they agreed, was European union.200 A joint declaration followed 
the meeting recalling the importance of Franco-German cooperation and reaffirming the 
two nations’ support for the ECCY. They equally condemned attempts to change borders 
through the use of force.201 Its innovation was the suggestion of creating a demilitarised 
zone (DMZ) between the two conflicting sides, which would be occupied by a 
peacekeeping force requiring the permission of all parties. The peacekeeping forces would 
be coordinated by the WEU with support from the CSCE and the UN.202 
As Mitterrand and Kohl released their joint declaration, the EC Foreign Ministers 
met once more. The discussion centred on the dispatch of a peacekeeping force to 
Yugoslavia. Following the Kohl-Mitterrand meeting, both Genscher and Dumas pushed in 
tandem for an approach to the UNSC with the aim of establishing a DMZ and creating a 
WEU peace force. However, the British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, put up 
tremendous resistance to the idea, and without his consent, the WEU was only asked to 
study the feasibility of intervention. Britain still privileged its Anglo-American security 
relationship and was unprepared for the WEU to become the defence arm of the EC. Hurd 
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thought that the military intervention could only lead to escalation or a shameful 
withdrawal, he thus recommended firmer sanctions and an arms embargo.203 The resultant 
EC declaration was thus vague. It recognised that “a new situation exists in Yugoslavia” 
that would require “new forms of relations and new structures” but partially abdicated 
responsibility adding that it was for “those who live in Yugoslavia to determine their own 
future.”204 
France therefore drafted a resolution for the UNSC that included several references 
to the creation of an “emergency force” and Chapter VII of the UN Charter that authorised 
use of force. As the Yugoslavs agreed a ceasefire on 22 September, Douglas Hurd worked 
hard to dilute the French proposition and had tasked the British representatives in New 
York with ensuring that the more proactive measures were removed from the final draft.205 
Dumas telegrammed Mitterrand, relaying the trouble he faced in New York: “There is 
strong resistance to all decisions of the Security Council that intervene directly in 
Yugoslav affairs… The idea of an interposition force is not yet ripe.”206 
With the UNSC set to meet on 25 September 1991, Pierre Morel wrote a note to 
Mitterrand regarding the proposed peacekeeping force. Morel had spoken to US National 
Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, who revealed there were differences at the heart of the 
Bush administration regarding the European initiative. Personally, Scowcroft thought that 
the move towards a European peacekeeping force was inevitable and he personally 
supported it since it was necessary to separate the belligerents. Morel explained why it was 
necessary for the Europeans to work through the WEU, which Scowcroft understood, but 
he was unsure whether the State Department or the Pentagon shared his sentiments. Finally 
Morel raised the logistical support that any European operation would necessitate, which 
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would entail NATO, and particularly US, support. Scowcroft reflected, “I think at the end 
of the day, we will be able to do this for you. For my part, I will go as far as I can to 
support you in this action.”207 France was committed to establishing a European peace 
force to resolve a European problem. However it faced resistance from the proponents of a 
continued Euro-Atlantic alliance in the post-Cold War era, namely Britain and sections of 
the US administration. 
The UNSC meeting culminated in resolution 713 that most notably created an arms 
embargo that covered the whole of Yugoslavia. Notably it omitted any mention of a 
peacekeeping force.208 The embargo greatly favoured the JNA who had a massive 
advantage in its arsenal. This therefore reinforced the Croats’ need to requisition arms from 
the JNA barracks and in fact led to an escalation in fighting; the exact opposite of the 
resolution’s intention. Therefore the Croats were unwilling to allow the JNA to leave their 
barracks, which angered General Kadijević. Henry Wynaendts worked desperately to bring 
about a settlement between Tuđman and Kadijević. Having reached an agreement to lift the 
siege of the JNA barracks on 29 September, the Croats immediately seized four barracks in 
Bjelovar, which the authorities claimed was the work of ‘irregulars’.209 The level of mutual 
mistrust between the JNA and Croatia now precluded any ceasefire.  
Jacques Faure, once again, provided an informed and subtle analysis of the 
situation in Yugoslavia at the end of September. Owing to “the failure of the consistent 
policy of internationalising the matter, presenting Croatia as a victim of aggression and to 
obtain recognition of Croatian independence in crisis”, the Croats continued to fight.210 
Similarly, Kadijević was dealing with a weakened federal army, which had been brought 
about by: the departure of Slovenian and Croatian officers; the refusal of BiH and 
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Macedonia refusal to send conscripts to the army; the Serbianisation of the army; and 
paramilitaries breaking the ceasefire. 211 Notwithstanding, and angered by the Croatian 
duplicity vis-à-vis the garrisons, Kadijević issued an ultimatum to the Croats: for every 
military object seized by the Croats, the JNA would destroy a civilian object of vital 
importance.212 Moreover, the JNA began operations against the coastal town of Dubrovnik, 
now with extra support from Serbian territorial forces. Tuđman wrote to Mitterrand 
highlighting offensives against UNESCO world heritage sites in Split and Dubrovnik, 
perhaps attempting to appeal to Mitterrand the aesthete.213 Patently, the JNA was now a 
tool of Serbian expansionism, as they attacked towns that were overwhelmingly populated 
by Croats. Shortly thereafter, Milošević and his allies declared that the Yugoslav 
Presidency could operate without the representatives from Slovenia, Croatia, BiH and 
Macedonia. This coup sounded the death knell of the federal architecture, which 
thenceforth became entirely an instrument of Serbia.  
In this context, Tuđman, Miloševic and Kadijević met in The Hague for discussions 
with Carrington and van den Broek. With the moratorium on Croatian and Slovenian 
independence due to expire on 7 October, the meeting produced a ceasefire and four points 
of principle for a basic solution: “(1) a loose association or alliance of sovereign and 
independent republics, (2) protection for human and minority rights with possible special 
status for certain areas, (3) no unilateral change of borders, and (4) a perspective of 
diplomatic recognition at the end of the negotiating process.”214 With Serb agreement, 
these points of principle directly implied that independence and recognition might be the 
outcome of negotiations and provided a slight glimmer of hope that the ECCY might 
resolve the crisis. 
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The following day, Tuđman wrote to Mitterrand asking him to “take urgent and 
effective measures to stop the destructive war in Croatia.”215 The Croatian President stated 
that, although a ceasefire agreement had been signed the previous day by Milošević and 
Kadijević, the Yugoslav army had continued their assault on Croatia throughout the night 
and into the morning. Tuđman disparaged the international diplomatic efforts, highlighting 
that “After all the ceasefire agreements already signed and the agreement reached 
yesterday at The Hague based on conditions for a political solution, it has become clear 
that these calls are not enough. To stop the extension of the excesses of war, immediate 
and concrete actions by the international community are necessary.”216 The Croatian 
President was aware that the EC Foreign Ministers were holding an informal meeting in 
the Dutch castle of Haarzuilens that day and hoped for a firm message from Europe 
directed towards Belgrade. 
At the informal meeting, Genscher and Dumas proposed a document that 
demonstrated the Community’s “desire to remain united in the face of Yugoslav crisis”.217 
Adopted by the majority of members, the two reaffirmed the Community’s desire to send a 
“clear message of firmness” to the parties in Yugoslavia, and welcomed the progress made 
by Carrington on 4 October. Furthermore, the Ministers indicated that recognition would 
come following a general settlement. France preferred recognition after the agreement of a 
general settlement. In principle, it was a sensible strategy that sought to solve the Yugoslav 
crisis in its entirety. In this respect, the Elysée’s policy was influenced by the French 
Ambassador in Belgrade, Michel Chatelais. The Ambassador warned:  
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Madness, sometimes with suicidal tendencies, sometimes criminal, has seized 
the main protagonists of this drama who have convinced the people that they 
are leading a war of liberation… the war will feed off war… Bosnia-
Hercegovina, where the peoples are mixed in an inextricable way, risks being 
the next front. The fighting is already at its ‘borders’.218  
 
The Yugoslav crisis would thus have to be solved holistically. However, when 
Hans van den Broek set a two-month ultimatum for a general settlement to be reached, 
Paris was concerned by the seemingly short time-frame.219 Carrington was similarly 
worried, labelling the schedule as “wholly unrealistic”.220 However, the Dutch, hoping to 
secure a foreign policy success, were determined to resolve the crisis within their 
Presidency of the Community.221 In the following fortnight, the Working Groups of the 
ECCY would work diligently to produce a proposal for the six republics at the plenary 
session on 18 October.  
This approach created two problems: France’s preference for recognition 
predicated on a general settlement implied that Serbia could block recognition if it 
remained uncooperative in negotiations. Similarly, Germany’s preference for a quicker 
recognition encouraged the Croats and Slovenians to simply weather the storm for two 
months. The approach was symptomatic of the difficulties Europe faced in constructing a 
Common Foreign and Security policy, which was still very much a work in progress. 
Furthermore, it was once more creating a notable divergence between Paris and Bonn.  
With calls in Germany continuing to grow in the face of attacks against Croatia’s 
historical and picturesque Dalmatian coast, France attempted to persuade London to soften 
its position to maintain European unity. On 9 October 1991, Pierre Morel held a “very 
direct” conversation on the topic of Yugoslavia with Stephen Wall, diplomatic adviser to 
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John Major.222 Morel thought that the reticence of Great Britain towards any idea of 
European action would lead Chancellor Kohl to think that it would become impossible for 
the FRG to continue to follow a European line. However, the Brits were concerned that 
any engagement in Yugoslavia would necessarily lead to an escalation. Morel warned that, 
by trying to keep Europe apart from the conflict, they in fact risked being sucked into a far 
larger crisis in the Balkans and Central Europe that could spread if they failed to isolate 
and stop the conflict in Yugoslavia itself. The French adviser was clearly rattled by 
Britain’s intransigence and decried the British abstention as “another form of ‘national 
politics’ inherited from the turn of the century, as much as the pro-Croatian and pro-Serb 
reflexes of others.”223 Morel added that, “it would not be possible to maintain a European 
line if Britain was in the background.” However, Wall was unmoved by Morel’s words and 
merely stated that Europe should not “underestimate the economic weapon”.224 
Throughout the European mediation in Yugoslavia, Britain remained resolutely realist and 
was the greatest brake on international initiative. 
With European unity increasingly strained, Mitterrand wrote to both Tuđman and 
Milošević on 11 October in an attempt to secure their cooperation with the ECCY. The 
French President stated that the right to self-determination had to be respected, which the 
peoples of Yugoslavia had the right to exercise peacefully and democratically. The parties 
must then reach a just and peaceful solution, which would enjoy an international guarantee. 
The rights of minorities, and everything there associated, must also be ensured, conforming 
to the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Mitterrand stated that it was essential 
that the fighting stop so that observers could play their role and so that more progress could 
be made in the ECCY and the Badinter Arbitration Commission. If fighting resumed, 
France would be prepared to implement sanctions against those responsible and establish a 
                                                     





humanitarian mission.225  
Following Mitterrand’s intervention, the parties convened once more in The Hague 
on 18 October where Lord Carrington’s ‘Arrangements for General Settlement’ – which 
the ECCY Working Groups had pieced together – were immediately rejected by Milošević. 
Although Lord Carrington had not raised the issue of Kosovo, and indeed the Europeans 
had continued to neglect the issue in favour of the crisis in Croatia, Milošević realised that 
the ‘Arrangements’ would apply to minorities in Serbia, as well as those in Croatia. This 
was unacceptable as it would entirely undermine his populist power base. Surprisingly, the 
five other republics voted in favour of Carrington’s proposal.226 
With Milošević’s rejection of the ‘Arrangements’, the EC, the US and the USSR 
released a tripartite declaration, which stated that they were “particularly troubled by 
reports of continued attacks against civilian targets by elements of the federal army and 
Serb and Croat irregular forces.”227 Indeed, the JNA had undertaken a massive 
bombardment of Dubrovnik and another ten Croatian towns with the worst excesses of war 
being carried in the town Ilok, near Vukovar.228 Similarly, Croat troops exacted reprisals 
on Serb civilians in Gospić.229 
 As the ECCY held its seventh session on 25 October, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were 
experiencing a merciless pounding from JNA artillery. Milošević, under strong domestic 
pressure to resist the ‘Arrangements’, was extremely obstinate in the meeting and 
continued to reject Carrington’s proposal.230  
The EC Foreign Ministers met three days later and issued their sternest declaration 
thus far. In particular, van den Broek and Genscher pushed for a firm condemnation of 
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Serbia with the Dutch Foreign Minister arguing that “it was now a matter of putting the 
Serbs under pressure and forcing them to take up clear positions at the next plenary session 
of the Yugoslavia conference”.231 Dumas provided some resistance to the general tone of 
the declaration but acquiesced in the face of the majority opinion.232 Having previously 
condemned the attacks against Dubrovnik, the resultant declaration of the meeting 
condemned the Serbs “plan to establish a greater Serbia.”233 If Serbia failed to cooperate 
the EC would: (1) continue the ECCY negotiations with the cooperative republics  “in the 
perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it”; (2) 
implement “restrictive measures” against those parties that do not cooperate; and (3) ask 
the UNSC to “examine without delay the question of new restrictive measures on the basis 
of Chapter VII.”234 The Europeans, antagonised by the Serbs’ obstinacy, appeared to be 
finding a meaningful common approach. 
In a press conference following a meeting with Gorbachev, Mitterrand sought to 
remain even-handed in his analysis of the conflict following the Foreign Ministers’ firm 
declaration. France, and the international community, faced significant problems in 
reconciling the right to self-determination with the inviolability of international borders. 
Reaffirming France’s support for self-determination, the President warned that the internal 
administrative borders of Yugoslavia would not necessarily translate into internationally 
recognised and guaranteed borders.235 Mitterrand remained greatly concerned by minority 
rights: 
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We need guarantees for international borders… and for the protection of 
minorities because these populations are interwoven and within a federated 
state things are very different: a Serb in Croatia feels protected if there is a 
federal state, he is in his country. A Serb, moreover a Serb community, in an 
independent Croatia loses its support. Immediately ethnic conflicts resurface. 
One could use the same argument in regards to Croats in Serbia, or the many 
Albanians in Kosovo etc…236 
 
Ahead of the next plenary session of the ECCY, the JNA with Serb reservists, had 
undertaken their ‘final operation’ to capture Vukovar. The Federal Air Force launched 
sixty-five aerial sorties against Vukovar and surrounding targets.237 At the meeting 
Milošević remained obstinate in spite of Carrington’s offer to remove the question of 
Kosovan and Vojvodinian autonomy from the ‘Arrangements’. Unfortunately, the move 
tacitly suggested that, the more Milošević rejected the proposal the more the Conference 
would bend to his will.238 Therefore, in the National Assembly, Roland Dumas reaffirmed 
France’s commitment to the principle of self-determination but owing to significant 
problems – namely minority rights and internationally guaranteed borders – the Foreign 
Minister noted that it needed to be carefully managed, which was the raison d’être of the 
ECCY and the Badinter Arbitration Commission.239 The French Foreign Minister’s 
restrained tone sat at odds with the EC’s latest response as its Foreign Ministers decided to 
demonstrate the credibility of their threats in the face of Serb obstinacy and withdrew from 
‘Yugoslavia’ all economic aid and benefits it received from the Community. 
The return of the US to the scene at the scheduled North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
meeting two days later, however, marked a shift back towards an overall even-handedness 
and a preference for a unified Yugoslavia. The US pressured Germany not to break from 
the non-recognition consensus that had been established within the Community.240 
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Notwithstanding, in its first statement on the Yugoslav conflict, NATO condemned the 
JNA’s attacks on Dubrovnik and other Croatian towns.241 In the margins of the NATO 
meeting, the EC Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their measures taken two days earlier. They 
also supported a move to apply an oil embargo through the UNSC.242 These universal 
measures were, however, applied to all republics equally, which in turn reinforced the 
superiority of the JNA and Belgrade. Furthermore, the EC declaration reinforced the need 
for a ‘global solution’ to the crisis prior to recognition. However, from a legal perspective, 
without Croatian and Slovenian independence it would be difficult to single out Belgrade 
for punitive sanctions as the envisaged embargos applied to the entirety of Yugoslavia. 
Once more, the Community faced a seemingly intractable problem.  
In a press conference following the summit, one journalist reflected that the 
Community had failed in Yugoslavia and asked Mitterrand what lessons the institution 
could learn from its ‘failure’.243 The President was irritated by the line of questioning and 
gave a frank appraisal of the situation: 
 
What is true is that nobody has imagined sending armies to Yugoslavia. One 
can imagine the kind of interposition forces which the United Nations has: they 
are not fighters, they separate the combatants… Europe does not have the 
means to impose its views, that is the reality. This is not a failure, we are at the 
starting point of a new dimension of political strategy in Europe, but we are 
only at a starting point.  
 
 With the peace process at a standstill, Carrington called a recess. Mitterrand and 
Kohl held their scheduled 58th Franco-German summit on 15 November and once more 
Yugoslavia formed a central part of the discussions. The two men again sought to reaffirm 
their unity of purpose ahead of the negotiations on the Treaty of European Union in 
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Maastricht on 9 and 10 December. Mitterrand reaffirmed his support for self-determination 
but again highlighted the intractable dilemma between determination and the borders of 
Yugoslavia. He argued that:  
 
If you want to avoid the permanent guerrilla warfare and bloody conflicts that 
risk engulfing the whole of Europe in difficult choices and differences of 
opinion, that will not be negligible, it is necessary for the European 
community, it is necessary for our countries, Germany and France, to play a 
role of appeasement, of agreement, of comprehension… If self-determination 
is just one more element in the conflicts that leads to its worsening, I do not 
think we have the intention to intervene militarily between the belligerents. So 
legal documents, important as they are, would not prevent the continuation and 
worsening of the war itself. 
 
The President’s analysis, namely that recognition would not resolve the war, had 
earlier been advocated by seasoned Yugoslav expert and ECCY mediator Ambassador 
Geert-Hinrich Ahrens who, in an internal paper, noted that “recognition would neither end 
the war nor restore lost territories to the Croats.”244 However, the situation on the ground 
would soon test the limits of Franco-German cooperation and would require a more abrupt 
and direct response. 
 
‘We must guard the unity of the Community at all costs’ 
The fighting in Croatia escalated to horrific levels, best demonstrated in Vukovar, which 
fell to the JNA on 18 November. Almost immediately, attitudes changed in the highest 
echelons in Europe. The Dutch Foreign Ministry thought that the crisis had shifted “from 
the political to the moral level.”245 The Dutch Presidency, which heretofore had largely 
been content to pursue even-handedness shifted dramatically in favour of ‘selectiveness’ 
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against the Serbs and began advocating for recognition.246 The Dutch had abandoned any 
hope of a negotiated settlement and had moved towards recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia within their existing borders. 
With nearly one-third of Croatia now in the hands of the Serbs, and satisfied with 
its territorial control, the Yugoslav Presidency called for UN peacekeepers in an attempt to 
freeze the conflict in stasis. France, who had long been in favour of a peacekeeping force, 
supported the initiative and France’s permanent representative thought that “Everything 
indicates that the Yugoslav population, which is the main victim of this crisis, places a 
great hope in the United Nations response.”247 France therefore supported the UN 
Secretary General’s decision to send his special envoy, the former US Secretary of State, 
Cyrus Vance, to Yugoslavia to study the possibility of sending UN mandated peacekeepers 
there. Furthermore, it had the potential to forestall the recognition issue which was rapidly 
gaining a head of steam, particularly since neither Germany nor the Netherlands were 
members of the UNSC. However, owing to UN reluctance – the organisation was already 
over-stretched in Cambodia and poorly equipped to deal with simultaneous crises – the 
enthusiasm of other UNSC members quickly dissipated. Furthermore, the Dutch were keen 
to press ahead with recognition in order to prevent Milošević from using the UN to 
consolidate his gains in Croatia.248  
Pierre Morel suggested to President Mitterrand that the Dutch Presidency had 
moved towards a policy recognition owing to German pressure. Morel reflected that, 
“Chancellor Kohl can slow, but not stop the determined course of the Germans to 
recognition. All the same, Genscher is tirelessly trying to substantiate the idea that 
recognition should interfere with Maastricht on 10 December.”249 Indeed, Germany moved 
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quickly to seize on the pressure for recognition. In the German Bundestag on 19 
November, Kohl indicated that “before Christmas one must come to a decision in this 
matter.”250 Genscher was far more forthright in his proclamations, particularly on the 
subject of borders, and he equated anybody who questioned the borders in south-eastern 
Europe as questioning the very stability of Europe. Genscher also criticised the deployment 
of UN peacekeepers, which he believed the Serbs would use to achieve recognition of their 
territorial acquisitions. 251 These were thinly veiled criticisms of French policy. 
The Elysée sought to move quickly and stem this move towards recognition 
through two methods: the acceleration of the moves towards a UN peace-force; and a 
Franco-German initiative offering recognition in existing boundaries in return for minority 
rights guarantees.252 However, Mitterrand was seemingly swimming against the tide as his 
Minister for Humanitarian Action, Bernard Kouchner, had returned from a humnaitarian 
mission to Dubrovnik and argued in favour of recognition.253 In the face of this growing 
pressure, and with his vision for post-Cold War Europe slipping away, Mitterrand, ever the 
contrarian, made some ill-considered remarks in an interview for the German newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:  
 
You ask me who is the aggressor and who is the victim? I am incapable of 
telling you. What I do know is that the history of Serbia and Croatia, for a long 
time, is replete with dramas of this nature, notably during the Second World 
War where many Serbs were killed in Croatian camps. You know that it was 
Croatia that was part of the Nazi bloc and not Serbia. Ever since Tito 
disappeared, the latent conflict between Serbs and Croats was going to 
reappear. It’s fact.254 
 
 The President’s outburst obscured a far more practical and pertinent question he 
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posed: would the border between Croatia and Yugoslavia automatically assume an 
international character?255 Mitterrand was determined that these fundamental questions 
should be resolved before recognition. Mitterrand relayed his worries concerning 
minorities and the potential for conflict in BiH and Macedonia to John Major on 2 
December. In a meeting with the British Prime Minister he reflected that recognition “will 
ruin the peace conference. We want guarantees on the borders and a minorities’ statute.”256 
Sadly prescient, the President continued: “If Bosnia and Macedonia become independent – 
and how can we not recognise them? – we will start another war.”257 Mitterrand and 
Dumas therefore sought to reach a quick compromise with their German counterparts. 
Following a long conversation with Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 3 December, 
Dumas informed Mitterrand that the Germans would not take any unilateral decision on 
recognition prior to 16 December, but it would come before Christmas.258 In the meantime, 
neither Genscher nor Kohl would make statements that would hinder France but the 
German Foreign Minister encouraged France to recognise the two republics in a joint 
initiative. Mitterrand agreed but on the condition that the recognition of new states was 
undertaken through an agreement with the EC or the UN once they had filled conditions on 
borders and minorities. However the Chancellor would not delay recognition under any 
conditions. Hubert Védrine worried that in one fell swoop the Germans would reduce the 
idea of a common foreign policy to nothing if they undertook unilateral recognition.259 At 
dinner the same evening, Kohl and Mitterrand talked in detail on the question of 
recognition. Mitterrand still could not persuade the German Chancellor to reconsider his 
timeframe. Kohl had delayed recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as long as he could and 
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the pressure from public opinion and the German political class had forced him to act.260 
With the Maastricht meeting set for 10 December, Robert Badinter responded to 
three questions from Lord Carrington – which he had submitted to the Arbitration 
Commission on 20 November – and announced the Commission’s Opinion. The 
Commission ruled that: (1) Yugoslavia was in a process of dissolution; (2) in the process 
of succession the states should act in accordance with principles and rules of international 
law, particularly regarding human rights and the rights of peoples and minorities; and (3) it 
is the republics’ decision whether to form a new association.261 The Commission’s opinion 
destroyed the claims by Belgrade that they were trying to preserve Yugoslavia. 
Surprisingly, Mitterrand’s close ally Badinter had produced a ruling that chimed entirely 
with the German Foreign Ministry rather than the Elysée. In the meantime, Croatia enacted 
human rights laws dealing with the status of minorities and reached a final agreement with 
the JNA vis-à-vis the blockade of barracks and personnel. Following Tuđman’s assurances 
to Bonn that he would continue to cooperate with the ECCY, there remained few obstacles 
to Germany’s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. However, Kohl and Genscher continued 
to face resistance from the international community.262 
At the Maastricht negotiations, the subject of Yugoslavia was conspicuous by its 
absence, although outside of the sessions Major and Mitterrand lobbied their partners to 
take a common position to “stem the rush of the Germans”.263 Moreover, the UN Secretary 
General wrote to the Community on 14 December warning against an uncoordinated 
recognition believing it could precipitate a conflict in BiH. That same day Mitterrand wrote 
to Kohl hoping to persuade the German Chancellor to delay recognition: 
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My dear Helmut, the changes in Europe and the emergence of new states 
provides a first opportunity to demonstrate our will to put in place a common 
foreign policy. From the document on the recognition of new states that France 
and Germany are ready to propose to the Community, the first of its kind, we 
must pay particular attention to a common position on the Yugoslav case. I 
know your intention to recognise Croatia and Slovenia without delay and I 
understand the reasons that have led you to adopt this position. I am for my 
part, as you know, very occupied by the consequences of an act of recognition, 
which, in the current climate, risks the extension, even a generalisation, of the 
conflict. I have been, in this regard, impressed by the terms and tone of the UN 
Secretary General’s letter. I believe we must take count of our responsibility, 
bearing in mind all the factors that affect our decision. We must guard the unity 
of the Community at all costs and particularly Franco-German unity in this 
case. That is why I consider it necessary that we adopt in the application, as in 
the document, the same position in terms and on the date of recognition of the 
Yugoslav republics. In my mind, such an approach would not delay the act of 
recognition beyond a reasonable time.264 
 
Nonetheless, the following day, Kohl replied to Mitterrand. The German President 
took note of Mitterrand’s words and indicated he was keen to work in the manner 
prescribed by the Franco-German document on recognition.265 However, he would not 
delay recognition, which both he and Genscher confirmed would occur before Christmas. 
On 16 December the EC Foreign ministers met and, in spite of pleas from 
Carrington, Cyrus Vance and US President George Bush to delay recognition, issued two 
declarations. The first declaration outlined the conditions, seemingly based upon the 
Franco-German document, which new states would have to fulfil to receive international 
recognition: (1) respect for the Charter of the UN, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of 
Paris; (2) human rights and minorities guarantees; (3) respect for the inviolability of 
borders, which could only be altered through peaceful negotiation and agreement; (4) a 
commitment to settle outstanding issues of succession and regional dispute through 
arbitration.266 Specifically, the Yugoslav republics would also have to accept the 
provisions for human rights in Lord Carrington’s ‘Arrangements’ and continue to support 
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the work of the UN and the ECCY. The Community therefore welcomed all republics who 
sought recognition to submit their requests by 23 December; a decision would then be 
applied on 15 January following further rulings from the Badinter Arbitration Commission. 
Despite the newly adopted position, Germany recognised Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally 
on 23 December.267 
Sensing that his opportunity to secure territory in Croatia was slipping away, 
Milošević once more approached Cyrus Vance to intervene in Croatia and sought to bring 
the Krajina Serbs into line. Simultaneously, on 11 January, the Badinter Commission 
announced its opinions on the questions posed by the EC.268 Opinion No. 2 clarified the 
legal position of Serbs in Croatia and BiH and ruled that they were entitled to minority 
rights and guarantees under international law but they did not have the right to secede from 
their respective republics.269 Opinion No. 3 ruled that the internal administrative borders 
between Croatia and Serbia, and BiH and Serbia, would become internationally recognised 
borders.270 The Commission expressed a reservation regarding the recognition of Croatia 
citing concerns regarding human and minority rights, but it was on a technical and legal 
basis rather than in response to human rights concerns.271 Slovenia’s request was far 
simpler and the Commission ruled that it satisfied the conditions laid out by the EC on 16 
December.272 The most controversial decision was the Commission’s Opinion on BiH. It 
ruled that BiH failed to meet the requirements as, owing to Serb resistance at a 
governmental level, it was impossible to ascertain the will of its population. The 
Commission therefore recommended an internationally-monitored referendum on Bosnia’s 
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independence.273 Singling out BiH, and therefore delaying its recognition, would leave the 
central republic isolated and highly vulnerable.274 
In light of these rulings the EC Foreign Ministers recognised Croatia and Slovenia 
on 15 January 1992, but delayed recognition of BiH until it held a referendum. The US 
lobbied the EC to reconsider its decision on BiH.275 However, the newly gained 
international recognition of Croatia speeded the creation of a UN peacekeeping mission in 
Croatia and, although the Krajina Serbs rejected the plan proposed by Cyrus Vance, 
Milošević applied sufficient pressure to the Krajina Serb leader Babić to ensure the 
implementation of the ‘Vance Plan’. France had long been keen to participate in a 
peacekeeping mission and offered to send a large contingent of peacekeepers of 
approximately three-to-four thousand troops.276 On 21 February 1992, UNSCR 743 created 
the United Nations Protection Force, which was a 15,000-strong force deployed to four 
sectors in Croatia labelled United Nations Protection Areas (UNPAs).277 The French 
peacekeepers were deployed in the Northern Sector and were the most numerous 
nationality; a clear demonstration of France’s commitment to the UN as an institution for 
conflict resolution. UNPROFOR’s mission would be to fully demilitarise and demobilise 
the UNPAs.278 However, it would never fully achieve its aim and its installation in Croatia 
allowed the JNA to withdraw to BiH in preparation for potential conflict there. 
Significantly, although the Europeans had achieved their Union at Maastricht, the damage 
created by disagreements over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would take 
considerable time to mend. In the meantime, as Mitterrand had warned, the prospect of 
independence in BiH brought with it the prospect of war. 
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Chapter Four – “Beyond Diplomacy”: French Initiatives and Humanitarian 
Intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina, April-September 1992. 
 
‘Highway of Hell’: Warning Signs in Bosnia-Hercegovina  
Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) was Yugoslavia’s most ethnically heterogeneous republic. The 
Muslims, who were the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia, had been granted 
nationality status under the 1974 constitution but, unlike other nationalities, did not form 
the majority in any republic. They were, nonetheless, the largest ethnoreligious group in 
BiH, accounting for 43.47% of the population in 1991. The Serbs and Croats constituted 
31.21% and 17.38% of the population respectively, whilst 5.54% classified themselves as 
“Yugoslavs”. However, historically citizens of BiH, regardless of ‘ethnonational identity’, 
had been denied the right to define themselves as “Bosnians”.1 Bosnians of an Orthodox 
religious confession had to pronounce themselves either “Serb” or “Yugoslav”; whilst 
Catholics could choose between “Croat” and “Yugoslav”.  Nonetheless, in the pre-war 
period ethnoreligious identity was a secondary identifier in a largely secular society, 
particularly in Sarajevo, and the suggestion of civil war between neighbours was 
unimaginable.  
However, it was flanked by Croatia and Serbia whose respective leaders had openly 
espoused virulent nationalism. In Serbia, Milošević had openly associated with the 
political stances of Dobrica Ćosić and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, which 
called for the creation of a Greater Serbia including territories in BiH. Tuđman had openly 
declared that many Bosnian Muslims were “incontrovertibly of Croatian origin” and 
moreover that BiH and Croatia were “an indivisible geographic and economic entity”.2 
Indeed, extremist politicians even claimed that the Muslims were Croats and Serbs who 
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had converted in the period of Ottoman rule; BiH could thus be divided between the two 
republics. From such perspectives, and based on an ethnonational rationale, the division of 
BiH between Croatia and Serbia seemed to be the logical conclusion of Yugoslavia’s 
demise.   
Accordingly, Bosnian officials became increasingly concerned by the escalating 
rhetoric of the nationalists in the neighbouring republics. Bosnian voters were treading 
unfamiliar ground and, inexperienced in democratic elections, many failed to recognise the 
intractable contradiction in voting for nationalist parties whilst supporting the continuation 
of BiH.  
Initially, the leader of the ostensibly Muslim ‘Party for Democratic Action’ 
(Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) Alija Izetbegović formed a government comprised of 
all three major parties. Throughout the first half of 1991, Izetbegović continued to support 
a unified Yugoslav state, albeit in a looser, confederate form, which the EC continued to 
advocate.3 The moves towards independence by Slovenia and Croatia greatly worried the 
Bosnians, who, without their western neighbours, would be left behind in a rump 
Yugoslavia under Serb domination. The SDA and Croatian Democratic Union in BiH 
(Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine, HDZ-BiH) gave their full support 
to Zagreb in its clashes with the Serbs; the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska 
Stranka, SDS) condemned the Croats.  
Therefore, the SDS began to undermine the stability of Bosnian political 
institutions by boycotting the Parliament and declaring that Izetbegović was not entitled to 
preside over the Bosnian Serbs nor represent them internationally.4 They intended to tear 
apart the communitarian spirt of Bosnia by increasingly ethnicising political debates. When 
the SDS in Croatia created the ‘Serb Autonomous Oblast of Krajina’, its tactics were soon 
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replicated by its Bosnian counterpart. The SDS declared that three Serb populated areas in 
northern Bosnia were henceforth SAOs, which created a corridor from Krajina in Croatia 
to Serbia-proper. Indeed, throughout 1991 Milošević envisaged swallowing the whole of 
BiH into a Yugoslavia that would also include Serbia, Montenegro, and the Croatian 
Serbs.5  
In spite of these significant warning signs, the brewing crisis in BiH was ignored in 
favour of solving the immediate crisis in Croatia, but also trying to pursue a common 
European line with regards to Croatia and Slovenia. Politically, raising the question of BiH 
at a European level would further have endangered the unity of the Twelve of Europe.  
As the conflict in Croatia escalated throughout the month of September, attacks 
against religious buildings started to unpick the communitarian fabric of BiH. These 
attacks had clear ethnoreligious content and were intended to create ethnic separation. As 
such, the population groups felt increasingly threatened and their search for security 
became essential.6 The legitimacy of the institutions that had represented stability and 
security in the preceding forty years had been eroded over the preceding decade, owing to 
their inability to deal with economic challenges. They were replaced by nationalist political 
parties who thus offered the security afforded by sharing a collective identity and 
providing solace in an uncertain time. However, the parties acted as vehicles for more 
radical nationalists who were prepared to employ violence to establish the ethnic division 
of BiH. 
This process had been exacerbated by the Bosnian Serb leadership who insisted that 
the only way that BiH could avoid an ethnoreligious civil war was to ethnically partition 
the country. One only need glance at an ethnic map (see map 1) of BiH to see the 
ridiculousness of this proposition.  
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Following two resolutions passed by the Bosnian Parliament on 15 October 1991, 
which called for Bosnian sovereignty and eventual withdrawal from Federal Yugoslavia, 
the SDS leader Radovan Karadžić made a harrowing statement to the Parliamentary 
Assembly on the evening of 14 October 1991: 
 
You want to take Bosnia-Hercegovina down the same highway of hell and 
suffering that Slovenia and Croatia are travelling. Do not think that you will 
not lead Bosnia-Hercegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not 
perhaps lead the Muslim population into annihilation, because the Muslims 
cannot defend themselves if there is war - How will you prevent everyone 
from being killed in Bosnia-Hercegovina?7 
 
When the vote came on Bosnian sovereignty on the morning of 15 October, the SDS 
walked out on the Parliamentary Assembly and the Croats and Muslims voted in favour. 
Milošević’s rejection of the EC Conference’s “Arrangements for General 
Settlement” on 18 October highlighted the Serb leader’s unwillingness to abandon his aim 
of creating a Greater Serbia. Reinforcing Milošević’s rhetoric, the Bosnian Serbs created 
their own “Assembly of the Serb Nation in Bosnia-Hercegovina” in the territory they 
dubbed Republika Srpska (RS) on 24 October and on 9-10 November the Serbs held their 
first separate plebiscite, choosing to remain part of “Yugoslavia”. In the intervening 
period, Lord Carrington had also suspended the EC Peace Conference during the NATO 
Rome Summit on 8 November in the face of Serb intransigence to his draft proposals 
contained in the “Arrangements for General Settlement”. The lack of consensus between 
the Europeans and the ineffectiveness of their diplomacy only strengthened the resolve of 
the Bosnian Serbs and thus increased the unlikeliness of a peaceful resolution of BiH’s 
present impasse.  
In December, as the Germans pushed for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the 
European Community offered each of Yugoslavia’s six republics recognition if they met its 
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criteria for new states. Applications for recognition would be considered by the Badinter 
Arbitration Commission, who would report its findings on 15 January 1992. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia separate from an overall 
framework for the entirety of Yugoslavia torpedoed any remaining hope for the EC Peace 
Conference. Following a meeting with Carrington and Portuguese Ambassador José 
Cutileiro on 19 December, Izetbegović decided that BiH would apply for recognition.  
In spite of warnings from the JNA, the Bosnian Presidency pressed ahead with EC 
recognition; Izetbegović still held out a rather naïve hope that the JNA would spring to 
BiH’s defence. Significantly, JNA troops withdrew from Croatia and Slovenia into BiH, 
which had been considered the safest republic to concentrate military hardware and 
production during the Titoist period owing to its mountainous terrain and central location.  
In early 1992, the local population in the north western opština of Prijedor observed the 
increased military presence in and around the municipality.8  
Once the SDS had declared the creation of the Autonomous Oblasts, in 
coordination with the JNA, they began a systematic campaign of disarming and 
neutralising non-Serb populations to render them defenceless in any forthcoming conflict. 
Thus the SDS, JNA and Serb paramilitary groups would be able to expel non-Serb 
populations through coercion or extermination to create an ethnoreligiously homogeneous 
Greater Serbia. 
 
Europe once more 
Having secured the ‘Vance Plan’ in Croatia, Cyrus Vance met Lord Carrington in Lisbon 
on 5 January - Portugal now held the Presidency of the EC for six months - and the former 
British Foreign Minister announced that he would convoke a new session of the ECCY the 
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following week.9 Carrington proposed talks on BiH within the framework of the EC 
Conference and, as the EC Presidency had passed from the Netherlands to Portugal, 
Carrington asked the Portuguese diplomat José Cutileiro to take charge of the negotiations. 
The recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January and the eventual installation of 
UNPROFOR in the UNPAs held the conflict there somewhat in stasis.  
However, the Badinter Arbitration Commission considered that BiH’s application 
for recognition was insufficient, as it “had not expressed the true will of the entirety of the 
republic’s population.”10 To rectify this, the Commission suggested that BiH hold an 
independence referendum under CSCE supervision. The Bosnian authorities set the date 
for the referendum as 29 February and 1 March.  
Carrington was slow to turn his attention to BiH, in spite of warnings and the 
evident potential for conflict. Indeed, the European mediation efforts lacked real leadership 
as the EC sought to heal rifts caused by the chastening exchanges over Slovenian and 
Croatian recognition. It was not until 6 February that Cutileiro held a series of discussions 
with leaders of the three ethnic groups and secured an agreement on a “mini peace 
conference to discuss the independence and sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina and to find 
a solution that suits all.”11 On 13 and 14 February the EC mediators convened a meeting 
and the three main parties outlined their preferences for BiH but little was achieved in 
these discussions. The parties agreed to reconvene the following week in Lisbon.12  
Back in the Portuguese capital, Cutileiro presented his first draft of the 
constitutional arrangements for BiH to the three leaders. The plan was a disaster. The 
Portuguese Ambassador, although enthusiastic, was certainly no expert on BiH at this point 
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and his plan reflected a lack of comprehension of the complexity of the republic’s 
ethnoreligious makeup. The Carrington-Cutileiro Plan proposed three constituent units in 
BiH, each with broad responsibilities (see map 2). The SDS had long supported such a 
‘cantonisation’ of BiH and the Carrington-Cutileiro plan merely validated and legitimised 
the ethnoreligious content of the SDS’s programme, particularly the autonomous regions, 
in the hope that the Bosnian Serbs would not resort to violence.  
 BiH held its independence referendum on 1 March.13 The SDS called a boycott of 
the referendum and erected barricades to prevent the delivery of ballot boxes to the ‘Serb 
Autonomous Regions’. However, 64.4 & of the population did vote in the referendum, 
including several thousand Serbs outside of the Autonomous Regions.14 99.7 & of 
respondents voted in favour of independence. On the evening of 1 March, Izetbegović 
appeared on television to announce the results. Immediately following the announcement, 
Serbs erected barricades in the capital, with Sarajevan Muslims responding in kind. It took 
several days of negotiations to defuse the situation. 
Once initial hostilities had died down, the EC diplomacy efforts resumed on 7 
March. The EC had continued to withhold recognition in the vain hope that its diplomacy 
may find a workable solution to the Bosnian problem. Cutileiro returned to Sarajevo on 16-
18 March, this time with a ‘Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina’, which had taken into consideration the preceding talks.  On 
18 March 1992 the three sides of the conflict in BiH agreed upon the ‘Statement of 
Principles’. The EC had manoeuvred itself into a corner: if the EC recognised an 
independent and sovereign BiH, the Bosnian Serbs would surely resort to violence, yet 
whilst the Bosnian Serbs continued to negotiate on the Carrington-Cutileiro plan no 
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recognition would be forthcoming. The Bosnian Serbs held all the cards and therefore the 
HDZ-BiH and SDA quickly repudiated the agreement.  
Accordingly on 6 April, the EC decided to recognise BiH “to demonstrate that they 
refused to yield to the blackmail exercised by the most extremist Serb elements.”15 
Simultaneously, the EC made a gesture towards the Serbs and proposed lifting the EC 
sanctions against Yugoslavia if it respected the terms that Cutileiro had been negotiating.16 
This gesture towards Serbia appeared to emanate from France as Roland Dumas remarked 
that it was essential to appear balanced and therefore to make a gesture to Belgrade. On 
raising the sanctions against Belgrade, Dumas stated that, “One cannot ignore the links 
between Serbs in Serbia and those of Bosnia-Hercegovina and it was necessary to send 
signals to Belgrade”.17 Once more, the message from the Europeans was confused and 
contradictory. 
At the beginning of April, Carrington insisted that a French politician assume the 
role of vice-President of the ECCY. The French recommended Thierry de Beaucé who had 
previously served in the Foreign Ministry working in cultural relations before becoming a 
special adviser to President Mitterrand.18 French peacekeepers, diplomats and politicians 
were assuming several important positions in the international community’s structures for 
resolving the Yugoslav crises.  
Following a day of heavy shelling in Sarajevo, de Beaucé and Henry Wynaendts 
held negotiations with Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević in Zagreb and Belgrade on 
9 and 10 April respectively. Alongside issues on UNPROFOR in Croatia, De Beaucé also 
addressed the issue of BiH reflecting after the meetings that, “we all hope that a solution 
will be found through dialogue within the recognised borders.”19  
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 The same day that de Beaucé and Wynaendts were holding meetings in Zagreb, 
Cutileiro travelled to Sarajevo on 10 April to hold talks with representatives from the three 
parties.20 The EC called for an immediate ceasefire in BiH and sent a strong warning that, 
“Violations of the principle of territorial integrity will not be tolerated and will not be 
without consequences for the future relations between the EC and those who will be held 
responsible.”21 The EC, demonstrating its detachment from reality, continued to call on the 
three parties to adhere to the agreement that they had signed in Sarajevo on 18 March, 
which the conflict had already rendered unworkable. The conflict continued to expand and 
it became quite evident that the JNA was supporting the Bosnian Serbs, as reports surfaced 
on the clearly partisan role of the federal army.22  
The CSCE released a declaration expressing their extreme worry and condemning 
the activities of the Bosnian Serbs and the JNA. Roland Dumas was quick to exclude 
France, and Europe, from this declaration, declaring that the Twelve of Europe were 
unhappy with the formulation of the declaration proposed by certain members of the 
CSCE.23 However Germany supported the American threat as Genscher called for the 
suspension of Yugoslavia from the CSCE if Serbia failed to adopt a fundamentally 
different attitude towards the UN, the CSCE and the ECCY.24 Conversely, Dumas 
considered that the EC had already “warned Serbia” and stressed that it was essential to 
“look towards dialogue, appeasement and a ceasefire and not the exasperation of feelings 
of confrontation.”25  
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The international debate on Yugoslavia was once more marked by Franco-German 
discord. France therefore sought to gain the upperhand and Dumas revealed that France 
was preparing an initiative for Sarajevo following the upcoming report of Cyrus Vance. 
Germany, not wanting to be upstaged, announced that the WEU, under German 
Presidency, would send a peacekeeping force to BiH.26  
On 22 April, Dumas announced that France would send aid and medicine to the 
civilian population of BiH and evacuate women and children of French nationality. He 
added that, “the United Nations must hurry to intervene in order to avoid a greater evil and 
new disaster caused by a conflict that more and more resembles a civil war.”27 In 
announcing this initiative, Dumas deplored the few results that the international 
community had obtained in the face of the drama that had hit the Bosnian republic. France 
would thus seek to rouse the international community from its slumber and lead through 
example by establishing a humanitarian airlift. In Bernard Kouchner, France had a young 
and energetic yet highly experienced humanitarianist to lead its efforts.  
Kouchner was a rising star in French politics and the Minister for Health and 
Humanitarian Aid had begun to occupy a central role within the Mitterrand administration. 
He had trained as a medical doctor before creating the NGO Médécins sans frontières 
(MSF). MSF was a highly influential organisation that strongly influenced the idea of 
‘humanitarian intervention’ employed, predominantly in Africa, in the 1980s.28 The UN 
built upon Kouchner’s humanitarianism and it would become incorporated in 
UNPROFOR’s approach, particularly in BiH. Thoroughly convinced by the righteousness 
of his cause and methods, Kouchner became deeply engaged with France’s policy towards 
the Bosnian crisis. 
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Kouchner arrived in Sarajevo on 23 April accompanying a delivery of 25 tonnes of 
humanitarian aid and medicines for the Bosnian population. He declared that he was in 
favour of a UN intervention in Bosnia, owing to his belief in the ‘right to intervene’, and 
reflected that “it’s too bad that only the command post of the peacekeepers is installed in 
Sarajevo and the troops elsewhere.”29  
BiH remained high on the European agenda as Dumas held a meeting with his 
German and Polish counterparts in Trémolat in southwestern France. The three issued a 
joint communiqué calling for an emergency meeting of the UNSC and the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force to re-establish peace in BiH.30 The French Ambassador to the UN, 
Jean-Bernard Mérimée delivered the letter to the UNSC President that evening.31 The 
combined weight and influence of a Franco-German proposal propelled Boutros-Ghali to 
announce that the UN was ready to act in BiH.  
Subsequently, Dumas held a meeting in Paris with his Portuguese counterpart Joao 
de Deus Pinheiro to discuss the possibility of sending EC or WEU observers to BiH under 
a UN mandate. In spite of Europe’s difficulties in Croatia, Boutros-Ghali still called upon 
the Europeans to take their part of the responsibility for solving the Bosnian crisis. Dumas 
also thought that “Europe should take initiatives… to advance any proposed solutions to 
the Yugoslav crisis.”32 Seemingly the Croatian crisis had done little to deter France from 
once more seeking to use the former Yugoslavia as a means to achieve a common 
European foreign policy. 
 Yugoslavia was thus high on the agenda when the EC met in Lisbon on 30 April. 
Ahead of the meeting Belgrade had proclaimed the creation of the Federal Republic of 
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Yugoslavia (FRY), consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. It offered the EC an opportunity 
to place conditions on its recognition of the newly defined Yugoslavia. Therefore the EC 
required a withdrawal of JNA troops from BiH before they would recognise FRY. Once 
more France and Germany clashed over a common approach on the issue. Germany 
favoured strict economic sanctions against Serbia threatening further possible diplomatic 
sanctions. France, however, continued to preach equivalency amongst the warring sides, 
believing that a balanced approach would be more productive.33  
France thus attempted to seize the initiative in solving the Bosnian conflict in 
Lisbon. Given France’s preference for an internationalised and multilateral solution, 
Dumas wanted to closely coordinate the efforts of the UN and the EC and proposed 
sending an observation mission to BiH under the leadership of Marrack Goulding, head of 
peacekeeping operations for the UN.  Accordingly Boutros Boutros-Ghali dispatched 
Goulding to Sarajevo to study the possibility of creating a peacekeeping operation in 
BiH.34  
Whilst negotiations between the three parties had continued in Lisbon, the situation 
in Sarajevo had steadily deteriorated. General Philippe Morillon – based in Sarajevo at 
UNPROFOR headquarters – worked with the Bosnian presidency and the JNA in an effort 
to prevent further escalation. However, by 2 May, Morillon’s efforts had been rendered 
obsolete as the JNA began shelling the capital. As the situation in Sarajevo continued to 
deteriorate, supporters of the Bosnian Presidency blocked the federal barracks. The JNA 
retaliated by undertaking a heavy bombardment of Muslim strongholds in Sarajevo. As 
Izetbegović returned from the Lisbon talks, he was taken hostage by the JNA. He secured 
his release against the liberation of General Milutin Kukanjac, who was pinned down by 
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government forces in the Marshall Tito barracks. However, the exchange convoy was 
attacked by government forces who aimed to requisition arms from the JNA.35  
It had become clear that UNPROFOR in its present state was not equipped to deal 
with the crisis in BiH; neither in terms of its mandate nor equipment. As fighting resumed 
in Sarajevo on 5 May, Morillon spent the evening at the residence of UNPROFOR 
commander Satish Nambiar in Stojčevac, where the latter decided that UNPROFOR could 
no longer maintain a presence in Sarajevo and its HQ would have to be relocated either in 
Zagreb or Belgrade.36 As such, it withdrew on 15 May, leaving behind a small contingent 
of French peacekeepers. 
The EC also considered its role as a mediator in the crisis in BiH, as the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister Jauo de Deus Pinheiro thought that “The situation is tragic and 
unacceptable and could lead the European Community to seriously rethink whether or not 
to continue to make sacrifices in order to mediate in a conflict that parties involved 
apparently seem set to continue.”37 With the resumption of hostilities on 5 May, the EC 
decided to “temporarily reduce” its presence in Sarajevo; the EC contingent was reduced 
by more than half.38 EC observers throughout BiH were withdrawn from Bihać, Banja 
Luka, Tuzla and Mostar following the death of a Belgian observer.39  
Europe continued to offer little deterrence to the Bosnian Serbs as the Portuguese 
Prime Minister, Anibal Cavaco Silva, declared that the purpose of the EC in BiH was not 
“to make peace, but to guarantee it” adding that “sending soldiers in these conditions 
would only make them easy targets.”40 Europe’s response to the war in BiH was slowly 
taking shape: to provide enough aid to sustain the civilian population whilst encouraging or 
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pressuring the “warring parties” to negotiate a settlement through international 
mediation.41  
As fighting continued throughout BiH and casualties continued to rise, the 
members of the EC decided to remove their Ambassadors from Belgrade, which seemed to 
one commentator to be in stark contrast to earlier disagreements within the EC and perhaps 
a cause for optimism.42 The US quickly followed suit and recalled Warren Christopher 
from Belgrade.43 Furthermore, following reports from the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNHCR) special envoy José-Maria Mendiluce on the conditions in BiH, 
the CSCE decided to suspend FRY from all questions relating to all former republics until 
30 June.44 The international community thought that diplomatic sanctions would be 
sufficient to discourage the Serbs from undertaking further attacks. However the 
international isolation of Serbia only fed the nationalist myth of Serbian victimisation.45 
As Europe pushed for greater sanctions against FRY, France continued to insist on 
the necessity of sending a UN deployment to BiH. Boutros-Ghali thought that the situation 
did not allow for a deployment. 46 Spokesman for the Quai d’Orsay, Daniel Bernard, 
announced that, in spite of Boutros-Ghali’s preferences, France was “thinking of a small 
contingent of a few hundred men, mandated by the UN and drawn from European forces 
… to perform basic and essential humanitarian tasks, such as the protection of 
humanitarian convoys, to provide airport access and the protection of negotiators.”47  
The following day the UNSC called on the Secretary General to prepare a study on 
the feasibility of humanitarian intervention along the lines that France had proposed. 
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Nonetheless, Boutros-Ghali remained resistant to the idea of sending peacekeepers to BiH 
and even questioned the efficacy of the UNPROFOR mission in Croatia.48 
Notwithstanding, France was pleased with the UNSC’s efforts and the Quai believed that 
UNSCR 752 “was going in the right direction” and the “desired way” adding that “we 
continue to consider the desirability of, at least, making a few hundred observers available 
to deploy in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in order to at least ensure the delivery of humanitarian 
aid and the protection of negotiators.”49 
As the EC and UN struggled towards implementing its humanitarian intervention 
1,200,000 displaced people fled the conflict, which one representative from the UNHCR 
described as: “without doubt the worst refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World 
War.”50 The Quai stated that the situation in BiH was “more and more preoccupying” and 
wanted the UN to convene a meeting of the interested parties the following week in 
Geneva.51 However a spokesman for the Secretary General declared that the UN was not 
prepared to host such a meeting particularly at a time when Carrington had reconvened the 
ECCY in Lisbon.52 This was in spite of the fact that the UN had admitted Slovenia, Croatia 
and BiH as new members on 22 May.53  
As in 1991, European inefficiency alarmed the US and Secretary of State James 
Baker thus revealed that he would not exclude military action against the Serbs if the 
forthcoming political, economic and diplomatic sanctions failed.54 Europe recoiled at such 
a suggestion and the British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd called for continued pressure 
against the Serbs but entirely dismissed any military action stating that “Nobody is ready to 
send soldiers into Yugoslavia who risk being stuck there indefinitely without an end in 
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sight without knowing what the human losses would be.”55 The Belgian Foreign Minister 
added support to Hurd’s cautious note adding that “Do we want the WEU to be 
responsible? Are you ready to assume the responsibility for all the victims that intervention 
would lead to?”56  
Europe was unable to agree on a sanctions policy so a military commitment was 
certainly not forthcoming. Indeed, France and Germany continued to clash over the speed 
and strength of the sanctions.57 As Serbia was becoming increasingly isolated from the 
international arena, France was concerned that the ability to negotiate with the aggressors 
would be lost and the inevitable outcome would be all-out conflict. Indeed, international 
isolation seemed to be the worst that the international community dared threaten as British 
Prime Minister John Major called on Serbia to end the violence in BiH threatening 
Belgrade with “international isolation”.58 
At a meeting in Lisbon, the EC debated immediate sanctions against FRY for 
which ten were in favour whilst France held some reservations citing concerns that Europe 
might burn its bridges with Belgrade.59 The new German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel 
was particularly vocal in calling for sanctions against Serbia.60 Elisabeth Guigou wanted to 
clarify that France’s goal was not to delay any decision on sanctions but to ensure that they 
were pursued through the right channels, that being either the Foreign Ministers Council of 
the EC or the UNSC. Any sanctions would therefore, Guigou argued, be more effective. 
Nonetheless, the EC agreed on sanctions in principle.61  
In spite of French reluctance, the EC eventually adopted a commercial embargo 
against FRY on 27 May and diplomatic sanctions on 2 June; the UN followed suit a day 
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later.62 However, these measures had little effect as heavy bombardments continued on 
Sarajevo, killing 16 people, which led to the suspension of the ECCY as the Bosnian 
government delegation withdrew.63  
Washington called for a firm response sensing that Milošević was tired and his 
resistance was weakening.64 The embargos had contributed to a worsening of conditions in 
Serbia, which added to growing unrest towards Milošević’s rule in Serbia.65 Indeed, there 
were anti-Milošević and peace demonstrations in Belgrade during the month of June.66 
In spite of the Serbs’ supposed weakening, the bombardment of Sarajevo continued 
throughout late May. Accordingly the WEU refused to rule out military intervention in 
BiH. It began to explore military strategies such as the creation of ‘protection zones’, 
similar to those employed in Northern Iraq.67 Indeed, the Bosnian government continued to 
call for intervention as the Foreign Minister, Haris Silajdžić, complained that “the UN 
sanctions against the Serb-Montenegrin Yugoslav republic have changed nothing”.68 
 
François Mitterrand in Sarajevo  
Following a meeting between Roland Dumas and Silajdžić, France began to focus on 
reopening the airport for humanitarian deliveries. The airport was pivotal to the French 
policy of humanitarian intervention and formed the centrepiece of its Bosnia policy. As 
Peter Andreas notes: “The particular form of humanitarianism in Bosnia served the 
strategic objective of avoiding more direct and risky military engagement with profound 
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political repercussions on the ground.”69 However France did not follow the implicit logic 
that many critics believed: that direct military engagement would solve the Bosnian crisis. 
By opting for humanitarian intervention France was demonstrating its vision for post-Cold 
War conflict resolution. 
 The following day the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Serge Boidevaix, 
met with Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade to persuade the Serbian leader to apply the 
conditions of UNSCRs 752 and 757, otherwise there could be no renewed dialogue.70 The 
Bosnian Serbs conformed to the provisions of UNSCR 757, which called upon them to 
cease attacks against the airport. However, they continued their bombardment of Sarajevo 
itself as monitors watched on.71 Nonetheless, the UN would consider Belgrade’s 
cooperation in reopening the airport as a demonstration of its goodwill.72  
In securing the parties’ agreement to UNSCR 757, the UN was able to pursue 
Boutros-Ghali’s primary mission in BiH: the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo. 
Indeed, on the ground Bernard Kouchner was attempting to force the issue as he attempted 
to lead an aid convoy to Sarajevo from nearby Visoko. However, after repeatedly trying to 
negotiate access to Sarajevo with the Bosnian Serbs, Kouchner was forced to leave the aid 
in Visoko, which would then be distributed by UNPROFOR and the Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) Pharmaciens sans Frontières. On his return, Kouchner gave an 
interview on radio station France Info and bemoaned the need to“negotiate from barricade 
to barricade, militia to militia” and that “I think we will get there, but it will take time and 
above all the maintenance of international pressure” although he thought it could take “a 
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few days or a few weeks.”73 In a further interview on TF1 he also suggested that “it is 
necessary to break the encirclement of Sarajevo airport and to bring food and medicine 
there.”74 The public and political gaze was fixed upon the airport as a panacea for BiH’s 
humanitarian woes and accordingly the credibility of the EC and the UN, and by extension 
France, became increasingly attached to this issue. 
On 8 June Boutros-Ghali reported back to the Security Council about the feasibility 
of sending a peacekeeping presence to protect the airport, which he thought would require 
approximately 1,000 men.75 The following day the UNSC approved military protection for 
Sarajevo airport under UNSCR 758, which authorised the Secretary General to send 
further personnel once the different parties had agreed to a ceasefire.76 Once more Paris 
expressed its readiness to contribute troops towards the extension of UNPROFOR, with a 
spokesman for the Quai noting that the “resolution corresponds to France’s wishes for a 
long time to see Sarajevo airport cleared to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief 
needed by the population.”77  
The Commander of UNPROFOR Lewis MacKenzie departed for Sarajevo to enact 
the resolution.78 Shortly after his arrival, an unknown group attacked a convoy that was 
transporting MacKenzie through the capital.79 The attack left one French soldier seriously 
injured.80 The Quai condemned the attacks adding that, “It is up to all parties concerned to 
respect the decisions of the Security Council and in particular to ensure the proper conduct 
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of the mission of UN observers at the airport in Sarajevo and in Sarajevo in general.”81 
Simultaneously France dispatched 50 soldiers for the first phase of securing the airport.82 
The reinforced UN contingent arrived on 11 June as a precarious calm lingered over 
Sarajevo. MacKenzie began negotiations with the Bosnian Presidency and Carrington 
announced that he would return for negotiations once the airport had been reopened.83 
The negotiations were more difficult than MacKenzie had envisaged.84 The links 
between the political leadership of the SDS and the Bosnian Serb militia made the 
reopening of the airport even more difficult, as Bosnian Serb soldiers told MacKenzie “that 
a lot of their colleagues had been killed securing the airport” and “MacKenzie won’t take 
the airport from us. We will kill you all [UNPROFOR] if you try.”85 Nonetheless, 
MacKenzie secured a ceasefire that would come into effect at 06h00 on 15 June. 
Therefore, under escort from the Bosnian Serbs, a thirty-man UNPROFOR reconnaissance 
party began to assess the condition of the airport. At this point, the airport became the 
focus of international attention as journalists the world over travelled to Sarajevo to report 
on the situation.  
Bernard Kouchner was becoming impatient and warned the UN that “we must not 
resign ourselves to the eternal wait for a ceasefire to enact a humanitarian plan.”86 
Kouchner had also been lobbying Marrack Goulding and Jan Eliasson, who were in charge 
of the UN’s humanitarian missions, to convince them to do everything possible to ensure 
the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo.87 Kouchner’s warnings 
became more salient as the ceasefire in Sarajevo collapsed spectacularly on the morning of 
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17 June at 05h00, having lasted approximately 40 hours.88 In spite of the collapse, Dumas 
said that “the action should be continued in Sarajevo despite the difficulties on the ground 
to achieve the liberation of the airport and allow the delivery of humanitarian aid.”89  
MacKenzie nonetheless felt that he had made great progress in talks to reopen the 
airport. Carrington thus proposed talks with Milošević, Tuđman and Izetbegović in 
Strasbourg on 25 June. UNPROFOR also secured an agreement on the means for heavy 
weapons control, which could have allowed peacekeepers to occupy the airport within 
days.90 It appeared that the UN-EC combination was making some minor yet noticeable 
progress in breaking the latest political impasse. However, appearances were deceiving and 
the US, perhaps sensing the inevitable collapse of negotiations and diplomatic progress, 
accused Belgrade of being duplicitous.91 
US doubts were justified as UNPROFOR efforts to reopen the airport were 
suspended on 20 June as fighting intensified in the surrounding area.92 Therefore aid 
continued to be delivered by road via the ‘humanitarian corridor’ that Kouchner had 
created. France was the only nation that was successful in delivering aid to the Bosnian 
capital. One Sarajevan reflected the French humanitarian aid was “symbolic, given the 
enormous needs, but important because it shows that we are not totally abandoned.”93 
However, following an attack against French volunteers, the French government decided to 
slow its aid programme until fighting abated.94 
Having just returned from Sarajevo, where he had been accompanying an aid 
delivery, the public intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy – often referred to publicly as ‘BHL’ – 
lobbied the President to act in BiH. He called Mitterrand’s long-serving personal secretary 
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Marie-Claire Papegay on 23 June, through whom he managed to arrange a meeting with 
the President that morning on France’s Bosnia policy. Over the course of a long meeting 
Lévy struggled to engage the President.  
Sensing that he had failed to convince the President to reappraise his Bosnian 
policy, Lévy concluded by commenting on Izetbegović. Lévy thought that he had found in 
“this well-read man, this man of texts and law, something of Léon Blum or better, an air of 
Salvador Allende, on the eve of the assault on the palace of La Moncada, in the famous 
photo where he has his miner’s helmet and his big glasses.”95 This comparison clearly 
resonated with the French President, who had previously entertained the idea that a similar 
fate could befall him as that of the Chilean President, and certainly saw himself as a man of 
action.96 Lévy had a note from Izetbegović appealing for help, which he proceeded to read 
to the President.97 Mitterrand was clearly taken by the notion that Izetbegović’s 
predicament was comparable to that of Salvador Allende. Nonetheless Lévy left the 
meeting with no clear indication of Mitterrand’s response to Izetbegović’s latest appeal. 
However the President would later reveal to Dumas that it was Lévy’s intervention that 
persuaded him of the need to seize the act.98 
Aware that the international mood was building towards a crescendo, and amidst 
increasing domestic criticism, Mitterrand held a private conversation with Dumas 
regarding a new initiative for Yugoslavia.99 The President told his Foreign Minister: “I 
want to strike a decisive blow. I feel that it is necessary to change the rhythm and to go off 
the usual paths of classic diplomacy. I am thinking of going to Yugoslavia.”100 The 
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President suggested either Belgrade or Sarajevo but Dumas warned against going to 
Belgrade.  
Mitterrand wanted Kouchner to accompany him but also wanted the visit to remain 
absolutely secret until the last moment, thus Dumas called Kouchner to inform him that he 
had to attend the forthcoming Lisbon summit that began on 26 June. Mitterrand wanted 
Dumas to stay behind “to cover the rear in case of difficulties and to manage it 
diplomatically.”101 The two would meet the following day in Lisbon to plan the visit. 
The theatre of such a visit spoke to the dramatic aspect of the President’s 
personality. There were several precedents for the President’s penchant to go ‘beyond 
diplomacy’. Following two attacks against international forces in Beirut, which killed 58 
French soldiers, Mitterrand immediately flew to the Lebanese capital. Similarly in January 
1985, as pro-independence voices mounted in the French overseas territory of Nouvelle 
Calédonie, the French President personally intervened to try and calm tensions between 
opposing groups.102   
In Lisbon, Dumas and Mitterrand met in the French embassy, where the President 
asked his Foreign Minister’s opinion on the envisaged visit to Yugoslavia. Dumas 
responded that:  
 
You cannot start in Belgrade… The critics will come from all sides. We will 
visit the red tyrant, the butcher of Sarajevo. We continue to privilege our 
alliance with the Serbs. I can hear now certain comments from the opposition 
and I read certain editorials before they’ve even been written.103  
 
Mitterrand agreed with his Foreign Minister but still warned against sharing the 
information with anyone, even those in the French delegation present in Lisbon.  
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The following day the Lisbon summit opened as the US Secretary of State James 
Baker called on European leaders “to kick Yugoslavia out of all international 
organisations”.104 Boutros-Ghali also issued an ultimatum to the Serbs calling for the end 
of hostilities and the relinquishing of heavy weapons by Monday 29 June. If they failed to 
do so then UNSC would meet to determine the means to ensure that the civilian population 
of Sarajevo received aid and relief. Diplomats at the UN suggested that resistance could 
lead to military action.105  
As the summit began, Sarajevo endured some of the heaviest bombardment it had 
seen theretofore. In the face of such blatant disregard for the international community’s 
warnings and sanctions, Mitterrand designated the Serbs as the main aggressors for the first 
time in the conflict. The French President stated “Serbia is the aggressor today, even if the 
origins of the conflict are far deeper.”106 Mitterrand said that the crisis in Bosnia had 
brought the credibility of the European Council into question and that if a solution was not 
found quickly then it could have a negative impact on the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty.107 France was due to hold a referendum on the Treaty in September. 
European leaders spent the afternoon discussing the Yugoslav crisis and Mitterrand 
demanded the strengthening of the embargo imposed on Serbia. The French President also 
called for the Europeans to put their military means at the disposal of the UN.108 In the 
afternoon, Mitterrand prepared the ground for a French initiative in a meeting of the 
European Council. During this session, Mitterrand handed Dumas a piece of paper 
outlining the plans for the trip to Sarajevo. Particular attention was to be paid to media 
relations, and it was decided that the photographer Claude Azoulay and a journalist from 
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the AFP should accompany the party.109 Dumas was tasked with preparing the operation 
and alerting international figures and organisations of his supposed departure for 
Yugoslavia.  
On the Saturday morning, at the insistence of Roland Dumas, Bernard Kouchner 
arrived in Lisbon. In making preparations for the trip, Dumas continued to suggest that he 
would be making the dangerous trip to Sarajevo. The Foreign Minister briefed his 
colleague on France’s latest BiH initiative: 
  
We are leaving for Sarajevo today, you and me. You know the terrain, you 
know the access: prepare our voyage. It will make a small noise. Our partners 
in the twelve do not know but France cannot allow the situation to worsen.110  
 
Similarly Mitterrand prepared Helmut Kohl for France’s latest initiative. Over 
breakfast Mitterrand revealed that a French initiative on Bosnia was forthcoming, although 
he spared the details, and asked for his German counterpart’s discretion. As Carine 
Germond notes, Mitterrand and Kohl had excellent personal relations, and agreed that 
close Franco-German cooperation was necessary to direct Europe. They therefore sought to 
use European and international opportunities to their advantage.111 Mitterrand forewarning 
Kohl is therefore unsurprising and was, in fact, essential to Franco-German cooperation on 
the former Yugoslavia. 
Dumas spent the morning in a specially prepared suite in a Lisbon hotel arranging 
the trip. He spoke directly with Milošević who warned that:  
 
It’s dangerous. Therefore go through Belgrade. There, we 100% guarantee 
your safety… A helicopter will take and bring you back from Sarajevo without 
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difficulty. You are not obliged to see us, nor even greet us. I understand the 
idea of your mission.112  
 
Dumas and Kouchner spent the rest of the morning speaking to UNPROFOR 
members, Ambassadors, and, eventually, Izetbegović. All warned that the visit was very 
dangerous and tried to deter the Foreign Minister. Indeed, it was certainly dangerous as the 
latest ceasefire had broken down that morning.113  
Following the final session of the Lisbon summit, Mitterrand held a brief press 
conference. In the corridor outside the conference room, he revealed to Helmut Kohl that 
the President himself was set to take an initiative very shortly.114 The President had told 
Dumas to round up the photographer Claude Azoulay and the AFP journalist Véronique 
Decoudu to tell them to join the President’s party at the airport.  
Just prior to their supposed departure, Dumas informed Kouchner that it was in fact 
the President who would be travelling to Sarajevo. Dumas told Kouchner, “You know your 
responsibility. I entrust the President to you.”115 Kouchner vowed to bring him back but 
wondered what they would actually do in Sarajevo, Dumas replied: “Demonstrate that 
whilst Europe is powerless, France is taking the initiative.”116  
From the presidential jet, Kouchner informed Lewis MacKenzie that it was the 
President, rather than the Foreign Minister as he had forewarned, who would be arriving in 
the Bosnian capital. The shocked General was taken aback and responded: “My God! Do 
you know the date? … You French are mad.”117 Of course, the President realised the 
significance of the date and sought to harness its symbolism as a diplomatic tool. 
En route Kouchner and Mitterrand had a long discussion on the links between 
humanitarianism and politics. Kouchner enquired of the President what had provoked this 
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sudden intervention. The Minister attempted to advance the case for a more robust 
response to the Bosnian War, particularly against the Serbs. Typically, Mitterrand reasoned 
historically: “this business in the Balkans is a thousand years in the making, and the 
international community interests itself with it for two years… Without Europe we would 
have had war with the Germans. The Serbs wanted to save the Federation.”118 Kouchner 
retorted that none of the efforts theretofore had prevented the systematic destruction of 
Bosnia by the Serbs. For the Minister, who had made several prior trips to Sarajevo, 
history was not a sufficient explanation nor an excuse for the tragedy unfolding in BiH, 
perpetrated predominantly by the Bosnian Serbs. Nonetheless, Mitterrand reasoned, “This 
war is cruel, inhumane, you must understand that the Serbs face a tradition that is too big 
for them, and they feel abandoned by the world.”119 Kouchner wondered why the President 
continued to indulge the Serbs. Mitterrand responded ahistorically: 
  
I have already told you this: I saw it happen in the most miserable German 
camps, the poorest, the most beaten prisoners: it was the Serbs, the only ones to 
have resisted the Nazi divisions and to be liberated by themselves, and where? 
Around Sarajevo, in the hills where we are going. Do not judge history without 
distance. Mistrust the immediate.  And, I repeat it to you, take care with the 
media.120 
 
When word reached UNPROFOR in Sarajevo that the French President would arrive 
that evening, the rumour quickly spread amongst a thrilled French contingent.121 Georges-
Marie Chénu, the French Ambassador to Croatia, called ahead of the President’s visit and 
indicated to the UN in Sarajevo that Mitterrand intended to land in Sarajevo that very 
evening. General Lewis MacKenzie was astonished and advised Chénu that, owing to the 
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condition of the runway and continuing fighting at the airport, the President should delay 
his arrival until the following morning.122  
However, unaware of the dangers of landing at the airport, Mitterrand remained 
determined to land there on the evening of 27 June. MacKenzie “had two options: accept 
the impossibility of the plan and merely await word of the inevitable crash, as the 
President’s aircraft tried to land at night in the middle of a war zone, at an airport 
controlled by the Serbs, without any landing aids; or try to facilitate his arrival by cleaning 
up the runway and marking the touchdown area.”123 Rather than have the “President of 
France splattered over a mountainside beside the runway”, MacKenzie opted for the latter 
and gathered a group of soldiers to negotiate a cessation of hostilities between the Bosniaks 
and the Serbs and to clear the runaway of debris, lest the presidential plane land only to 
puncture a tyre and skid into an adjacent minefield.124  
The pilots were becoming increasingly anxious about landing at Sarajevo after 
nightfall and contact with UN radio control became increasingly difficult. The Captain 
aborted the landing citing cloud cover. Instead the President flew to Split, where Chénu 
had made alternative arrangements for the presidential party. Preparations continued in 
Sarajevo throughout the night and MacKenzie told the Serb and Muslim liaison officers 
posted to the Postal, Telephone and Television (PTT) building: 
 
This is important: tomorrow morning we are expecting a VVIP at the airport. 
He is coming here to try and help stop the war. If either of your sides do 
anything to interfere with the visit, it will be seen around the world on CNN 
and your side will suffer consequences. I strongly recommend that you get hold 
of your political and military leaders and tell them to cool it for the next 
twenty-four hours. There will be a group of UN soldiers on the runway at 0700 
hours tomorrow morning to clean up the debris. Don’t use them for sniper 
practice!125 
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That evening the Foreign Ministry publicly announced Mitterrand’s intention to go to 
Sarajevo and that he would be spending the night in Split. Whilst there, the President 
refused to meet Tuđman for fear of the political ramifications. Instead he met two Croatian 
ministers, who warned him against proceeding to Sarajevo owing to the date. Mitterrand 
told his Croatian partners that he was aware of its significance and explained to the 
oblivious Kouchner that, “It’s the day of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by the Serb 
revolutionary Gavrilo Princip”.126 One of the ministers pointed out that “the tradition is 
that the Serbs go crazy on this day… They permit everything for the defence of their 
country, including assassination. You are in serious danger.”127 The President was 
unphased by the dangers, and indeed relished the symbolism of such an anniversary. 
In Paris, Roland Dumas continued to monitor the President’s progress. He sent a 
message to Chancellor Kohl on behalf of Mitterrand to inform the German chancellor that, 
following their conversation in Lisbon, the French President had decided to go to Sarajevo. 
Dumas also spoke with Života Panić, the Minister of Defence, to ensure that the Bosnian 
Serbs would disengage their forces surrounding the airport. This would be achieved the 
following morning with assistance from UNPROFOR.128   
The following morning the President left Split on one of two French Super Puma 
helicopters that had been dispatched from Paris. They took off at approximately 9.30 local 
time and arrived at Sarajevo airport an hour later, where General MacKenzie and a group 
of French officers welcomed the President. The second helicopter had been hit by a single 
round of heavy machine gun fire, which would greatly complicate the return journey for 
the French delegation.129 It also demonstrated that the President’s safety was far from 
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guaranteed during the visit. MacKenzie recommended that the President call for his jet to 
be sent and that a repair team be dispatched to fix the stranded Super Puma.  
The President was taken to the UN headquarters in Sarajevo in the PTT Building. 
There Mitterrand spoke with General MacKenzie on the conflict. The Canadian relayed his 
personal assessment of the conflict to the President, stressing that he believed all sides 
were equally culpable. Furthermore, when MacKenzie explained that supposedly the Army 
of the Republic of BiH (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, ARBiH) fired at their 
civilians he detected a glimmer in the President’s eye.130 He also asked Mitterrand to relay 
a message to Izetbegović: “Stop the harassment of federal forces at the airport and the 
agreement [reopening of the airport] can be applied.”131 For the Bosnian government, 
preventing the reopening of the airport was a sensible strategy. In its present state, the 
ARBiH was comprehensively less well-armed than the Bosnian Serbs and could only 
possibly hope to win the conflict through international intervention. The airport impasse 
had, as journalist David Rieff reflected, made the besieged city “the most famous place in 
the world.”132 In allowing the airport to be reopened the government would resign itself to 
accepting humanitarian intervention as the international community’s modus operandi in 
BiH.  
The Canadian General was thus shocked to learn that Mitterrand intended to speak 
only with Izetbegović and not the Bosnian Serbs nor Croats and feared that his existence in 
Sarajevo would become even more difficult once the French delegation had left. Thus he 
appealed to the President to meet Karadžić, and after deliberations with Kouchner, 
Mitterrand agreed.133 The President had been keen to avoid the Bosnian Serbs for fear of 
the damage that it would do to his public image. MacKenzie thus suggested the airport for 
                                                     
130 Ibid. 
131 Braunstein, Matthew. Mitterrand à Sarajevo: 28 juin 1992, Le rendez-vous manqué (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2001), 82. 
132 Andreas. Blue Helmets, 3. 
133 MacKenzie. Peacekeeper, 254. 
 166 
the meeting and Mitterrand corrected the General saying that it would be only a brief 
greeting of five minutes. MacKenzie, aware of the Bosnian Serbs’ cunning, told the 
President that the meeting would last as long as the Bosnian Serbs saw fit, as fighting 
would engulf the environs of the airport as soon as the meeting started, preventing the 
President’s departure.134 
Following his meeting with MacKenzie, Mitterrand began his tour of the besieged 
capital (see map 3). An armoured vehicle took the President from the PTT building to the 
Presidency, where he was greeted by his Bosnian counterpart. Mitterrand told Izetbegović 
that he had come to Sarajevo to witness for himself what was truly happening and recalled 
that it reminded him of the German towns that he had traversed in 1945 and that it had 
suffered to the same degree.135 In a conversation with Bernard-Henri Lévy, Izetbegović 
later claimed that, “I told him [Mitterrand] and showed him proof of the existence of 
concentration camps and I was waiting for his reaction upon his return to France.”136 Such 
a revelation would almost certainly have provoked a concerned reaction from the former 
POW. However, although Izetbegović went to lengths to describe the systematic campaign 
the Serbs were waging against the Muslim population, which was harrowing in itself, he 
did not provide proof of the existence of concentration camps.137  
Following their meeting, the two Presidents walked to the nearby Koševo hospital. 
En route thrilled Sarajevans greeted the French President who had visited their besieged 
and beleaguered city.138 Passers-by cried “Mitterrand, you are our last hope! Thank you for 
your courage!” as sporadic canon shots reminded the Sarajevans of their plight.139  
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During the walk, Izetbegović turned to Kouchner and explained that “Women are 
deported after having been raped, and they are directing innocent men, civilians, unarmed, 
to extermination camps [emphasis added].”140 This was also interpreted to Mitterrand. 
However, Kouchner believed that the claim of “extermination camps” was out of 
proportion, but recalls to “have promised, with the approval of the President, to try to open 
the camps.”141  
When he reached the hospital, the French President witnessed first-hand the effects 
of shelling on the city’s civilian population. In the city’s only emergency room he found “a 
woman with a torn cheek, a girl paralysed in the legs, recumbent soldiers.”142 Having 
visited the hospital, Mitterrand and Izetbegović walked to the bakery on Vaso Miskin 
Street where, on 27 May, the shelling of a breadline left sixteen people dead and tens more 
injured. Mitterrand laid a single red rose at the shrine to the victims’ memory. The two 
Presidents then held a joint press conference. The visit had a clear emotional impact on the 
President, who remarked that “One can really see an imprisoned population, subjected to 
murderous blows. One feels a great sense of solidarity when one sees it.”143 Asked by a 
journalist why he had decided to make the visit, Mitterrand responded that he “believes in 
the symbolic strength of acts” and that he hoped “to seize the universal conscience to come 
to the aid of a population in danger … what is happening is not acceptable.”144 Symbolism 
was the most potent weapon that Mitterrand had at his disposal and he employed it in an 
effort to secure the reopening of the airport. He told the assembled press that he wished to 
see the airport reopened so that aid could be delivered, under military protection if 
necessary.  
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Although Mitterrand had designated the Serbs as the aggressors only two days 
previous, he was keen to highlight that his mission was “not to make war with anybody” 
and that “France is not the enemy of any of the republics of the region”.145 However the 
President was keen to stress that the example of Sarajevo was different and that the amitié 
Franco-Serbe makes France “all the more free to say that this is not acceptable.”146 After 
leaving the press conference, Mitterrand departed for the airport to return to Paris. In the 
course of the afternoon, the President’s jet had landed at the airport. However, a drunken 
Bosnian Serb had driven into the President’s jet, damaging the wing, and himself, in the 
process, which would delay take-off.147  
As Mitterrand arrived at the airport he was greeted by Radovan Karadžić, Ratko 
Mladić and Nikola Koljević. Karadžić told Mitterrand that he was preparing to hand 
control of the airport to the UN. As the group walked inside, machine gun fire erupted 
outside as Lewis MacKenzie had predicted. With fighting around the airport and a 
damaged jet, the President was effectively the hostage of the Bosnian Serb delegation. 
MacKenzie thus suggested that Mitterrand hold a small meeting with the Bosnian Serb 
delegation.148  
Karadžić and Mladić launched into their tired tropes about Islamic fundamentalism 
in BiH and the threat it posed to Europe, leaving their audience unimpressed. Karadžić 
tried to convince the President that the Bosnian Serbs were entitled to their own 
independent territory, to which Mitterrand curtly retorted, “Perhaps. But you are going 
about it in the wrong way.”149 In response, Mladić went on the offensive claiming that the 
Bosnian Serb who had driven into the President’s jet, of which Mitterrand was not aware, 
had been under Muslim gunfire. Just as Mladić revealed this, the pilot of the jet entered to 
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reveal that it had been repaired and was ready to depart. Karadžić ended the meeting by 
telling the President, “You feel sorry for yourself, but for one Bosniak death, there are one 
hundred Serbs that you ignore!”150 Kouchner recalls that Mitterrand looked Karadžić 
directly in the eye and replied, “You mock me and you say stupid things. You are losing 
your cause. I do not believe you.”151 This curt retort marked the end of the conversation.  
After some deliberation, Mitterrand decided to leave in the repaired jet. Before 
leaving he asked MacKenzie what assistance France could usefully offer him in Sarajevo. 
MacKenzie requested that once the Bosnian Serbs handed over the airport, the UN would 
need humanitarian aircraft to land almost immediately to “kick-start” the operation.152 
Furthermore, he requested a company of French marines be dispatched to secure the 
airport. The President duly obliged. 
In the aircraft en route to Split, Kouchner once more tried to convince Mitterrand of 
the necessity to intervene. Mitterrand responded, “Who? France alone? No. We will not 
add war to war. Only the naïve, liars and some fiery intellectuals can think of that.”153 The 
visit to Sarajevo appeared only to reaffirm Mitterrand’s resolution to solve the crisis 
through humanitarian aid and a political solution. 
Reaction to the President’s visit was greeted in the Parisian press with near 
unanimous praise. The conservative newspaper Le Figaro considered that the President 
had recaptured French public opinion with panache. It reflected that:  
 
The French have always been receptive to such feats - Bonaparte at the bridge 
of Arcola, Clemenceau in the trenches, de Gaulle advancing under fire towards 
the nave of Notre Dame. One cannot help thinking that Mitterrand was inspired 
by the examples of this man that he has for half a century, so admired (without 
saying it) and so hated (without hiding it).154  
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Libération thought that Mitterrand had retaken the initiative in solving the Bosnian 
crisis, having swum against the tide in trying to negotiate with Serbia over the preceding 
months. Moreover, Liberation noted, the visit will have buoyed the Sarajevans as not only 
was Mitterrand the French President, nor a member of the twelve of Europe, he was one of 
the P5 and therefore represented far more than France.155  
However, internationally reaction was slightly more tempered. German officials 
appeared to be irked as theretofore France had appeared to be the most reticent to act 
against Serbia.156 However, on Sunday evening Mitterrand personally called Helmut Kohl 
and “the bittersweet reactions of his [Kohl’s] entourage left no trace” as Kohl had realised, 
owing to their conversation in Lisbon, that Mitterrand was planning an initiative of such a 
magnitude.157 In contrast, the German press praised the personal courage of Mitterrand. 
However, and perhaps still offended over recognition disagreements in December 1991, 
the German press accused the President of breaking from a unified European approach..158 
In Britain, across the board the press praised the “personal courage” of the French 
president.159 Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Minister, had expressed a similar sentiment 
saluting “the courageous act of an aging French president”, underlining that “nothing in 
Europe, nor in Maastricht, prevents a country from taking such an initiative.”160  
In the short-term, the President’s visit appeared to have brought about the 
reopening of the airport; the declared aim of his visit. The Bosnian Serbs relinquished 
control of the airport on the afternoon of 29 June, although as part of the agreement 
reached with the UN the Bosnian Serbs were also required to remove artillery from around 
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the airport, which encountered problems.161 Twenty UNPROFOR observers were placed in 
the area surrounding the airport and a French Transall transport aeroplane landed that 
evening carrying aid and food. The following morning three more transporters, carrying 
aid, medicine and equipment to repair the airport, landed without incident.162  
However the Sarajevan population were soon able to discern the purpose of 
Mitterrand’s visit and the initial Francophile enthusiasm quickly dissipated. A week after 
the President’s visit, the Bosnian newspaper Oslobođenje bemoaned the humanitarian 
policy of the West that sought only to deal with the “symptom of the disease”.163 The 
article also perceptively reflected that Mitterrand sought to use the symbolism of his 
Sarajevo visit to counter criticism domestically and also to demonstrate internationally that 
Europe could act without US interference.164 Izetbegović recalled that, “Many regret the 
reopening of the airport and this ‘humanitarian’ policy of the West, which had definitively 
relegated the struggle for rights, justice and laws. Instead, we had a policy of alms imposed 
on us, which, of course, did not meet our expectations.”165 
The President’s visit precipitated a flurry of diplomatic activity. Carrington once 
more renewed the ECCY paying tribute to “a spectacular gesture” and adding that the 
President’s visit would probably have “a very important effect for the population of 
Sarajevo.”166 Furthermore the UNSC authorised the deployment of 1,000 more 
peacekeepers to protect the airport, whilst Britain declared that it was ready to participate 
in a humanitarian airlift.167 
The EC began its humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo on 2 July, with five French and 
one British transporter planes delivering over 600 tonnes of aid and material to the Bosnian 
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capital.168 The following day, Carrington flew to Sarajevo to meet Izetbegović as he tried 
to seize on the initiative given by Mitterrand’s visit.169 However, once more European 
mediation failed to achieve any progress as Carrington concluded “the three communities 
are not very happy living together.”170  
 
Internationalising the Crisis 
France proposed a new diplomatic initiative at a meeting of the Group of 7 (G7) by calling 
for the creation of an international conference on Yugoslavia. Jean Musitelli, spokesman 
for the Élysée, indicated that the G7 “should not rule out the possibility of an international 
conference bringing together the UN, the European Community and all parties in the 
Yugoslav crisis.”171 Musitelli also indicated that France had not ruled out the possibility of 
sending ground troops, not peacekeepers, to protect the aid convoys, adding that “These 
are not empty words.”172  
The following day, as a CSCE summit opened in Helsinki, France sent military 
helicopters to Sarajevo, which led journalists to question Musitelli whether this was a 
separate French initiative. However Musitelli soon confirmed that they were sent in 
support of UNSCR 761; the resolution that had authorised the deployment of a further 
1,000 UN peacekeepers to secure the airport.173 Secretary of State Baker also reported that 
George Bush had told Alija Izetbegović that he would consider the possible use of aerial 
force to destroy the Serbs’ heavy artillery.174 The Foreign Ministers of the WEU and 
NATO would also hold meetings during the course of the CSCE summit to discuss the 
situation in Yugoslavia. The international community was beginning to undermine the 
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threat of force, particularly since it was evident that there was a lack of will to engage 
militarily with the Bosnian conflict. 
This was not lost on the Bosnian Serbs who continued to negotiate at a political 
level as they attempted to present a fait accompli on the ground. Following its ministerial 
meeting on the morning of 10 July, the WEU reverted to type announcing that they would 
study the possibility of enacting a naval blockade against Serbia; a rather empty threat.175 
The following NATO meeting concluded that the NATO forces would support this 
measure and would help to ensure that the embargos against Belgrade were respected.176 
On the concluding day of the CSCE summit, Mitterrand sought to clarify France’s 
position in regards to sending troops to BiH. The French President explained that France 
did not envisage sending troops to take part in the fighting in Yugoslavia but it was 
prepared to send peacekeepers to assure the protection of humanitarian convoys. 
Mitterrand perceived that France “is not in the mindset to send troops to fight on the 
ground but it is in the state of mind to send troops to protect humanitarian supplies.”177 
France had rolled back on its thinly-veiled threats from the day previous. Nonetheless the 
President reaffirmed France’s commitment to execute the decisions of the UN and once 
more called for the creation of an international conference for Yugoslavia.178 
Whilst in Helsinki, Mitterrand held a meeting with Franjo Tuđman to discuss the 
issue of Bosnia-Hercegovina. At that stage, the Croatian President advocated the 
cantonisation of BiH owing to its ethnic composition. However, Mitterrand was keen to 
warn Tuđman that this was not the point of view of the Bosnians themselves. Mitterrand 
believed that “in each village there is a little of everybody [each ethnic group]”, which 
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Tuđman disputed. The Croatian leader argued that “cantonisation will be possible but the 
Bosnian leadership opposes it and wants a unified Islamic state.”179  
Tuđman appealed to France and the international community directly to pressure 
Izetbegović into accepting the EC’s solution. “The international community and Europe, at 
the heart of which France plays an important role, must oblige the representatives of the 
three peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina to negotiate around a table and to find solutions for a 
shared life in the interior of Bosnia-Hercegovina.”180 Tuđman continued, “It must be a 
democratic and peaceful solution. The Serbs and Croats are in favour of cantonisation, the 
Bosniaks are not. It is necessary to impose a peaceful solution.”181  
Tuđman thought that “the problem is the Croatian part of Bosnia formerly included 
in the Banovina created in 1929, which now feels threatened and wants to re-join. I don’t 
want it. We have recognised Bosnia-Hercegovina; but it will not survive as a unified state, 
but as a union.”182 Tuđman had revealed his vision for the former Yugoslav space (see map 
4). The Croatian President derived his concept of the Croatian ‘nation’ from his revisionist 
historical interpretations of Yugoslavia. As Gordana Uzelak notes therefore, “the 
population of territories which Tuđman considers as historically Croatian becomes a part 
of the Croatian state.”183 Although Tuđman sought to hide his intentions from Mitterrand, 
he was prepared to accept the loss of some Croatian territory if it were compensated for in 
BiH. 
Mitterrand pointedly stated that thus the “Croats are doing the same thing in Bosnia 
as the Serbs.”184 The difference, Tuđman declared, was that the Croats did not attack the 
Bosnians, they were defending Croatian territory. Nonetheless, Mitterrand noted that 
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Bosnia was an internationally recognised state and was present at Helsinki, at the same 
invitation as all others. Tuđman conceded that Croatia had even recognised BiH but was 
concerned that Izetbegović wanted a unified Islamic state. Mitterrand again retorted that 
the Bosnian leader had made no indication that this was his intention.  
Following the CSCE summit, its members released a statement expressing their 
concern that, “The authorities in Belgrade bear primary responsibility.”185 Once more, 
implicit threats and heightening rhetoric had resulted in few measures that would actually 
exert little influence over the fighting in BiH. Indeed the UNPROFOR spokesman in 
Sarajevo, Fred Eckhard, criticised the measure, complaining that “the Adriatic coast is a 
long way from Sarajevo”.186 The task of UNPROFOR seemed to be growing daily as 
reports emerged that the Bosnian Serbs had launched an attack against the Bosniak enclave 
of Goražde.187 This marked the start of a vast offensive by the Bosnian Serbs throughout 
BiH that saw them lay siege to many strategically located towns and led to another mass 
exodus of Bosniak civilians.188 
The new wave of ethnic cleansing created a surge in refugee numbers, who were 
fleeing towns in eastern BiH into neighbouring republics. Accordingly, Tuđman wrote to 
Mitterrand to highlight the growing refugee crisis in BiH. He wrote that: “Croatia cannot 
deal with the number of refugees coming from BiH. Many swim across the Sava River. 
Croatia has more than 650,000 refugees about 361,500 from BiH.”189 He highlighted the 
fact that the Serbs were taking advantage of the focus on Sarajevo and the “only remaining 
solution lies in a rapid and energic [sic] military intervention by international forces.”190 
The Croatian Minister for the Interior, Ivan Jarnjak, also made an appeal to Europe to 
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accept refugees from BiH as Croatia could not continue to support the vast numbers that 
were fleeing from the war in its eastern neighbour.191  
Intelligently, with renewed talks led by Carrington scheduled for 15 July, Karadžić 
called for an immediate ceasefire. The Bosnian Serbs had made significant progress in 
cleansing the east and could thus attend the talks in a strong military position.192 At the 
talks at the auction house Christie’s in London, where Carrington was a chairman, the 
Bosniaks stuck steadfastly to the line that they would not engage in direct negotiations with 
the Bosnian Serbs until a ceasefire held for seven days and the Serbs relinquished control 
of their heavy weapons to the UN.193 Once more, the talks made little progress, although 
Karadžić assured Carrington that he was ready to respect a ceasefire around Sarajevo and 
guarantee the safety of the ‘humanitarian corridor’.194 With the media focus fixed on the 
capital, this was an astute move that also allowed the Bosnian Serbs to continue their 
offensive in the countryside of BiH.195 
 There was also cause for cautious optimism amongst the European diplomacy. In 
Belgrade, the ascension of the writer Dobrica Ćosić to the position of President of the FRY 
and Milan Panić, a Serbian American multimillionaire pharmaceutical tycoon, as Prime 
Minister led to new hopes that renewed dialogue may halt hostilities.196 The early mood-
music from the Panić premiership appeared promising as he proposed the demilitarisation 
of BiH under the control of the UN and called for one hundred days to bring peace to the 
former Yugoslavia.197 The newly installed Prime Minister wrote to Mitterrand to express 
his “sentiment of admiration and respect for the act of great courage and wisdom of a 
statesman that you demonstrated by visiting Sarajevo.” Panić added that, “I want to walk 
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along the path that you have traced, Mr President, by visiting Sarajevo.”198 Indeed, the new 
Yugoslav Prime Minister did trace Mitterrand’s footsteps and visited Sarajevo on 19 
July.199 
The British Foreign Secretary was also following in the President’s footsteps as he 
arrived in Sarajevo on the morning of 17 July, as a fourteen day ceasefire was signed 
between the three parties in London.200 In Sarajevo, Hurd declared that the EC would not 
accept the ethnic partition of BiH, although he immediately undermined himself by stating 
that he did not foresee military intervention to impose a particular solution on the 
ground.201 Hurd perfectly encapsulated the contradictory European approach to solving the 
Bosnian conflict, which in turn provided the Bosnian Serbs with an implicit confirmation 
that they could continue to try to create a fait accompli partition in BiH. Hurd had set the 
parameters for European policy, which was based on its poorly perceived understanding of 
the Bosnian Serbs’ war aims.202 
Following the conclusion of the talks in London, the three parties agreed to a 
ceasefire that would come into effect at 18h00 on 19 July. Furthermore, the UN announced 
that it was ready to assume a supervisory role for the transfer of the Serbs’ heavy 
weapons.203  In Belgrade, Hurd declared that he was more optimistic that the ceasefire 
would hold, although he warned that “the moment of truth had come” and that “the 
response will come on the ground and not a signature at the bottom of a document.”204 
Whilst Hurd was in Belgrade, Mitterrand received Panić in Paris for talks, where the 
Yugoslav Prime Minister told Mitterrand that he could “count on him to introduce a 
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peace.”205However, as the deadline for the ceasefire came, its chances of success were 
slim. The UN had again closed the airport amidst fighting as the deadline passed.206 Once 
more, the aggression emanated from the Bosnian Serbs and the EC considered expelling 
FRY from all international organisations.207  
UNPROFOR reopened the airport on 21 July following a lull in fighting, which 
allowed Carrington to reach Sarajevo to hold discussions.208 Simultaneously, in Zagreb 
Izetbegović and Tuđman signed an agreement of friendship and cooperation and called on 
the EC and the US to take effective measures against the forces of FRY who continued to 
attack BiH and equally Croatia.209 Significantly this marked an agreement between the two 
to formally join forces against the Serbs and a temporary cessation in hostilities against one 
another.210  
The agreement led to a renewed push by the Bosnian Serbs. Once more 
UNPROFOR threatened to close the airport amidst heavy fighting.211 Boutros-Ghali 
declared that UNPROFOR would be unable to undertake supervision of the heavy weapons 
around the airport; the UNSC remained determined.212  
That same day, two French UN armoured vehicles escorted a humanitarian delivery 
to Goražde; one struck a landmine en route.213 Following this incident, Roland Dumas 
highlighted the fragility of the humanitarian mission in BiH and declared on France Soir 
that the “action must be strengthened.”214 Having reflected that the refugee crisis in BiH 
had taken France “by the throat”, the Foreign Minister added: “We must move up a gear, 
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beyond humanitarian assistance, and find political solutions to the Yugoslav crisis.”215 
Moreover, German and US rhetoric had continued to heighten; the ruling Christian 
Democrats in Germany called for military intervention unless the ceasefire agreement 
signed in London was respected.216 
The UNSC called on the EC to consider the enlargement of the ECCY to address 
the problems in the former Yugoslavia.217 Therefore, Britain – who now held the EC 
Presidency – decided to hold a conference in London in the second half of August that 
would bring together the three parties in conflict, the EC and the UN.218 In preparation the 
British Foreign Office invited the three parties to London to hold discussions under EC 
auspices and chaired by Cutileiro.219  
At the meeting Cutileiro reaffirmed the line that negotiations were possible whilst 
fighting continued.220 Once more the negotiations reached their disheartening conclusion 
of no settlement. The Bosnian government continued to refuse the ethnic cantonisation of 
BiH, which Karadžić continued to support, knowing fully well that the situation on the 
ground greatly favoured his side. The Bosnian Croats were repesented by Mate Boban who 
continued to call for the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from the areas that they had 
conquered.221 Haris Silajdžić raised the issue of atrocities in BiH and called for the creation 
of an international tribunal to try Karadžić and the Serb leaders, comparing them to Hitler 
and his cronies.222 Still seeking to acquire the Bosnian government’s acceptance to his 
‘General Statements’, Cutileiro announced the immediate creation of a human rights 
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committee in BiH.223 Izetbegović also petitioned the UNSC to lift the arms embargo 
against BiH so that the Bosniak population could protect itself against the worsening 
atrocities.224 
The summer of 1992 had revealed the horrific extent of the Bosnian Serb campaign 
of ethnic cleansing that had ravaged BiH. This systematic campaign had largely been 
ignored in the Western press, as news reporting had fixated on the plight of Sarajevo. The 
Bosnian Serbs’ campaign aimed to remove the cultural and territorial ties of Bosnian 
Muslims to the regions that the Serbian leaders envisaged as part of Greater Serbia. This 
led to massive population displacement as refugees fled towards Muslim-held urban 
centres or towards neighbouring republics. This created Bosniak enclaves throughout BiH, 
wherein Bosniak civilians lived under siege.  
Stories emerged in the international media concerning the existence of 
concentration camps in BiH. In a series of articles for New York Newsday at the end of 
July, the journalist Roy Gutman exposed the existence of a network of concentration 
camps. These articles were widely replicated throughout French media over 3 and 4 
August and film footage captured by an ITN news team from the Omarska concentration 
camp was broadcast on 7 August.225 Furthermore, the haunting image of ‘the young thin 
man’, (‘le jeune homme maigre’) Fikret Alić, was widely-printed and led to comparisons 
with Nazi extermination camps.226  
On 3 August the UN confirmed the existence of a single ‘prisoner camp’ in a 
stadium in Bosanski Novi on the border between Croatia and BiH.227 The Quai called for 
“immediate access without restrictions” for the International Committee of the Red Cross 
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(ICRC) and UNHCR.228 Meriel Beattie writing for Le Monde had also begun to investigate 
camps near Prijedor but was restricted access by Bosnian Serb militiamen. However, she 
could make out hundreds of men imprisoned on a sports field in the distance.229 Sports 
stadiums and fields across BiH provided a readily available and well-constructed 
infrastructure for prison camps throughout BiH.230  
 The existance of concentration camps greatly concerned the President owing to his 
own experiences in World War II. He told a meeting of the Council of Ministers that “all 
humanitarian convoys must be protected, all camps must be visited, controlled and 
open.”231 Mitterrand believed that the solution was to increase the humanitarian effort by 
gaining access to the camps and reinforcing the mandate for aid delivery.  
Roland Dumas affirmed the President’s view and added that France would learn the 
truth about the camps and the behaviour of those involved in them, which required “the 
right to go there and see the physical cruelty which the people collected there have been 
victims of.”232 Therefore Dumas called on Kouchner to visit the camps; he entered the 
camps of Manjača and Omarska on 14 August.233 There he saw 700 Bosniak men penned 
into a stable, all appearing to have lost more than 10 kilos and reflected that “the infirmary 
was a place for people to die”.234  
Calls for stronger intervention emerged from within Mitterrand’s own party as 
André Billardon, the Socialist Deputy for Saône-et-Loire called for the UN to mount a firm 
response and not to exclude military intervention. He added that France should be involved 
in any such action.235 Furthermore both Le Figaro and Le Quotidien de Paris were openly 
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calling for Western military intervention.236  Mitterrand held steadfastly to his 
humanitarian approach and warned that “adding war to war will resolve nothing.”237 
The ICRC had yet to confirm whether these camps were in fact concentration 
camps, much to the frustration of Simone Veil, former Health Minister under Giscard 
d’Estaing. A survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau, she condemned the International Red Cross 
declaring that “The HCR talks explicitly of concentration camps. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross refuses to confirm it. Everyone passes the buck in the face of 
the Yugoslav drama.”238  
Interventionist voices were also growing in opposition parties in neighbouring 
Germany with many advocating military intervention, lifting the arms embargo for 
Bosniaks and Croats and a new Nuremberg trial.239 In Britain, former Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher was calling for an ultimatum and military action against the Serbs, 
whilst former French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert called for the bombing of Serb 
artillery and infrastructure.240  
Therefore Boutros-Ghali called upon European organisations to be ready to assume 
the role of controlling heavy arms in BiH, as he wrote “European countries and the 
regional organisations are particularly well-placed for an urgent action.”241 As Boutros-
Ghali continued to protect the UN from becoming more deeply involved in BiH, the US 
was calling for a UNSCR to allow CSCE to send a verification mission to judge whether or 
not crimes against humanity had been committed in the course of the conflict.242 The 
Bosnian government had released their own list pertaining to the network of camps under 
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Bosnian Serb control, which claimed that 97,000 people were held in 94 camps across 
BiH.243  
Europe responded and called for immediate unrestricted access to the camps in BiH 
and appealed to Belgrade to use its influence over the Bosnian Serbs. In a communiqué, 
the EC called on all parties to conform to international human rights and the Geneva 
Convention.244 In an effort to support Europe, NATO declared that it was studying the 
possibility of supporting humanitarian aid delivery through military means, although a 
spokesman highlighted that it would take several weeks.245 Georges Kiejman, the 
governmental minister for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that France “will be 
ready to study the neutralisation of heavy arms in possession of the Serbs”, although he 
was also keen to stress that any heavy arms under the control of Bosniaks and Bosnian 
Croats would also be targeted.246 Therefore, France would seize the UNSC to draft a 
resolution to increase the capacity of UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia.247 Whilst highlighting 
that the situation in BiH was “extremely complex”, Kiejman indicated that if the Bosnian 
Serb commander would not open the camps that there were “other means than those of 
discussion.”248  
The Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek, expressed his support for 
military protection for humanitarian convoys and the need to gain unrestricted access to the 
camps.249 London also called for an immediate meeting of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights to investigate the camps, as Douglas Hogg prepared to meet leaders in Brussels to 
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prepare for the creation of an enlarged conference.250 NATO also planned an extraordinary 
meeting of its Ambassadors to discuss the options available to ensure the delivery of 
humanitarian aid in BiH.251 The UNSC also announced that it envisaged the limited use of 
force to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid.252 Chancellor Kohl expressed his support 
for such an approach.253 Critically, Russia also supported a reinfocement of UNPROFOR; 
although it was keen to stress that this was only if reports from BiH proved to be well-
founded.254 However the mandate would only provide for humanitarian deliveries.  
The US was keen to highlight that it was not prepared to see its troops embroiled in 
a guerrilla war and was therefore only prepared to offer air support.255 Douglas Hogg 
added that, “The only objective justifying the massive use of force would be to obtain a 
peace agreement and there is no reason to think that the use of force would bring a peace 
agreement.”256 Elisabeth Guigou, added further weight behind the humanitarian 
intervention line, stating that “there is no question of going to war in Yugoslavia because 
we will not solve this conflict with cannon shots.” However, Guigou did add that it was 
Europe, following a French initiative, which had called for the humanitarian aid to be 
accompanied by military means.257 That same day Douglas Hurd revealed that London, 
Paris and Washington were very close to an agreement for the protection of humanitarian 
deliveries.258 The international community had well and truly adopted the Mitterrandienne 
line. 
The Bosnian government themselves were resistant to the type of intervention 
envisaged by the UNSC and would have preferred the Bosnian Serb artillery to have been 
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neutralised.259 Nonetheless the US, France and Britain were close to an agreement 
regarding a new UNSC resolution that would authorise “all means necessary” to ensure the 
delivery of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian population.260 However, there were clear 
differences over who should contribute the ground troops to secure the delivery: 
Washington flatly refused; Germany’s constitution strictly forbade sending troops outside 
of NATO territory; the Bosnian government refused Italian troops; and Britain had already 
declared its reluctance to send ground troops to BiH.261 France, however, was proactive 
and the government dispatched Bernard Kouchner to study the resolution’s 
implementation.262 
As these discussions continued, political pressure continued to grow in France as 
politicians from all sides of the political spectrum called on the French government to 
act.263 Furthermore a limited survey by the French Institute of Public Opinion found that 
61% of French people favoured direct military intervention in BiH under the auspices of 
the UN.264  
In France, the opposition criticised the government for its insufficient solution to 
the crisis in BiH. The criticisms were often aimed at the President. Former Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac called for prompt aerial operations and criticised Mitterrand for 
demonstrating an excessive sympathy for the Serbs and accused the President of 
committing an “historic error”.265 He also declared himself to be “worried by the 
accumulation of serious errors that characerised French diplomacy for three years” and 
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went so far as to suggest that Mitterrand was complicit in the war’s continuation.266 
Charles Millon, who would become Defence Minister under the Juppé government in May 
1995, judged the resolution insufficient and called on France to pursue concerted 
diplomatic action with a credible threat of force.267 Further political parties and interest 
groups called for military intervention and condemned Mitterrand’s policies.268 Indeed, 
given Mitterrand’s sensibilities towards concentration camps - he was himself a former 
POW and had assisted in liberating the concentration camps in Germany - he found the 
polemics against him to be particularly unpleasant.269   
Nonetheless, Mitterrand rejected the calls for further intervention reflecting that 
there was no other possible action for France other than in the framework of the United 
Nations.270 The President was confident that the “belligerents, and particularly the Serbs, 
would be reluctant to face an international force of the type that will engage the United 
Nations.”271 Even Bernard Kouchner now declared that “a war is impossible and would 
only complicate the conflict”, adding that “the conditions of detention of the prisoners are 
improving, even if they are still horrible.”272  
On 13 August the ICRC published a communiqué confirming the poor treatment of 
innocent civilians in camps and called for urgent measures to bring about respect for the 
Geneva Convention and the end of the practices of mass population transfers.273 
Furthermore, the first extraordinary session of the UNHCR focussed on the practices of the 
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Bosnian Serb authorities and condemned them “in the strongest possible terms”.274 Thus 
the senior officials of the CSCE met in Prague to define European participation in securing 
the delivery of humanitarian aid. Later that day the UNSC unanimously adopted 
resolutions 770 and 771. The former urged the parties to stop fighting, provide access to 
any prisons or camps, and authorised “any means necessary” to secure the delivery of 
humanitarian deliveries under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Significantly, resolution 771 
was the first resolution to condemn the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’.275  
In France, Roland Dumas announced that he was ready to send a contingent of 
1,100 peacekeepers to ensure the implementation of the resolutions.276 The Minister of 
Defence Pierre Joxe hoped that “the example of its [France’s] determination could have a 
ripple effect”, reflecting that France did not want to, nor could, act alone.277 Nonetheless, 
France remained one of the most proactive members of the international community in 
sending troop contributions to UNPROFOR and shaping the policies of the UN and 
Europe, for better or worse.  
 
Maastricht and London 
France’s initatives had not been driven solely by humanitarian motivations. Just as a crisis 
in Yugoslavia had threatened the Maastricht Treaty a year previous, so too had it in August 
1992. With a referendum due in France on 20 September, the war in BiH became a central 
issue in the public debate. For critics of the Maastricht Treaty and European Union, BiH 
demonstrated exactly the flaws that a multilateral institution with a common foreign and 
security policy would face and be unable to solve. For the supporters of Maastricht, the 
crisis in Yugoslavia demonstrated the necessity of greater integration to prevent future 
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ethnonational conflicts in Europe.278 Support for Maastricht amongst the French population 
had appeared guaranteed at the beginning of June, with 69% of the population in favour. 
However, by 20 August this had dropped to just 53%.279 The importance of a successful 
conference in London was clear.  
Ahead of the conference, Britain announced that it would make 1,800 peacekeepers 
available to protect humanitarian convoys under resolution 770.280 Italy also offered to 
provide 1,500 troops to help secure the border and protect humanitarian convoys.281 
Seeking to tie the initiative into the debate on Europe, Pierre Joxe was quick to highlight in 
a press conference that Britain’s decision was a major evolution for the situation in BiH 
and declared that it represented a “pledge to build a new relation throughout Europe.”282  
Lord Carrington had privately announced his intentions to resign his role as the 
President of the ECCY and Cyrus Vance had earmarked Lord David Owen to replace 
him.283 Prior to his appointment, Owen had been rather bullish in his calls for air strikes. 
He therefore feared that the French would resist his appointment. As Britain held the EC 
Presidency, the decision on who to appoint as the Community’s negotiator fell to them. 
Aware that the French government was struggling ahead of the referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty, John Major appeared on French television alongside Mitterrand to lend 
support to the pro-Maastricht campaign and was able to use this as leverage to ensure the 
appointment of David Owen as EC mediator.284  
France’s position as one of the main European policymakers towards the conflict in 
BiH was also coming under increasing pressure domestically. On 20 August, Roland 
Dumas faced the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly where 
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France’s policy towards BiH was roundly criticised. Alain Juppé, future Foreign Minister, 
declared that “French diplomacy has committed many errors by not solemnly condemning 
the odious practice of ethnic cleansing and by not condemning those truly responsible, that 
it is to say the government of Mr. Milošević.”285 Juppé added that France had, in not 
supporting any military intervention, only encouraged the Serbs in their campaign. 
Similarly, Charles Millon, the President of the Union Démocratique Française in the 
National Assembly called on Mitterrand to “solemnly condemn the practice of ethnic 
cleansing.”286 Dumas indicated that he believed the forthcoming London Conference 
would resolve many of the fundamental issues that were causing the crisis in BiH.287  
To ensure that the Conference was as effective as possible Roland Dumas met with 
his German opposite Klaus Kinkel to coordinate their positions.288 This may have been due 
to a fear that an Anglo-American lead on BiH was forthcoming, with Cyrus Vance as the 
head of the UN mediation and David Owen at the head of the EC’s. Owen reflected that 
the French “would be suspicious of anything that smacked of an Anglo-American axis.”289 
However, the US had made it quite clear that it had limited ambitions with regards to the 
London Conference, particularly since George Bush was approaching an election 
campaign.290  
The Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić had declared that the London 
Conference would mark a turning point in the Yugoslav crisis.291 Panić, who had 
established himself as a rival to Milošević and Ćosić in FRY, hoped that successful 
negotiations would lead to a softening of sanctions against his republic. Panić had written 
to Mitterrand ahead of the conference and confided that:  
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I am particularly concerned that many countries continue to deal with Mr 
Milošević and his government, rather than me and my government. They 
accuse Mr Milošević of being the individual most responsible for the civil war 
and its tragic consequences and yet they refuse to recognise and deal with me 
and my government of peace. That is putting form before substance.292 
 
 Panić was reaching out to Mitterrand once more in the hope that the French 
president may be able to bring about a change in this respect. He was committed to ending 
the war and hoped to use the Conference to this end.293 The international community 
would increasingly pin its hopes of removing Slobodan Miloševć on the Serbo-American 
busninessman.  
The participants began to arrive in London on 24 August. The following day Lord 
Carrington confirmed in a press conference that he would be stepping down from his role 
as the EC mediator and that David Owen would replace him. Carrington’s replacement had 
hoped for an effective stick to go alongside any carrots that may have been presented at the 
Conference. However, the international community was reluctant to provide a credible 
threat of force. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali even went so far as to state that he believed that the 
carrot was more useful than the stick to solve the crisis in Yugoslavia.294 That same day, 
NATO had also failed to reach an agreement about the appropriate measures to take to 
protect the humanitarian convoys.295 All signals ahead of the Conference pointed to it 
being the latest episode in the long series of the international community’s prevaricative 
policymaking. 
As the conference opened, the UN had already untertaken to create a permanent 
structure for negotiations at its headquarters in Geneva. Following an opening speech by 
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John Major, other parties were invited to give statements. Roland Dumas highlighted that it 
was France that had initially called for the enlargement of the Conference on Yugoslavia 
and that France had long been at the forefront of the international efforts.296  
The Foreign Minister prioritised four objectives for the Conference: the renewal of 
political dialogue, also including minority rights in the Sandžak and Kosovo; the reduction 
of violence and a reinforcement of the arms embargo; to ensure the delivery of essential 
humanitarian aid; and finally to obtain strict respect for Human Rights. Thus Dumas 
proposed two measures: to ask the Badinter Commission to give its opinion on minorities’ 
rights and guarantees so that the new International Conference for Former Yugoslavia 
would have a legal framework; and the creation of an international criminal court to judge 
crimes.297 Dumas also called on the Bosnian government to authorise surveillance and 
reconnaissance flights over Bosnian territory, suggesting that a no-fly zone may be 
required.298 
That evening the London Conference adopted a declaration of principles that would 
provide the foundations for future negotiations on the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia.299 A work programme for ICFY was drawn up that would be chaired by Cyrus 
Vance as the UN’s representative and David Owen for the EC. The ICFY would continue 
to seek the assistance of the Abitration Commission, as Dumas had hoped, as well as 
creating a working group on “Humanitiarian Issues”.300  
On the second day of the London Conference the various parties lambasted the 
Serbs. Under pressure, they agreed to withdraw their heavy arms from a “significant 
portion” of Bosnian territory, which would then be put under the control of the UN.301 
Karadžić also offered to withdraw from two-fifths of the territory that the Bosnian Serbs 
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already occupied. The coercive and concerted approach appeared to be paying dividends. 
Therefore, in a parallel meeting the WEU announced that it would put a further 5,000 
troops at the disposal of the UN; one of their objectives would be the control of the heavy 
arms.302  
Initially the London Conference seemed to be a success. The Conference produced 
two documents that, had they been adhered to, would have led to a very different outcome 
to the war in BiH. The “Specific Decisions by the London Conference” and “Statement on 
Bosnia” papers provided a blueprint for the Conference in Geneva and also secured an 
agreement that the Bosnian Serb side would place all heavy weapons around Sarajevo, 
Bihać, Goražde and Jajce under UN supervision within a week.303 
At the end of August, David Owen organised the permanent Conference in Geneva 
and met EC Foreign Ministers in preparation. He also met Mitterrand in Paris who 
specifically warned against aggressive force against the Serbs and ruled out air strikes.304 
Therefore, the stick that Owen needed to bring the Serbs to heel had already been 
withdrawn by Mitterrand. Once more, the international community resorted to the threat of 
the ‘total isolation’ of Serbia. Dumas reflected that, “we would naturally like to act 
quickly, but the situation is complex.”305 Owen also urged caution and suggested that it 
was too soon to tell whether the agreements at the London Conference had been violated 
and that his peace mission should be judged over a timespan of months.306 
ICFY was created in difficult circumstances. An Italian aid plane was shot down on 
3 September, which UNPROFOR members blamed on Bosnian Croats, and led to the 
suspension of flights to Sarajevo airport.307 Furthermore, on 9 September, two French 
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peacekeepers, Sergeant-Chief Vaudet and Corporal Madot, were killed as government 
forces attacked an UNPROFOR logistical convoy, hoping to pin the blame on the Bosnian 
Serbs to provoke US intervention.308  Pierre Joxe asked the Bosnian authorities “to ensure 
the safety of soldiers of all countries who come to their aid” and called on them to punish 
the perpetrators of the attack.309 
In light of these attacks against UNPROFOR members, the UNSC began discussing 
measures to further protect the peacekeepers and humanitarian deliveries. As Vance and 
Owen were in Sarajevo meeting Izetbegović, France, representing the WEU, was pushing 
in the UNSC for a greater freedom for UNPROFOR peacekeepers to retaliate to 
aggression.310 Dumas also tried to convince his partners in the EC to support his calls for 
aerial support for humanitarian convoys. France was the largest single contributor to 
UNPROFOR with 1,500 peacekeepers on the ground, and therefore wanted to be able to 
provide greater protection for its troops.311 On 14 September the UNSC passed resolution 
776, which enlarged the size of UNPROFOR to cover BiH and also permitted the use of 
self-defence.  
Although an important step had been taken that provided UNPROFOR with a 
mandate to employ limited force, the upcoming referendum on the Maastricht Treaty had 
become the dominant political issue in France as fighting continued in BiH. Although the 
war, amongst many issues, had threatened the ‘oui’ vote, the government narrowly secured 
its desired result on 20 September, as 51% voted in favour.312 The Mitterrand 
administration had carefully navigated the summer of 1992 and resultantly had ensured 
that France played a leading role in directing the international response to the war in BiH.  
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Chapter Five – France and the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, October 1992 - May 
1993. 
 
Almost immediately after the conclusion of the London Conference, reports in the US 
press emerged that Bosnian Serb Army (Vojska Republike Srpske, VRS) forces had carried 
out massacres of Bosniak citizens. Immediately, Roland Dumas called upon the UN to 
launch an enquiry into the potential war crimes and went so far as to employ the term 
‘genocide’.1 Characterising the crimes as genocide infers responsibilities on the 
international community under the 1948 Genocide Convention. Accordingly the Security 
Council passed UNSCR 780 on 6 October 1992, which expressed the Council’s concern at 
the continuation of “widespread violations of international humanitarian law” and called 
upon the Secretary General to establish a Commission of Experts to investigate any 
reported violations of the Geneva Convention.2 Dumas offered French experts for the 
inquiry commission adding that “The international community should shed light on the 
massacres and practice of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, which have outraged 
the conscience of mankind.”3  
With the harsh Bosnian winter on the horizon, the no-fly zone (NFZ) over BiH that 
Dumas had previously advocated at the London Conference was enacted by the UNSC on 
9 October under UNSCR 781, thus allowing safe passage of humanitarian aid deliveries. 
However, the Bosnian Serbs frequently violated the NFZ within a week of its creation with 
little more than international condemnation as a consequence.4  
 Simultaneously, negotiations in Geneva continued and reinvigorated discussions on 
future constitutional arrangements for BiH. ICFY faced several difficulties in negotiating a 
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settlement for BiH, particularly since the conflict between the Bosniaks and the Bosnian 
Croats had recently escalated. Furthermore, Morillon held negotiations with the leaders of 
the three communities’ military forces on the subject of demilitarising Sarajevo.5  
Slobodan Milošević was once more coming under domestic pressure with elections 
for the Serbian presidency due in December 1992. Both Milan Panić and Dobrica Ćosić 
cooperated with ICFY, much to Milošević’s chagrin, and Vance and Owen hoped that 
Ćosić would oust Milošević. Ćosić requested a meeting with Mitterrand, which Védrine 
advised against.6 Jean Vidal reflected, in a note for the President, that the former dissident 
turned President was “reasonable in spite of his ultranationalism” and he was a more likely 
alternative to Panić.7 In the end, Ćosić opted not to stand.8  
  
Making Plans 
On 27 October, the Bosnia Working Group of the ICFY presented ‘Options for BiH’ to the 
Conference’s Steering Group. Over the following months and through negotiations this 
plan evolved into the ‘Vance-Owen Peace Plan’. The Steering Group’s initial plan 
envisaged 7-10 regions, which would have ethnic majorities but importantly would retain 
their multi-ethnic and multicultural character. Significantly, it also envisaged a single 
unified Bosnian state with a central, albeit weakened, government. 
November in BiH began with a ‘week of peace’, wherein conditions on the ground 
were the complete antithesis of the initiative’s title.9 Fighting between Bosniaks and 
Bosnian Croats had also intensified, particularly around the southern town of Mostar. 
Therefore, planning in the ICFY Working Group on BiH continued as Vance and Owen 
tried to put pressure on Milošević from within Serbia to win Serb support for the VOPP. 
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Milan Panić, who had openly challenged Milošević at the London Conference, had decided 
to run for the Serbian Presidency in the elections of December 1992. Panić ran against 
Milošević on a campaign slogan of ‘Now or Never’. The same slogan seemed appropriate 
for the Bosnian population as winter tightened its grip on the mountainous republic. 
 Following the investigations that had been established under UNSCR 780, reports 
reached the UN at the beginning of October that heightened the need for a solution. France, 
through its Ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, reported that it had received 
witness testimony attesting to massacres and war crimes in BiH, adding that:  
 
The stories highlight a process: occupation and destruction of a village, 
executing some of the inhabitants, transferring others to camps where they 
were subjected to ill-treatment and harsh prison conditions, elimination of the 
most influential members, possibly release or exchange of the others provided 
they abandon their property and declare they will never return to their 
properties.10 
 
 The publication of these reports led to an increasingly vocal advocacy for military 
intervention. Significantly, the Democrat Bill Clinton had won the presidential election in 
the United States on 3 November 1992. In his election campaign Clinton had been calling 
for a more robust response to the Bosnian Serbs’ campaign of ethnic cleansing and had 
criticised George Bush’s lack of action to protect the Bosniak population.11  
Vance and Owen refused to exclude military action in BiH during a press 
conference in New York.12 Indeed, several ideas began to circulate at this time, which 
would influence the discourse and structure of the VOPP. The Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) had actively played a role in trying to protect the Bosniaks and launched 
an initiative to lift the arms embargo. At the behest of the OIC a special meeting of the 
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UNSC was called on the subject of selectively lifting the arms embargo, which was 
rejected. Instead, the UNSC adopted further sanctions against Serbia. Whilst this measure 
was presumably intended to place further pressure on Milošević ahead of the upcoming 
presidential elections, these sanctions in fact played into Milošević’s rhetoric about the 
West. Milošević unleashed a wave of propaganda against Panić, whom the pro-Milošević 
state-run media claimed was a US American agent determined to impose further sanctions 
against Serbia.13 That Panić spoke Serbian with an American accent, having moved to the 
US in the 1950s, only reinforced this idea in the eyes of many rural Serbs.  
 The OIC held its Sixth Extraordinary Session of Foreign Ministers on 1-2 
December 1992 with David Owen in attendance alongside the UNHCR Special Rapporteur 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. At the Conference, Izetbegović called on the OIC to use its 
influence to continue to pursue the lifting of the arms embargo in the UN and to put greater 
pressure on the Serbs. The Conference also lamented the lack of protection for the 
population.14 The British, who still held the EC Presidency, declared that military 
intervention would be a “grave error”.15 However, the day after the OIC Conference the 
long-awaited opinions of the Commission of Experts established under resolution 780 
condemned the practice of ethnic cleansing and held the JNA and Serbian political leaders 
responsible for crimes against humanity in BiH, adding that the “international community 
will do everything possible to bring them to justice.”16 
 These reports led to criticism in France of the UN efforts and the French 
contribution. A report published by the Finance Commission in the Senate criticised the 
UN’s bureaucratic system for hindering the operation in BiH. Senator François Trucy 
condemned the UN’s shortcomings and French inconsistences in its diplomacy adding that, 
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although France prided itself on having the greatest number of peacekeepers on the ground, 
it had little influence “in the quiet of the New York headquarters of the UN.”17 The danger 
to French peacekeepers was also raised, given their imprecise mandate on when to respond 
with force.  
The parallel UN intervention in Somalia initially seemed to be far more successful 
than in BiH. Nonetheless, Roland Dumas was keen to stress that the precedent set by 
‘Operation Restore Hope’ in Somalia was not necessarily applicable to BiH. When 
questioned by a journalist whether the mission in BiH would be extended Dumas 
responded that, “There are times when we must listen to public opinion but also take 
responsibility as leaders.”18 The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, echoed his 
French counterpart’s sentiment, stating that, “In Somalia, the warlords force humanitarian 
action. In Bosnia-Hercegovina there is a civil war supported from the outside by the Serbs 
in Belgrade.”19 
 As the UN was focussing on its operation in Somalia, and Roland Dumas claimed it 
as a victory for Mitterrand’s policy of humanitarian intervention, daily life continued to 
deteriorate in Sarajevo. As humanitarian organisations squabbled over strategy, the airport 
had once more been closed to all flights.20 Furthermore, there had been resurgence in 
attacks against UN personnel, which reinforced Admiral Lanxade’s and Senator Trucy’s 
earlier criticisms of the UNPROFOR mission and its mandates. It was necessary for 
Defence Minister Pierre Joxe to make a statement declaring that France did not currently 
envisage withdrawing from Yugoslavia in spite of the difficult conditions for the 
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peacekeepers who “for higher reasons related to the nature of the mission, cannot fight 
back.”21 
 It was clear that, once more, the credibility of the international community’s 
commitment to BiH was being questioned, particularly given the evident will to respond to 
the crisis in Somalia. For the first nine days of December, the Bosnian Serb forces made 
significant territorial gains in and around Sarajevo. Philippe Morillon warned David Owen 
of a further Bosnian Serb attack on the capital, whose aim would be “to move toward the 
centre of the city from both the West and South to hold at least half the city as negotiating 
leverage in future talks.”22 Therefore at its Edinburgh Summit, the European Council 
declared itself in favour of the use of force to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs respected the 
NFZ and the creation of ‘safe zones’ in Yugoslavia. France also stressed the need to gain 
access to detention camps once more with military accompaniment if necessary. Jean 
Musitelli indicated that the European Council could ask the UNSC to “authorise the 
implementation of this no-fly measure by force”, which, he added, had already “suffered a 
number of violations.”23  
Roland Dumas thus instructed Jean-Bernard Mérimée to make the first approaches 
to other UNSC members to put in place a new resolution to allow the use of force to 
protect the NFZ. Dumas added that France was ready to act in this respect and hoped that 
other Western countries would participate.24  
 The British were sceptical about the French initiative on the NFZ and preached 
prudence.25 Russia was also perturbed by the move towards force and instead called for the 
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lifting of sanctions against Serbia. However, Dumas was convinced of the necessity to 
resort to force, stating that “it is more necessary than ever to maintain the pressure on the 
Serb leaders. The sanctions declared by the Security Council must be applied with 
rigour.”26 On 15 December, Boutros-Ghali thus called on NATO to study the possibility of 
supporting a new UNSCR. Paris, London and Washington all supported the move, 
although the Brits were the most reluctant citing concerns about their peacekeepers’ 
safety.27  
The following day, Vance and Owen chaired a meeting of the Ministerial Steering 
Committee of ICFY where Owen stressed three points with regard to BiH: firstly, the 
necessity of an International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia; secondly, the need to protect 
the NFZ through force; thirdly, a reinforcement of existing sanctions.28 The US Secretary 
of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, emerged from the meeting by naming Milošević, Karadžić 
and Mladić as potential war criminals and hinted that the arms embargo needed 
reassessing.29 Following this hardened US rhetoric, NATO prepared to discuss its potential 
means and strategy for enforcing the NFZ in BiH. France hinted that it would be prepared 
to participate, on a case by case basis, in peacekeeping missions under the umbrella of 
NATO.30  
On 17 December, NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels to discuss means to 
maintain pressure on Belgrade. However, Ministers were divided on the use of force to 
enforce the NFZ with France and the Netherlands in favour, whilst Britain continued to 
call for a policy of isolation.31 France, not part of the integrated command structure of 
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NATO, was awkwardly placed to influence NATO strategy and therefore sought to 
maintain a UN involvement in peacekeeping operations. 
 The following day, the UNSC began to examine two new resolutions: firstly, a 
proposition from the Bosnian government supported by the OIC to lift the arms embargo; 
and secondly, a French initiative that condemned the campaigns of mass rape in BiH and 
called for all detention centres to be closed immediately.32 France, alongside Britain, 
opposed the lifting of the arms embargo and would remain an obstinate opponent to any 
further suggestion of such a measure. Roland Dumas believed that lifting the arms 
embargo would be a failure because giving arms to the Bosniaks would not appease the 
conflict.33 However, the Quai d’Orsay was delighted that the UNSC voted unanimously in 
favour of resolution 798 calling for the immediate closure of all detention centres.34  
The General Assembly requested that the UNSC envisage selectively lifting the 
arms embargo if the Serbs continued to violate UN resolutions after 15 January 1993; the 
vote was passed overwhelmingly. Europe, lacking a unanimous approach to the arms 
embargo, abstained from the General Assembly vote.35 Vance and Owen were also 
opposed to lifting the arms embargo, both of whom were awaiting two major events before 
they revealed their major initiative: the presidential election in Serbia and the inauguration 
of Bill Clinton in the US.36 
 Meanwhile, with negotiations due to start in Geneva on 2 January, Morillon tried to 
increase pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. The General invested himself heavily in the 
success of the VOPP and evoked the possibility of military intervention if the negotiations 
in Geneva failed to create a workable solution in BiH. He publicly pondered whether a 
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military victory “could be achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the question is what will 
be the price for the future?”37  
One uncertainty had been settled ahead of the Geneva negotiations: Milošević had 
won in Serbia’s presidential election, although the circumstances of his election were 
questioned internally by Panić’s supporters.38 France was disappointed by the result. 
Bernard Kouchner had hoped that Milan Panić would triumph, adding that “If not, there 
will be war.”39 Influential voices within France were once more calling for military 
intervention as the President of the National Assembly addressed a letter to the Prime 
Minister Pierre Bérégovoy, affirming that “a majority of deputies want a firmer 
engagement from France.”40  
It became clear that there was cross-party support for stronger intervention with 
deputies from the three major parties writing an open letter to Mitterrand demanding him 
to send Belgrade an ultimatum.41 The letter declared that its signatories were “horrified by 
the barbarity of the Serbian forces” and “scandalised by the wait-and-see policy of the 
democratic countries that plays into the hands of the torturers.”42 The terms of the 
ultimatum would include: lifting the sieges of Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, Bihać, Travnik and 
Goražde and establishing a security perimeter of 40km around each town; the immediate 
liberation of all detention camps; and a definitive break with the principles of ethnic 
cleansing. The letter proposed the aerial bombardment of specific military targets if the 
Serbian government failed to adhere to the terms. 43 
This growing domestic pressure appeared to affect French policy. In an interview 
for France 2 Dumas declared that military action was now necessary to enforce the NFZ 
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over BiH.44 The Foreign Minister added that “it is necessary that actions of force be 
undertaken against planes, possibly against the runways of planes, helicopters if they are 
found, in a way that these offences… cease.”45 On 28 December Dumas held a series of 
meetings in Geneva with Boutros-Ghali, Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
and representatives from the OIC. Boutros-Ghali and Kozyrev remained highly reluctant to 
see force employed in BiH, whilst Bill Clinton had affirmed that the US would continue to 
pursue a tougher approach.46 The use of force to ensure respect for the NFZ would 
therefore be considered by the UNSC only if the Geneva negotiations chaired by Vance 
and Owen in January 1993 failed.47 
On New Year’s Eve, in his annual address to the French people, Mitterrand gave 
his strongest suggestion that France would contribute to a military intervention in BiH 
during his New Year’s Eve address. Having reflected that Western Europe had made 
significant progress towards greater integration, the President pointed to the fragmentation 
of Eastern Europe, particularly in Yugoslavia. “You can measure”, stated Mitterrand, 
“thanks to the images that come to us, the ruthlessness of war in Bosnia, with its atrocious 
ethnic cleansing, its camps of misery and death, rape and torture.”48 The President declared 
that a solution would have to be found through the UN, noting that “Arbitration, 
conciliation, dialogue, we have tried them all”.49 “France”, he noted, “is the source of most 
of these propositions in this direction.” He continued, “Nearly 5,000 [French] soldiers are 
on the ground to come between the combatants, to help, to save lives. No other country has 
made such an effort. What more can we do?”50 Therefore Mitterrand outlined his terms for 
further French engagement: “I will only consent to it if the United Nations takes 
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responsibility and if the Americans and Europeans engage with us.”51 If the Geneva 
negotiations failed Mitterrand would “expect the Security Council to order to disengage the 
airspace of Bosnia and the routes that will allow us to reach the prison camps and martyr 
cities, like Sarajevo.”52 The French President had given his clear and unequivocal support 
for the forthcoming negotiations in Geneva. 
 
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
On New Year’s Day 1993, Alija Izetbegović declared that, like the war in BiH, the Geneva 
negotiations had been imposed upon the Bosniaks and that they would not accept an 
imposed peace.53 Izetbegović was under intense domestic scrutiny for negotiating at the 
same table as Karadžić and was buoyed by the ambivalence of the incoming Clinton 
administration towards the VOPP. However, Owen warned that the failure of the Geneva 
negotiations would lead to “a considerable intensification of fighting”, which could lead to 
a western intervention.54 Therefore, that the negotiations in Geneva began against a 
backdrop of relative peace and calm in Sarajevo was cause for quiet optimism amongst the 
international community.55 
 The version of the VOPP that was presented to the negotiators on 2 January 1993 
envisaged a decentralised state consisting of 10 provinces that would be granted 
“substantial autonomy… while denying them any international legal character.”56 The 
provincial governments would be established according to the pre-war census; a significant 
mistake as the war had rendered that poll entirely obsolete. It also required that hostilities 
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cease within 72 hours and aimed to demilitarise Sarajevo first before the rest of the 
country.57  
Mitterrand placed France firmly behind the Geneva negotiations and sought a 
meeting with the outgoing US President George Bush to discuss the matter. Bush travelled 
to Paris on 3 January.58 Following the discussions, the two heads of state held a press 
conference where they confirmed that the use of force could be implemented to ensure 
respect for the NFZ but it would be imprudent to talk about further intervention whilst the 
Geneva negotiations were underway.59 However, and to Mitterrand’s likely relief, Bush 
was keen to point out that there would be no NATO or US intervention that would 
endanger the peacekeepers that were already on the ground in BiH.60 Bush could not speak 
on behalf of his successor. 
 As the negotiations in Geneva continued, Roland Dumas revealed that the three 
communities had asked for France’s good offices to ensure that a suitable agreement was 
reached for all parties. France’s neutrality in 1991 and 1992 had afforded it a level of 
diplomatic flexibility that other countries had lost. The Foreign Minister called for 
continued pressure on the Serb contingent with a potential recourse to military action, he 
also declared that the VOPP was “not bad in itself but it will, without doubt, be necessary 
to adapt it.”61  
 The Bosnian Croats accepted the VOPP without reservation. The Bosnian Serbs 
considered that it was “acceptable as a basis for starting negotiations”, since the plan did 
not allow for the creation of a separate Serb entity. The biggest hurdle to ensuring 
compliance with the VOPP was Izetbegović, for whom the map was far from acceptable. 
                                                     
57 Owen. Balkan Odyssey, 90. 
58 “Le conflit dans l'ex-Yougoslavie dominera les entretiens Bush-Mitterrand”, AFP (2 January 1992). 
59 MAE, Conférence de presse conjointe de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, et de M. 
George Bush, Président des États-Uns d’Amérique. Accessed on 6 June 2015. 
http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.  
60 “M. Bush: pas d'action qui mette en danger les troupes sur le terrain”, AFP (3 January 1992). 
61 “Bons offices de la France en Bosnie-Herzégovine, selon M. Dumas”, AFP (3 January 1992). 
 206 
As the first round of negotiations reached their end on 4 January, to be reconvened on 10 
January, Owen wrote directly to Mitterrand who he “thought could help most with 
Izetbegović.”62 
 Away from Geneva, France – alongside Russia, Britain, the US, and Spain – was 
considering a military operation to ensure respect for the NFZ.63 France intended to have a 
draft resolution before negotiations recommenced in Geneva.64 Whilst Ratko Mladić 
refused to rule out the removal of Bosnian Serb heavy weaponry, Dumas had secured 
agreement from the three Presidents in the Geneva negotiations for “Sarajevo to be 
declared an open town.”65 In a letter sent from Dumas to Boutros-Ghali, the French 
Foreign Minister added that he had also secured an agreement that “the forces that encircle 
it [Sarajevo] are removed to more than thirty kilometres of the capital.”66 France was 
certainly using its good offices in support of the VOPP. Therefore, following Owen’s 
aforementioned letter to Mitterrand, the French President granted Alija Izetbegović an 
audience in Paris on 9 January. 
In a quite odd decision, Izetbegović decried the West as appeasers ahead of his 
Paris engagements, comparing the situation in the Balkans to that prior to the Second 
World War. In a press conference in New York, Izetbegović pronounced that, “Today, 
there is an atmosphere of Munich with certain people in favour of an accord with Hitler, 
while others advocated resistance.”67 He continued: 
 
Unfortunately, there are a lot of parallels. At the time, it was Czechoslovakia. 
Today, it is Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the time, it was Hitler. Today, it is 
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Milošević. At the time, there was Chamberlain and Daladier. Today, there are 
others.68 
 
Although Izetbegović did not name Mitterrand or Major, the allusion was quite 
clear. Whilst Izetbegović had been in New York, the Bosnian vice-Prime Minister Hakija 
Turaljić had been murdered by Bosnian Serbs whilst he was being escorted to the airport 
by French peacekeepers.69 Colonel Patrice Sartre, leading the escort mission, attempted to 
negotiate his way past a Bosnian Serb roadblock on the road linking the city centre and the 
airport. Three British warrior vehicles offered the French colonel assistance, which he 
refused, telling the British captain that, “This is a French problem!”70  
Once the Bosnian Serb militiamen at the blockade discovered that Turaljić was 
inside the vehicle, they fired seven bullets killing the vice-Prime Minister. Morillon 
publicly announced Turaljić’s death calling it “an appalling tragedy”, adding that it would 
surely have consequences on the negotiations in Geneva.71 Indeed, the murder threatened 
the very continuation for the Geneva negotiations. Mitterrand condemned the killing but 
thought “We must give a last chance to peace. We must try to find a solution to this 
conflict.”72 
 A note from Jean Lévy prior to Mitterrand and Izetbegović’s meeting highlighted 
the worsening situation for the domestic population in BiH, particularly owing to the 
wintry conditions there. With the Geneva Conference due to reconvene the following day, 
Lévy noted the difficulties that the VOPP would encounter, particularly from the Serbs.73 It 
also reflected on the difficulties in the UN in agreeing on a draft of a resolution regarding 
the protection of the NFZ in Bosnia through force, particularly on the wording of the 
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resolution. The means to bring the resolution into place would also lead to a certain delay 
owing to technical and logistical issues.74  
Lévy thought that the French President should relay that the guarantees offered by 
the international community in support of the VOPP were serious and that the Bosnian 
President should therefore consider them as such. However, perhaps seeking to give 
Mitterrand some bargaining power, Lévy noted that it was important for the Bosnian 
Muslims to avoid being blamed for the failure of the VOPP as it would considerably hinder 
any future measures taken by the international community.75  
Mitterrand impressed on Izetbegović his belief that it was absolutely essential to 
continue with negotiations “without any illusions about Serb sincerity.”76 Nonetheless, 
Izetbegović complained that the map of the VOPP was “unacceptable” and underlined that 
“without recourse to force we can do nothing”.77  
Mitterrand confided in Boutros-Ghali in a meeting on the same morning that: “I 
took a bet on successful negotiations. The Serbs have won the war. The Muslims should 
stop otherwise they will be locked into a system that will be terrible for them.”78 Therefore, 
President Mitterrand had alluded to Izetbegović the fact he was considering raising the 
arms embargo.79 
Thus Mitterrand sounded out his European allies on the idea of lifting the arms 
embargo. The response was short and shrift: the Russians were entirely against it; Britain, 
citing concerns owing to ground troops in BiH, was reticent; Italy, Spain and Greece were 
only slightly less reluctant than Britain.80 France was sufficiently invested in the success of 
the VOPP to consider lifting the embargo at this time. 
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In the Security Council, France was clashing with the US over the wording of a 
draft presidential statement, proposed by Russia, “calling on the parties to reach without 
delay an agreement on the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.”81 The US, concerned how other 
Islamic countries would react to such pressure being placed upon the Bosnian Muslims to 
acquiesce to the VOPP, was reluctant to give their wholesale support to the draft, 
questioning the phrase “without delay”.82 France supported the wording but the US 
suggested amending the draft presidential statement to include “taking note of the peace 
plan proposed by the Co-Chairmen”. Jean-Bernard Mérimée reflected that “‘taking note’ 
was tantamount to ‘rejecting’”.83 Notwithstanding, France threw its weight entirely behind 
the VOPP but with Clinton set to be inaugurated on 20 January, found the US to be a 
difficult partner in persuading the Bosnian government to acquiesce. 
As the negotiations resumed in Geneva, Dumas once more declared France’s 
support for the peace process: “France very clearly privileges the negotiations and dialogue 
to achieve peace.”84 The French Foreign Minister also called on the camps to be liberated 
by force. He tasked Kouchner with organising a convoy to liberate prisoners from the 
detention camps and, somewhat overstepping the mark, added that this “liberation will 
become effective through force.”85 Hubert Védrine had previously suggested the idea to 
Mitterrand following a discussion with Bernard-Henri Lévy.86 Given Mitterrand’s 
preference for the UN, Defence Minister Pierre Joxe was quick to highlight that any such 
mission would have to be carried under that organisation.87 The following day Dumas 
rowed back on his prior statement declaring that France was not “waiting to escape the 
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constraints” of the UN, adding that “it is necessary that these resolutions be executed, in 
the framework that has been chosen, that of the UN.”88 
Meanwhile, in Geneva, the negotiations collapsed as Radovan Karadžić refused to 
acquiesce to the VOPP in spite of pressure from Slobodan Milošević. Karadžić wanted to 
return to the capital of the Bosnian Serb territory, Pale, to discuss the proposals with the 
Bosnian Serb Assembly. Vance and Owen therefore referred to their employers: the UN 
Secretary General and the EC respectively. With Boutros-Ghali reluctant to employ 
enforcement of the NFZ and the Russians concerned about the role of NATO in any such 
operation, the responses to Karadžić’s obstinacy were predictably tame.  
Following a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the EC in Paris on 13 January, the 
Danish Foreign Minister – Denmark now held the EC Presidency – announced the 
Community’s response: “If progress is not made, we are preparing a very strong weapon, 
the total isolation of a community [Serbia] and its citizens.”89 At this meeting Owen also 
pressured the EC to use its influence in the UNSC to establish an international criminal 
tribunal specifically for the former Yugoslavia. In the US Bill Clinton also called for the 
creation of a tribunal to try war criminals.90 France, who had already established a group of 
“high-level specialists” to examine such a legal process, would share their findings with 
the Danish Presidency.91  
The following day, David Owen met with President Mitterrand. Owen hoped to 
reconfigure the map of the VOPP to give the Serbs a land corridor through province 3 (see 
map 5), with the Bosniaks being compensated with a larger province 1 and the Bosnian 
Croats could link provinces 1 and 10 to give them control of their border with Croatia. 
Owen also wanted to modify international boundaries, which France had recently been 
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considering privately. 92 The co-President felt that he needed the support of one powerful 
EC country and saw in France the nation most clearly committed to the success of the 
VOPP. Owen reflected that, “I hoped that by involving Mitterrand I could tie Roland 
Dumas… step by step to the ICFY process.”93 Once Owen had suggested these measures 
to Izetbegović in Zagreb the following day, he reported the outcome to President 
Mitterrand by letter. Izetbegović flatly refused as he thought it would encourage the 
creation of a Greater Serbia and he could only accept the creation of a guaranteed 
“throughway”.94 Nonetheless, Owen thought that, with some modifications, Izetbegović 
would be prepared to accept the map, which would then place the onus on the Bosnian 
Serbs to do the same.95 
As Vance and Owen negotiated in Zagreb, the UNSC continued to work on 
bringing about the enforcement of the NFZ. However, Russia remained hesitant and 
wanted to wait until the attitude of the Bosnian Serbs towards the VOPP became clearer.96 
The Bosnian Serb Assembly gave its accord to the VOPP, which Roland Dumas 
characterised as “a step and its encouraging but our job is not finished yet.”97 However, it 
appeared to lend momentum to the third plenary session of the Geneva negotiations, which 
resumed on 23 January. 
As the negotiations opened a substantial demonstration took place in Place de la 
République, Paris.98 The scale of the demonstrations forced Mitterrand to clarify his 
position on BiH in response to a number of intellectuals engaged with the demonstration: 
“These figures are very respectable, but what are they asking for? War? France and its 
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army, alone, in combat that is, by its nature, bloody? Let me prefer other methods.”99 
Indeed, support for the VOPP and the Geneva negotiations remained Mitterrand’s 
preferred method. However, its future was being brought into question by the new US 
administration. 
Whilst publicly declaring that Yugoslavia was a priority for the US, in private the 
US called the work of the ICFY into question as the new Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher “expressed doubts about whether it [the VOPP] can realistically be achieved, 
whether they can, in fact, find an agreement.”100 Madeleine Albright, who was Clinton’s 
nominee to become US Ambassador to the UN, had also undermined the latest European 
efforts stating in a US Foreign Relations Committee that, “I have watched with some 
amazement that the Europeans have not taken action. I believe that we must… press our 
European allies on this.”101 The Clinton administration was incredibly naïve, bullish and 
irresponsible in its handling of the VOPP. It wished to project its own solution on to the 
crisis and, in turn, undermined the Geneva negotiations. This attitude had led Izetbegović 
to “think that the United States of America will finally decide to send means of defence to 
the Muslims.”102 This was, in fact, far from the case. 
However, the selective lifting of the arms embargo that covered the whole of 
Yugoslavia remained a contentious issue and would require a UNSCR to reverse its 
decision. This would be difficult to achieve given strong British resistance to such a 
measure. President Mitterrand had also publicly stated that: “The leaders of Bosnia, a 
country that is a victim of relentless war, do not require so much a military intervention but 
the means to defend themselves… but I am resistant to the general thrust for the use of 
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force.”103 As ICFY prepared to move the peace talks to New York and the Security 
Council, the French President was holding steadfastly to his policy on BiH: ‘adding war to 
war will resolve nothing.’ 
Before the talks reconvened in New York, the European Council of Foreign 
Ministers held a meeting in which they issued a statement in clear support of the VOPP.104 
Simultaneously in the US Vance and Owen met with the US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher in an attempt to secure US support for the plan. Christopher emerged from the 
discussions and was publicly ambivalent on the prospects of its success.105 The Clinton 
administration was creating international friction exactly at the time when Europe had 
coalesced around the VOPP. Furthermore, the US’s reluctance to overtly support the plan 
placed the ICFY negotiators in a difficult position, particularly with regards to France and 
its position in Europe. Owen reflected that if the mediators bowed to US pressure and 
delayed its negotiations in New York then “Mitterrand would go off on his own with a 
purely French initiative.”106 Of course the French President’s capacity for individual and 
unilateral initiative has been evident throughout this study. 
In spite of, and in stark contrast to, US ambivalence the whole of Europe remained 
committed to the VOPP as talks began in New York. David Owen briefed European 
Ambassadors to stand their ground against US attempts to modify the revised map that had 
been put forward. Furthermore, by moving the negotiations to New York, Vance and Owen 
tied the US into working directly within the Security Council where they had already 
secured majority support for their plan. Following discussion in the UNSC on 8 February, 
a revised map (see map 6) of the VOPP was agreed upon, which incorporated the changes 
that Owen had sought Mitterrand’s support for in January.  
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The need for a peace plan was evident as Izetbegović wrote to Mitterrand appealing 
for action to ensure that humanitarian aid reached Bosnian civilians. The Bosnian President 
highlighted that only, “Three humanitarian convoys reached Srebrenica during the past 
three months, while one convoy (43 tons of food) reached Žepa.”107 Indeed, Vance and 
Owen had received indications from peacekeepers on the ground that the humanitarian 
situation was deteriorating, which had added new impetus to their efforts.108 
On 10 February Warren Christopher announced the Clinton administration’s much 
vaunted policy on BiH. The policy amounted to little more than qualified support for the 
VOPP with six principles that would thenceforth guide US policy on BiH. Warren’s 
statement outlined: a special US envoy to be assigned to the peace negotiations; the need 
for a negotiated rather than an imposed settlement; a tightening of sanctions against Serbia; 
a reduction of suffering; a readiness to employ military force to enforce a negotiated 
settlement; and broad consultation with partners and allies throughout the process.109 
Publicly, France favourably welcomed the US initiative. Daniel Bernard, spokesman for 
the Quai, stated that, “The American declaration, and it is very positive, privileges the 
pacifist option since it excludes a military intervention before the signing of an 
agreement”.110   Bill Clinton also sent his Western partners a memorandum declaring that 
the US would rally to the VOPP and officially renounced any potential unilateral US 
military intervention.111  
Contrary to French interests, however, the US President advocated an important 
role for NATO, which led Mitterrand, in a cabinet meeting, to call the entire French 
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involvement into question: “If this were to turn into a NATO monopoly, I will re-examine 
the very principle of our participation. We are only committed to the United Nations.”112 
 
Protecting a Peace Plan 
On the ground in Bosnia, the situation in the Muslim enclaves was becoming more and 
more desperate, particularly in the eastern enclave of Srebrenica. Philippe Morillon had 
long hoped for a civil authority to support him in negotiations in BiH. Thus Jean Vidal 
wrote a note for Hubert Védrine on 5 February requesting that France send an Ambassador 
to Sarajevo as soon as possible. Vidal could see no reason to object to this adding that, 
“The uncertainty around the Vance-Owen Plan does not appear to me to be a sufficient 
reason to procrastinate.”113 Quite the opposite in fact, owing to French support for the 
VOPP, it was a necessity.  
The French diplomacy dispatched Henri Jacolin, who arrived in the capital on 12 
February. Le Monde described him as “an ambassador without an embassy”.114 He 
immediately set about making contact with Izetbegović, other members of the government 
and local religious leaders.  Since he spoke Serbo-Croat he quickly became well-known 
amongst the Sarajevans.  
Early in February, a small group of inhabitants had escaped the eastern enclave of 
Srebrenica and made their way to Sarajevo. They had come to protest to the Bosnian 
government about the lack of aid and support for the eastern enclaves. The former mayor 
of Srebrenica, Murat Efendić, who was acting as the representative of the people of the 
eastern town in Sarajevo, went to see Morillon to discuss the situation in Srebrenica and 
Cerska. 
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Morillon had also received information from MSF, journalists and the UNHCR 
reinforcing the survivors’ claims. The General thus believed that what was occurring in the 
east of BiH greatly threatened the peace process and that, “an offensive was underway, in 
which the Serbs had decided to empty these enclaves, whilst leaving an open corridor, 
because they were enraged… because of what had happened on Orthodox Christmas in the 
neighbouring villages, which they had attributed to Nasirović [Naser Orić] and his 
supporters.”115 Morillon warned the Serbs that if they undertook such an offensive, “they 
were going to risk a new Vukovar, which public opinion will never forgive them for”.116 
The General was determined to give the VOPP a fighting chance and pleaded with the 
Mayor of Srebrenica:  
 
Let me go there, let me put observers in place, you say that it’s not you and that 
you want peace. I want to believe you, I believe your sincerity. Show your 
sincerity, allow me to go there. And me, by my presence, through observers, in 
fact, because I do not ask to place men with aims, I could help you to 
consolidate the ceasefire. If I am not there, there will never be a ceasefire that 
holds.117 
 
The Sarajevans were also growing increasingly frustrated with the West’s 
humanitarian intervention in BiH and sought to draw greater attention to the plight of 
Bosniaks in the east of the country. To achieve this, the Sarajevan municipal authorities 
refused to receive further international aid in solidarity with the enclaves in the east. 
This brought humanitarian issues to the fore once more as the US and Russian 
special representatives to ICFY met to harmonise their policies on BiH on 13 February.118 
This marked a significant step in the international community’s mediation in Yugoslavia as 
it brought pressure to bear from both of the former Cold War superpowers.  
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Bernard Kouchner travelled to Sarajevo in an effort to relieve the east enclaves. 
There he met with Morillon and Izetbegović to discuss methods of delivering aid and to 
arrange prisoner exchanges.119 The same day an aid convoy left Belgrade headed for the 
eastern town of Cerska, which many people were fleeing for government-held Tuzla.120 By 
refusing aid in Sarajevo, the Sarajevan authorities had effectively paralysed the UN’s 
humanitarian intervention and in doing so had drawn significant attention to the plight of 
Bosniaks in the east of BiH. It certainly seemed to be effective as the French press began to 
focus on the Bosnian Serbs’ campaign in the east of BiH and Le Monde asked: 
“Intervention, must we rethink humanitarian action?”121 
On 19 February, Morillon thus accompanied an aid convoy to Goražde, having 
negotiated its passage with the Bosnian Serbs. For four weeks the Bosnian Serbs had 
denied aid organisations access to the town.122 Therefore the General employed his 
influence to secure the delivery to the besieged population. The same day, the UNSC 
renewed and updated UNPROFOR’s mandate now specifically referencing Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, which provides for the use of military force for self-protection whilst 
acting in the pursuit of UN resolutions.123 That evening, Mitterrand appeared on France 3 
in support of UNPROFOR and reinforced his UN-centred approach:  
 
I believe that the rescue operation in the new republics of the former 
Yugoslavia must be decided upon by the UN and not by individual countries, 
otherwise such and such a country will oppose the interests of another. And do 
not forget that it is there, in Sarajevo, that the First World War started.124 
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 The President also declared that, “nearly all efforts have come from France”.125 
Indeed, the next French initiative came to fruition through the UN as the UNSC created the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which Roland Dumas had 
“devoted all his energy to achieving” and Robert Badinter had proposed to Mitterrand in 
the summer of 1992.126 
 At the end of February, the US secured the agreement of the UN Secretary General 
to undertake humanitarian airdrops, which Germany and Russia offered to assist with at the 
beginning of March. The need for humanitarian aid to Muslim enclaves was becoming ever 
more pressing as the Bosnian Serbs began a ‘land-grab’ in the east of BiH in attempt to 
present a fait accompli in case the VOPP came to fruition. The UNHCR declared that 
ethnic cleansing had once more resumed in BiH as the town of Cerska fell to the Bosnian 
Serbs.127 The Europeans firmly condemned the latest round of atrocities committed by the 
VRS and, in a public statement, declared that they would be in contact with the US and 
Russia to “put pressure on those responsible for these atrocities and to guarantee the free 
access of international aid.”128 For Roland Dumas, this only further necessitated the need 
for the success of the VOPP and he sensed “in his Russian partners in Moscow a 
willingness to assist in the search for a solution in Bosnia-Hercegovina.”129 The French 
Foreign Minister added that, “it is essential that the international community, including the 
US and Russia, commits itself fully to support the Vance-Owen Plan, which represents the 
only settlement of the current conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina.”130 
 It is in this context that, on 5 March, Vance and Owen asked the French 
Ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, to encourage François Mitterrand to invite 
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Slobodan Milošević to Paris. The ICFY co-Presidents wanted to encourage the Serbian 
President to put pressure on Karadžić to sign the VOPP and believed that Mitterrand 
“could personally be of crucial importance in achieving this.”131 The President reluctantly 
agreed and the meeting was scheduled for 11 March. 
 Before hosting Milošević, Vance, and Owen at the Élysée, Mitterrand met with Bill 
Clinton in the Oval Office at the White House on 9 March. There the two discussed their 
parameters for military intervention in BiH. Mitterrand explained to Clinton, that:  
 
I am saying no to a battle of conquest. I will not expose the French army to a 
guerrilla war. The Bosniaks’ game is to confuse everyone: they need an 
international war, and a holy war [guerre sainte].132 
 
 Clinton outlined his conditions noting that he would only engage troops when “the 
moment comes, and if Congress accepts it, to guarantee a peace agreement already agreed 
between the parties.”133 Although the Bosnian government continued to hope for Western 
intervention, it would not be forthcoming. 
 The day after he returned to Paris, Mitterrand met with Milošević, Vance and 
Owen. Mitterrand later reflected that, “I did not really want to become personally involved 
in this negotiation, which threatened to fail, but Lord Owen insisted and I thought that I 
could be of some use.”134 David Owen later reflected that the President had rendered the 
peace process a great service. However, Mitterrand paid careful attention to detail and was 
keen to ensure that there were no pictures of the two Presidents shaking hands for fear of 
the domestic public reaction.135 
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Meeting between Slobodan Milošević, François Mitterrand, Cyrus Vance and David Owen, Élysée Palace, 
Paris, 11 March 1993.136 
 
During the discussions, which lasted five hours, Owen reflected that Mitterrand 
“was in top form: he was well briefed and his interventions were timely and frequently 
delivered with great emotion, notably when he spoke of Serbia’s historical ties with France 
and when drawing from his own personal experiences.”137 Mitterrand was a persuasive and 
powerful mediator in the meeting, adding timely and telling support to Vance and Owen’s 
arguments.138 When Milošević argued that he could not bring the Bosnian Serbs to heel 
and that Serbia proper should not suffer for this, Mitterrand retorted: “Yet I consider you 
the third negotiator and you have no interest in prolonging the blockade… if not the war 
                                                     
136 MAE, “À l’initiative des co-présidents de la conférence de Genève, réunion entre M. François Mitterrand, 
President de la République; Slobodan Milošević, Président de la Serbie; Cyrus Vance, médiateur des Nations 
unies pour l’ex-Yougoslavie; Lord Owen, médiateur de la CEE pour l’ex-Yougoslavie; Roland Dumas, 
ministre des Affaires étrangères, 11 March 1993, PO11543. 
137 Owen. Balkan Odyssey, 124. 
138 Ibid. 
 221 
will take another intolerable turn and there will be new sanctions.”139 Indeed the issue of 
sanctions was the most promising means to extract any commitments from Milošević over 
BiH and Mitterrand left the discussions to reflect on how he could assist with the matter. 
After an interlude, the French President re-joined the meeting at dinner. Owen 
reflected that, Mitterrand “had clearly thought long and hard about the importance 
Milošević attached to economic arguments… He had obviously decided that if progress 
was to be made, this bullet [lifting sanctions] had to be bitten, and he set out France’s 
position in dramatic and unambiguous terms.”140 Mitterrand called on Milošević to exert 
his influence over the Bosnian Serb leaders Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. The 
French President told his Serbian counterpart “either the Serbs persist, and they will be 
increasingly excluded and punished; or they re-join European society and enjoy its 
fruits.”141 Mitterrand appealed to Milošević: “Lend us a helping hand” and “if the ‘Vance-
Owen Plan’ is accepted we will demand the immediate lifting of sanctions.”142  
Mitterrand had clearly laid out his terms and, although he conceded that it would be 
difficult, would seek to ensure support from other heads of state for his proposals. 
However, this offer was time-sensitive: legislative elections would take place in France in 
three weeks, following which Mitterrand would be far harder pressed to deliver on his 
offer. It appeared that an opposition victory was highly probable and Mitterrand would be 
a co-habiting President with a government which would likely consist of politicians he had 
clashed with over the issue of BiH. The Quai d’Orsay confirmed two days later that the 
VOPP would have to be signed in its entirety to bring about the lifting of sanctions against 
FRY.143   
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In the days after the Élysée meeting, Milošević was far more receptive to practical 
negotiations on the VOPP. Mitterrand’s intervention in the negotiations in Paris had given 
the ICFY co-Presidents new momentum. The Serbian President was able to convince 
Karadžić to join the negotiations in New York on 14 March and to negotiate seriously.144 
As Karadžić joined the negotiations in New York, Mitterrand visited Boris Yeltsin in 
Moscow. There Mitterrand revealed that he was “very open to the idea of Russian 
participation in the application of the peace plan” and Yeltsin affirmed that there was “no 
real alternative to the Vance-Owen plan as a basis for the settlement of the conflict in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina.”145 Russian involvement would necessarily preclude NATO 
hijacking the peace process and keep it firmly anchored in the UN, currently the VOPP’s 
best hope. 
 
‘You are now under the protection of the United Nations’ 
Simultaneously, General Philippe Morillon was attempting to change the situation on the 
ground in support of the VOPP. The UNPROFOR commander had travelled to Zvornik on 
10 March with the aim of travelling to Srebrenica the following day via Banja Koviljača.146 
Morillon hoped to help prepare for deliveries of humanitarian aid and to negotiate a 
ceasefire between the ARBiH forces in the town of Srebrenica and the Bosnian Serbs in 
the surrounding villages. On 11 March, a team from MSF attempted to deliver 
humanitarian aid to the town but had been forced to hand over a large proportion of its 
cargo to the Bosnian Serbs controlling access routes.147 Morillon and his team left the now 
infamous village of Bratunac at 15h00 to reach Srebrenica. The Bosnian Serbs had 
destroyed the bridge on the main to road to Srebrenica the night before, which forced 
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Morillon and his team to travel along a small and snowy mountainous road that had been 
mined by a member of the ARBiH forces defending Srebrenica.148 One of the aid trucks hit 
a landmine and was flipped into a ditch.149 Having lost their aid en route, the UNPROFOR 
party received a cold welcome when they reached the besieged town after nightfall. 
In the morning, Morillon met with the commander of the ARBiH forces in the 
town, Naser Orić, whom he tried to convince that he could secure a ceasefire and the re-
establishment of humanitarian channels to the town.150 However the General was unaware 
that Orić intended to prevent him from leaving the town later in the day by surrounding his 
vehicle with women and children. Orić hoped that it would draw international attention to 
the plight of the eastern town. In the afternoon, Morillon gathered the town council to 
introduce the team of observers that had accompanied his mission. The General envisaged 
sending another team to help with the opening of “humanitarian corridors” by road and air, 
and to assist with the evacuation of injured civilians.151 
Shortly thereafter, Morillon attempted to leave Srebrenica but was prevented from 
doing so by hundreds of women and children.152 Morillon tried to negotiate with the 
instigators of the demonstration but the women of Srebrenica had quite rightly deduced 
that holding Morillon hostage would draw greater international attention to the plight of 
their town. So desperate were the women to ensure that the French General would not 
leave, some slept on the roads with their children in the snow.153 He tried to flee the town 
by the cover of dark, having organised a secret rendezvous with a UN vehicle outside an 
abandoned house.154 However, the town’s militia had discovered Morillon’s plan and 
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prevented the vehicle from reaching the meeting point and thus the General had to return to 
Srebrenica. 
 Early that morning Morillon made a speech in the centre of Srebrenica on a 
loudspeaker. The General famously announced to the assembled crowd that “You are now 
under the protection of the United Nations.”155 The General would not leave Srebrenica 
until the first aid convoy arrived and the danger of a Serb attack had passed.156 Lesser 
known are the statements that Morillon made to Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs over amateur 
radios: 
 
Peace is at your doors, it will ensure what you have asked for: the respect for 
everyone’s right to liberty and dignity. Put your trust in the United Nations; put 
your trust in me. You know well that we are not your enemies. You must 
understand that this is also for you, the Serbs, that I am in and that I will stay in 
Srebrenica.157 
 
 Morillon then asked the women of Srebrenica to allow him to leave to negotiate 
with the VRS forces nearby. The General wanted to ensure that humanitarian aid could 
reach Srebrenica and realised that this would require high-level political support to ensure 
that the Bosnian Serbs would acquiesce and allow the passage of humanitarian convoys. 
He was eventually allowed to leave on 13 March after promising to travel to Belgrade to 
demand an end to the Serb assault on Srebrenica. Therefore on 14 March, by radio link on 
the French television channel TF1, Morillon said that: 
 
I decided for my honour as a soldier that this is too much and then, during the 
night, I saw waves of refugees arrive in the town and this made my decision to 
stay until the security of this population is insured… It is necessary that 
pressure at a political, diplomatic and world opinion level continue so that this 
convoy arrives. It’s a question of life and death.158  
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 The UNPROFOR Commander certainly received support for his initiative in 
France. Alain Juppé of the RPR declared that, “This demonstrates that the presence on the 
ground of a peacekeeping force is the only way to roll back the Serbs.”159 The French 
Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy paid tribute to Morillon and hoped that Slobodan 
Milošević would “take into account the necessity for this awaited convoy to arrive in the 
town. Otherwise it will be up to the international community to decide on and I think we 
cannot let things go on as they are today.”160  
However, by 16 March, there had been no progress in persuading the Bosnian 
Serbs to allow humanitarian aid to reach Srebrenica. The same day, negotiations 
recommenced in New York on the VOPP, and Karadžić remained uncooperative. The 
Bosnian Serbs’ conduct around Srebrenica made the negotiations particularly difficult.  
Following negotiations with VRS leaders half-way between Bratunac and Srebrenica, 
Morillon advised that “there is no progress at this time.”161 However, the Bosnian 
government provisionally accepted the VOPP on 14 March. In the eyes of the international 
community, the Bosnian Serbs did not appear to be willing to cooperate.  
The Quai d’Orsay reaffirmed its desire to see the Serbs meaningfully contribute to 
the peace plan and its spokesman Daniel Bernard called the opening of Srebrenica “a test 
of Serbian will to contribute to the peace settlement”.162 Placing further pressure on the 
Serbs, Roland Dumas added that France was ready to send aid to Srebrenica by airlift, 
stating that, “If this operation was to take place, it would be necessary to implement United 
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Nations Security Council resolution 781 which prohibits flight over Bosnia.”163 Indeed, the 
enforcement of the NFZ became absolutely necessary as three planes from the direction of 
Titovo Užice launched bombs containing poisonous gas against Srebrenica.164 However, 
the negotiations on how to enforce the NFZ were particularly protracted owing to Russian 
concerns about the impact it could have on the negotiations.165 
 On 19 March Morillon succeeded in convincing the Serbs to allow an aid convoy to 
reach Srebrenica. He had persuaded the Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić to 
cease his attacks on the town and to stop the forceful expulsion of Bosniak civilians from 
the town.166 However, the conditions of the agreement with Mladić entailed disarming 
Srebrenica’s population. This would ultimately prove to be a fatal miscalculation. Morillon 
accompanied the first convoy, believing it necessary as the town’s population “only knew 
General Morillon.”167 In spite of his agreement with Mladić the offensive continued, which 
Morillon attributed to insubordination on behalf of local Bosnian Serb commanders, one of 
whom was relieved of his post by Mladić at Morillon’s behest.168  
These continued attacks greatly worried the inhabitants of Srebrenica and thus, 
once the food and medical supplies had been unloaded from the convoy, terrified women 
and children stormed the empty trucks in an effort to flee the besieged town. On the 
journey to Tuzla, six people died of asphyxiation.169 In response to the humanitarian 
catastrophe in Srebrenica that Morillon had brought to the world’s attention, France 
dispatched a field hospital to the town and declared that it was ready to airlift injured 
civilians out of the town.170 However, the Bosnian Serbs blocked the French humanitarian 
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dispatch from Belgrade, which led France to confirm that it would participate in the 
airdrops that the US had undertaken a month previously.171  
 Away from Srebrenica, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats had signed 
the interim arrangement and provisional map of the VOPP in New York, although 
Izetbegović’s signature was dependant on Serb acquiescence within a ‘reasonable’ 
timeframe. The Bosnian government had finally signed the VOPP, perhaps in the 
knowledge that it was about to lose some of its eastern territory in Srebrenica. For Dumas 
the government’s decision to sign the VOPP was vindication of the French policy on BiH. 
He stated: “That the Muslims today accept the Vance-Owen plan shows that the way that 
[France] chose in proposing the peace conference, was the right solution.”172 In this 
context, the Bosnian Serb offensive in the east stood in stark contrast to the Bosnian 
government’s reluctant accord with the VOPP. Now the international community needed to 
coalesce around the plan. 
On the ground Morillon continued to try to bring about peace in the east, a clear 
pre-requisite for the VOPP. His advisers reflected that the French General had become 
“dangerously obsessed with the fate of Srebrenica, and his own promise never to abandon 
it”.173 Morillon decided to launch two new ambitious operations: to send one hundred 
peacekeepers to Srebrenica to prevent the town from falling to the Bosnian Serb forces; 
and to allow Bosnian Serbs in Tuzla and the surrounding areas to evacuate to Bosnian Serb 
held territory.174 However the Bosnian Serbs were deliberately preventing the evacuation 
of injured civilians from Srebrenica by shelling the town, which UNPROFOR denounced 
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as “deliberate sabotage”.175 Against this backdrop, Paris strongly encouraged Morillon to 
travel to Belgrade to talk with Milošević to obtain a ceasefire.176 On 26 March, Morillon 
secured a tentative ceasefire that would commence on 28 March at midday, so that 
Srebrenica’s wounded could be evacuated.177  
 
Cohabitation and Clinton 
Meanwhile in France, the legislative elections of 21 and 28 March had presented the RPR-
Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française, UDF) coalition with 
a landslide victory and a crushing defeat for the PS. The Mitterrand era had ostensibly 
come to an end, although the President was unwilling to relinquish his hard-earned power. 
The combative Jacques Chirac, who had positioned himself as the RPR candidate for the 
presidential elections two years later, called on Mitterrand to resign. Other conservatives 
did not support this demand but Chirac refused to be Prime Minister under Mitterrand.  
Instead, the position at the head of the government fell to Édouard Balladur who 
chose Chirac’s ally Alain Juppé as Foreign Minister. Balladur firmly believed that France 
was over-exposed in Yugoslavia and was concerned by the poorly defined mandate of the 
French peacekeepers on the ground. In this respect, Hubert Védrine was correct to note that 
Balladur reasoned “à l’anglais”, demonstrating a mix of sang-froid and caution.178 Balladur 
was less flamboyant than Mitterrand and particularly on the question of Yugoslavia.  
Mitterrand was now gravely suffering from the prostate cancer that he had kept 
hidden from the public. Nonetheless, the President had prepared for the second 
‘cohabitation’ and had created an information network that would keep him well-
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informed.179 The position of Hubert Védrine as Secretary General of the Élysée was key in 
this respect, acting as an intermediary between the Hôtel Matignon and the presidential 
palace.180 Védrine reflected that, “from April 1993 to May 1995, Alain Juppé will fit… in 
with Mitterrand’s foreign policy but not without bringing a new energy and a greater 
operational capacity to it.”181 On the question of Yugoslavia, the main pillars of France’s 
policy would remain the same: the prioritisation of a political solution and the presence of 
a UN peacekeeping force.182 With the fate of the VOPP yet to be decided and Mitterrand 
having so strongly supported the peace process, France continued to support the ICFY 
efforts.  
 Evidently one of the most pressing foreign policy matters for the new government 
was BiH, as the Bosnian Serb offensive in the east of the country continued. Only days 
after the elections in France, a further catastrophe befell the population of Srebrenica. As 
the UNHCR tried to evacuate Srebrenica’s wounded on 31 March, Bosnian Serb forces 
shelled the town and killed several would-be evacuees.183 That same day, the UNSC voted 
to enforce the NFZ over BiH, giving a seven-day period before it came into effect and a 
further week before enforcement would start.184 NATO would play a vital role in the 
resolution’s implementation. Significantly this marked the first ever combat role for NATO 
and France confirmed that ten Mirage 2000 RDI and four Mirage F1 CR would participate 
in the operation.185  
Russia had been vital in securing the agreement and offered its good offices to the 
Bosnian Serb Assembly in discussions on the VOPP map on 1 April. Nonetheless, the 
Assembly rejected the map on 3 April. The Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev 
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expressed his disappointment adding that, “we are very worried and I think that the 
rejection of the Vance-Owen plan by the Bosnian Serbs is a tragic error.”186  
 As further evacuations continued in Srebrenica, often under fire, Bosnian Serb 
forces refused the entry of aid trucks to Srebrenica, allowing only empty transporters to 
access the town. On 4 April, the Bosnian government refused any further evacuations from 
the Srebrenica enclave on the grounds that it furthered ethnic cleansing. Exasperated, 
Morillon set out for Srebrenica on 7 April with a new aid convoy of five trucks and over a 
hundred Canadian peacekeepers. The General had not gained Serb consent, a pre-requisite 
of the peacekeeping mandate. He was halted and detained for seven hours by Bosnian 
Serbs in the town of Sokolac and three trucks were forced to turn around as the remainder 
of the convoy moved on to Zvornik.187 In Zvornik, women and children surrounded the 
two remaining convoy vehicles to prevent the General from reaching Srebrenica. The 
UNPROFOR commander had to limp back to Tuzla defeated and humiliated. 
 UN officials were gravely concerned by Morillon’s activities in eastern BiH, 
feeling that by intervening in Srebrenica, the French General had exposed the weakness of 
UNPROFOR. As Ratko Mladić proposed a ceasefire on 9 March, the military staff of the 
VRS forces accused French peacekeepers and General Morillon of taking the side of the 
Bosnian government. General Manojlo Milovanović wanted Morillon to be withdrawn 
from BiH because, he stated, “he is the personal envoy of Alija Izetbegović and represents 
the Muslims.”188 However, Boutros-Ghali stood behind Morillon and confirmed that the 
General had been “acting in conformity with UN resolutions.”189 The newly appointed 
French Defence Minister François Léotard replied that it was not acceptable to question the 
neutrality of the peacekeepers, adding that, “It is very unjust to question the 
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professionalism and neutrality of the peacekeepers, whether they’re French or another 
nationality.”190 Léotard was visiting French peacekeepers in BiH, and was accompanied by 
Morillon to Bihać, where two French peacekeepers had recently been killed.191 During his 
visit Léotard indicated that, following reports in Le Monde that the General Staff had 
requested his return, the General would remain in BiH for the time being.192 Morillon was 
essential for the French presence on the ground, particularly since he was considered as 
“the man for negotiation” and in this respect he had not completed his mission.193  
Izetbegović also wrote to Mitterrand regarding the rumour that France would retire 
Morillon from BiH. The Bosnian President thought that Morillon had been extremely 
responsible during his tenure and that “From the beginning General Philippe Morillon had 
demonstrated himself to be very communicative and ready to cooperate to resolve the 
Bosnia-Herzegovinian crisis.”194 Izetbegović praised the General’s preference for 
“concrete and operational actions over cabinet work and verbal conversations.” The 
Bosnian President believed that this approach had done much to win over the population of 
BiH. Thus the General’s actions in Srebrenica marked the peak of his achievements. 
Izetbegović was keen for the General’s mandate to be extended, pleading that “we ask you 
to prolong his mandate in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which could be crucial for the peaceful 
resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian crisis.” Aware that accusations had been against 
Morillon for exceeding his mandate, Izetbegović also added that in Srebrenica Morillon 
had acted “perfectly in conformity with the name and the task of the forces under his 
command (United Nations Protection Force).”195 
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 On the ground the UN continued to try and evacuate Srebrenica but the Serb 
capture of the town became increasingly likely. On 12 April VRS forces launched a brutal 
attack against Srebrenica that killed 56 people in an hour, including schoolchildren.196 
These continued atrocities led France to pursue new sanctions through the UNSC, which 
Russia had previously postponed. This was the first initiative by the new government who 
declared that they would support further sanctions and were “determined to take, in 
coordination with its partners, new initiatives that can impose a way to avoid the spread of 
these tensions throughout the region.”197 The US was also considering lifting the arms 
embargo if the Bosnian Serbs refused to sign the VOPP and continued their attacks against 
besieged towns.198 
 However, sanctions would not be enough to stop the fall of Srebrenica, which 
seemed inevitable by 14 April. The local authorities asked an UNPROFOR member to 
deliver a surrender message to the UN headquarters in Belgrade. The UNSC and 
UNPROFOR faced a catastrophe. On the night of 14 April, the VRS pierced through 
ARBiH defence lines in Srebrenica and surrounded the town. The town had fallen by the 
morning.  Aware that he had defeated the Bosniak forces in Srebrenica, Mladić allowed the 
Canadian company, which Morillon had previously tried to escort to Srebrenica, to enter 
the town. The Bosnian Serb General acquiesced largely because it would be implementing, 
what the UN inappropriately dubbed, a “disarmament agreement”.199 To announce the 
‘surrender’ of Srebrenica would lead to stronger calls for military intervention, which was 
entirely against UNPROFOR’s interests. However, in New York the UNSC was debating a 
measure to make Srebrenica a ‘safe area’, which would compel UNPROFOR to protect the 
civilian population in Srebrenica.  
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 The ‘safe areas’ policy was proposed by the non-aligned members of the UNSC 
who suggested a “Council of Protected Areas” as a means to force the major countries, 
which is the P5, to prevent a massacre in Srebrenica and Sarajevo.200 The ‘safe areas’ 
concept that emerged was far removed from the one originally envisaged by the non-
aligned caucus of the UNSC. Resolution 819 was adopted unanimously and demanded that 
Srebrenica and its environs be treated as a ‘safe area’ free from hostilities and requiring the 
withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces. Additional peacekeepers would then be placed in the 
town to ensure that it could not be used as a launch point for future Bosniak attacks against 
Bosnian Serbs. 
Simultaneously on 16 April, Morillon held negotiations with Mladić at the Sarajevo 
airport. Mladić called for the complete surrender of ARBiH forces in the town, adding that 
he would allow women, children and the elderly to leave; men of fighting age would be 
considered prisoners of war. Morillon advised the Bosnian Army to accept the terms of 
truce so the UNHCR could begin evacuating Srebrenica.201 Mladić had achieved 
everything he had hoped to in Srebrenica without provoking international intervention: the 
population had been disarmed and weakened; and the battle lines had been frozen in place 
by the UN safe areas resolution. Srebrenica could be safely ignored and VRS troops and 
weapons deployed there could be safely moved to a more strategically important location 
in the battle for BiH. Thereon Srebrenica would fall victim to the Bosnian Serbs’ political 
methodology of “slow-motion genocide” with its fate to be decided at a later date.202  
Alain Juppé demanded a vote on the total blockade of Serbia who he accused of 
mocking the international community. Although the US and UK were prepared to give a 
reluctant Russia a further day to consider the measure, France was adamant that the vote 
had to be taken on 17 April. Juppé stated that France “now calls for the vote in the shortest 
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possible time in the United Nations Security Council that will totally isolate Serbia from 
the rest of the world.”203 The blockade was preferable for Juppé because “it avoids putting 
the 5,000 French soldiers on the ground in a situation where they are under fire from one 
side or the other.”204  
Resolution 820, which emerged from these discussions, condemned the Bosnian 
Serbs’ failure to sign the VOPP and their practice of ethnic cleansing, and implemented a 
blockade against Serbia. These sanctions would come into effect in nine days’ time. 
During the intervening period David Owen travelled to Belgrade to once more convince 
Milošević to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the VOPP. However, increasingly 
frustrated by the Bosnian Serbs’ bullishness, Owen indicated that he would consider 
military measures necessary against the Bosnian Serbs if they failed to sign the VOPP 
during a television interview.205 
 
The Failure of the VOPP: A Catastrophe of Clinton’s Making 
Almost immediately the new Foreign Minister threw himself headlong into the challenge 
of BiH. Juppé, an astute, intelligent and energetic politician, realised the limits of French 
influence and that any future peace would require the agreement of both the US and 
Russia. Where Mitterrand had believed that US and Russian support for VOPP was 
important, Juppé did not believe that it would ensure Bosnian Serb acquiescence in and of 
itself. He was therefore prepared to place far greater pressure on the Bosnian Serbs than the 
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French administration had theretofore. Juppé declared that thus far in the Bosnian crisis 
“the international community has been lax, it’s obvious.”206 
The Foreign Minister referred to the events around Srebrenica as “a turning point” 
and added that “I say today with the greatest firmness: enough is enough.”207 He was quick 
to add however that the new French government had only been “responsible for this matter 
for 15 days.”208  The blockade provided the new administration in France with an 
opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the VOPP and its firmer line against the 
recalcitrant Bosnian Serbs. The Quai d’Orsay declared that it was actively preparing for the 
blockade so that it could be readily implemented. Furthermore, the Quai added, it 
represented continuity in the French policy that aimed to pressure the Serbs to accept the 
VOPP.209 It also condemned continued attacks against Srebrenica, stating that “If there is 
surrender or a capture [of Srebrenica], the responsibility will be entirely with the Serbs.”210 
Similarly the Clinton administration was increasingly irritated by the Bosnian 
Serbs’ disregard for the international community’s interventions in BiH. Without troops on 
the ground, unlike France and the UK, the US had decided that lifting the arms embargo 
against the Bosnian government would transform the conflict without the need to 
implement a settlement through force. The Quai was concerned by the US approach, given 
that both the State Department and Quai d’Orsay’s studies on combining targeted airstrikes 
and lifting the arms embargo suggested that they would be ineffective without support 
from troops on the ground.211  
In response to the US suggestion, François Léotard held a meeting with the UK 
Defence Minister Malcolm Rifkind on 19 April. Britain and France’s positions aligned 
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perfectly on the issue of air strikes, encapsulated by Léotard’s statement in a joint press 
conference: “We are very apprehensive on the question of aerial intervention at the 
moment, until the UN peacekeepers are either regrouped or better protected.”212 If military 
action were to occur in BiH, owing to France’s large ground presence, Léotard also 
demanded greater representation for France in the UN’s decision-making bodies in New 
York.213 
Sensing that the French government was reluctant to see the use of force, Clinton 
tried to exploit the perceived gap between the Elysée and the Matignon to bring about 
French acquiescence to US policies. Clinton called Mitterrand on 20 April in an effort to 
convince the French President that there were “a large number of options” to force the 
Serbs to “put an end to their aggression”.214 The French were prepared to use force but 
remained committed to the arms embargo; the Elysée, the Matignon and the Quai shared 
this analysis. Accordingly, Alain Juppé publicly announced that, as the VOPP was “the 
only instrument available to us today for any chance of peace”, France was “in the course 
of studying [targeted airstrikes]” although it would require a formal UNSC resolution.215 
France was so thoroughly committed to the success of the VOPP that it was willing to 
consider the use of force to bring about its implementation. 
As Owen continued his negotiations in Belgrade, the EC Foreign Ministers met in 
Copenhagen with BiH and the US proposal on the agenda. US rhetoric had gradually 
heightened since the fall of Srebrenica and public opinion in the US was increasingly 
frustrated with the peace process. The ICFY co-President warned the EC against 
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acquiescing to US demands.216 Nonetheless, and in an effort to convince the Bosnian Serbs 
to sign the VOPP, there were indications that the EC was prepared to consider military 
intervention as the Danish Foreign Minister declared that the EC was “excluding nothing… 
including a military intervention”.217 
In Belgrade, Slobodan Milošević agreed to the VOPP on 25 April, with the 
previously agreed UN sanctions due to come into effect the following day. Milošević, who, 
as a political operator was motivated by personal power, was unprepared to further support 
Karadžić in the face of crippling sanctions that would have undermined his domestic 
support.218 The French approach of pressuring Milošević appeared to have paid dividends, 
but it had failed to account for the Bosnian Serbs’ fierce independence: the Bosnian Serb 
Assembly declared that it was unable to make a final decision on the VOPP. This delayed 
the final decision by approximately three weeks with a referendum slated for 15-16 May. 
The Quai d’Orsay declared that, “France regrets that, in spite of tireless efforts of Lord 
Owen, to which it pays tribute, the negotiations to obtain the agreement of the Serbs to 
Vance-Owen plan have not succeeded.”219 France called for peace and added that, “If this 
appeal is not heard, one must remember that the EC, gathered in Denmark on 24 and 25 
April, has not excluded any new initiative.”220 
Whereas, prior to the advent of the second cohabitation, France may have launched 
an initiative to secure Bosnian Serb acquiescence, the new government was far more 
conservative in its approach. Owen reflected that the new Prime Minister Balladur was 
“very precise and cautious involving French troops further in Yugoslavia” adding that, 
“There would certainly be less flamboyance about French policy from now on and instead 
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a careful calculation of interest.”221 Alain Juppé also preached prudence: “We must give a 
chance to the sanctions policy” and “test the good faith of President Milošević.”222 
On 28 April, Alain Juppé, sensing that the US was formulating its actions in BiH, 
suggested to Mitterrand and Balladur that he should meet with the British whom he 
thought would be more likely to accept targeted airstrikes without lifting the arms 
embargo. Moreover, Balladur stated that, “We must envisage regrouping our units and not 
always saying ‘yes’ to requests to increasing our numbers.” 223 This would become a 
familiar refrain of Balladur over his premiership, and would greatly shape France’s role in 
BiH over the following years.  
Following discussions in New York, all parties agreed to negotiations in Athens, 
Greece, on 2 May. There, isolated and harassed, Karadžić agreed to the VOPP, with a 
caveat that he would need to secure the agreement of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in a 
meeting that was fixed for 8 May. Owen and, to a lesser extent, Vance had secured the 
signatures to the VOPP, which marked a huge step. However, the question of 
implementing the plan, and ensuring the Bosnian Serb Assembly agreed, was still 
unsettled, which left diplomats somewhat sceptical about the VOPP’s implementation. 
Parallel to the Athens Conference, the US had been developing its policy of ‘lift 
and strike’: lifting the arms embargo selectively and providing targeted airstrikes against 
the Bosnian Serbs. France’s Ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, reflected that:  
 
The American administration’s interest in lifting the arms embargo is easily 
explained. This solution has the merit of simplicity and the total absence of 
engagement for Washington, in the form of an air presence or troops on the 
ground. It also allows, inexpensively, to win over the sympathy and opinions of 
Muslim governments.224 
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Having just secured agreement from the three communities in BiH, the US 
threatened the unity of purpose that the international community had found in Athens: the 
UK and France would be extremely reluctant to see the implementation of such a policy 
whilst they had such a significant number of troops on the ground. Furthermore, the US 
policy raised institutional questions regarding the direction of any such implementation 
force: would it be directed by NATO and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), the UN or a configuration of the two. 
Alain Juppé was sceptical of the US’s potential role in implementing the VOPP and 
called on “everyone”, notably the US and Russia, to participate in an implementation force. 
Nonetheless, Clinton sent Warren Christopher to Europe to garner support for ‘lift and 
strike’ following the Athens Conference. Juppé was irritated by the US’s untimely 
intervention. On 2 May, the Foreign Minister stated that, “there is a division of roles that 
does not seem acceptable to me: that of some having planes and dropping bombs and 
others, the Europeans, especially the French, on the ground.”225 The Foreign Minister also 
added that “it will take an international force placed under the responsibility of the United 
Nations where everyone must be involved.”226 Indeed, France and the US were divided 
over the shape of the implementation force as Warren Christopher travelled from London 
to Paris.  
In France, Christopher met with Léotard, Mitterrand, Balladur and Juppé. During 
his meeting with Christopher, Mitterrand called for careful planning and prudence. He told 
the US Secretary of State that, “I agree with your approach to threaten and deter, but we 
must coldly examine the consequences.”227 The President was greatly concerned about the 
results of the US’s proposals to use aerial bombardment with such large numbers of French 
and British peacekeepers on the ground. Christopher highlighted that the US had come to 
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the “lift and strike” policy as the US congress would be unlikely to agree to send US 
ground troops to BiH and this policy would “allow the Muslims to defend themselves.”228 
Mitterrand conceded to Christopher that morally, he was right. However, as with the 
question of aerial force, Mitterrand urged careful calculations: 
 
There is a certain paradox in denying weapons to the Muslims who are being 
attacked by both the Serbs and the Croats… if we decide not to give them our 
support. It’s paradoxical and shocking. But, practically, such a measure will 
have adverse effects. Before it is even of some use (because it will take some 
time), such a decision will signal to the Serbs that the moment has come to 
accelerate the final phase of their offensive. And the arms that would 
eventually reach the Muslims would no longer be of use in a guerrilla war. 
Meanwhile, the Serbs will be assured control of towns, the nodes and means of 
communications, etc. I must also mention the problems posed by the presence 
of UN soldiers in Bosnia.229 
 
Mitterrand added that he had no objection “in principle” to lifting the arms 
embargo but thought that Britain and the French government would resist such a 
measure.230 If the Serbs responded negatively to the VOPP, Mitterrand declared that it 
would be necessary to re-examine the issue.231 
This would soon be the case as, in Pale, the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the 
VOPP, overwhelmingly voting against ratification of the plan on the morning of 6 May 
1993. A referendum would still take place on 15-16 May, wherein the question would be 
put to the Bosnian Serb population. However, the popular vote was a moot point, as it 
would invariably side with the Assembly, and the international community was now faced 
with many difficult decisions on the future of the VOPP. Milošević and Ćosić had 
intervened personally in the talks in Pale and the Serbian President was thoroughly 
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disheartened by the result. He now attempted to dissuade the international community 
from taking punitive measures against the Bosnian Serbs.  
The Serbian leadership in Belgrade proposed a five-point programme for the 
military imposition of the VOPP that included: a UN implementation force with the right 
to respond with force; that force should be constituted by Serbia’s allies in the two world 
wars, namely France, Britain, Russia and America; the UN should issue a three-day 
ultimatum for the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw to 30km from the Bosnian enclaves; 
Yugoslav Army officers should liaise with the UN; and the Geneva negotiations should 
continue.232 Owen believed that Belgrade was prepared to accept UNSC-sanctioned action 
against the Bosnian Serbs and, had the US approached Russia for a joint initiative at this 
point, then the next two and a half years of fighting and some of the war’s worst excesses 
may have been avoided.233 
In Paris, the Quai d’Orsay was deeply concerned by events in Pale. The Quai 
described it as a “grave decision that France regrets and from which we all draw all the 
consequences” adding that, “we are reflecting on all the initiatives that the situation 
requires and will liaise with our partners.”234 The General Secretary at the Quai called a 
crisis meeting, believing that the US would soon call on the UNSC to lift the arms 
embargo. In such an instance France was prepared to use its UNSC veto.  
To avoid such a conflict in the Security Council, Alain Juppé had envisaged an 
alternative solution: France should work towards the creation of several ‘safe zones’ that 
had been proposed by the non-aligned countries in the UNSC. Aware that the alternative 
was worse, Mitterrand acquiesced to the Quai’s suggestion.235 That evening, the UNSC 
adopted resolution 824 creating “safe zones” in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, and 
Bihać, alongside Srebrenica. The Quai was pleased with the wording of the resolution that 
                                                     
232 Owen. Balkan Odyssey, 158-9. 
233 Ibid., 159. 
234 “‘Une décision grave que la France regrette’, affirme Paris”, AFP (6 May 1993). 
235 Favier and Martin-Roland. La Décennie Mitterrand, 582-3. 
 242 
was “cautious on the means to assure the protection of these zones and it refers to another 
resolution to authorise the use of military force.”236 
France also prepared a draft resolution for the UNSC that called for the 
implementation of border monitors and endorsed the VOPP declaring it to be “still alive”. 
However the US was vacillating and announced that they were considering other options 
in Europe.237 Following the vote in Pale, Bill Clinton had an apparent change of heart on 
the ‘lift and strike’ policy after reading Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts.238 The book 
argues that the conflict in the Balkans was the consequence of ancient ethnic hatreds and 
thus international intervention was doomed to fail.  
Warren Christopher was now in Europe “pushing a policy that the President’s not 
comfortable with.”239 The US therefore moved to a policy of ‘damage limitation’, 
attempting to shield Clinton from any domestic or international criticism. Moreover 
opinion polls showed that over fifty & of American citizens were against air raids.240 The 
‘lift and strike’ debacle was the latest in a series of US policy declarations that caused a 
Euro-Atlantic rift. 
Warren Christopher returned from his European excursion and counselled the 
President and his foreign policy advisers not to risk greater friction with Europe over ‘lift 
and strike’.241 Instead Christopher argued for a policy of containment to prevent the 
spread of conflict to Kosovo and Macedonia.242 Europe wanted to continue with sanctions 
and the reinforcement of the safe areas. However, France was considering means to 
protect the safe areas, which French experts had warned would be difficult. To call the 
US’s bluff Juppé thus appealed to Russia and the US to send troops to reinforce the safe 
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areas.243 Juppé correctly noted that, the reason “the reinforced sanctions have had an 
effect is due in large part to the strongest sanctions the international community has 
decided on.”244 The US had failed to recognise this and, having suffered a severe 
diplomatic rejection, it began reformulating its policy on BiH. 
France thus fleshed out its safe area policy as it circulated a non-paper to the US, 
UK and Russia on its thinking.245 Juppé hoped this non-paper would serve as a basis for a 
UNSCR on the military practicalities of the safe areas and sought to tie the US and Russia 
to troop contributions. The memorandum envisaged that up to 12,000 peacekeepers would 
be required to defend the safe areas with American and Russian contingents; Juppé 
believed “the Serbs would think twice before attacking them.”246 Furthermore, the 
Foreign Minister was unprepared to continue exposing French peacekeepers to the 
dangers in Yugoslavia, recalling before the National Assembly that, “there have been 
more deaths and injuries in Yugoslavia than during the whole Gulf War, including, alas, 
in the French contingent.”247 Therefore, Juppé summarised his policy concisely: “the 
military way is the way of despair. We do not have the right to exclude it but we have a 
duty to do everything to not have recourse to this last resort.”248  
The Bosnian Serb population returned a resounding rejection of the VOPP on 16 
May 1993. Although Juppé had declared that the referendum had “no meaning”, for the 
US it signalled the long-awaited death knell for the VOPP.249 The US State Department, 
now seeking to sweep the BiH issue under the carpet, attempted to dilute any forthcoming 
measures that could affect the US. The Clinton administration stepped down from the 
moral high ground that it had previously occupied on the VOPP. On 18 May Warren 
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Christopher spoke before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and adopted the ‘Ancient 
Ethnic Hatred’ argument. He declared that “you’ll find indication of atrocities by all three 
of the major parties against each other. The level of hatred is just incredible.”250 Clinton 
and Christopher were extremely sceptical about the prospect of protecting the safe areas 
and the President declared that he would not send US troops into a “shooting gallery”.251 
The US had changed its rhetoric to suit its new containment policy but had, in the process, 
destroyed the last peace plan that would maintain a unified state of BiH; every plan 
thereafter envisaged ethnic partition.  
However, some members of the international community were unprepared to 
abandon the VOPP so readily and still envisaged protecting the safe areas. To this end 
Russia called a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the UNSC. However Warren 
Christopher, determined to abandon the VOPP, refused to attend the meeting, torpedoing 
the Russian initiative.252 Juppé would not be drawn on his position between the US and 
Russia and had planned to attend the Foreign Ministers’ meeting and a separate meeting 
with Christopher. Washington, London and Paris instead conceived a new diplomatic 
initiative, which was presented to the Russians by Christopher and agreed on 20 May.  
The US had previously distributed a new plan that envisaged dividing BiH into 
three zones: Serb, Muslim and Croat. In France, Mitterrand rejected this approach 
declaring before a cabinet meeting that, “such a division supposes new population 
displacement. This would cheapen human lives.”253 Rather, the President called for 
relaunch of the VOPP with greater protection for the ‘safe zones’. However given 
Balladur’s preference to protect French peacekeepers, he was unconvinced that France 
should contribute towards any greater protection of the safe areas: 
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That would engage us for years. It is not necessary to respond now. There is no 
other initiative than to protect these zones by demanding the contribution of 
other countries but after a few months, we will have to answer the question, 
that is to say, to admit defeat… to a fait accompli. Obviously, I will not say this 
publicly.254  
 
Mitterrand responded that, “this fait accompli can be contained… our silence will 
lead us towards solutions we do not want.”255 However, in the context of cohabitation the 
President’s influence over foreign policy was not as strong as it had once been. Instead the 
President and his cabinet reached a compromise. 
The US proposed a ‘Joint Action Programme’ to Russia, which Christopher 
drafted hastily over dinner. Primarily, Christopher sought Russian blessing for the JAP 
and it was drafted with US public opinion and Russia at the forefront of the State 
Department’s thinking.256 However, the US also needed to repair relations with Europe, 
particularly France and Britain. Similarly, the Quai under Juppé desired improved Franco-
American relations and the JAP offered an opportunity to achieve this for both sides. This 
would come at the cost of damaging relations with Germany, who were greatly 
disappointed by the turn of events and began to call for lifting the arms embargo.257 
However, for French agreement, the US would have to cede ground on the 
protection of ‘safe areas’. Clinton and Christopher had both been sceptical of France’s 
‘safe area’ policies and held long and private negotiations with France ahead of a broader 
meeting with the other JAP signatories on this issue.258 On 22 May, following a meeting 
in Washington, the Foreign Ministers of the US, the UK, France, Russia, and Spain, 
issued a Joint Action Declaration that outlined the contours of the JAP: the VOPP was to 
be re-dubbed a ‘process’; the creation of an International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
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Yugoslavia; and a commitment to protect the six ‘safe areas’ in BiH. Officially, as the 
Quai confirmed, the VOPP “remained the basis for a political solution in Bosnia”, but it 
would be implemented over a longer of period time.259 In reality, the VOPP had been 
abandoned in favour of the JAP that the US had circulated to foreign ministries on 18 
May.  
David Owen remained hopeful that the VOPP could have been implemented 
through the WEU but, with both France and Britain signatories to the JAP, this last hope 
was extinguished. In doing so France and Britain had strained relations with their 
European partners. Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, all opposed the move by 
their European allies. Given these sentiments, Mitterrand met personally with Helmut 
Kohl during the 61st Franco-German summit in Beaune in an attempt to repair the damage 
that had been wrought by France’s adherence to the JAP and the abandonment of its 
European allies. 
Simultaneously, in New York, France and Britain were pursuing the implementation 
of a UNSCR that would allow UNPROFOR to use force to protect the ‘safe areas’. Hurd 
met Juppé in Paris, and the French Foreign Minister announced that, “Our analysis and 
ideas converge” and that the two would work together to ensure that the “safe zones were 
implemented” in the shortest possible time.260 On 4 June the Security Council issued 
UNSCR 836, which authorised the use of force in case of aggression against any of the 
six enclaves. ICFY would have to go back to the drawing board. 
The period of cohabitation bore witness to a far greater realism in France’s policy 
towards BiH. With Juppé and Balladur in power, a fundamental shift towards a more 
conservative and measured approach followed. Both were reluctant to see either Clinton 
or Yeltsin claim the credit for France’s initiatives and earnest work towards a peace 
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settlement. However, both men supported the main tenet of Mitterrandienne policy in 
BiH: to not add war to war.  
Alain Juppé also agreed that BiH required a political solution rather than a military 
one. However, he was more pragmatic than Mitterrand and saw France’s role as an 
international organiser, an arbitrator and mediator within the community, rather than a 
leader. Thus far, the limits of French power had been exposed in BiH and Juppé was not 
too proud to admit this. France’s future efforts thereon would be under a diplomatic 
direction, aimed to create a greater dialogue between the US and Russia, and to heal the 
transatlantic rift caused by the ‘lift and strike’ debacle.  
 248 
Chapter Six – France and the Tripartite Peace Plans, June 1993 - April 1994. 
 
Over the course of the spring of 1993 fighting had intensified between the Croats and the 
Bosnian government, with the Bosnian Croats attempting to carve out an ethnically pure 
state of Herceg-Bosna. The Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatska vijeće obrane, HVO) 
forces in Herceg-Bosna had been subordinated to the Bosnian TO as part of the 
cooperation agreement between Izetbegović and Tuđman in July 1992. In the provinces 
that had been designated Bosnian Croat under the VOPP, the ARBiH resisted 
subordination to Croatian Defence Council control. Furthermore, many Bosniak citizens 
had been cleansed from Jajce by the VRS in September 1992 and fled to towns such 
Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovača, or villages near Bila and Zenica.1 This wave of 
refugees, with additions from eastern BiH, contained many military-aged men who 
replenished the ARBiH that had been defeated in Jajce and allowed the Bosnian 
government to seriously envisage taking offensive military action against the HVO and 
VRS.2 Simultaneously, the Bosnian Croats, as discussed, accepted the VOPP immediately 
and saw it as a means to partition provinces 8 and 10 of the provisional map. However the 
newly reinforced ARBiH was unprepared to accept a fait accompli particularly in multi-
ethnic Mostar, which “became a frontline in the fighting”.3 
David Owen warned European Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 8 June in 
Luxembourg that, “Partition within the box of the present boundaries of Bosnia-
Hercegovina will mean too small a Muslim state. It will be to create a Palestine within 
Europe, a certain recipe for continued fighting, terrorism and discontent.”4 Indeed, a quick 
glance at a map of the frontlines and entities of summer 1993 reveals the dire situation that 
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the Bosnian government faced. With the creation of a Greater Croatia and a Greater Serbia 
seemingly possible once more, Owen urged the Community to take a broader approach to 
the problem of BiH and to apply pressure to Tuđman, as well as holding Milošević to his 
VOPP commitments. 
Aware of his government’s dire strategic position, Izetbegović made a ‘private’ 
visit to France at the invitation of Bernard-Henri Lévy. Over the two days of 11 and 12 
June, Izetbegović had a full itinerary. On the evening of 11 June, before the cameras of 
France 2 the Bosnian President launched an appeal to the French people calling for their 
moral support. Izetbegović read the appeal in French from a script, pleading that the 
Bosnian people be allowed to defend themselves.5 Alongside other media commitments, 
Izetbegović also had lunch with Mitterrand at the Élysée.  
The Bosnian President was accompanied by Bernard-Henri Lévy and Nikola 
Kovać, a Bosnian Serb who had remained loyal to the Bosnian government.6 Mitterrand 
raised the subject of Goražde initially, which Lévy and Izetbegović were both quick to 
assert was worsening. Izetbegović recounted the fact that over the preceding 24 hours the 
Bosnian government had lost some fifty percent of the territory around Goražde and the 
situation in Srebrenica was equally desperate. The Bosnian President informed Mitterrand 
that on that very morning he had received a message from an amateur radio-operator 
destined for the two heads of state appealing for the two men to “Save Goražde”.7  
Izetbegović highlighted that Goražde was one of the six UN ‘safe zones’, the 
origins of which he attributed to France. Mitterrand declared that the UN resolution on the 
‘safe zones’ was put in place to save lives but it had not been fixed by law and therefore 
Izetbegović needed to alert other powers. The French President then moved on to the 
subject of Sarajevo, asking “if the Serbs had wanted to take Sarajevo, could it be 
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achieved?”8 Izetbegović thought that the Serbs could not take Sarajevo; if they did it would 
come with heavy losses and the destruction of the town. The Bosnian delegation 
nevertheless made it clear that they believed that the majority of democratic Bosnians – 
Muslim, Croatian or Serbian – wanted a unified Bosnia and therefore the Bosnian 
government had accepted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan as it would bring peace.  
However, for the Bosnian government the current situation was untenable, as 
Izetbegović protested:  
 
We are the only legal government and we are deprived of arms. It’s a nonsense! In 
practice, this embargo has only worked against Bosnia-Hercegovina because 
Serbia is a producer and exporter of arms. Thus the embargo has been a negative 
influence on the conflict.9  
 
Mitterrand responded, “In any case, this was not at all the intention of those who 
decided on it.”10 Izetbegović replied sharply: “But, in politics, what counts is the 
consequences.”11 Mitterrand remained undeterred from advocating the continuation of the 
embargo. The Bosnian President remarked that, “You cannot escape the following 
problem: either you defend us or you leave us to defend ourselves”.12 Mitterrand revealed 
that he had spoken with Clinton, Major, and French military advisors who had all given 
him the same response on lifting the arms embargo: it would lead to the extermination of 
the Bosnian Muslims before they could receive arms. He qualified the statement by adding 
that, “these are not people who wish for the victory of the Serbs.”13 
‘BHL’ highlighted the logical outcome of the West’s approach: “This situation will 
one day drive the West to have to join the battle in Bosnia.”14 Mitterrand conceded that the 









situation had driven the international community closer towards conflict than thus far. 
Therefore he would continue to defend the arms embargo. Izetbegović demanded two 
measures: to defend the ‘safe zones’, particularly Goražde; and for UNPROFOR to defend 
the Bosnians or allow them to defend themselves. The Bosnian President argued that “the 
rebalancing of arms could lead to peace.”15 Although Mitterrand conceded that “It is an 
argument, but the risk is the liquidation of your [the Bosnians] resistance before you are 
armed.” The President added that he had never hidden this but conceded that “the right to 
defend oneself seems fundamental”.16 The problem, he thought, was convincing the 
Security Council. Therefore, Mitterrand said that France would revisit the issue in the 
UNSC, although he felt it would be very difficult.17 He conceded that, in calling for the 
lifting of the embargo, the Bosnians were demanding the most simple of rights: self-
defence.18   
 
The Union of Three Republics 
Whilst Izetbegović had been in Paris, Milošević had been in talks with Owen and 
Stoltenberg. In this meeting, the Serbian President proposed a new map for BiH (see map 
7), which envisaged dividing the republic in three. Owen and Stoltenberg chaired 
discussions between the parties on this Serbian proposal on 15-16 June in Geneva, which 
crystallised a three-part ethnic division that would form the basis for the next three 
internationally-brokered peace plans. The Bosnian government was far from thrilled with 
the share of the map that had been designated to them and the task of the ICFY negotiators 
became to ensure a better deal for the Bosnian government and persuade Izetbegović that 
his interests could be represented through the new negotiations.19 Europe had abandoned 
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the VOPP but the ICFY now had a new basis on which to negotiate. Moreover, the US 
condoned this approach, which ratified ethnic cleansing, having opposed the VOPP on 
exactly that basis.  
This US volte-face greatly irritated Germany, alongside Warren Christopher’s 
public criticism of Germany in the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.20 The US Secretary 
of State declared in an interview for USA Today that Germany had “a particular 
responsibility” in triggering the war and persuading the Europeans to act like them, adding 
that “Lots of specialists think that the problems we have there [Yugoslavia] today started 
with the recognition of Croatia and then Bosnia.”21 Once more the conflict in BiH was 
deeply affecting Euro-Atlantic relations. 
On 22 June 1993, in an effort to heal another rift caused by the Bosnian War, 
Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl discussed the Bosnian War over breakfast in Copenhagen 
before a European Council meeting. Kohl’s Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel had been 
surprised by the ICFY co-Presidents’ readiness to change the VOPP but Chancellor Kohl 
was more accommodating and realised that circumstances necessitated greater flexibility. 
As Sabrina Ramet and Letty Coffin note, Germany was still eager to be a “team player” 
and gave its support for a new plan, albeit whilst “gritting its teeth.”22 However, Kohl was 
adamant that the result of adaptations could not be the creation of a new Palestine and to 
this end Germany used its political influence to pressure Tuđman into cooperation on 
BiH.23 The Germans rightly reflected that any acceptance of ethnic partition of BiH was a 
validation of ethnic cleansing and they were therefore the last nation to abandon the VOPP. 
A decision was due to be taken later in the day on the question of lifting the arms 
embargo or providing armed protection to the ‘safe zones’. France had seized the UNSC 
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on 14 June in an effort to quickly implement UNSCR 836 that had created the ‘safe zones’ 
and had made clear that lifting the arms embargo would raise the possibility of French 
withdrawal from UNPROFOR.24 The French president postulated that,  
 
Whatever the decision taken today… it will not be possible to maintain the two 
types of presence: this would succeed in giving a new impetus to the war on 
the ground, that is to stay the lifting of the arms embargo and the one to defend 
the safe areas though it may lead to potential fights to protect them. I recognise, 
it is evident, that humanitarianism does not answer the question on the political 
level. It has served as some cover for the Serbian and Croatian aggressors. But 
we took the decision to have troops on the ground. Must we now withdraw 
them? Withdrawal would be the logical consequence of a decision such as 
lifting the arms embargo or fighting in the safe areas. This would amount to 
changing the nature of the presence of foreign troops in Bosnia.25  
 
Kohl remained sceptical and thought that the least that those assembled could do 
was to suggest that the arms embargo could eventually be lifted. Édouard Balladur, who 
had accompanied Mitterrand, shared the President’s analysis and repeated that it was 
necessary to choose between the two “mutually exclusive options”: lifting the embargo or 
protecting the safe areas. Balladur added that, if the arms embargo were lifted it would no 
longer be possible to protect the safe areas. Kohl remained obstinate, replying that, “it 
cannot hurt to say that we are leaving this option open. Otherwise it gives the Bosnians the 
impression that they do not have a chance to one day see the embargo lifted.”26 The French 
President shared his feelings on the potential outcome of lifting the arms embargo: 
 
My intuition, but I can clearly be wrong, is that the reality will impose itself on 
our diplomatic theory. Even before the first anti-tank weapons are delivered or 
parachuted in to Sarajevo or Goražde, the war will end with extinction and we 
will move to the stage of guerrilla warfare.27  
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The conversation moved to the subject of the ‘safe zones’. Mitterrand pondered: 
“are we determined to defend the security zones? In fact, this plan goes against my feeling, 
because we this enter into the war, but I bow to political necessity.”28 Kohl reflected that 
his French counterpart was right to believe that war would resolve nothing and that it 
would take hundreds of thousands of men. Nonetheless protecting the safe areas appeared 
to be the most sensible option for Mitterrand; it did not require many more troops and the 
Serbs would not attack UN troops.  The President reflected that the reputation of the UN 
was at stake: “a people, guaranteed by the United Nations, is in danger of death. We would 
do worse than our predecessors who abandoned their Czech protégés.”29 Kohl posed the 
reasonable question: “What would happen if the zones are not defended?”30 Mitterrand 
thought that it would discredit the UN, whilst Balladur highlighted that only a lack of will 
would lead to that, whilst lifting the arms embargo could lead to nothing else, highlighting 
that “we would wash our hands of this business.”31 Both Germany and France prioritised 
“multilateralism in international crisis management” and, thus, had to protect the UN’s 
reputation.32 
Mitterrand postulated that the Serbs had nearly achieved their aims and that the 
international community must settle for this and focus on creating a suitable territory for 
the three “elements” in BiH. He believed that “it would force the Serbs and Croats to fit 
into a state of Bosnia, whilst giving them rights they do not currently possess.”33 The 
President was again placing himself firmly behind the international mediation efforts, 
which he saw as a far more preferable solution to the creation of a Greater Serbia or 
Croatia. In this respect, Mitterrand thought that the autonomy of the Bosnian Serbs and 





32 For an overview of German Foreign Policy towards the Yugoslav successor states see: Ramet, Sabrina P., 
and Letty Coffin. “German Foreign Policy Toward the Yugoslav Successor States”, 48-64. 
33 Petit dejeuner Kohl/Mitterrand à Copenhague, 22 June 1993, AN, AG/5(4)/10879. 
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Croats was an important issue as they would be unwilling to relinquish the power they had 
acquired to either Belgrade or Zagreb. Thus isolating Pale and Mostar and increasing 
diplomatic pressure on Belgrade and Zagreb could provide a new impetus to the 
international peace efforts. 
At the summit, the European Council agreed to support the UN in the rapid 
implementation of the ‘safe zones’. Sources close to Mitterrand leaked the fact that, if the 
international community refused to provide military means to protect the ‘safe zones’, then 
the President would be prepared to partially lift the arms embargo in favour of the Bosnian 
government.34 The President was putting his allies on guard in case they decided to 
abdicate their responsibilities. Mitterrand was frustrated with France’s partners, which was 
evident in a cabinet meeting the following day:  
 
We are committed to a ‘safe zones’ policy. Each country must make a 
commitment to participate in their defence without making excuses not to do 
so. Germany says that it cannot send troops and is arguing to lift the embargo, 
supported by Turkey and Izetbegović. It must be seen as a desperate solution 
that will create a widespread guerrilla war in the Balkans. It is an incredible 
injustice to see France calling this into question whereas others do nothing.35 
 
As negotiations continued in Geneva, and Owen and Stoltenberg began 
approaching a reasonable settlement that Izetbegović could present to the Bosniak 
population, fighting intensified on the ground as the Bosnian Serbs tried to protect the lines 
that they envisaged in the “Union of Three Republics” plan. Conversely, the Bosnian 
government had an interest in destabilising the lines that their public would not accept as a 
peace settlement. In this context, NATO was pressing the UN Secretary General to allow 
for a wide-reaching mandate to use aerial force. France remained concerned about the role 
envisaged for NATO in the chain of command in defence of the ‘safe zones’. Mitterrand 
was greatly concerned that NATO would monopolise the use of force and undermine his 
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approach through the UN. In such an event, France could be bypassed in the chain of 
command and would be unable to make decisions on the use of aerial force that could have 
direct implications for French peacekeepers. Bill Clinton understood the French 
President’s attachment to the UN as a means to convey French influence and to direct 
policy. Therefore on 25 July the US proposed a tripartite mechanism for authorising air 
strikes between France, the US and the UK. Mitterrand called it a “preposterous idea” and 
believed that it was no substitute for the UN.36 
The issue was becoming more salient as the Bosnian Serbs had reinstalled heavy 
artillery on Mount Igman overlooking Sarajevo in an attempt to carve out the largest 
territorial coverage possible ahead of a peace agreement (see map 8). The US was keen to 
use NATO force to bring about a Bosnian Serb withdrawal. François Léotard flew to 
Washington for a meeting with his US counterpart Les Aspin to share French concerns on 
the implications for its troops on the ground. On his return Léotard confided to Mitterrand 
that, “The Americans accuse us of having a theological approach to this issue of the chain 
of command with our incessant references to UN resolutions.”37 The President was 
reflective:  
 
It’s curious, in a very religious country where each meal starts with a prayer 
that one would use the word ‘theological’ in a meaningless way. The 
American authorities need a foreign policy success. I’ve already seen that. We 
must remain on guard. It’s in the interest of our country for us to oppose the 
will of NATO to monopolise everything.38  
 
 Mitterrand’s fears were allayed following a North Atlantic Council Meeting on 2 
August 1993. Whilst the US had pushed for the use of military force, Canada held some 
fundamental questions about the implications for the peacekeeping operations on the 
ground. The NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, issued a statement following a 
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full-day of negotiations outlining NATO’s terms for intervention, which required wide 
consultation with the UN and UNPROFOR.39 The chain of command had been greatly 
diluted and any recourse to force would be a slow process. 
 However, the Bosnian Serb forces on Mount Igman were proving to be a block on 
the negotiations in Geneva. Although Owen encouraged Milošević to pressure Karadžić 
and Mladić, the Bosnian Serb leadership had become over-confident in their own power 
but also regarding the international community’s threat to use force. The US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were keen to use NATO airpower to ‘sober up’ the Bosnian Serbs, which led to 
open disagreements between NATO and the UN. However, Juppé declared that NATO’s 
decision was “an important step towards military action” that France agreed with.40 The 
French Foreign Minister spoke with Warren Christopher on the issue and the Quai 
confirmed that the US and France “shared the same analysis and the same determination” 
to force the Bosnian Serb withdrawal, deeming it necessary for the continuation of the 
Geneva negotiations.41 
However, Karadžić made a high-risk calculation that NATO countries would be 
unprepared to see reprisals against UNPROFOR peacekeepers in the event of air strikes 
against the Bosnian Serbs; he was right. Karadžić warned that air strikes threatened the 
continuation of peace negotiations and cautioned that he could not be held accountable for 
the actions of the VRS forces on the ground if NATO launched strikes. The Bosnian Serb 
leader warned: “If a single bomb hits a Serb position there will be no more talks. We 
would have an all-out war and catastrophe.”42 The international community backed down 
and the negotiations in Geneva continued. 
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 By 20 August, the three parties had agreed in principle to a new plan for the Union 
and David Owen distributed drafts of the Plan to the EC. The ‘Union Plan’ included: a 
constitutional agreement that included human rights courts; a draft agreement guaranteeing 
the Bosniaks access to the Adriatic; and an agreement to peacefully implement the 
settlement.43 On 24 August, Milošević wrote to Mitterrand regarding the recently 
concluded Geneva negotiations. Milošević felt that Serbia had made the greatest sacrifice 
during the negotiations and therefore appealed to Mitterrand “to kindly employ the 
influence of your country to the effect that the package of solutions be accepted, and to 
create such conditions where – in the implementation stage – all the three parties would 
carry out all its provisions, conscientiously and with a sense of responsibility.”44  
Meanwhile, Alain Juppé and Klaus Kinkel sought to bring pressure to bear on 
Franjo Tuđman in support of the Geneva negotiations at the end of August. The fighting in 
Mostar, between Bosnian Croats and government forces, had continued and prevented the 
delivery of humanitarian aid to the town. Initially, Juppé and Kinkel focussed on ensuring 
the delivery of aid to Mostar appealing to Tuđman for “moderation and restraint in the fate 
of Mostar and at the very least to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid.”45 This joint 
initiative helped to heal differences that France and Germany had expressed over BiH and 
the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade. In a PR coup Kinkel and Juppé secured 
Franjo Tuđman’s agreement to “promise to close the camps near Mostar, where 10,000 
civilians are detained, or at least to allow the Red Cross to inspect them.”46  
 Whilst the negotiations stalled in Geneva, Juppé and Kinkel continued their work in 
support of the ‘Union Plan’. The two Foreign Ministers announced publicly that they were 
preparing an initiative “to see how we can act with Mr. Izetbegović in a way that means the 
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agreement can be concluded as quickly as possible.”47 The provisional map of BiH at that 
stage left the Muslim republic completely landlocked, which represented a major 
stumbling block for the Bosnian government. France and Germany therefore announced 
that they would send a mission of experts to the coastal town of Neum to study the 
feasibility of establishing a commercial port there. Kinkel announced that, “This 
contribution is conceived as a concrete support for the Geneva negotiations.”48 The 
Franco-German report reached the co-Chairmen, Owen and Stoltenberg, as they prepared 
to host the final round of negotiations on the ‘Union Plan’ aboard the Royal Navy’s HMS 
Invincible. The report noted that Neum was not a feasible commercial port and instead 
recommended the town of Ploče as a more viable alternative.  
During the negotiations aboard the Invincible Tuđman agreed to grant the Bosniaks 
access to the sea via Ploče. Under the agreement, Sarajevo would be administered by the 
UN and Mostar by the EC. The three parties came to a tentative agreement, with 
Izetbegović deferring the decision to a Bosnian Assembly vote on 27 September. Although 
the Bosnian Croat and Serb Assemblies agreed to the plan, the Bosnian Assembly rejected 
the plan, primarily because the military leaders wanted to continue to fight to regain lost 
territory, particularly against the Croats.49 
 
The ‘Kinkel-Juppé Plan’ 
Although the ‘Union Plan’ had failed, Europe had now fully reconciled itself to support the 
principles of the Plan, including the more problematic aspects that legitimised ethnic 
cleansing. Furthermore, in a meeting of the FAC, Owen had reintroduced a ‘globalization 
concept’ noting that the crisis in BiH would only be solved through a global solution for 
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the former Yugoslavia.50 On the issue of BiH, Milošević had been able to persuade 
Karadžić to return to negotiations on the basis of the ‘Union Plan’ but he was reluctant to 
see any further international interference in the internal affairs of Serbia. 
However the US had continued to push for a partial lifting of the arms embargo in 
favour of the Bosnian government following the failure of the Plan. Bill Clinton was 
frustrated by British and French resistance to lifting the embargo, which led to a 
particularly public and testy Euro-Atlantic exchange of words. Warren Christopher sniped 
that “Western Europe is no longer the dominant area in the world.”51 The Quai retorted that 
its stated position was “to prioritise a negotiated settlement between the parties, which is 
incompatible with lifting the arms embargo on the sale of arms, and at the same to call on a 
ground and air military presence to protect the most threatened zones.”52 The French 
Foreign Ministry also recalled that the US had signed up to the JAP in May, which its 
current proposals bulldozed.53 
Mitterrand and Juppé remained greatly troubled by the humanitarian plight of 
Sarajevo and the US accusations. Juppé announced that the Quai had approached the 
Belgian Presidency of the EC to study methods of financing humanitarian aid for BiH 
whilst stressing that the delivery had become increasingly difficult. With a second winter 
under siege fast approaching in the Bosnian capital, France thus launched an initiative to 
reopen the humanitarian route between Split and Sarajevo. Indeed, revelations regarding 
massacres of Bosniaks by their former Bosnian Croat neighbours in Stupni Do had 
revealed that the situation on the ground was far from improving.54 That they could be 
traced back to the highest echelons in Zagreb particularly disturbed the international 
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community. In a cabinet meeting on 27 October discussing this issue Alain Juppé declared 
that he felt as though he were “preaching in the desert”, on the humanitarian situation in 
BiH.55 The usually cautious Balladur was also frustrated: “We have gone from failure to 
failure for the past two years, this time we must achieve our goal of forcing open the road 
blocks.”56 
During a European Council meeting in Brussels two days later, Mitterrand warned 
of a “risk of a serious European conflict at the start of the next century” that would be 
precipitated by ethnic divisions.57 The President also highlighted that the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Sarajevo had once more become problematic and warned his European 
partners that “we must be conscience and be vigilant of military aspects.”58 Ahead of the 
Council meeting Mitterrand and Kohl had written a joint letter calling on the Community 
to “reinforce the humanitarian aid for the victims of war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and to 
assure the delivery of aid to affected zones and towns.”59 The following day the European 
Council issued a declaration that called for the “use of all appropriate means to support the 
convoying of humanitarian aid [emphasis added]”, which Canada and the US questioned 
during a North Atlantic Council meeting on 3 November.60 
The following day Milošević indicated Serbia’s terms for a new round of 
negotiations: “equal respect for the rights of the participants”; and “non-interference in 
internal Serbian matters.”61 Milošević was concerned that Kosovo, the Sandžak and 
Vojvodina might be integrated into the latest round of negotiations given Owen’s previous 
recommendations to enlarge the scope of any new peace plan. Furthermore, Milošević 
called for a relaxation of sanctions against Serbia, stating that a new conference “would not 
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be acceptable if the Serb party remains under an embargo, whilst the Croatian party is 
privileged.”62 Croatian actions in Stupni Do lent legitimacy to Milošević’s appeal. 
However, the Bosnian Croats were suffering setbacks in their conflict with Bosniaks, 
losing the town of Vareš, with Tuđman making desperate appeals to Izetbegović to stop the 
offensive.63 
 On 5 November, David Owen sent a COREU (CORrespondance EUropéenne) 
telegram to European Foreign Ministers outlining points for forthcoming discussions. 
Entitled ‘Joint Action on the Former Yugoslavia’, it outlined the ICFY co-President’s 
priorities for a Bosnian Settlement. It noted that the HMS Invincible package could still be 
modified to accommodate Izetbegović’s previous demands. However, Owen rightly noted 
that “By spring those maps will be as dead as the previous negotiations.”64 In its approach, 
‘Joint Action on the Former Yugoslavia’ chimed with France’s approach to solving the 
conflict. Owen recommended that the European Foreign Ministers consider how “to use 
sanctions as a lever for peace” whilst noting that an “urgent settlement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is the only hope of avoiding the deaths of thousands, if not hundreds of 
thousands of people, the majority of whom are likely to come from the Muslim 
community.”65 Realistically, Owen added that, “In the absence of a political settlement the 
best that can be hoped for is to alleviate suffering where possible, without exposing 
humanitarian personnel to excessive danger.”66 
 Following Owen’s recommendations Juppé and Kinkel wrote a joint letter to the 
President of the FAC, Willy Claes. The two Foreign Ministers proposed a ‘twin-track 
approach’ citing the approach of winter for the Bosnian population and an increasing risk 
of renewed war in UNPAs in Croatia. The letter emphasised three priorities: “Securing 
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humanitarian assistance for Bosnia; arriving at a solution for Bosnian based on the Geneva 
package; and establishing a modus vivendi for the areas of Croatia under UNPROFOR 
mandate in order, as an interim step, to prevent the danger of war there.”67  
The ‘Kinkel-Juppé Plan’ (see map 9) made specific recommendations on 
humanitarian operations, including: increasing financial resources for humanitarian aid and 
an active encouragement for Islamic states to contribute; the establishment of humanitarian 
corridors from the Dalmatian coast to Sarajevo and the reopening of Tuzla airport; and the 
readiness of EC members to provide troop contributions and logistical supports for these 
endeavours.68 The letter also declared support for the ‘Union Plan’ adding that 
implementation would be key to securing a deal. The Foreign Ministers indicated that 
Milošević appeared willing to negotiate and would demonstrate territorial flexibility on the 
map of BiH if the lifting of sanctions could be tied step-by-step to the Bosnian Serbs 
meeting their obligations under the agreements. This would be time-sensitive too, adding 
that “the sooner the Serbian side meets its obligations under the agreements to be 
concluded, the quicker things will move.”69  
The Plan was also the first to place conditions on the Bosnian government stating 
that: “If the Muslims’ current territorial demands are met and they still remain unwilling to 
sign the peace package, it will have to be made clear to the leaders in Sarajevo that military 
options do not have the slightest chance of success and they would thereby risk losing the 
support of the international community.”70 Once these agreements had been reached, and a 
modus vivendi established in Croatia, the Foreign Ministers proposed a conference, dubbed 
‘London II’ where, with the pressure and support of the EC, they hoped a deal could be 
achieved on those two issues. There would then be a ‘London III’ once all issues had been 
                                                     





settled that would then allow for human rights issues in Kosovo, the Sandžak and 
Vojvodina to be regulated by an international monitor presence.71 
 The plan was intended to give David Owen renewed vigour and prestige ahead of 
any further negotiations and the ICFY co-President certainly welcomed the Franco-
German initiative, reflecting that, “It was a development I both wanted and needed.”72 In 
its efforts ICFY had often lacked the direct intervention and interest of the government’s 
on whose behalf it had been convened. The Kinkel-Juppé Plan tied Germany and France to 
the peace process but was also intended to demonstrate the viability of a European CFSP. 
However, the plan remained resolutely realistic declaring that it “must also try to win the 
support and participation of the United States of America and Russia”.73 The plan came 
fully-loaded with carrots and sticks for all three parties, which was particularly salient 
given the ferocious fighting between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks. 
The first priority for the EU was securing an agreement from the three parties in 
BiH. With a WEU Council meeting scheduled for 22 November, it was agreed that the 
Council of Foreign Ministers would hold an extraordinary session to discuss the Franco-
German initiative. Britain supported the plan, albeit somewhat envious of the reinvigorated 
Franco-German alliance.74 However, the US was extremely sceptical, remaining reluctant 
to see sanctions lifted against Serbia.  
As France, Germany and Britain worked closely alongside the ICFY to add flesh to 
the bones of the new peace plan, Mitterrand wrote to Milošević to express his 
disappointment that the ‘Union Plan’ peace talks had failed, whilst recognising the 
contribution made by the Serbs. However, Mitterrand was aware that humanitarian 
convoys were still struggling to reach Sarajevo. He wrote to Milošević stressing that it 
appeared inconceivable to him that genocide would occur in Sarajevo and other besieged 
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towns without a sudden catalyst; he hoped the Serbs would not provide one.75 In this 
respect, the French President noted that it depended on all those involved in the 
negotiations and Serbia in particular. “The moment has come,” declared Mitterrand “to 
escape the current language and conformism.”76 The French President was personally 
appealing to his Serbian counterpart to support the Franco-German initiative as he declared 
that, “I would like to see Europeans such as you, us and those who want to associate with 
it, finally put an end to this tragic and dishonourable story. I hope that you will help with 
the success of a policy that will bring military and civil peace to these towns.” 77 
At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on 22 November the EU 
demonstrated a unity of purpose in its order of business and remained optimistic that, 
without US intervention, a peace deal might be secured. Although the US expressed 
scepticism regarding lifting sanctions against Serbia, they remained distant from the EU 
initiative. Indeed, as the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve invited the three parties to 
Geneva on 29 November, the US, alongside Russia, was only invited in an observer 
capacity. 
The EU set out its detailed position in an open session with all three parties before 
entering into bilateral negotiations with each party. The leaders of the three communities 
also outlined their conditions. Izetbegović accused the EU of a “complicity of crime”, 
called for the end of the arms embargo and made territorial claims on the port of Neum. 
Tuđman was unwilling to cede Neum, and noted that French and German experts had 
already declared that Neum was not a viable commercial port. Milošević criticised 
previous EU measures but indicated that, “he wanted to look at the EU’s latest proposals in 
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a positive light” and thought that “All three sides should sign the peace settlement and 
begin implementation immediately.”78  
In the bilateral meetings, the EU Foreign Ministers divided their labour 
intelligently: Kinkel intervened mostly before the Croats and Juppé before the Serbs. Juppé 
highlighted that the EU desired to conclude the settlement before Christmas and that 
sanctions could then be incrementally lifted depending on Serb territorial concessions and 
implementation.79 The Foreign Ministers’ interventions in Geneva had once more added 
momentum to the negotiations, which the co-Presidents continued through until 2 
December in an effort to create a map for a Muslim majority republic that covered a third 
of the territory of BiH. 
David Owen sent a COREU to the EU Foreign Ministers to report the outcome of 
the Geneva negotiations. Sarajevo was central to the negotiations, with a partition of the 
capital city under UN supervision appearing possible.80 Mostar would be split down the 
middle by its natural demarcation, the Neretva River, foregoing the need for EU 
supervision. David Owen reflected that, “Following the destruction of the [stari most] 
bridge and bitterness engendered over the last few months, it is a task we [the EU] could 
well do without.”81 Finally, the issue of implementation was crucial to reaching an 
agreement with the Bosnian government pressing for a NATO ground force, with the HMS 
Invincible negotiations having fallen down owing to the Bosnian government’s concerns 
over implementation.82 Owen urged the EU to reach security guarantees ahead of the next 
series of negotiations between the three parties slated for 12 December, which was 
rescheduled for 21 December. 
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As fighting eased on the ground, bilateral meetings continued between the ICFY 
and the three parties. The European Union were eager that the Bosniaks be given 33.3% of 
the territory of BiH and were threatening to reinforce sanctions against the Serbs if they 
remained antagonistic.83 Notwithstanding, the Bosnian Serbs were resistant to these 
changes. Alain Juppé thought that “The Serbs bear the primary responsibility for the 
impasse”.84 In spite of these difficulties, David Owen reported to the European Council on 
10 December that the Kinkel-Juppé Plan remained on course.85 However, if the 
negotiations failed, the Quai revealed that it would consider withdrawing its 6,000 
peacekeepers stationed across Yugoslavia the following spring.86 
With negotiations scheduled for 21 December, the EU sent a series of requests to 
the three parties, which included two ill-judged statements: the first calling on the Serbs to 
renounce the partition of Sarajevo; the second on the Croats to renounce the partition of 
Mostar. Following negotiations between the three parties with the Co-Chairmen, the EU 
ministers held a series of meetings with the parties the following day, in the same format as 
at the end of November. Although Tuđman and Milošević had been brought in to the 
negotiations, the parties had failed to reach an agreement the previous day, with the 
Bosnian Serbs unwilling to allow a link between the enclaves in the east and Sarajevo, and 
the Croats were equivocal about providing the Bosnian Muslims with access to the sea.87 
The Bosnian Muslims were prepared to consider the partition of both Mostar and Sarajevo 
provided they received concessions from the Bosnian Serbs in the east, and they still 
desired sea access at Neum. The talks were in a delicate state ahead of the EU Foreign 
Ministers’ mediation. 
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These negotiations and the distance between the three parties had left Alain Juppé 
decidedly, and publicly, pessimistic ahead of the EU Foreign Ministers’ intervention on 22 
December, judging that the chances of a success remained as small as they had before.88 
Nonetheless, the EU Foreign Ministers set about employing their influence to secure 
agreement from the three parties. The EU position was: 33.5% of the territory for the 
Bosnian Muslims; 17.5% for the Bosnian Croats; and temporary UN administration of 
Sarajevo. Karadžić rejected the final point, which caused Alain Juppé to launch into the 
Bosnian Serb leader viciously. Juppé also demanded the reopening of Tuzla airport, which 
Karadžić declared he would only do after a peace agreement had been signed. The French 
Foreign Minister “said he was outraged by Karadžić’s remarks.”89 
Co-Presidents Owen and Stoltenberg were left to pick up the pieces after a heated 
final session, with a further meeting agreed for 15 January. The EU had only succeeded in 
securing a ceasefire for Christmas.90 However, the fighting in BiH continued unabated with 
complete disregard for the supposed ceasefire.91 The Bosnian government forces in 
particular had relaunched an offensive with arms deliveries being supported by the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Arab and Iranian countries. The ‘Kinkel-Juppé Plan’ 
had suffered a setback and France was experiencing diplomatic fatigue. Mitterrand’s New 
Year’s Eve speech reflected a change in attitude. Rather than the activist message of a year 
previous, the President reflected that “1993 will leave us with images of blood and death 
with Sarajevo as a symbol of a martyred population.”92  
In a cabinet meeting on 5 January Alain Juppé despaired that, “None of the parties 
want peace, all of them are preparing for war, in particular the Muslim army in central 
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Bosnia, and UNPROFOR is under attack.”93 The Foreign Minister believed that it was 
necessary to “re-establish the credibility of the international community” and suggested 
that France use the upcoming NATO summit to obtain formal US support for the 
implementation of a negotiated settlement.94 The following day, Juppé, with Mitterrand’s 
blessing, addressed a letter to the 15 other members of NATO and Boutros-Ghali, in clear 
terms: “The action of UNPROFOR is paralysed. This situation cannot continue. We must 
reinforce its methods and reaffirm our readiness to use air strikes that would be needed.”95 
However, Boutros-Ghali remained sceptical regarding the use of force and required 
convincing, with the Secretary General holding extensive talks on the subject in Paris on 8 
January. 
Juppé repeated his exasperated message to David Owen during a meeting on 7 
January 1994. The French Foreign Minister threatened the withdrawal of French 
peacekeepers if the Kinkel-Juppé Plan failed, sensing that public opinion was changing on 
the conflict in BiH. However, there was a difference of opinion on withdrawal between the 
key decision makers on French foreign policy: Mitterrand wanted to stay; Léotard 
vacillated on his position; and Balladur and Juppé wanted to withdraw.96 Thus, for the 
Quai, it was essential to secure agreement on the Kinkel-Juppé Plan. With a NATO summit 
scheduled in Brussels for 8 January, the Foreign Minister urged Owen to ensure UK 
support for “bringing the US on board… including a specific commitment to the EU 
Action Plan.”97 Furthermore, Juppé set a proposition that the EU “give Izetbegović another 
month before signing a peace settlement otherwise we [the EU] announce our intention to 
withdraw in April”.98 Juppé therefore advocated a trilateral effort to convince Izetbegović 
to resume negotiations on the plan, which succeeded. 
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Talks began on 9 January in St. Petersburg, although they made no real progress: 
Izetbegović was antagonistic towards Tuđman given that the ARBiH was making progress 
in Central Bosnia. Simultaneously, at the NATO summit in Brussels François Mitterrand 
called on the Organisation’s members to strengthen its engagements in BiH, particularly in 
regards to the protection of peacekeepers.99 Clinton concurred, in spite of reluctance within 
his administration, and declared that NATO should be “ready to act” if the situation in 
Sarajevo and the ‘safe zones’ continued to deteriorate.100 France was willing to encourage 
NATO in order to secure the Kinkel-Juppé Plan as France had been central to its inception 
and it could therefore be a vehicle for French prestige.  
The reopening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian deliveries was a further pertinent 
matter. The north-eastern town attempted to remain free of nationalist politics throughout 
the war and accordingly was the antithesis of the Bosnian Serb political project and its aim 
to create ethnically homogeneous zones.101 As such it stood as a direct challenge and 
obstacle to Bosnian Serb war aims, both territorially and ideologically.  
 Negotiations between the three parties continued on 18 and 19 January, but there 
was no progress on key issues.102 Meanwhile, France continued to pressure the US into a 
greater military commitment towards implementing a peace settlement for BiH. Warren 
Christopher travelled to Paris for talks with Alain Juppé on 24 January, wherein the French 
delegation argued that the international community must carefully coordinate their 
diplomatic efforts: the US should pressure the Bosniaks; the Germans the Croatians; and 
Russia and France the Serbs. However, Christopher was clear that Washington was 
unwilling to pressure the Bosnian government to accept the Kinkel-Juppé Plan.103 The 
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meeting soured relations between Washington and Paris as the State Department declared 
that Juppé had “a strange moral calculus”, adding that “it is hard to understand his 
logic”.104 The Quai retorted: “if we are talking on a moral level the choice today is between 
merely watching the fighting or doing everything possible to stop it.”105 Washington and 
Paris were further apart than they had been when the VOPP had collapsed. Following the 
meeting, Hubert Védrine reported to Mitterrand that: 
 
In reality, I worry that the United States do not yet have a vision for the future 
or an idea how to bring these unfortunate people to coexist peacefully in the 
future and reconstruct their countries. They encourage the ‘Bosniaks’ to fight 
to the last Bosniak because it is a way to fight ‘communist and fascist’ Serbia. 
After the relentlessness of the political and military leaders of the three parties 
in conflict, the American attitude is without doubt the second cause of the 
continuation of the war.106   
 
This transatlantic disparity came at exactly the time that Juppé was seeking a 
greater concertation of international diplomacy. On 25 January Mitterrand and Balladur 
sought to reunite the international community in a common approach and jointly called on 
“the international community to take its responsibilities by following a coherent policy and 
closely coordinating its efforts.”107 The President and the Prime Minister reiterated the 
need “to put in place, by using force if necessary, the decision taken in Brussels [the 
NATO summit] to assure the relief of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and the opening of the 
Tuzla airport.”108 The declaration reflected Juppé’s frustration with the three parties in the 
conflict. The appeal noted that the parties “do not appear, neither one nor the others, ready 
to conclude a peace” and France believed that it was essential to call “on all belligerents to 
make the necessary concessions.”109  
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Russia responded by calling a ‘special session’ of the UNSC Foreign Ministers.110 
The Russians proposed that the UNSC adopt the EU Action Plan, call for a ceasefire and 
the end of blockades against humanitarian aid. The Quai was pessimistic about the 
outcome of such a meeting highlighting that the US would likely be unfavourable and that 
such a meeting sidelined many troop-contributing countries.111 Immediately Izetbegović 
rejected the Russian proposal declaring that, “We will not accept any imposed solution.”112 
The US reinforced its line that it would not impose a solution with Madeleine Albright 
declaring that there would be “no meeting, no pressures, no conference, no resolution.”113 
Rather the US excluded such a move “now more than ever” believing that it would require 
military implementation that the Americans continued to categorically refuse.114 
Furthermore, the US Senate overwhelmingly voted in favour of a measure that urged Bill 
Clinton to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government.115  
With the three parties determined to continue fighting, and rumours abounding that 
Madeleine Albright sought to secure 40% of the territory for the Bosnian government, the 
EU Action plan fizzled out on 2 February during an ICFY Steering Committee meeting.116 
This was compounded by Helmut Kohl during a trip to Washington, where he declared that 
“Germany will not participate in any undertaking where the Muslim party will be subjected 
to an unjustified pressure.”117 With its key European partner having abandoned a plan that 
it had jointly conceived, and the US once more bulldozing a peace plan, France had to 
accept the demise of the EU Action Plan. 
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A Massacre in a Marketplace  
On 5 February 1994 Izetbegović wrote to François Mitterrand detailing events from the 
early afternoon in the Bosnian capital: “Sixty six civilians have been killed and one 
hundred ninety seven wounded, at the Sarajevo marketplace today… Since the beginning 
of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina more than 200,000 people have been 
killed, 16,000 children among them.” 118 Mere hours after the shelling of the Markale 
Marketplace in Sarajevo, Izetbegović implored Mitterrand to use his influence “in order 
that the international community either fulfils its obligations towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or to lift the arms embargo to allow us to defend ourselves. Any other 
solution is equal to being an accomplice to this crime.”119 
 Initially there were issues in verifying the origins of the shell that caused the 
carnage in the capital. UN investigators concluded that the 120mm mortar had been fired 
from the northeast of the market. Although the evidence was inconclusive, it appeared 
beyond reasonable doubt that the shell had been fired from a Bosnian Serb position.120  
 Juppé immediately launched a diplomatic initiative to bring about the immediate 
lifting of the siege of Sarajevo. The massacre provoked great shock and horror in the 
international community, which produced the galvanising effect that Juppé had previously 
hoped for in support of the EU Action Plan. In the night following the attack, the Quai 
published a communiqué that called for “the immediate lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, 
the rounding up of heavy weapons held by all the parties and their supervision by the 
UN.”121 France hoped “that the methods to implement this action, including the recourse 
to aerial force, will be defined in the shortest time possible by the United Nations in 
cooperation with NATO.”122 Juppé noted that there was a consensus that the NAC need to 
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meet as soon as possible, and that France would demand an ultimatum be put before the 
belligerents.123 
 On 6 February the FAC met in Brussels to discuss the use of aerial force to break 
the siege of Sarajevo with the Belgian Foreign Minister calling on Boutros-Ghali to order 
selective air strikes against Serb heavy weapons around Sarajevo.124 At the meeting, 
David Owen also urged the EU to continue its support of the Action Plan, and to try for a 
‘Sarajevo first’ approach. Immediately following the meeting, Juppé spoke directly with 
Owen and confirmed that he remained supportive of the EU Action Plan, but believed that 
the priority was to now lift the siege of Sarajevo. The Foreign Minister’s preference was 
for an ultimatum calling for the establishment of cordon sanitaire around Sarajevo, with 
the Bosnian Serbs withdrawing to a distance of 30 kilometres. Moreover, and with 
Balladur’s blessing, Juppé realised that this would imperil UNPROFOR personnel, a 
consequence he fully accepted.125  
 Juppé was keen to send a strong message on the day of the FAC meeting but, with 
David Owen eager to highlight some deficiencies in Juppé’s demands, his fellow Foreign 
Ministers were not as strident in their approach. The French Foreign Minister was visibly 
disappointed that the FAC did not agree to launch an ultimatum.126 Following the meeting 
the EU called for the immediate lifting of the siege of Sarajevo and declared itself ready 
to use aerial force following consultations with NATO on 9 February. 
 NATO was typically more forthcoming than the EU and Juppé’s approach paid 
dividends as the NAC issued the Bosnian Serbs with an ultimatum, giving them 10 days 
from 10 February to remove their heavy weapons to a distance of 20km from Sarajevo.127 
It also demanded an immediate ceasefire, which was almost immediately respected. 
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Furthermore, the NAC communiqué positioned NATO behind the EU Action Plan. 
Significantly, for the first time, a peace plan had secured Euro-Atlantic support. 
 Accordingly, Mitterrand ordered the casting off of the French aircraft carrier Foch 
and asked Balladur to authorise the participation of French air forces based in Italy.128 In 
Washington, Bill Clinton declared that “NATO is ready to act” warning the Bosnian Serbs 
that “Nobody should doubt the determination of NATO.”129 In Paris, Mitterrand 
telephoned Bill Clinton to congratulate the US President and the Quai “rejoiced at the 
strong and clear decision of NATO.”130 A communiqué from the Quai declared itself 
pleased with the support demonstrated by the US and added that, “France and its 
European and American partners must redouble their efforts in connection with Russia to 
promote an early conclusion of a peace agreement on the basis of the European Union 
Action Plan.”131 In this statement, the Quai alluded to one key outstanding issue: the role 
of Russia. 
 Russia was extremely hostile towards the NATO threat of force in BiH and, 
having denied a previous request, moved its peacekeepers then stationed in Croatia to 
Serb-held areas of Sarajevo on 16 February. The Russians presented this fait accompli the 
following morning and hoped to convince the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy 
weapons. Both Britain and France welcomed the Russian initiative, although the Quai was 
quick to qualify its praise declaring that it was important that “this initiative be translated 
into action and that all the conditions put forward by the NATO ultimatum are 
satisfied.”132 Indeed the French cabinet had renewed its determination to use force if 
necessary and Mitterrand believed that “if it is necessary to strike… we must do so 
massively. [s’il faut frapper… il faudra le faire massivement.]”133 Aware that the NATO 
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machine had whirred into life, with Clinton in favour of massive strikes, Yeltsin sent a 
circular letter to Western leaders warning against “unpredictable consequences” if air 
strikes materialised.134 Instead, the Russian President called for all air strikes to require 
the authorisation of the UN Secretary General, whilst expressing his desire for Russia to 
become a “partner” of the West in conflict management and added that, “our partnership 
is being put to the test in Sarajevo.”135 Yeltsin promised his Western ‘partners’ that he had 
put new pressure on Milošević and the Bosnian Serbs. 
 The outcome of this Russian diplomatic initiative was far from evident in the 
Élysée on the evening of 20 February with the ultimatum due to expire at midnight. 
Hubert Védrine reflected that, “the Élysée briefly regained the atmosphere of the Gulf 
War.”136 With maps laid out, Mitterrand called General Jean Cot, the head of 
UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia, to clarify the situation on the ground: the withdrawal was 
progressing on schedule.137 Consequently the President spoke to Clinton in Washington 
who confirmed that air strikes would not be necessary. The Russian initiative had 
succeeded and all artillery had been withdrawn from around Sarajevo. Mitterrand wrote to 
Yeltsin to express his feeling that France “greatly appreciates the new efforts that you 
have undertaken with M. Milošević and with the Bosnian Serbs… that demonstrate that 
the Russian diplomacy had been heard.”138  
 Mitterrand also publicly acknowledged the Russian effort in a special broadcast to 
the French public, declaring that “the retreat of the heavy arms has been obtained thanks 
to the determination of the allies [les alliés] and the moderating intervention of Russia 
with the Serbs.”139 Notwithstanding, Mitterrand reaffirmed France’s significant 
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contribution: “I must stress the role of France who, since the start, is at the origin of all 
initiatives aimed at solving the conflict and who is it that has provided the UN with the 
largest contingent of peacekeepers?”140 Yet, the President was not ready to rest on his 
laurels, and he envisaged using this new allied consensus to lift the sieges on other towns 
in Bosnia.141 Therefore France proposed, through the UNSC, to place Sarajevo under the 
control of the UN and to re-establish vital services there, with the same strategy for the 
other ‘safe zones’.142 However, both the US and Russia expressed doubts about the latest 
French initiative, particularly since the US was working towards its own diplomatic 
initiative.  
 
Making Contact   
Almost immediately, a greater US involvement brought about a significant change in the 
configuration of the parties in BiH. The UN Special Envoy, Charles Redman, and the US 
Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, negotiated an agreement to create a Croat-
Muslim Federation. In the Élysée Mitterrand had underestimated the potential of such an 
agreement and thought that “it would never work” believing that the grievances between 
the Croats and Muslims were too deep for them to successfully collaborate.143 The 
President reflected that: “this will be another agreement, similar to those that we’ve grown 
used to over the past two years.”144 Alain Juppé shared the President’s scepticism and 
thought that it presented a “mortal danger” for the Croats.145 However, the agreement 
solved many issues that had been intractable during negotiations: the Bosnian 
government’s access to the sea; access to weapons for the government forces; and a united 
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front to fight against the Bosnian Serbs.146 Furthermore, Bonn, Zagreb’s closest European 
ally, supported the agreement and offered economic incentives to Croatia to sign. 
Nonetheless, Alain Juppé warned that it was essential “to reintroduce a coherency to what 
appears today to be a sort of diplomatic proliferation.”147  
With the Croat-Muslim accord reached on 2 March, to be signed on 18 March, the 
French Ambassador to the US relayed to Paris that Washington believed the accord could 
lead to Bosnian Serb resurgence. This was particularly evident in the Bosniak enclaves that 
had previously been designated as UN ‘safe zones’, specifically because, with the Croat-
Muslim accord, they prohibited a contiguous Serb land mass. Bihać, where the largest 
contingent of French peacekeepers was based, was particularly vulnerable in this respect 
and, on 11 March, a French peacekeeper was killed after three days of bombardment.148 
French officers in the Bihać pocket requested air support via Yasushi Akashi, the Secretary 
General’s special representative in Bosnia.149 However, the long-winded process gave the 
perceived Bosnian Serb culprits time to retreat before authorisation could be given.150 
Ironically, France had been greatly in favour of such a long-winded authorisation 
mechanism when it curbed NATO’s enthusiasm. 
Immediately, Édouard Balladur strongly criticised the long delay and 
administrative process to order the use of force to protect the peacekeepers. Having 
traversed the frontlines to reach the town of Bihać to make an unscheduled visit to French 
peacekeepers stationed there, the Prime Minister bemoaned that “Again, it has taken more 
than an hour before the administrative procedures have reached their conclusion… And 
when they did, the tank had disappeared.”151 Having spoken to the officers in Bihać, 
                                                     
146 Gow. Lack of Will, 262-3. 
147 “Alain Juppé appelle à une concertation entre Russes, Américains et Européens”, AFP (2 March 1994). 
148 “France Bosnie ONU (Urgent)”, AFP (11 March 1994). 
149 Favier and Martin-Roland, La Décennie, 600-601. 
150 A preliminary UNPROFOR report revealed that the fire appeared to have originated from a Bosniak-held 
position. “Le soldat francais tué à Bihać vraisemblablement victime d'un tir musulman, selon la 
FORPRONU”, AFP (17 March 1994).  
151 “Le Premier ministre français critique la lenteur du processus de riposte”, AFP (13 March 1994). 
 279 
Balladur revealed that he was “Extremely shocked by the casualness and incompetence of 
M. Akashi” and wrote to Boutros-Ghali demanding a streamlined procedure for the use of 
force to protect UNPROFOR troops.152 Balladur revealed that, alongside Juppé and 
Léotard, France would examine ways to quicken the decision-making process.153 Juppé 
thought that the UN lacked the required resolve to use force in Bosnia and added that, “We 
must move more quickly and more determinedly.”154 Although the UN rejected the 
criticisms, a spokesman for Boutros-Ghali indicated that the UN would, nonetheless, 
examine its procedures.155 The UN Secretary General was, however, unwilling to pass the 
authorisation for the use of force to a military leader and rather it remained under civilian 
control.156 
Resultantly, the Bosnian Serb leadership, particularly Ratko Mladić, was becoming 
increasingly belligerent towards the international community, UNPROFOR and NATO. 
Mladić accused the French peacekeepers in Bihać of having “installed observation posts in 
front of the Muslims’ positions along the line of confrontation with Serb units, so the 
Muslims use their strong position to open fire.”157 The next Bosnian Serb challenge to 
UNPROFOR came in the eastern enclave of Goražde, which provided the international 
community with a galvanising event akin to that experienced following the Markale 
incident in February. 
In the first week of April the Bosnian Serb forces, under the command of Mladić, 
launched a renewed offensive against Goražde. The UNPROFOR forces in the eastern 
pocket were under the command of the British General Michael Rose. Initially Rose was 
reluctant to use force, but when it became evident that Mladić intended to conquer the 
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town, the British General called for air support at 18h55 on 10 April, having given 
significant warning to Mladić.158 This was the first air attack ever launched by NATO. The 
Quai confirmed its support for the measure and added that “France is ready to fulfil all its 
responsibilities.”159  
This did little to dissuade Mladić, as shelling resumed the following morning. Once 
more, Rose called on air support, which only further antagonised Mladić. The Bosnian 
Serbs broke off contact with UNPROFOR as David Owen spoke with the Bosnian Serb 
leaders Nikola Koljević and Momčilo Krajišnik in Paris. Krajišnik made it quite clear to 
Owen that the Bosnian Serbs would not stop their assault on Goražde until they had 
captured the town.160 As David Owen tried to leave Paris to fly to Zagreb, he encountered a 
large student demonstration outside the National Assembly that was demanding firmer 
action to protect Goražde.161 International indignation was rising over the Bosnian Serbs’ 
latest wave of attacks. 
An escalation by the international community, however, would be unlikely, 
particularly given the deterioration in relations between Russia and its ‘partners’. The 
Russian Foreign Minister warned that “It is a grave danger and a grave error to take such 
decisions without prior consultations with Russia.”162 Yeltsin repeated this message during 
a meeting of the UNSC on 11 April 1994. In a manoeuvre reminiscent of the Russian 
intervention in February, Yeltsin declared that Russian mediation would be indispensable 
in bringing peace to BiH, particularly since the Bosnian Serbs had broken off 
communications with UNPROFOR. Moreover, Mladić had effectively taken hostage of 
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UNPROFOR personnel stationed in Sarajevo by closing off access routes to the city.163 In 
Serb-held territory some 150 UNPROFOR personnel had been fully taken hostage.164 
As the Bosnian Serb assault on Goražde resumed with new ferocity on 15 April, the 
ICFY Co-Chairmen were considering how best to solve the present crisis and settled on a 
solution that would incorporate the US and Russia, alongside France, Britain and 
Germany: a ‘Contact Group’. With the US reluctant to work within the framework of the 
ICFY, a new administrative and coordination mechanism would need to be created. France 
enthusiastically supported the proposal and emphatically told Owen to act on his proposal, 
which would establish the Contact Group.165 
As the situation deteriorated in Goražde, Akashi rejected calls for air strikes in 
exchange for Bosnian Serb promises to stop the shelling, withdraw to 3km from the town, 
and release UNPROFOR personnel. Nonetheless, the Bosnian Serb assault on Goražde 
resumed on 16 April, which resulted in the evacuation of personnel from the international 
community, including UNPROFOR, and  Bosnian Serb forces occupied one half of the 
town. Izetbegović wrote to Mitterrand on 17 April 1994 regarding the situation in Goražde. 
To draw the French President’s attention to the plight of the population of Goražde, 
Izetbegović remarked that “the Serbian aggressor, among other things, has launched a 
missile against an aircraft belonging to Armed Forces of France.” 166 Izetbegović thus 
highlighted that Mitterrand could infer “how this ruthless and well-armed force is used 
against 70,000 Bosniaks, mainly women and children, in Goražde.”167 That same day 
Izetbegović wrote to Boutros-Ghali and told the Secretary General in no uncertain terms 
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that “my people hold you responsible for this situation” and demanded his resignation 
should Goražde fall.168  
The following day, Mitterrand wrote to Boris Yeltsin, Andréas Papandréou and 
Boutros-Ghali, as well as speaking to Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl. The French President 
sought to encourage the heads of state to create a new conference based on the principles 
of the EU Action Plan.169 Once again, discord had emerged amongst the parties that had 
tentatively called themselves ‘partners’ in February. Therefore, in support of the 
President’s personal intervention, Juppé publicly advocated the creation of “a common 
position to jointly exercise pressure that can relaunch the diplomatic process.”170 Similarly, 
at a meeting of the FAC, Juppé urged the EU to forge a common position with the US, 
Russia and the UN. Formally bringing Russia into the negotiations would provide a useful 
counterweight to US domination of the peace process. At the meeting, the EU called on the 
UNSC to vote on a resolution demanding a ceasefire in Goražde and the withdrawal of 
Bosnian Serb forces from the town.171 However, the Bosnian Serb forces were becoming 
increasingly confident in their manoeuvres and continued to highlight the futility of the 
diplomatic process at this point. 
On 19 April, Bosnian Serbs stormed the Lukavica barracks in Sarajevo and, from 
under the noses of the French peacekeepers, appropriated 18 anti-aircraft canons.172 These 
brash Bosnian Serb moves embarrassed the international community, particularly Russia 
who had hoped to once more play a mediating and conciliatory role. Boutros-Ghali wrote 
to the NATO Secretary General to authorise offensive air strikes to defend all six ‘safe 
zones’.173 However, with British personnel in Goražde, the British remained reluctant to 
authorise the use of air force, which created significant internal tensions with the US in 
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NATO.174 Rather, NATO and the UN called for the lifting of the siege of Goražde and 
issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs unless they fulfilled three conditions: an 
immediate ceasefire; the retreat of Bosnian Serb forces to 3km from Goražde by 23 April; 
and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry to a distance of 20km by 26 April.175 Initially, 
Yasushi Akashi announced that the withdrawal process was moving in the right 
direction.176 
The Quai viewed the ultimatum with “great prudence”, with a spokesman 
indicating that “we must wait to see if what has been announced translates into facts.”177 
Indeed, prudence was the best policy as it quickly became evident that the Bosnian Serbs 
had continued attacks against Goražde and Sarajevo with NATO requesting authorisation 
from Akashi to use air force.178 However, the UN Special Representative denied the 
request as he was in negotiations in Belgrade trying to secure a much-needed diplomatic 
victory for himself. He did achieve a victory, albeit a minor one, and secured an agreement 
from Karadžić to cease hostilities around Goražde and to allow the dispatch of 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers to Goražde.179 A Ukrainian deployment set out, shortly to be 
followed by a British and French contingent. However, the French contingent received 
orders from the French Defence Ministry shortly before they were due to depart for 
Goražde that they should return to their barracks.180 
Despite initial difficulties, the withdrawal process progressed on schedule as Alain 
Juppé, Warren Christopher and Douglas Hurd met in London to discuss the convocation of 
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the Contact Group.181 France, particularly since cohabitation, had been working towards 
such an initiative that brought US and Russian power to bear in the negotiation process. 
The Contact Group would meet frequently at the levels of Political Directors and 
Ambassadors. Its first meeting coincided with the conclusion of the NATO ultimatum, 
which, as it had in the case of Sarajevo, passed without recourse to force.182 Immediately, 
the Group visited Sarajevo to “explain their aims and emphasize the new international 
solidarity in the search for a solution”.183 
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Chapter Seven – France and the Conclusion of the Bosnian War, May 1994 - 
December 1995. 
 
The Contact Group Plan 
Following the Bosnian Serb withdrawal from the environs of Goražde, the frontlines 
reached a relative level of stability and fighting on the ground eased. This provided the 
international community with an opportunity to attempt to develop a coherent policy for 
BiH. The Contact Group constructed its own map for BiH, which envisaged a 51-49 & 
split of the country, with the larger half for the Croat-Muslim federation (see map 10). The 
plan roughly divided the territory along the lines that had previously been agreed during 
the HMS Invincible negotiations but without such contention between the Bosnian 
government and the Bosnian Croats. 
 The Contact Group had moved to quickly construct a plan and agreed that the 
initial stages needed to be completed within 10-14 days with the first ministerial meeting 
scheduled for 13 May 1994. Initial meetings with Izetbegović and Karadžić innovated 
little, whilst Karadžić rejected the 51-49 split entirely out of hand.1 
Although there was a general consensus amongst the Contact Group on its plan, the 
embargos and sanctions remained contentious issues. The US continued to push for lifting 
the arms embargo, with its Senate voting to raise the embargo unilaterally on 12 May.2 
Moreover, Juppé indicated that, if the Contact Group Plan were to fail, France would be 
willing to consider lifting the arms embargo, describing the pressure from the US as “very 
strong”.3 Ahead of a meeting of the Contact Group ministers in Geneva on 13 May, Juppé 
indicated that he had found in Washington “a willingness to create a close cooperation with 
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France”.4 France also circulated a non-paper ahead of the Ministerial meeting, which 
sought to revive a global solution for Yugoslavia and the reestablishment of a 
constitutional framework based on a union of two republics.5 It also suggested that certain 
areas should have a designated special status and that the Bosnian Serbs should have 
access to the sea.  
At the 13 May meeting, the Ministers agreed a timetable and to call the parties to a 
meeting on 24 May. Discussions would focus on a map and the establishment of “a light 
constitutional framework”, whilst a parallel series of talks would attempt to bring an end to 
hostilities.6 In a second round of talks, envisaged one week on from the first, the parties 
could air their views so that they could be integrated into the plan, with a final ministerial 
meeting envisaged for 7 June. This plan would then be presented to the parties “on a take it 
or leave it basis” in mid-June.7 Party to the negotiations, David Owen reflected that, 
“There was a general feeling at the meeting, especially among those longest engaged in the 
negotiations that enough was enough and the time had come to make a final effort.”8 
The parties convened with the Contact Group in a resort in Talloires, France, 
overlooking the Lac d’Annecy, close to Geneva. As the negotiations got underway the 
UNSC President released a statement calling on “the parties to resume, without 
preconditions, serious efforts to reach a political settlement.”9 As the parties worked 
towards a settlement in the French lakeside resort, the Contact Group sent them a letter on 
1 June drafted by Juppé and Kinkel urging them to accept the peace plan.10 However, 
Izetbegović remained reluctant to see a peace plan imposed on BiH, particularly sensing 
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that the tide of war could turn in his favour, much to Mitterrand’s consternation. The 
French President told Izetbegović: “If you want war to continue, well, block the 
negotiations!”11 With the Bosnian Serbs continuing to break the agreements for the 
exclusion zone around Goražde, the Bosnian government refused to participate in the 
negotiations.12 
On 4 June, Owen wrote to Douglas Hurd, Alain Juppé and Klaus Kinkel urging the 
three Foreign Ministers to apply pressure to secure a strong backing from the State 
Department who were working from the basis that “we basically offer a solution, but it is 
up to them [the parties] to decide whether to accept.”13 Owen indicated that there needed to 
be incentives to sign: for the Federation, if the Bosnian Serbs failed to sign, the arms 
embargo could be lifted, with tactical support from NATO air assets; for the Bosnian 
Serbs, if the Federation refused, they would see sanctions suspended and were reassured 
that the embargo would not be lifted.14 However, given the Clinton administration’s 
unwillingness to see sanctions lifted against the Bosnian Serbs and unpreparedness to 
impose a settlement, Owen feared the US would require significant convincing. To this 
end, Mitterrand told Clinton, whilst the US President visited Paris in early June, that “we 
must impose peace.”15 
Although the Contact Group were closer in coordinating their policies than at any 
time previous, lifting the arms embargo still remained a contentious issue. During a visit to 
Paris, Haris Silajdžić – now the Bosnian Prime Minister – questioned Mitterrand and Juppé 
on the implementation of the Contact Group Plan. Mitterrand remained opposed to the use 
of force whilst Juppé declared that, if the peace process failed, France would consider “the 
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retreat of its troops on the ground and lifting the arms embargo.”16 Although the US was in 
favour of lifting the arms embargo, it did not want to bear the full responsibility of the 
potential humanitarian catastrophe if the Contact Group followed a ‘leave, lift and strike’ 
policy.17 
However, by early July the Contact Group Ambassadors had created a coherent 
plan, which was discussed by the Foreign Ministers in Geneva on 5 July ahead of a 
meeting with the three parties the following day. The Contact Group had attempted to 
‘divide and rule’ the parties during negotiations in late June, with the US focussed on 
securing the Bosnian government’s agreement to the map and Russia on the Bosnian Serbs. 
The Ministers also agreed the incentives and disincentives, demonstrating a coherent and 
consistent approach. They presented the Contact Group Plan to the parties on 6 July with 
each side raising some objections to the envisaged map but not rejecting the plan 
outright.18  
Alain Juppé and Douglas Hurd thus undertook a diplomatic mission to Pale, 
Sarajevo and Belgrade on 11 July in support of the Contact Group Plan. During the trip the 
Foreign Ministers met with resistance in Sarajevo and, in particular, Pale, which led Hurd 
to declare for the first time that Britain would consider raising the arms embargo.19 
However, in Belgrade, Milošević was keen to impress that he had done all he could to 
force the hand of the Bosnian Serbs and continued to hope that sanctions against 
Yugoslavia would be lifted regardless of the outcome.20 Upon his return to Paris, Juppé 
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revealed to Mitterrand and Balladur that, if the peace plan failed, he would move towards 
lifting the arms embargo and the withdrawal of French from BiH.21 
On 12 July 1994, Mitterrand therefore wrote to Milošević in support of the Contact 
Group Plan. The President highlighted that both the US and Russia supported the plan and 
that “This unity of views between the principal powers, including Russia, gives a new 
decisive importance to this new plan.”22 The French President believed that the plan could 
only be successful if Milošević attempted to bring Serbia out of international isolation and 
stressed that “It is of the utmost necessity that you use your influence to ensure that the 
Bosnian Serb officials accept the proposed map within the given time.”23 Mitterrand knew 
that:  
“Without doubt, many questions will still remain to negotiate or to clarify… 
However I can assure you that only a restoration of trust between the Serbian 
people and international community, following the acceptance of the plan and 
its application on the ground, would allow these questions to be settled in a 
satisfying manner for the interested parties. France, you can be certain, will 
spare no effort in this sense.” 24  
 
If, however, the plan were rejected or the Bosnian Serbs requested an alteration 
Mitterrand felt that he must “express [his] conviction that France would no longer oppose 
the adoption of measures that could trigger a dangerous process of escalation for all and, 
above all, for the peoples of the region.”25 In concluding, Mitterrand referred to l’amitié 
Franco-Serbe to impress his willingness to support Milošević. The French President 
reflected that, “The Serbian people, who have a long tradition of friendship with the French 
people, today finds itself before an historic choice in favour of peace that it must have the 
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courage to accomplish. France, through my voice, and in the name of our shared history, 
warmly encourages you in this.”26 
On 18 July, the EU Foreign Ministers issued a statement urging the parties to agree 
to the Contact Group Plan, stating: “We are convinced that the peace plan that was handed 
over to the parties concerned on 6 July offers the only viable basis to find a peaceful 
solution… It should be accepted without conditions in the interests of the people suffering 
in the former Yugoslavia.”27 The Croat-Muslim Federation threw its support behind the 
plan and Izetbegović appeared on television to announce the policy adding, “We can 
gradually come to end this injustice and ultimately reunite Bosnia-Hercegovina if we 
manage to develop our part of the country as a democracy.”28 Meanwhile in Pale, the 
Bosnian Serb Assembly reached a decision, which Karadžić would deliver to Geneva on 
20 July. Alain Juppé made a “final appeal” to the Bosnian Serb leaders hoping that “Pale 
does not choose war, because it is on the horizon if the answer is no.”29 In Geneva, it 
transpired that the Bosnian Serbs had essentially rejected the plan. 
Two days later, David Owen sent a COREU to the EU Foreign Ministers 
highlighting that “the authority of the EU itself is on the line”.30 Owen believed that “The 
key as always is Milošević” and urged the EU Ministers to threaten the Serbian President 
with further sanctions unless he acted against the Bosnian Serbs. 31 Moreover, Owen 
advocated for ‘leave, lift and strike’ before winter, highlighting an inconvenient truth: “If 
the Croat and the Muslim forces are not sufficiently strong with outside air power, then the 
world will have to live with a Serb imposed solution.”32 
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On 25 July, as the Contact Group reconvened in Moscow, Boutros-Ghali indicated 
that, if the peace plan were entirely rejected, he would call for the total disengagement of 
UNPROFOR across the former Yugoslavia.33 However, if the plan were accepted the UN 
Secretary General indicated that a Contact Group force would have to undertake its 
implementation.34 France, attached to the role of UNPROFOR, was unconvinced by the 
Secretary General’s strategy.35 
Russia sent a delegation to Pale on 27 July in an effort to convince the Bosnian 
Serb Assembly to reconsider their decision on the Contact Group Plan. The Russian 
intervention was to no avail though as the Assembly upheld its previous decision.36 Indeed, 
the Bosnian Serbs were once more demonstrating their hostility to the international 
community as they closed the ‘blue road’ that allowed civilians access to and from 
Sarajevo. Izetbegović wrote to Mitterrand to inform him that this had come as a result of 
orders from Karadžić. “The strangulation of Sarajevo,” Izetbegović noted, “had begun 
again.”37 The Bosnian President had therefore written to the President of UNSC to call an 
urgent meeting of the UNSC to bring measures against the Serbs. Izetbegović asked for 
Mitterrand’s support in this.38  
The Contact Group ministers met the following day and work quickly began on 
implementing new sanctions, which would be brought before the UNSC with the utmost 
haste.39 The Contact Group issued a communiqué that welcomed the Federation’s 
acceptance of the Contact’s Group proposal and “emphasised that acceptance of the 
Contact Group’s proposal is the essential first step for achieving an equitable and balanced 
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overall settlement”.40 However, the Bosnian Serb war project – namely to create an 
ethnically homogeneous and sovereign Republika Srpska – could not be accommodated 
through the Contact Group Plan, and thus attaching peace to “acceptance” would prove to 
be a significant error. 
Significantly Slobodan Milošević publicly declared himself in favour of the 
Contact Group Plan and stated that the Bosnian Serbs “must accept the international 
community’s proposal”.41 Therefore, Bosnian Serb politician Momčilo Krajišnik 
announced that Pale would organise a referendum in Republika Srpska on the Contact 
Group Plan.42 Furthermore, Karadžić announced that he wanted to revisit negotiations with 
the Contact Group immediately, although Paris immediately shot down the Bosnian Serb 
leader stating that his declarations “contain no new elements of a nature that responds to 
the requests of the Contact Group”.43 On 3 August the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the 
Contact Group Plan for a third time whilst calling Krajišnik’s proposed referendum for 
three weeks later.44  
Milošević was enraged by the Bosnian Serbs’ obstinacy and disobedience and, 
having been influenced by Contact Group Foreign Ministers, declared a blockade between 
FRY and RS. A statement on 4 August from Belgrade read that the Federal Government 
decided: “To sever political and economic relations with the Republic of Srpska; To ban 
the stay of the members of the leadership of the Republic of Srpska (Assembly, 
Presidency, Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; As of 
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today, to close the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the Republic of 
Srpska for all transports except food, clothing and medicine.”45 
Belgrade’s move did little to influence the Bosnian Serb population’s vote on 27 
August: the Plan was overwhelmingly rejected by over 90% of voters.46 Furthermore, 
Karadžić indicated that he would “never accept” the Plan, adding that “We are going to 
take peacekeepers hostage, bring down planes and imprison all foreigners who are on our 
territory. We will do everything that is favourable for our people, without any restraint.”47 
Indeed, the Bosnian Serb campaign in the north-east of BiH intensified as Karadžić and 
Mladić set about fulfilling their war aims.48 Therefore the Clinton administration began to 
consider raising the arms embargo and Paris began to study withdrawal strategies for that 
eventuality. Indeed, Paris informed Washington that they would support raising the arms 
embargo so long as UNPROFOR had been evacuated.49 However, Juppé advocated 
continuing negotiations, telling Warren Christopher that: “We must not count on lifting the 
arms embargo to resolve the problem, we must try to find a political fall back in common 
with the Russians before we resign ourselves to an acknowledgement of failure.”50 Juppé 
advocated maintaining diplomatic activity and encouraged the isolation of the Bosnian 
Serbs. 
The US began more direct diplomatic interventions with the Bosnian and Croatian 
governments with newly appointed US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke 
travelling to Zagreb and Sarajevo at the end of August.51 However, Russia was voicing its 
concerns that, in spite of Milošević’s support for the Contact Group Plan, sanctions had not 
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been raised against Belgrade.52 Cracks and fissures were appearing in the façade of the 
Contact Group as the EU Foreign Ministers met in Usedom, Germany, on 11 September 
1994. At the meeting Juppé proposed gentle encouragement of Milošević but without 
giving him “exaggerated credit”.53  The French Foreign Minister also proposed that, much 
as the US had with the Muslim-Croat Federation, the Bosnian Serbs should be allowed a 
confederal link with Serbia. Juppé also bemoaned the lack of tougher enforcement of the 
exclusion zones and lambasted the notion of raising the arms embargo, declaring it to be 
“absurd”.54 As he had previously told Washington, Paris would only consider raising the 
arms embargo if UNPROFOR were withdrawn first. Douglas Hurd importantly noted that, 
if the embargo remained in place, it would be important for troop contributors to remain on 
the ground in BiH.55 Juppé confided in his British counterpart that, “It will be a matter of 
avoiding a renewal of the debate on lifting the arms embargo.”56 
The Clinton administration acquiesced on raising sanctions against Belgrade, 
provided that the UN inspectors stationed along the borders confirmed the blockade was 
being respected.57 Moreover, Clinton offered $30 million of aid to the Bosnian government 
if Izetbegović renounced his demand to lift the arms embargo.58 The Clinton 
administration was greatly concerned about the period between UNPROFOR withdrawal 
and the delivery of arms to Federation forces, which would have led to an intensification of 
fighting and thus to greater calls for intervention in the States. Izetbegović accepted the 
demand but chastised Juppé for France’s role in this policy and accused France of being on 
the side of “those responsible for ‘ethnic cleansing’.”59 The Bosnian President’s strong 
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admonishment of France had a deeper significance as Franco-Bosnian relations had soured 
over the pocket of Bihać in the west of BiH. 
 
Paris-Bihać-Washington 
The town of Bihać occupied a perilous position during the conflicts in BiH. In the north-
western corner of BiH in the Cazinka Krajina region, the ‘Bihać Pocket’ was flanked on 
the west by the Serb-held Krajina territory in Croatia, and to the east by Serb-held territory 
in Western BiH. Consequently, from the start of the conflict, the Bihać pocket had been a 
hotly contested area between all three parties with the Bosniaks and Croats forming a 
tenuous alliance against the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.60 The town was established as one 
of the UN ‘safe zones’ in May 1993. Completely isolated from the Bosnian government, 
the region’s leading business man and counter-current member of the SDA, Fikret Abdić, 
led a rebellion against the Sarajevo regime. Having convinced elements within the ARBiH 
5th Corps to support his mutiny, Abdić established a short-lived but not insignificant 
fiefdom in Bihać.  
 The creation of the Muslim-Croat Federation and a concertation of their two 
military forces led to a renewed offensive against the Abdić rebellion, which was 
eventually quashed in August 1994. Almost immediately, Serb forces sought to capitalise 
and attacked the Bihać pocket. Led by Mladić himself, the attack was repulsed and the 
ARBiH counter-attacked to a great effect.61 Rumours even circulated amongst Bosnian 
Serb sources that Mladić had been wounded or even killed, which the Bosnian Serb 
military moved quickly to quell.62 General Sir Michael Rose had once again threatened the 
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Bosnian Serbs with NATO air strikes, as he had in Goražde, but the Bosniak repulsion of 
the attack nullified that threat.63 However, he did authorise the use of air force against a 
Bosnian Serb tank on the outskirts of Sarajevo. Mladić threatened reprisals against 
UNPROFOR members with French peacekeepers perilously positioned in Bihać.  
As previously mentioned, the largest contingent of French peacekeepers was 
located in the Bihać pocket, and the head of UNPROFOR, the French General Bernard de 
La Presle, was studying a potential retreat strategy in coordination with NATO for 
peacekeepers in Bihać in response to the fighting in September.64 Throughout October, the 
ARBiH forces began to make significant gains at the expense of the Bosnian Serbs in the 
north and south east of BiH.65 With an ARBiH offensive likely in Bihać, and with Balladur 
eyeing a presidential campaign the following May, France decided to retire its near 1,300 
men from the Bihać pocket at the end of October; a costly ground war was not something 
the Neo-Gaullist government could become embroiled in.66 However, before the French 
peacekeepers could leave, the ARBiH launched a massive offensive to break its 
encirclement. The ARBiH forces broke through in the south and south east, capturing more 
than 200km2 by the end of October.67 Nonetheless, the French contingent was replaced by 
a Bangladeshi battalion, equipped with only 300 rifles.68  
As the Federation began to make headway on the ground, Clinton once more came 
under pressure from Congress to raise the arms embargo, with the US submitting a draft 
resolution to the UNSC for the embargo to be lifted in favour of the Federation in six 
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months.69 Buoyed by their successes and US encouragement, the Muslim-Croat Federation 
undertook an offensive in Sarajevo. France believed that in this context, the Bosnian 
government had become convinced to pursue a military solution to the conflict in BiH.70 
The escalating US rhetoric antagonised the Russians who called on the UNSC to take 
measures against the Bosniaks following the flight of thousands of Bosnian Serbs from the 
Bihać pocket. France called for a ceasefire in an effort to diffuse the situation, much to the 
anger of the Sarajevan authorities.71 
By 14 November, the inevitable Serb counterattack had materialised in Bihać, 
launched from the Krajina. In the intervening period, the Republicans had won a 
significant majority in the elections for Congress, reinforcing the pro-Bosniak lobby on 
Capitol Hill. Thus Clinton, seeking to avoid unnecessary conflict with the Republicans, 
announced that the US would unilaterally lift the embargo against Bosnia and Croatia. In 
Paris, there were fears that the Contact Group was disintegrating.72 François Léotard wrote 
to his American counterpart, William Perry, expressing his concerns that, thenceforth, the 
Bosnian Serbs would no longer see UNPROFOR as a neutral force. The French Defence 
Minister relayed his fears in a letter: “Its [UNPROFOR] retreat will not be accomplished in 
a peaceful manner because the belligerents could be tempted to seize equipment by force, 
the Serbs anticipating the lifting of the arms embargo and taking the offensive and the 
Bosniaks opposing a retreat that would leave them without defence.”73 Clinton dispatched 
the Undersecretary of State, Peter Tarnoff, to Europe to allay his partners’ fears. In 
meetings with Juppé and Védrine, Tarnoff revealed that Clinton was personally hostile to 
lifting the embargo and that he would not force the issue in the UNSC.74 
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The Clinton administration remained in favour of using air strikes though and when 
Serb forces used two fighter planes stationed in the Krajina to bomb Bihać, it provided 
NATO with an opportunity to demonstrate its aerial might in BiH once more. UNPROFOR 
even confirmed that the Serbs had dropped a napalm bomb against the civilian population 
of the town, a device that had been banned under the UN Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons; fortunately, the device failed to detonate.75  
With increasingly vocal calls for NATO force to be brought to bear against the 
Serbs, Juppé condemned the escalating conflict: “There has been an offensive and there is 
now a counter-offensive all of which is quite unacceptable and against which we bear the 
strongest condemnation, but the only way to avoid these kinds of events is the cessation of 
[military] activities.”76 Although Juppé indicated that the Serbs bore the primary 
responsibilities for the latest renewal, he added that the government in Sarajevo had to bear 
some responsibility for the renewed conflict.77 This comment, and France’s policies, 
appeared to do irreparable damage to Franco-Bosnian relations. Haris Silajdžić summoned 
Henri Jacolin, the French Ambassador to BiH, and vented his frustrations at French policy: 
 
The authorities in Paris are overtly anti-Bosniak contrary to French public 
opinion. M. Juppé is opposed to what we do to defend ourselves but is not 
moved in anyway by offensives undertaken by the Serbs. French UNPROFOR 
officers themselves have also adopted an anti-Bosniak position. There is today 
an alliance between France, Great Britain and Russia to block everything, in 
the United Nations as on the ground.78 
 
Indeed, the conflict in BiH had brought French and British foreign policy into 
greater alignment, which was reinforced by the good relationship shared between Douglas 
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Hurd and Alain Juppé.79 The day that Silajdžić admonished Jacolin in Sarajevo, France and 
Britain announced the creation of a Franco-British partnership in aerial defence, with the 
situation in BiH featuring heavily in the discussions.80 The following day, the UNSC 
clarified the conditions for the use of force to assist UNPROFOR in pursuing its mandate 
in BiH and also extended such measures to Croatia, from where, significantly, the Serbs 
had launched their attacks against Bihać.81 
Serb attacks intensified against Bihać on 20 November, which led Juppé to declare 
it “unacceptable that the international community leaves Bihać to be bombed without 
reacting” adding that he hoped that NATO would implement the UNSCRs from the 
previous day to attack Serb positions in the Krajina.82 The following day Juppé would see 
his demands fulfilled as NATO bombed the Udbina airbase in Serb-held Croatia.83 
However, the raid failed to deter the Serbs who continued their assault on Bihać, coming 
within 2km of the boundaries of the ‘safe zone’ itself.84 This brought a further NATO 
attack against missile sites in and around the Bihać pocket, but this was less-welcomed 
amongst the Contact Group than the raid on 21 November.  
As Washington continued to push for further air strikes, Russia stated that it was 
“extremely worried by the tendency to resolve the question of solving the conflict in 
Bosnia exclusively through force.”85 Paris and London were equally concerned, 
particularly regarding reprisals against their peacekeepers in Sarajevo. Alain Juppé called 
for a ceasefire and for the Bihać ‘safe zone’ to be respected as the Bosnian Serbs entered 
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its perimeter on 23 November.86 John Major wrote to Mitterrand on 24 November, as the 
Bosnian Serbs closed in on the centre of Bihać: 
 
I am worried by the thoughtlessness with which NATO embarks in this civil 
war day after day. To simply launch air raids does not move us an inch closer 
to a solution but risks, in contrast, putting UNPROFOR in an untenable 
situation.87 
 
As Major wrote to Mitterrand, the Bosnian Serbs were close to entering the town of Bihać 
itself, with Karadžić intending to disarm the ARBiH 5th Corps stationed in the town.88 
Mitterrand pragmatically reflected on the situation with François Léotard: 
 
The Serbs have won. It’s tragic but that’s how it is. We cannot stop the course 
of events. UNPROFOR is powerless. Air strikes can do nothing in a country 
like that. The Serbs want to snub NATO and the UN. They have done that and 
have no need to occupy Bihać.89 
 
Mitterrand’s prediction was extremely prescient as the Bosnian Serbs entered Bihać 
and, with the Bosnian forces having fled to the north of the province, respected the 
ceasefire that Yasushi Akashi had called for the day previous.90 NATO planes flew 
overhead as the Serbs entered the town but, citing adverse weather conditions, returned to 
base.91 However, it seems as though NATO and the UN were prepared to accept a fait 
accompli; France and Britain’s fears over the safety of their peacekeepers had been 
allayed. The US Defence Secretary William Perry acknowledged that “The situation is 
really under the control of the Serbs.”92 The Bosnian Serbs had faced down NATO, which 
had strengthened Karadžić’s and Mladić’s confidence and their position at the top of the 
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Republika Srpska hierarchy. Furthermore, it led the Bosnian government to redouble their 
efforts to have the arms embargo selectively lifted. The Bihać incident led to a serious 
reassessment of US policy on the former Yugoslavia but the US was quick to assure its 
allies that it would not push for lifting the arms embargo, as the Undersecretary of State 
Peter Tarnoff assured them: 
 
We do not want to get involved in this pothole alone. We need our friends and 
allies, we need governments prepared to deploy men on the ground in 
humanitarian and military missions and we need diplomatic solidarity. As for 
the embargo, it cannot be lifted unilaterally, but through a Security Council 
decision.93  
 
For Juppé the dramatic events in Bihać were the “consequence of contradictions 
and divergences within the last few months” and he thought it was necessary to “repair the 
cohesion of the Contact Group.”94 Tarnoff’s words were intended to assuage the US’s 
Atlantic allies, but Clinton would come under increasing domestic pressure to lift the arms 
embargo through into the New Year. Thus, covertly, a US based company began training 
the Croatian military and arranged arms shipments to the Federation from Iran via 
Croatia.95 The Clinton administration was formulating its policy that aimed to bring the 
Federation and Croatia into concertation against the Bosnian Serbs.96 
Franco-German relations had also been adversely affected with the conservative 
newspaper Frankfürter Allgemeine Zeitung accusing France and Britain of regressing back 
to a pro-Serb line.97 The Kinkel-Juppé partnership of the year previous had deteriorated 
and been replaced by Hurd and Juppé, as Germany more closely aligned itself with the US. 
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France sought to reinvigorate the diplomatic initiative within the Contact Group. 
Thus the Contact Group was reunited on 27 November in Paris, with Juppé calling for a 
“quick and strong reaction” from the international community.98 During a Franco-German 
summit on 30 November, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand and Édouard Balladur 
formulated a confederal plan for Bosnia, with the Bosnian Serbs being allowed to associate 
with Serbia if they accepted the whole of the plan.99 Washington had already declared 
itself to be ready to discuss such a proposal and other diplomatic initiatives on 28 
November.100  
Following a ministerial meeting on 1 December, NATO reaffirmed its stance in 
favour of negotiations, stating in a communiqué that: “We remain convinced that the 
conflict in Bosnia must be solved at the negotiation table.”101 At a Contact Group 
ministerial meeting on 2 December, Juppé convinced his peers to adopt the Serbian 
confederation as its policy, as a concession to the Bosnian Serbs.102 The Contact Group 
also revealed that it was willing to make territorial modifications to the map in order to 
bring the three communities back to the negotiating table.103  
Meanwhile, the US had begun negotiating with the Bosnian Serbs directly again, 
which undermined Juppé’s ‘dual-track’ approach of isolating the Bosnian Serbs on one 
hand and reaching out to Serbia on the other. Nonetheless, on the back of this initiative, 
Juppé and Hurd flew together to the former Yugoslavia, visiting Belgrade, Sarajevo, 
Zagreb, and Pale following the US’s earlier initiative. They focussed their efforts on 
Milošević and hoped he could convince the Bosnian Serbs to return to the negotiation 
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table.104 Milošević believed that the right to a confederation was the “best argument” to 
convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept a peace plan.105 
The return to diplomacy by the international community, and away from military 
intervention, infuriated Izetbegović, who publicly chastised Mitterrand at a CSCE summit 
in Budapest on 5 December: “Paris and London from the beginning have assumed the role 
of protectors of Serbia and prevented all attempts to stop the Serbian war.”106 On having 
resumed talks with Milošević and reconfiguring the Contact Group map, Izetbegović 
added: “You, civilised countries, you want to invite to the negotiating table a creation 
based on tyranny and genocide.”107 Mitterrand responded:  
 
We French are saddened and offended when we hear it said that France should 
be responsible for all that has happened in Bosnia. What do you accuse us of? 
That we have not approved lifting the arms embargo. It seems to me that we 
were right.108  
   
  The Bosnian President’s outburst did little to dissuade Mitterrand from pursuing 
the diplomatic path to peace. The French President wrote to Clinton: “We must give every 
chance to the Contact Group. We must use every map on the table, including the Milošević 
map.”109 However, Clinton was coming under ever-greater pressure in the US to lift the 
arms embargo with Congress once more raising the issue. Paris, in concert with London 
and Washington, once more began to study the withdrawal of its peacekeepers.110 The 
Clinton administration remained opposed to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and settled on 
a clever formulation to deter hawkish US senators and congressmen from persistently 
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pressuring the President: if raising the arms embargo forces UNPROFOR to withdraw, the 
US will have to dispatch 15,000 ground troops to account for the deficit.111  
As rhetoric built towards the withdrawal of UNPROFOR in winter 1994, Radovan 
Karadžić announced on CNN that he intended to normalise relations with UNPROFOR.112 
This change of heart had been brought about by the sudden intervention of former US 
President Jimmy Carter, who was invited by Karadžić to use his good offices in the 
conflict in BiH.113 Following a diplomatic mission to Pale and Sarajevo, Carter secured a 
four-month ceasefire, which commenced on 24 December. Surprisingly, the ceasefire held 
and, with Carter’s intervention, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to join the Contact Group peace 
discussions once more.114 As 1994 came to a close, the Contact Group had a basis to once 
more resume its work with all parties, as UN troops stationed themselves between the sides 
in contested areas. 
 
Exit Europe, Enter USA 
As François Mitterrand highlighted in his final New Year’s Eve address to the French 
public, France would assume the Presidency of the European Union for six months on 1 
January.115 The main thrust of the President’s speech was the future of Europe and its 
centrality to France’s future: “Have no doubt, France’s future is through Europe. By 
serving the one, we serve the other.”116 The French President also had a stark warning for 
his European compatriots during his final address to the European Parliament on 17 
January. In a speech typical of France’s eloquent President, Mitterrand recounted 
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autobiographical anecdotes that highlighted the perilous path that European civilisation had 
traversed over the preceding century. He reflected: “Nationalism means war! War is not 
only in our past, it is also maybe in our future, and it’s you… who are henceforth the 
guardians of our peace, of our security and this future!”117 The crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia had clearly reinforced the President’s preference for greater European 
integration and concertation. 
 The President’s warning was particularly salient in the Yugoslav context at the 
beginning of 1995. The so-called ‘Zagreb-4’ or ‘Z-4’ Ambassadors – consisting of the US 
and Russian Ambassadors to Croatia and Ambassadors Geert Ahrens and Kai Ede on 
behalf of ICFY – were facing an increasingly difficult task in January 1995 as the Croatian 
Government revealed it would not agree to a renewal of UNPROFOR’s mandate in Croatia 
beyond March 1995. The ‘Z-4’ had worked tirelessly shuttling between Zagreb and Knin 
over the preceding three years in an attempt to broker a deal to reintegrate the Croatian 
Serbs into the Croatian state with an amount of autonomy.118 However, the Croatian 
Government was seemingly preparing for a military takeover of the Krajina.119 Inevitably, 
tensions between Zagreb and Knin heightened once more.  
David Owen tendered his resignation to Mitterrand on 17 January but indicated he 
would only do so at a time that was convenient to the French Presidency of the EU.120 
Owen held France’s efforts in the former Yugoslavia in the highest regard and thanked 
Mitterrand for his personal involvement, and particularly for his meeting with Milošević in 
March 1993, alongside the interventions of General Morillon and General de La Presle.121 
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Resignation at an inopportune time would have soured his relations with the French 
establishment. The French Presidency was unprepared to accept Owen’s resignation at that 
time, and he thus continued.  
With his resignation tentatively scheduled for June, Owen renewed his efforts and, 
aware that the Contact Group had ceased to function effectively, tried to closely tie Juppé 
to the peace process, eschewing the COREU mechanism and writing to the French Foreign 
Minister directly. In this vain, David Owen approached Juppé at the end of January 
believing that the Contact Group had “a six-week window of opportunity in which we 
might be able to pressurize the parties into a settlement, not just in Bosnia-Hercegovina but 
in Croatia as well.”122 Owen indicated that Tuđman was becoming more cooperative, as he 
was seeking recognition from Belgrade, and believed that a meeting between Tuđman and 
Milošević in Paris at the invitation of President Mitterrand would be a useful initiative.123 
In the meantime, Juppé travelled to Washington aiming to bring about a 
“diplomatic rapprochement” between France and the US.124 Upon his return Juppé met 
Owen, who had just met with Milošević and Tuđman, and revealed that, owing to pressure 
from Congress, the Clinton administration wanted to be fully involved in any discussions 
and needed a breakthrough within the next few weeks.125 Juppé returned to the idea that a 
conference under the French EU Presidency would be a useful exercise, which Owen 
agreed with, having “always believed that there would need to be another ‘London 
Conference’ within the French Presidency.”126  
Meanwhile, Owen suggested establishing a back-channel for negotiations with 
Karadžić, believing that “Private diplomacy was needed.”127 Indeed, ‘private diplomacy’ 
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was the new modus operandi with Paris at its epicentre. With Mitterrand prepared to host a 
meeting between Tuđman and Milošević, the Quai would have to announce a meeting with 
Izetbegović for domestic consumption.128 However, the Contact Group Plan would require 
some adjustment as Owen believed that Karadžić had never taken it seriously. Therefore, 
on legal issues, the two men also agreed that “It would make sense for Paris to act as the 
single focus.”129 
Juppé publicly proposed calling a “last chance” international conference, to prevent 
the renewal of fighting in BiH and Croatia in spring.130 Juppé spoke with his counterparts 
in the Contact Group and received cautious ascension to his proposal.131 However, the 
parties themselves were unenthused with Milošević calling it a “serious waste of time” and 
Silajdžić glibly dismissed the initiative as BiH did not require “a new public relations 
conference.”132 Without the support of the parties, Juppé’s initiative was dead-on-arrival. 
Instead Paris launched an initiative focussed on lifting the sanctions against Belgrade if 
FRY recognised BiH and Croatia.133  
Running parallel to France’s sanctions initiative, Owen and Stoltenberg, reporting 
directly to Paris, met with Karadžić and Krajišnik on 1 February in an attempt to 
reinvigorate discussions on the Contact Group Plan before renewed fighting in spring 
rendered it obsolete. Following the discussions Owen drew up eight maps along the 51-
49% split negotiated under the Contact Group Plan, which he believed could be made 
acceptable to the Bosnian Serbs and the Federation.134 However, Richard Holbrooke, 
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irritated by the resumption of talks with Pale, pulled the plug on a follow-up meeting.135 
Increasing US preponderance over the peace process led the Serbs, both in Belgrade and 
Pale, to believe that policy was “being directed from Washington with Russia sidelined and 
the EU having, when it comes to the crunch, no capacity or will to differ from the 
Americans.”136 Owen detected a change in mood in Milošević owing to US influence on 
the international community’s sanction policy and as such believed that “it will not be easy 
to find a new approach that will attract Milošević, Izetbegović and Tuđman.”137 He was 
right. 
As the ceasefire drew nearer to its conclusion, activity within the Contact Group 
became frenetic. With Croatia determined not to renew UNPROFOR’s mandate, Milošević 
was unable to offer FRY recognition as he would be seen to be selling the Krajina Serbs 
“down the river”.138 The US focussed on trying to secure Croatian agreement for a renewal 
of the UN mandate, whilst France and Britain focussed on the recognition of BiH. 
Diplomatic efforts were frantic as it became clear that the Bosnian government was 
preparing for a spring offensive. Juppé hosted Warren Christopher for a meeting in Paris 
on 22 March, in hope of reinvigorating the Contact Group and coordinating its constituent 
members’ diplomatic efforts.139 He also proposed progressively lifting sanctions against 
Belgrade in the hope that it would prolong the truce in BiH and help talks between Croatia 
and Serbia.140 However, events on the ground had overtaken the politicians once more as 
fighting resumed in Tuzla.141 As fighting once more escalated, two French peacekeepers 
were shot and injured in Sarajevo, one in ‘sniper alley’, with Juppé and Balladur both 
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calling for immediate actions to be taken against those responsible.142 Juppé confided in 
Balladur that “Douglas Hurd and I think that the diplomatic process has failed and the 
resumption of fighting in Bosnia is unavoidable.”143 Balladur gave the order to prepare the 
withdrawal of French peacekeepers in cooperation with NATO, although Paris was greatly 
concerned that they would be taken hostage as collateral as they retreated; this tactic would 
become commonplace in the summer of 1995.144 
As the ceasefire negotiated by Carter in December expired on 1 May, the former 
Yugoslavia looked as though it may once more descend into all-out war. The Croatian 
Army (Hrvastka vojska, HV) launched ‘Operation Flash’ against Western Slavonija 
following supposed attacks by Croatian Serbs against Croatian citizens on the highway 
between Zagreb and Lipovac, a town on the Serbian border.145 The HV cleansed Western 
Slavonija, a UNPA, and sent thousands of Croatian Serbs fleeing towards BiH and Serbia. 
‘Operation Flash’ was a success for the Tuđman government as the flight of Croatian Serbs 
from the region without having to use excessive coercion was palatable to the US. 
Although the UNSC publicly condemned Operation Flash, no sanctions were forthcoming. 
Therefore, this operation offered a blueprint for solving ‘ethnically complex problems’. 
However, imposing this logic on any solution to the conflicts would require significant 
population exchanges, expulsions or exterminations to create a ‘clean’ solution.146 Unlike 
in January 1994 the US, as Védrine noted, now had a vision for the future but its ‘clean’ 
solution would create a lot of mess before it could be imposed. 
In the context of this heightening tension in BiH and Croatia, and following 
Jacques Chirac’s strong performance in the first round of the presidential elections, the 
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French were privately indicating that the new government would look to withdraw from 
UNPROFOR unless the ceasefire was extended and UNPROFOR was reinforced.147 
Chirac, who won the presidential election on 7 May, sought to make a break with the past 
in the field of foreign policy. The new President would seek to break with the 
‘immobilism’ of the late Mitterrand years through bold decisions and muscular diplomacy. 
As he entered the Élysée on 17 May 1995, BiH was once more in the midst of fighting 
with the US once more pushing for a robust response. The Bosnian War provided Chirac 
with an immediate opportunity to announce himself on the international stage.148  
   
Jacques Chirac and the Force of Will 
Two days before Chirac’s inauguration on 17 May, the President-elect tasked Alain Juppé 
to liaise with Douglas Hurd in Paris to discuss reinforcing UNPROFOR and the 
“impossibility of staying in place without a change.”149 Upon Chirac’s election, Juppé was 
transferred from the Quai to the Matignon and was an important point of continuity in the 
new administration. NATO continued to study UNPROFOR’s retreat as fighting 
continued. There was one final lifeline for peace negotiations: following the earlier French 
initiative and three weeks of a US diplomatic offensive, Milošević was offering 
international recognition of BiH in its current boundaries in exchange for lifting 
international sanctions against FRY.150 Juppé warned in the National Assembly that: “if 
these talks are in vain, neither France, nor its partners, could maintain its peacekeepers in a 
powerless UNPROFOR that would lose its raison d’être.”151  
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The SDS met in Banja Luka on 23 May to discuss Milošević’s gesture. There they 
demonstrated their hostility towards the Serbian President’s concession and reaffirmed that 
they still rejected the Contact Group Plan as the UN renewed sanctions against RS.152 
Furthermore, they announced the unification of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs in an 
attempt to shore up their respective territories.  
Without RS’s acquiescence, the US diplomacy failed in Belgrade over the terms of 
reemploying sanctions against FRY in the case of non-recognition.153 From a public-facing 
perspective, the failure of the negotiations led by Robert Frasure allowed the US and 
NATO to once more present Belgrade and the Serbs as obstinate and would legitimise the 
future use of air force. Indeed, as it became evident that the talks in Belgrade had failed, 
Clinton publicly lamented the UN’s refusal to employ air force around Sarajevo a week 
earlier, declaring himself “firmly in favour” and “very surprised that the UN prevented 
them.”154 
With pressure from the West as Krajina was crumbling, and continued isolation 
from Belgrade to the east, the Bosnian Serbs became increasingly desperate in efforts to 
fulfil their war aims of creating an ethnically homogeneous RS. On 24 May, having 
requisitioned previously impounded heavy weapons, the Bosnian Serbs launched the 
deadliest wave of attacks against Sarajevo since the ultimatum of February 1994. Silajdžić 
immediately appealed to Washington to protect Sarajevo under the terms of February 
1994.155 The UN issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, which they disregarded.156 At 
16h00 local time, NATO attacked two Bosnian Serb weapon dumps near Pale.  
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The new French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, immediately issued a 
communiqué in support of the air strikes.157 De Charette was quite different from his 
predecessor. Richard Holbrooke later reflected that de Charette “was a classic high French 
official, elegant aloof, always sensitive to real or imagined insults toward himself or 
France–a distinction that he did not seem to acknowledge.”158  
However, the air strikes did not have the intended consequences of dissuading the 
Bosnian Serbs from further attacks. Immediately, Bosnian Serb forces took UNPROFOR 
members hostage, eventually totalling 360 of which 173 were French. The VRS then 
undertook a massive bombardment of Tuzla that left at least 71 civilians dead.159 The 
following day, NATO launched further air strikes, which led to further hostage taking by 
the Bosnian Serbs and their use as human shields.160 Alain Juppé was infuriated by the 
Bosnian Serbs and was prepared to withdraw UNPROFOR if another solution was 
forthcoming: “If the current deployment of UNPROFOR is seen as an obstacle or 
impediment to the response of the international community, we should draw the conclusion 
from this by organising its withdrawal.”161 Chirac phoned Milošević to express “France’s 
indignation” and called on him to use his influence to secure the release of the 
peacekeepers.162  
On the ground, French peacekeepers launched a ‘commando’ operation against 
Bosnian Serbs around Sarajevo, without a modified mandate, in an attempt to retake a UN 
observation post from Bosnian Serb forces; one French soldier was killed in the 
                                                     
157 “Approbation francaise des frappes aériennes de l'OTAN en Bosnie”, Agence France Press (25 May 
1995). 
158 Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War, Revised Edition (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 185. 
159 “Durcissement de la confrontation entre les Serbes de Bosnie et les grandes puissances”, AFP (29 May 
1995); “France-Bosnie-Serbes”, AFP (26 May 1995). 
160 “Les Serbes prennent l’ONU en otage pour faire cesser les raids”, Libération (27 May 1995). 
161 “M. Juppé: ‘nous ne pouvons plus accepter que la communauté internationale soit…”, AFP (26 May 
1995). 
162 “Libération de Casques bleus: M. Milošević a informé M. Chirac”, AFP (2 June 1995). 
 313 
confrontation.163 Such a military initiative would have been almost unimaginable under 
Mitterrand but with Chirac in the Élysée such proactiveness was encouraged. Indeed, 
Chirac criticised the military Chiefs of Staff for being too lax and leaving French 
peacekeepers at the mercy of UN policy.164 Therefore, the new President spoke with John 
Major to formulate a response to the hostage crisis with meetings of NATO, the EU and 
the Contact Group scheduled for the following day.165  
During the meetings, European and NATO Foreign Ministers expressed their 
preference for UNPROFOR to remain on the ground but agreed that they would need to be 
redeployed and better protected.166 In France, the hostage crisis remained the main priority 
with a particular emphasis being placed on securing their release, as one official remarked 
“we have three days of intense efforts ahead of us.”167 Juppé condemned the NATO air 
strikes that led to the hostage crisis considering that they “were not well prepared” and that 
“they have put our soldiers’ lives in danger.”168 As London prepared to send 
reinforcements to BiH in support of the 30 British peacekeepers that had been taken 
hostage, Juppé outlined his plans: “We must equip peacekeepers with the means to defend 
themselves” with “the development of a rapid reaction force with the double-key of NATO 
and the UN.”169 In the Contact Group meeting on 29 May in the margins of a NATO 
summit, de Charette proposed reinforcing UNPROFOR with heavy weapons and grouping 
them in more defensible positions. France would oppose any further air strikes until the 
hostage crisis had been solved.170 Russia was opposed to a “disguised” modification of the 
peacekeepers’ mandate.171  
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Russia, who could have acted as an intermediary condemned the Bosnian Serbs and 
accused Pale of having “taken the bit between its teeth and not realising what it has 
done.”172 Therefore Russia opted out of dispatching a diplomatic mission to Pale as it had 
done in the past.173 Russia’s new laissez-faire policy towards BiH allowed for a more 
robust US approach, which was evident in Warren Christopher’s rejection to renew 
negotiations with Pale.174 
The Bosnian Serb Information Minister announced that the hostages would only be 
released “When their governments and the UN have made peace with the Serbs.”175 
Nonetheless, the international community clung to the hope that Milošević could be 
convinced to recognise BiH and pressure Pale into a settlement, seemingly unaware that it 
would do little to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from continuing to pursue their war aims.176 In 
a further rejection of the international community’s jurisdiction in BiH, Karadžić declared 
that all UN resolutions were thenceforth nullified. 
Jacques Chirac sent General de La Presle to meet with General Mladić in Vlasenica 
on 29 May to discuss the French government’s position on the recent events in BiH. 
Immediately, the French General indicated to Mladić that he was not at the meeting to 
represent the international community, the UN or the Contact Group, but France and its 
government. He told the Bosnian Serb General that “The objective of this meeting is to 
establish contact and prevent isolation of the RS, which I have never supported. If there is 
no contact there will be conflicts which will lead us to tragedy.”177 De La Presle indicated 
that Juppé and Chirac were “open to new options” and with Jean-Bernard Merimée now 
the Chairman of the UNSC, France was reconsidering its deployment in BiH. With a 
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NATO meeting scheduled in the Netherlands the following day, France wanted “to keep 
NATO on a short leash” and therefore supported the “idea of a double key, for 
UNPROFOR to play a decisive role.”178 De La Presle also acknowledged that “NATO has 
completely different ideas about the area. We will try to hold them back.”179  
Aware that Mladić was similarly hostile to the Contact Group, de La Presle 
revealed that “France will propose that the Contact Group be disbanded and we go back to 
a single representative” but added that “What France will be able to get is closely linked to 
the results here on the ground in connection with: the condition of prisoners of war; the 
freedom of movement of UNPROFOR.”180 De La Presle indicated that, if the hostages 
were released immediately, then France could achieve some positive steps to integrate 
Republika Srpska into the international community.181 If they were not, the General 
warned that UNPROFOR would soon leave BiH and would be unable to stop its place 
being taken by NATO.182 The threat of a NATO presence is one that de La Presle wielded 
freely and warned that UNPROFOR: 
 
Contingents will be replaced with those from Islamic countries which are just 
waiting for the opportunity. One can count on the M [Muslims] to be clever 
enough to bring in the Muslim countries. I have been preventing this, but I had 
to accept Turkish forces and I think it would be a tragedy for this area and for 
Europe.183 
 
De La Presle, displaying the prejudice that was present in some of the French 
UNPROFOR contingents in BiH, indicated that negotiations needed to succeed to prevent 
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this eventuality.184 On the Contact Group he revealed that France and Britain had been 
successfully working on the map and highlighted that, “The map can change through 
negotiations.”185 De la Presle then added that “There would be no withdrawal of the 
Serbian side until a complete delineation of the territory is achieved.”186 Perhaps de La 
Presle believed that he would be able to bring the Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiating 
process following the release of the hostages. However, his statements instead indicated to 
Mladić that the international community, and France and Britain specifically, were willing 
to accept changes to a map that had earlier been offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis. 
However, Mladić had no intention of achieving this through negotiation and instead 
wanted to create facts on the ground prior to negotiations through renewed ethnic 
cleansing.  
Without a negotiated settlement for the release of the UNPROFOR hostages and no 
prospect of redefining the UNPROFOR mandate, France proposed the creation of a ‘Rapid 
Reaction Force’ in the UNSC, which would “signal a more muscular approach to the 
mission in Bosnia”.187 The proposal was met with Russian scepticism over the force’s 
mandate whilst the US worried about the timetable of the force’s creation.188 Chirac spoke 
with Clinton on 2  June to clarify the role of the RRF, calling it a “multinational brigade of 
rapid reaction”, which significantly indicated that it would require 4,000 or more troops.189 
Clinton indicated that he would be prepared to send US troops to BiH in support of 
UNPROFOR redeployment, which was broadly supported by public opinion, but cancelled 
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the deployment of 3,500 US troops to Italy at the last moment.190 The French President 
was starting to establish himself on the international stage and was keen to highlight that 
the Constitution placed the President at the head of the armed forces. At the funeral of two 
French peacekeepers killed in BiH Chirac outlined his guiding principles: 
 
Our military presence in Bosnia is based on a simple and strong idea: the 
security of Europe is currently at stake in this region. We will no longer accept 
the return of ethnic hate and barbarism on the continent.191  
 
Seemingly motivated by the French President’s more muscular intervention, 
Milošević had convinced Pale to the release 120 peacekeepers in Bosnia, including 63 
French.192 The Bosnian Serbs were concerned about the possible reinforcement of 
UNPROFOR and vacillated between threats and concessions in an effort to avoid such an 
outcome.193 Whilst releasing the peacekeepers had been a concession, the Bosnian Serbs 
shot down an American F-16 over Bihać in retaliation.194 Mladić, seeking to antagonise the 
US, claimed that the Bosnian Serbs had captured the pilot and were holding him 
prisoner.195 Karadžić indicated that he would continue to hold the hostages unless he 
received guarantees that there would be no further air strikes. The Greek Defence and 
Foreign Ministers, who were in talks with the Bosnian Serbs, confirmed the cessation of air 
strikes to Karadžić.196 With aerial attacks seemingly ruled out, the creation of the RRF 
remained highly important.  
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The 15 NATO and EU Defence Ministers officially finalised the details for the 
RRF at a meeting in Paris on 3 June, with its deployment envisaged for the end of the 
month.197 However, its creation would require a new UNSCR that appeared to be difficult, 
with the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev warning that he was opposed to the 
force.198 To assuage Russian fears concerning reprisals and escalations in BiH, Britain and 
France agreed that the RRF would be deployed under a peacekeeping mandate, as 
UNPROFOR had.199 Initially it had appeared that Chirac wanted the RRF to act as an 
intervention force.200  
The release of a new wave of hostages on 7 June made the force’s diluted mandate 
a slightly more acceptable decision for the governments on both sides of the channel.201 
Juppé and Hervé de Charette were keen to emphasise the closeness of the Franco-British 
RRF initiative with Douglas Hurd declaring that, “Since the Second World War, the 
French and British military have never been so close, working well together, and I am sure 
that will continue.”202 France pushed to have the UNSC pass a resolution on the RRF in the 
quickest time possible with Britain sending a forward unit to establish a working base in 
Sarajevo.203 
As the first French elements of the RRF arrived in Split on 13 June, the Bosnian 
Serbs announced that they were releasing the final hostages; they were all released by 18 
June.204 The hostage crisis had scarred Chirac who, during his first television interview 
since assuming the Presidency, called the Bosnian Serbs’ tactics “a barbarous and 
scandalous act” and therefore the RRF would be “an energetic and effective support force 
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each time UNPROFOR soldiers are threatened or humiliated.”205  However, the US was 
dragging its heels on the creation of the RRF as Clinton faced a foreign policy battle with 
Republicans in Congress who were reluctant to approve the $200 to $300 million required 
as the US contribution.206 Furthermore, with NATO announcing that they had completed 
withdrawal plans for UNPROFOR, Congress was concerned that the RRF would act as a 
means to implement the peacekeeping force’s retreat.  
Chirac appealed directly to the Capitol to support the creation of the RRF during 
his first state visit to Washington, labelling it absurd that the creation of the RRF would be 
the first step towards UNPROFOR’s total retreat.207 Nonetheless, on 15 June, the 
Republican majority in Congress wrote to Clinton informing the President that they were 
categorically opposed to the creation of the RRF. Nonetheless, the UNSC passed resolution 
998 on 16 June, which officially created the RRF with its peacekeepers working under a 
UN mandate but wearing their own nation’s uniforms.208 
Paris, and its partners, somewhat over-optimistically thought that the resolution of 
the hostage crisis could lead to a reinvigoration of the diplomatic process.209 It appeared to 
suggest that perhaps Belgrade was once more able to wield influence over Pale. Under the 
direction of Carl Bildt, who had replaced David Owen as ICFY co-President in early June, 
a new round of discussions got underway. Although the international community hoped 
that war fatigue would facilitate negotiations, fighting continued throughout the latter part 
of June. 
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France’s Last Stand 
One thorny issue that had plagued international peace plans for BiH after the failure of the 
VOPP had been the future status of the eastern Bosniak enclaves. As the international 
community undertook negotiations with Carl Bildt and Thorvald Stoltenberg at the helm, 
one of these ‘safe zones’ came under attack from the Bosnian Serbs: Srebrenica. 
 In April 1993, General Morillon had fixed international attention on the former spa 
and metal mining opština. By bringing a ceasefire to the town and securing the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, Morillon had disarmed the Bosniak population to bring about Serb 
acquiescence. A small contingent of UNPROFOR peacekeepers had been stationed in the 
enclave thereafter. On 31 March 1995, General Mladić had given the order to undertake 
operations around the enclaves, with General Milenko Živanović, head of the Drina Corps 
of the VRS giving order Krivija 95: attack Srebrenica.210 Although the Bosnian Serbs 
claimed the offensive was in response to ARBiH attacks in the enclave, the French 
National Assembly, in its extensive report of 2001 on the genocide in Srebrenica, declared 
that it was “to create a favourable situation on the ground in case of negotiations.”211  De 
La Presle’s earlier meeting with Mladić during the hostage crisis tacitly acknowledged that 
changes to the map were required. Indeed, as Samantha Power notes, “Many western 
policymakers secretly wished Srebrenica and the other Muslim safe areas in eastern Bosnia 
would disappear.”212 
 On 6 July, the VRS began its assault on Srebrenica and targeted Dutch observation 
posts and their headquarters at Potočari.213 The Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) commander 
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Tom Karremans requested close air support with the decision falling to the French General 
Gobilliard, who denied the request. The National Assembly inquest into France and 
Srebrenica believed that “It is evident that this lack of reaction from the Serb attack was a 
mistake: the lack of determination it conveyed to not defend UNPROFOR was very 
disturbing.”214 Indeed, if it was not prepared to protect its own then what protection could 
UNPROFOR offer the population of Srebrenica? Nonetheless, the Dutchbat commander 
refused to release the arms that had been impounded in Potočari to the mayor of 
Srebrenica, Ramiz Bećirović.215 The town’s position was perilous: it was undefended and 
indefensible. 
 The following day, Carl Bildt met Milošević and Mladić in Belgrade and the attack 
on the enclave resided. However, it resumed with a new ferocity on 8 July with a further 
call for aerial support being denied. On 9 July, the Bosnian Serbs made significant progress 
through the enclave, taking control of several UN observation posts with Dutch 
peacekeepers being taken hostage en route to the town of Srebrenica.216 General Bernard 
Janvier received a request for air support from Karremans in Srebrenica and instead 
ordered the Dutch peacekeepers to establish a ‘no-further line’ on the road to Srebrenica, 
which they failed to do. It became quite clear to Mladić that, at this point, he would face 
little resistance in his efforts to capture Srebrenica, in spite of an ultimatum from Janvier 
and Akashi that stated if the Bosnian Serbs crossed the ‘no-further line’ then aerial force 
would be deployed.217 
 On 10 July, aware that the VRS were quickly closing on the town, NATO declared 
that it was “always ready” to intervene in Bosnia.218 Similarly, France revealed that its 
contingents of the RRF, notably its attack helicopters, were ready to provide support to 
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Dutchbat.219 By the afternoon, with Dutch peacekeepers installed in Janvier’s requested 
location, the Bosnian Serbs launched an attack against UNPROFOR positions. This 
information reached the UNSC but its response was mild with Juppé sending a telegram to 
Merimée demanding that the parties withdraw.220 As Bosnian Serb infantry came within 
sight of the Dutch peacekeepers, Karremans once more called for air support. Janvier 
denied the request citing nightfall and the large number of refugees attempting to flee the 
town.221 That evening confusion reigned in communications between the UNPROFOR and 
Dutchbat. UNPROFOR HQ informed Karremans that air strikes would be available for six 
o’ clock the following morning provided he submitted a new request and provided targets 
for NATO. Curiously, Karremans explained to the town’s population that air strikes would 
arrive the following morning without a new request.222  
 The following morning, NATO fighters circled in the sky above the enclave 
awaiting their targets. With a breakdown in communications between the General Quarters 
in Tuzla and Dutchbat on the ground, the fighters had to return to base to refuel and were 
thus unavailable until 14:00.223 Mladić used this window of opportunity to strike and 
captured the town itself. Eventually NATO undertook an aerial operation targeted on 
Bosnian Serb tanks.224 However, once the VRS had reached the town and the Dutch 
peacekeepers, the UN was far less willing to employ force for fear of the risks to 
UNPROFOR members. The UN announced that Srebrenica had fallen to the Bosnian 
Serbs.225 Throughout the episode Dutchbat had failed to fire a single shot to halt the 
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advancing Bosnian Serb ground forces and moved aside as the VRS entered the Potočari 
compound where many of the town’s inhabitants had fled.  
The National Assembly’s inquest into Srebrenica reflected that: “The Serbs had 
taken Srebrenica and henceforth waited to settle the fate of Žepa and Goražde. But above 
all they intended to eliminate the Muslim populations so that these enclaves no longer 
existed”.226 They undertook this process by systematically separating the men and boys 
from the women of Srebrenica. As the women were expelled from the town, the Bosnian 
Serb forces undertook a genocidal killing of more than 7,000 men and boys of Srebrenica 
over the course of 12-16 July 1995. 
 As the town fell, the international community’s reaction was tempered, perhaps 
realising that the fall of the Muslim enclave simplified the map of BiH. As the Republicans 
in the US announced that they would once more seek to lift the arms embargo, a 
spokesperson for the White House indicated that the fall of Srebrenica had “not changed 
the situation of peacekeepers in Bosnia.”227 However John Major warned that such intense 
fighting placed the UNPROFOR mission in peril and risked its withdrawal.228 Chirac’s 
reaction was even firmer. 
 Chirac was irritated by the US’s isolationism, protecting itself from troop 
commitments through NATO air force and seeking to lift the arms embargo. The French 
President declared that, “if Congress decides to lift the embargo” and if this decision was 
confirmed by the American government, UNPROFOR “will have to retreat 
immediately.”229 Chirac sought to call the US’s bluff and, in concert with Britain, called on 
the Serbs to withdraw from Srebrenica declaring that France was prepared to use military 
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force to re-establish the ‘safe zone’ if the UNSC mandated it.230 As the NATO Council 
examined the situation in Srebrenica on 12 July, de Charette announced that France was 
ready to put its entire means at the disposal of the UNSC to force the retreat of the Bosnian 
Serbs in Srebrenica and to return the Muslim population to the enclave.231  
For Chirac, Srebrenica had revealed the bankruptcy of UNPROFOR in its present 
configuration but also of the international community’s engagement with BiH. In front of 
the two chambers of the French parliament, Chirac greatly criticised humanitarian 
intervention and, by extension, Mitterrandienne policy in BiH: “do not mix the types: to 
mix the military and the humanitarian is a mistake.”232 On the issue of Srebrenica, Chirac 
added that, “If the enclaves are not respected, if Srebrenica is not rehabilitated, it is the 
entire UNPROFOR mission that is at stake.”233 Alain Juppé similarly declared that, 
“France cannot accept the politics of the fait accompli” in Bosnia.234 The Chirac 
government had found its feet in international politics and was using its newly found voice 
to force the international community to act.    
Hervé de Charette visited his Dutch counterpart to discover why Dutchbat had 
failed to defend Srebrenica having declared that UNPROFOR has “two very precise tasks: 
humanitarian aid and interposition. They did neither one nor the other. They eventually 
became the accomplices in what we have always refused [ethnic cleansing]. If that’s the 
case, it is better to leave.”235 Chirac telephoned Clinton and proposed that US helicopters 
drop French troops in Srebrenica to retake the town, which the US President believed was 
“hare-brained”.236 Eventually Carl Bildt was able to dissuade Chirac from further pursuing 
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the issue.237 However, this was an extremely astute strategy from the Chirac government 
who knew that the US was still unprepared to deploy ground troops in a combat role and 
was also prepared to accept a territorial fait accompli as they had with Operation Flash. 
France could retreat from its commitments in BiH not in shame but because the rest of the 
international community was not as committed to protecting the population as it was. The 
new President did not share his predecessor’s faith in the effectiveness of multilateralism 
and was keen to undertake unilateral initiatives and lead by example. In terms of public 
relations, it was a master stroke that restored French prestige after it had been thoroughly 
downtrodden throughout the Bosnian conflict. 
 As reports emerged that, alongside vast forced expulsions, the Bosnian Serbs had 
committed atrocities in Srebrenica, Chirac’s stand forced Clinton to admit that 
UNPROFOR’s days “were numbered” in BiH.238 Sensing this to be the case, the Bosnian 
Serbs issued the peacekeepers in Žepa and Goražde with an ultimatum to leave the enclave 
whilst they continued the genocide in Srebrenica.239 On 14 July, the VRS attacked two 
UNPROFOR observation posts in Žepa, which led NATO to launch two fighters to survey 
the scene.240 In spite of the scenes in the eastern enclave, the UNSC and the US resisted 
French appeals for action in the other ‘safe zones’, only condemning the “unacceptable 
practice of ethnic cleansing.”241  
Even France had resigned itself to the fact that Srebrenica had been abandoned and 
the time to recapture it had passed, but it continued to petition its partners to protect Tuzla, 
Goražde and Žepa.242 Chirac had exposed the utter pusillanimity of the international 
community in the face of the Bosnian war’s most visible horrors. Indeed, the international 
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community’s response was to call a conference in London on 21 July on the future of 
UNPROFOR, which effectively gave the Bosnian Serbs the greenlight to push ahead in 
their offensives in the meantime.243 
On the ground, French peacekeepers embodied the new ethos of Chirac’s BiH 
policy as they retaliated with great force against Bosnian Serbs on Mount Igman in 
Sarajevo. Following a Bosnian Serb attack on a UN convoy French peacekeepers launched 
30 heavy shells, 9 tank shells and 30 smoke bombs against Bosnian Serb positions. One of 
the French UNPROFOR members highlighted that the attack had come on Bastille Day, 
which had bolstered their determination and pride.244  
With this new bullishness, Defence Minister Charles Millon proposed the creation a 
multinational force, consisting of France, Britain, Germany and the US to occupy Goražde 
and protect Sarajevo to prevent their fall.245 If not, France would withdraw its contingents 
from BiH.246 Millon, following inconclusive meetings with his British and American 
counterparts, reflected: “There is no alternative solution. Either it is a programme of 
withdrawal with shame on the face of the entire international community… or the allies 
will decide to make very strong gestures in Goražde, on one hand, and Sarajevo, on the 
other.”247 That Žepa was omitted from this plan indicates that, perhaps, the international 
community was willing to cede the territory to the Bosnian Serbs. Chirac was once more 
attempting to rouse the US from its isolationism, but, once more, the US prevaricated over 
the initiative; the US clearly favoured any operation to be carried out through NATO.248 
The Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Contact Group and heads of diplomacy 
of the troop contributors gathered in London on 21 July to hammer out a new policy on 
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BiH, with the fate of Žepa hanging by a thread and Goražde in grave danger. France’s 
bullishness had  caused it to be isolated and Chirac hesitantly declared that he was ready to 
accept an American ultimatum on Goražde underpinned by air strikes.249 Hervé de 
Charette had to concede defeat on France’s proposition but was quick to qualify that “It is 
not at all a diplomatic failure.”250  
The international conference resulted in the West falling in line behind the US 
policy on the use of air force, issuing an ultimatum against the Bosnian Serbs in case of 
renewed attacks against Goražde. The RRF would provide ground support and 
reconnaissance. The British Defence Minister, Malcolm Rifkind, quickly proclaimed that 
“The meeting is a great success!”251 However, the Conference highlighted that the links 
with Russia fostered by the Contact Group had effectively ended and that, thenceforth, the 
US and NATO were at the forefront of operations.252 Clinton quickly declared that any use 
of force against the Bosnian Serbs would be decisive.253 Simultaneously, the US Special 
Envoy and Contact Group member Robert Frasure began US-led shuttle diplomacy and 
somewhat superseded Bildt and Stoltenberg. The US had begun to wake from its slumber 
and was directing the international policy on BiH, side-lining France and Europe in the 
process.  
 
Pax Americana  
In spite of the London Conference, Žepa fell to the Bosnian Serbs on 25 July. However, 
with the US at the helm, the loss of the eastern enclave recast the map of BiH in a way that 
made ethnic delineation far easier. Notwithstanding, the US was becoming increasingly 
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frustrated by the ‘double-key’ authorisation of air strikes in BiH, and Clinton spoke with 
Chirac on the subject, aware that the French President, supported by Boutros-Ghali, was 
concerned about the role of NATO.254 The French were now the greatest opposition to the 
US being able to finally lead policy on BiH and a story emerged in the New York Times 
that, in revenge for the death of two French peacekeepers, three French Mirage fighters had 
bombed Pale.255 Of course, if France had acted in such a way, its opposition to the US and 
its support of the ‘double-key’ would be entirely hypocritical. Washington was able to 
secure a modification of the ‘double-key’, which saw the UN military commanders on 
theground given sole authority on behalf of the UN, removing the civil authority. In this 
case, it fell to General Bernard Janvier, and ergo France still held a key position in 
authorising NATO air strikes in BiH.256 
 As the US sought clarification on the ‘double-key’ and its Senate voted for the 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, the Bosnian Serbs had undertaken an offensive 
against Bihać on 26 July.257 NATO quickly began working on a plan to protect the ‘safe 
zone’.258 Moreover, Croatia began to send assistance to the western pocket.259 Indeed, the 
Croatian war machine was whirring into life as the US warned that “The Serb offensive on 
Bihać is extremely serious and threatens to drag Croatia into the war to protect the 
enclave.”260 The UN revealed that it was deeply concerned that Croatia would, in the 
following days, undertake an offensive against the Krajina Serbs.261 Their fears would soon 
be realised. 
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 Tuđman launched an attack against Knin through Bihać, under the pretext that the 
Krajina Army and the VRS were planning to wipe out the Bihać pocket and then move to 
link the Self-Autonomous Oblast of Krajina with RS.262 Russia moved to condemn the 
Croats through the UNSC but Germany and the US would not adopt a formal 
declaration.263 France, now aloof from the US strategy, condemned the latest attacks as 
Hervé de Charette stated that: “they [the attacks] are part of a logic of war, while France 
follows the logic of peace.”264 Bildt and Stoltenberg organised a meeting between the 
Croats and the secessionist Krajina Serbs on 3 August 1995, but with Tuđman ready to 
seize back the territory and reluctant support granted to the offensive by Clinton, the talks 
were doomed to fail.265  
Until May, Tuđman had still envisaged partitioning BiH between Croatia and 
Serbia and he sketched a map of his vision for the Liberal Democrat leader Paddy 
Ashdown at a banquet in London held to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Second World War’s conclusion (see map 11). Croatia required US support, and the US 
would not allow BiH to be wiped off the map. Therefore, Tuđman sought to re-establish 
his authority over the Krajina. Between 4-7 August, Croatia launched ‘Operation Storm’ to 
reconquer Serb-held territories, sending 200,000 Croatian Serbs fleeing to RS and 
Serbia.266 The US immediately pounced on the offensive as its Defence Secretary William 
Perry declared that it offered “an opportunity to achieve a negotiated peace accord.”267 The 
contours of Pax Americana were becoming more defined: mass population exchanges to 
create ethnically homogeneous territories in the region. Thus, the HVO pushed into BiH 
providing assistance to the ARBiH in driving the Bosnian Serbs eastwards. 
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Washington attempted to renew the diplomatic process, whilst sending presidential 
adviser Anthony Lake to European capitals to secure support for its efforts.268 In the 
former Yugoslavia, Robert Frasure, supported by new delegations in Bosnia, Croatia and 
Serbia, sought to bring about a negotiated settlement once more. This settlement would 
maintain an independent BiH, with the Federation attached to Croatia and Republika 
Srpska linked to Serbia through confederal ties.269 The US envisaged a summit including 
the Contact Group and Tuđman, Izetbegović and Milošević.270 
However, a week after proposing the conference the US diplomatic effort received 
a heavy blow when Robert Frasure, alongside two members of his diplomatic team and a 
French soldier, was killed when the vehicle he was travelling in plungde down a hillside 
outside Sarajevo.271 The diplomatic effort momentarily halted, until Robert Frasure’s 
replacement, Richard Holbrooke, was in place. In the meantime fighting continued in BiH 
as the increasingly pressurised Bosnian Serbs became desperate, bombing a refugee camp 
in Tuzla and engaging in heavy fighting with Croats in the southern town of Trebinje.272  
As members of UNPROFOR began to withdraw from BiH at the end of the month, 
the Bosnian Serbs shelled Sarajevo killing 35 people on 28 August.273 Izetbegović was in 
Paris at the time, meeting with the US and Europeans to discuss the US’s latest peace 
initiative. However, Izetbegović declared that he would suspend the negotiations unless the 
Bosnian Serb artillery surrounding Sarajevo was destroyed.274 De Charette assured 
Izetbegović that UNPROFOR would provide an appropriate response to the previous day’s 
events.275 This was just the pretext that the US and NATO had been waiting for since the 
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London Conference a month earlier. On 30 August 1995, NATO launched ‘Operation 
Deliberate Force’, a campaign designed to inhibit the VRS and its heavy weapons. The 
RRF provided vital tactical support on the ground. One French Mirage jet that participated 
in the operation was shot down in the vicinity of Pale, with its two pilots being captured 
and taken hostage.276 
Richard Holbrooke began his shuttle diplomacy in earnest with the significant 
assistance of NATO air force being brought to bear against the Bosnian Serbs. The 
campaign would continue until the Bosnian Serbs acquiesced and removed their heavy 
weapons from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo on 20 September. With the cover of 
NATO force the ARBiH, with significant support from the HVO, continued its offensive 
and drove the Bosnian Serbs further back until they held less land than at any point 
previously in the war. The Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdžić, declared in a television 
interview that the offensive would stop depending on how the Bosnian Serbs treated the 
peace process.277  
The US continued to take the lead with Warren Christopher inviting the Foreign 
Ministers of Croatia, BiH and FRY on 26 September.278 However the Bosnian government 
threatened not partake in the discussions, as they remained concerned that RS wanted to 
leave BiH and unify with Serbia in the future. Similarly Tuđman announced that he would 
soon seek to liberate Vukovar, the last separatist stronghold in Croatia.279 However, the US 
was able to convince the Bosnian government to take part in the discussions, although 
there were significant differences between the parties.280 Nonetheless, the three sides 
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signed a provisional agreement as a constitutional basis ahead of further negotiations.281 
Richard Holbrooke then met with Hervé de Charette in his hotel suite at the UN.  
De Charette was concerned that the Quai had been sidelined as Holbrooke chose to 
contact France through the President’s cellule diplomatique at the Élysée.282 The French 
Foreign Minister was eager to hold any forthcoming negotiations in France. He told 
Holbrooke: “The French press is saying that the United States had taken over the 
negotiations and left France standing on the sidelines… It must be held in France.”283 As 
Holbrooke took his leave of de Charette, the Foreign Minister took the diplomat’s arm and 
said, “This is very important to France.”284 Eventually “to mollify them” the US agreed to 
the signing ceremony taking place in Paris.285 
Fighting diminished in BiH as a result of the agreement with the US securing a 
ceasefire from 10 October.286 If the ceasefire came into effect, and held, Clinton would 
invite the three heads of state – Milošević, Tuđman, and Izetbegović – to the US for 
intensive discussions on a peace plan for BiH; it worked. 
On 1 November, the three Presidents arrived at the Wright-Patterson Air Base in 
Dayton, Ohio for three weeks of intensive negotiations. France, Europe and the United 
Nations who had played such a significant role over the preceding three years of the 
conflict had been sidelined by the US diplomacy. By the end the US had secured the 
‘Dayton Peace Accords’, which resolved the conflict in BiH (see map 12). It split BiH 
along the 51-49 share that had been agreed as part of the Contact Group Plan and created a 
NATO implementation force (IFOR) to replace UNPROFOR.287 France would be charged 
with administering the south-eastern sector of BiH, which included Sarajevo (see map 13) 
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and would contribute 10,000 troops to the force. It was initialled by the three Presidents in 
Dayton on 21 November, to be officially signed at a ceremony in Paris on 14 December. 
Yet, for France there was one outstanding issue: the fate of the two pilots, Frédéric 
Chiffot and José Souvignet, who had been taken hostage on 30 August. The Bosnian Serbs 
had continued to hold the two men throughout the negotiations and the US were 
sufficiently pragmatic not to risk the entire peace process on their behalf. Chirac, however, 
made the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in Paris contingent upon the release of the 
two peacekeepers with an international criminal lawyer for the ICTY, Gregor Guy-Smith, 
later noting that:  
 
If there had been no Paris conference, there would have been no Dayton 
Peace Accord. Not only was a nation waiting for the return of these two 
gentlemen, the world was waiting for the return of these two 
gentlemen.288 
 
Mladić’s notebooks, which were seized whilst he was on the run in 2010, reveal 
that Jacques Chirac once more sent General de La Presle to speak with the Bosnian Serb 
General in early December to secure the release of the pilots. Chirac wanted a precise 
answer on the release of the pilots and had de La Presle deliver a message to Mladić to 
indicate that, “France has stated its readiness to support the lawful application of the 
Dayton agreement and object to the unfair transfer of Serbs, and is particularly interested 
in the situation in Sarajevo.”289 Thus Chirac proposed that France should take over the role 
of holding Sarajevo, Goražde and Mostar.290 However, if the pilots were not returned to 
France “within hours or days” Chirac threatened Mladić with the following:  
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Having France withdraw its troops from Sarajevo and the staff would be 
moved to Igman, as would the battalion, which would suit the Muslims 
who want to enter those barracks, while the neighbourhoods would be left 
to the neighbourhoods. The Americans have been trying up to now to 
place a brigade in Sarajevo. In that case, France would implement the 
NATO plan.291 
 
Publicly France issued an ultimatum on 12 December that included possibly 
pushing for the reestablishment of economic sanctions and a reconfiguration of bilateral 
relations between France and Serbia.292 The pressure paid off, as the two pilots were 
released on the day of the ultimatum and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords at the 
Élysée took place two days later.293 
In front of the world’s media, Milošević, Tuđman and Izetbegović signed the 
Dayton Peace Accords, officially titled the ‘General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in La Salle des Fêtes in the Élysée Palace. As host, Chirac made 
the opening speech and was keen to emphasise the role that France had played in bringing 
peace to BiH. He recalled the 56 French lives that had been lost in the republic and 
reflected that: “France has spared no effort to the united, multicultural and democratic 
identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is in this spirit that it will contribute to the full 
implementation of the agreement signed today.”294 Indeed, France had spared little effort, 
and had been behind many initiatives aimed at maintaining a unified BiH. However, the 
more pragmatic, simplistic and robust diplomacy of the US over the course of the 
preceding six months had been more effective. To the quiet din of the international 
community’s polite applause, the three leaders stood up and shook hands, marking the end 
of the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II. 
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Conclusion 
France and Yugoslavia shared a far more complex historical relationship than the simple 
notion of the amitié franco-yougoslav suggests. This conception of a traditional friendship 
was a rhetorical device deployed at times of political expediency for one, or both, of the 
countries. As such, its vitality provides a useful perspective on the health of Franco-
Yugoslav relations and the alignment of the two countries’ foreign policy priorities. 
Throughout the twentieth century, Yugoslavia was a significant object of focus in French 
foreign policy. Accordingly, the Western Balkan state offers a useful viewpoint of French 
geopolitical preoccupations and European security dilemmas. France’s early attempts to 
contest les anglo-saxons in Yugoslavia during the early-Cold War highlighted the Fourth 
Republic’s reluctance to kowtow to US hegemony in the West. De Gaulle’s unwillingness 
to engage with Yugoslavia – in part owing to his personal antagonism towards Tito – 
reflected the General’s efforts to restore France to the highest ranks of international 
politics. The General did not see Tito’s Yugoslavia as an equal, but as a junior partner and 
one that was over-achieving on the international stage. 
By the time Mitterrand assumed the Presidency in 1981, Yugoslavia had certainly 
declined to the rank of a junior partner in international politics owing to its economic 
troubles and the death of its veteran leader Tito. However, as a symbol of a socialist ‘Third 
Way’ it still held a tremendous value and, as the newly elected PS embarked on its radical 
socialist programme, a reinvigorated amitié offered the French Socialists political 
credibility. However, the U-turn of 1983 represented a move away from an ideological 
socialism to a more technocratic vision, which was characterised by a commitment to the 
European political and economic project. In this respect, human rights and political 
freedom became more significant matters for Paris. Once more, this led to a divergence 
between France and the Yugoslav regime, which was increasingly reverting to 
authoritarianism in the face of political opposition caused by resurgent nationalism. 
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By the end of the 1980s, prescient voices in the French diplomacy were warning 
that the very future of the Yugoslav federation was at risk. However, events at the end of 
the Cold War overshadowed the developing existential crisis that confronted Yugoslavia. 
The predictability of the bloc system gave way to greater fragmentation, which Mitterrand 
was greatly concerned could threaten European peace and stability. The historical aspect of 
the President’s analysis warned that events in the Western Balkans could once more 
provide the spark to a European conflict as it had in 1914. Amidst this process of 
fragmentation, Mitterrand sought to tie East European events into a pan-European 
framework by creating a European Confederation. In this context, a unified Yugoslavia 
was preferable to six new, potentially antagonistic, nations with potential minority 
problems. Therefore, reconfiguring Yugoslavia was a far more attractive proposition. 
Throughout the Yugoslav crises, France sought to build and strengthen the 
multilateral institutions that Mitterrand saw as essential to establishing an international 
post-Cold War order. France remained a medium-sized power that would best be able to 
exert its influence through multilateral institutions where it was centrally-positioned 
amongst the world’s most powerful nations. Mitterrand envisaged empowering these 
institutions in such a way that France’s European and global vision could be achieved 
through them; US disengagement with Europe facilitated such an approach. Therefore, 
once it became evident that Yugoslavia was in a process of dissolution, France attempted 
to develop and strengthen European institutions through its crisis management. Through 
this experience, Europe would become more coherent and possess a stronger identity ahead 
of the impending Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. However, the reality was quite 
different. Although Germany, and particularly Helmut Kohl, attempted to hold the 
Community line for as long as possible, he eventually relented to public pressure and broke 
ranks with his European partners by recognising Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally on 16 
December 1991. Independence in Croatia brought with it a cessation of hostilities, which 
 337 
was protected by UNPROFOR. Sensing that, for the time being, a European peace force 
was a non-starter, France enthusiastically supported peacekeeping through the UN and 
was, throughout the Yugoslav crises, the single largest contributor of personnel to 
UNPROFOR. 
European division over Yugoslavia led to a lack of leadership with regards to the 
deteriorating situation in BiH, much to the republic’s detriment. By the time the EC 
engaged with Yugoslavia’s most ethnically heterogeneous republic, BiH had already 
become embroiled in fratricidal and genocidal warfare. The deteriorating humanitarian 
situation led France to assume the mantle of European leadership as its Minister for 
Humanitarian Action, Bernard Kouchner, sought to alleviate the population’s suffering 
whilst negotiators attempted to reach a political settlement. As the strangulation of 
Sarajevo by the VRS deprived the city’s population of vital supplies, and amidst growing 
public concern in France, François Mitterrand made a dramatic visit to the besieged 
capital. His initiative encapsulated France’s approach to the Bosnian crisis as he reopened 
the airport for humanitarian deliveries, bemoaned the horrific conditions for the civilian 
population and urged the leaders to reach a negotiated settlement. Therefore, throughout 
the Bosnian War, France proposed many key initiatives in this direction, which were often 
diluted by its partners in the inevitable polices of the lowest-common denominator that all-
too-often defines multilateral bodies. The opportunity to push serious initiatives through 
the UNSC often, and unfortunately, only came in the wake of the latest tragedy to befall 
the beleaguered populations of the former Yugoslavia. In these times, France remained 
determined to find a political solution, counselling against hasty moves towards 
unpredictable aerial campaigns. 
Consequently, France steadfastly supported the internationally-brokered peace 
plans and offered necessary support and encouragement in an effort to bring about an end 
to the conflict. However, it required a unified approach to achieve the level of international 
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pressure required, and a willingness to implement the plans, for them to be successful. The 
distinct lack of political will to deploy combat-ready ground troops meant that any 
initiative would only be forthcoming in the face of the war’s worst excesses; this was, in 
effect, the catalyst for Operation Determined Force and the Dayton Peace Accords. 
Mitterrand’s amoral analysis accounted for this and sought to protect the population from 
such atrocities.  
The VOPP was the most promising plan that could have maintained a unified BiH. 
Although there were deficiencies in the VOPP, as any plan aimed at trying to solve BiH’s 
‘ethnic’ problem, those nations and politicians who had been closely tied to the ICFY and 
the diplomacy of the Yugoslav crises supported it nonetheless, realising that its good far 
outweighed its bad. In this respect, France and, specifically, Mitterrand, were sufficiently 
nuanced in their moral and political calculations to understand the opportunity that the 
VOPP offered. However, the Manichaean moralising of the newly installed Clinton 
administration and its untimely championing of ‘lift and strike’ torpedoed the VOPP and, 
as such, represents a far greater diplomatic sin than any committed in Europe. Indeed, it 
would take two more years before a peace settlement could be imposed and it would 
require massive population expulsions and exterminations, sanctioned by the US in the 
case of Operation Storm, to bring about a map of Croatia and BiH more in keeping with 
US policy. 
The election of Jacques Chirac in May 1995 brought a significant change to 
France’s role in Bosnia and the international community. The Gaullist was far less 
concerned about multilateral institutions and resolving international crises, and more 
concerned with restoring French prestige in the context of a shameful international 
episode. Chirac, who thought of himself far more as the Commander-in-Chief than his 
predecessor, was prepared to sanction unilateral military actions and resort to force, as 
demonstrated by the establishment of the RRF. It was Chirac who proposed deploying the 
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RRF to recapture Srebrenica whilst the rest of the international community stood idly by. 
Therefore, although France had been sidelined by ‘robust’ US diplomacy, the President 
sought to gain international recognition for, and derive prestige from, France’s 
involvement by hosting the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords at the Élysée Palace. 
Indeed, France deserves far greater recognition for its role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
for better or worse. 
 
Reflections 
France’s role in the international community’s response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia is 
often overlooked and underestimated. It has frequently been portrayed as obstructive with 
many accounts choosing to focus on the words, rather than deeds, of François Mitterrand. 
This study has thus sought to integrate France in to the historiography of Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution and, in doing so, provide a more nuanced evaluation of its role. Indeed, what 
emerges is an interesting narrative of Mitterrand’s attempts to develop a French vision for 
post-Cold War security architecture in the midst of an international crisis. 
In the field of French diplomatic history, this investigation seeks to build upon the 
work of Frédéric Bozo, who has reappraised, and provided a valuable insight into, France’s 
role in the end of the Cold War. It also seeks to continue the work of scholars such as Josip 
Glaurdić and Norbert Both, both of whom have used archival documents to analyse 
Europe’s and the Netherlands’ roles respectively in Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Regrettably, 
the archival basis for this initial study is incomplete and is one area for future study. It is 
hoped that the breadth of sources and secondary literature consulted herein provide 
sufficient support to the archival material. 
What in many ways is a preliminary study demonstrates that there is significant 
scope for further potential research into French foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. 
A detailed examination of French diplomatic practice during the second cohabitation 
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would provide an interesting insight into late Mitterrandienne policy. Similar 
investigations into the Transitrian War, the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and the Georgian 
Civil War, may offer a useful vantage point on France’s diplomacy vis-à-vis the Russian 
Federation. More detailed historical investigations of Franco-Yugoslav relations, 
particularly during the presidencies of Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing, would also 
provide illuminating perspectives on France’s Cold War. Whilst a directly related 
comparison and ‘sequel’ to this study would be one on France’s response to the Kosovo 
war.  
Throughout this research project each chapter has uncovered new areas for further 
investigations. For example, the French UNPROFOR contingents are a consistent feature 
of Part Two of this study and would make for a fascinating history. Similarly, an 
investigation of the RRF, and a comparison with UNPROFOR, could lead to a useful 
analysis of post-Cold War peacekeeping. Indeed, by paying greater attention to France’s 
post-Cold War vision and its efforts to develop multilateral institutions, scholars can 
continue to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the end of the Cold War and 
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